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SUMMARY
Following the German occupation of Denmark on April 9th 1940 Danish 
representatives were left to their own devices and their positions in their respective 
host-countries became very much dependent upon the goodwill shown to them by 
their host-govemments and, in the case of the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland, 
the governments and officials of the occupying forces. With their connections with 
the Government in Copenhagen severed the main task of the Danish representatives 
was to secure Danish interests in the North Atlantic Territories as well as elsewhere.
The fact that Denmark had not put up a fight to defend her neutrality and the 
subsequent collaboration of the Danish Government with the German occupiers 
counted against the Danish representatives abroad. However, the Danes were able to 
exercise a remarkable level of influence on the British and Americans with regard to 
their policies towards the North Atlantic Area. The extent of influence was mainly 
due to the entrepreneurship of each individual, the constitutional status of the 
territory as part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and also due to strategic importance 
attached by the occupying forces’ governments to the occupied territories in 
question. This latter point became especially apparent in the power struggle amongst 
the Danish representatives that emerged from the lack of a Danish Government in 
exile. It became important to the British and the Americans that it was the Danish 
representative in their country, who emerged as the victor of this power struggle, 
because that would help to secure their future interests in the North Atlantic 
territories. The Danish representatives were thus in some cases shown more goodwill 
and attention than their Norwegian colleagues, although the Norwegians had put up a 
brave fight against the Germans and had joined the allied side.
The North Atlantic area proved very important to the general war policy of the 
British and Americans during Second World War. British policies were much 
dependent upon the Americans and Greenland and Iceland became instrumental in 
the increased involvement of the Americans in the war.
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TEXT AND REFERENCES
Throughout the thesis the reader will notice that there is some inconsistency in the 
spelling of Danish, Faroese and Icelandic names of people and places. This is due to 
the fact that there are some letters in the Danish, Faroese and Icelandic languages, 
which do not appear in the English alphabet. Subsequently, most references to place 
names or people’s names in the British and American documents appear slightly 
different than in the rest of the text. The confusion, however, should be minimal, 
since the difference in the English writing rarely changes the names substantially.
There are also occurrences, where the titles of the Danish representatives are being 
referred to differently by the various departments and countries, mainly because 
there is no English or American equivalent for the Danish title. For example, there is 
no English term for the Danish title ‘landsfoged’, which the title of the position that 
Svane and Bran hold in Greenland. In some documents they are referred to as 
‘county chiefs’, in others as ‘governors’.
The reader should also be made aware of the fact that throughout the thesis the term 
“Home Rulers” is used as a common term to describe those politicians in the Faroes, 
who wanted increased Faroese independence from Denmark prior and during the 
war. The reason for this is that in their documents related to Faroese matters the 
British officials use the term “Home Rulers” as a common term for both the 
moderate and the extreme independence party, the People’s Party, who wanted full 
independence like Iceland. However, it needs to be pointed out that after the war the 
term “Home Rulers” became a term for those only, who wanted increased Faroese 
influence on Faroese matters while remaining under the Danish Crown.
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to examine US and British policies towards the Danish 
North Atlantic territories during Second World War and the extent to which the 
Danish representatives were able to influence these policies.
The hypothesis begs two questions. The first one is: How were the Danish 
representatives in the North Atlantic territories, London and Washington DC able to 
exert influence on the British and the Americans in their policies towards the North 
Atlantic territories, when they were representing a Government, which was under the 
influence of the enemy (Germany)? The second question is: What were their actions 
and policies in achieving this?
In order to answer these questions a number of multifaceted relationships need to be 
examined:
The relationship between Copenhagen and the North Atlantic territories, 
because as the thesis will show, the level of action and influence of each 
Danish representative in the North Atlantic, London and Washington DC 
corresponded to the level of constitutional dependency between Denmark and 
the territory -  each territory differed from the other in this respect ranging 
from Greenland being a colony to Iceland being semi-autonomous with a 
Home Rule Government.
The relationship between the Danish representatives, the occupying powers 
and the US/UK respectively (if either not an occupying power); also the 
relationship between the local Danish and Norwegian representatives often 
moulded the role of the Danish representatives and thus needs to be 
examined.
The relationship between Danish representatives in London and Washington 
DC with the Danish representatives in the three territories, their respective 
host governments, with Copenhagen and with each other.
In addition to the constitutional status of each of the North Atlantic territories within 
the Danish Kingdom, there were events, which affected the relationships questioned 
above. The most important of these events was the German invasion of Denmark on
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April 9th 1940. Another was the Danish signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact in June 
1941, which placed Denmark firmly in the hands of Germany. The state of 
emergency in Denmark in August 28th 1943, which marked the end of Danish 
submission to German suppression and the formal entry of Danish subjects to the 
Allied cause, also had its effect on these relationships. The entry of the Soviet Union 
and then the US into the war, and the “Battle of the Atlantic” were also important 
events as these augmented the importance of the North Atlantic area to both the US 
and UK.
This thesis’ aim is thus to examine, uncover and compare the role of the Danish 
representatives, who were in charge of the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland 
during Second World War. These areas in the North Atlantic were occupied by the 
British and the Americans respectively and thus this thesis not only examines those 
representatives situated in the North Atlantic territories, but also those in Britain 
(London) and the United States (Washington DC, and New York).
The role of the Danish representatives and the extent to which they were able to exert
influence on the British and Americans during the Second World War was very
much dependent upon the attitude of their host governments towards the situation in
Denmark. The fact that Denmark, unlike Norway, had not defended her neutrality did
not help the Danish cause in the allied world. Nor did the fact that the Danish King
and Government remained in Denmark and to some extent collaborated with their
occupiers, while their Norwegian counterparts went into exile and joined the war on
the Allied side, help the attitude towards Danish subjects abroad. As this article from
a Tennessee newspaper reveals,
There is a striking difference in the bearing of two royal brothers, King 
Christian X, of Denmark, and King Haakon, VII of Norway, toward the 
invasion of their country by Hitler. The Danish ruler, when the Nazis 
seized Copenhagen in a surprise move which paralysed court, populace 
and the miniature army, issued an appeal to the nation in a few hours 
which ended: “Any undignified word or action might have dangerous 
reactions. God protect you all. God protect Denmark.” Ruler and people 
accepted the situation without even protest. But the Norwegian King was 
made of sterner stuff. Getting a hint as to what was coming a few hours 
before German troops, smuggled into the port of Oslo, appeared on the
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streets of the capital, Haakon and a few followers escaped from the city, 
and entrenching themselves in a not distant village, beat off a Nazi band.1
The Danish representatives were, nevertheless, to a varying extent able to influence 
British and U.S. policies towards the North Atlantic area, and thus succeeded to a 
large degree in securing Danish interests in the territories, despite having no 
government in exile to confer with.
The questions that have to be asked in order to address the hypothesis have been 
listed above; but how do I come to the answers to these questions? How can, for 
example, influence on policy be determined? How can I determine the presence and 
effect of influence? What evidence is needed to determine this influence, in 
particular, as shown in the section above, when other outside factors, often “events”, 
are also present?
As the hypothesis begs the question to what extent did the Danish representatives 
succeed in influencing the British and the Americans in their policies towards the 
North Atlantic territories, the question ‘how influence is to be determined’ must be 
raised. Determining what is evidence of ‘influence’ can be difficult. An obvious 
evidence of influence is when it is explicitly stated in a correspondence, as was the 
case in the attempt of Hilbert and Rewentlow to influence the Norwegians in London 
to have Thorstein Petersen and Nils Ihlen removed from the Norwegian Consulate in 
the Faroe Islands. Another way of determining influence is when a player changes 
his or her attitude during a course of time. One good example is the British 
authorities in the Faroes’ attitude towards Hilbert, which changed over time and with 
the arrival of new personnel.
METHODOLOGY
This is a thesis in diplomatic history. What diplomatic history sets out to do is to 
explain the origins and the effects of foreign policies. Its focus is on each country’s 
policy-making elite and the representatives of that country. Diplomatic history thus 
requires analysis both of the domestic political system where the representative’s 
authority derives from and the international system in which he represents his state.
1 Nashville Banner. Tennessee, ”A contrast in kings”, 22.04.40
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What I set out to do is not to write a historical piece, which I claim to be the absolute 
truth, because no reading of a document by two persons will ever be the same. 
Nevertheless, my aim is to uncover a piece of history of the North Atlantic area 
during Second World War, which in parts has remained uncovered.
Keith Jenkins argues that “one cannot recount more than a fraction of what has 
occurred and no historian’s account ever corresponds precisely with the past.” Like 
Jenkins points out, I know the limits of anyone undergoing a research into the past. I 
cannot know everything, but access to documents, primary sources, in all languages 
involved, and accounts from different people in different positions and different 
countries on the same issue makes it in some cases possible to make cross-references 
and hence substantiate the reading of the documents. Thus, although Roland Barthes 
argues that “the past per se cannot act logically as a check on the historian’s free play 
because, constituted by discourse, as an effect of discourse, it cannot be made to 
function as a cause of discourse or as a pre-discursive check (on itself)” I can but 
only be aware of these methodological limits, which research in history poses on my 
thesis.
Being aware that when writing a historical piece, one cannot do so utterly neutrally, I 
have nevertheless tried to strip my presentation of what happened from anything, 
which can resemble biased. Nevertheless, in writing this thesis I retell what has 
happened and therefore it will always be my interpretation of the findings I have 
uncovered. As my research rests mainly on primary sources, it is only in a few cases 
where I use secondary literature that I also have to take into account that these 
accounts of what happened are the interpretations of the authors of the events. Thus, 
for the most part of the thesis, it rests on my own readings and understanding of the 
documents.
To substantiate the information retrieved from the documents I have tried to build up 
an understanding of the environment they were written in and when it comes to the
2 Jenkins, Keith. Rethinking History. Routledge, London, 1991, p. 11
3 Barthes, Ronald, in D. Attridge et al, ed., Post-Structuralism and the Question o f History, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 3
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key-persons, the personality of the author. However, I can never obtain full empathy 
with the authors of the documents, because I cannot know for definite what their 
thoughts were, when they wrote them. Also, because I was not present at the time the 
documents were written, I can never have a full understanding of the setting they 
were written in or the atmosphere surrounding the situation they were written in. 
Nevertheless, it helps keeping in mind that documents have to be read within the 
context of the discursive they were written in. Thus, it is important to keep in mind 
when uncovering the parameters of the situation, they were written in. However, this 
is not to say, that any set of parameters would produce the same document under the 
same conditions. Thus, the personality of the author has to be taken into account as 
well.
Some documents had several comments on the sleeve. This was particularly the case 
with the British documents. Others, especially the Danish documents, were mere 
accounts, stripped of any personal opinion. These are, I assume, reflections upon the 
different nature of practise in each country’s Foreign Affairs Department. For the 
purpose of this thesis, where the emphasis is on the attitude of the actors involved 
and whether or not they were influenced in the course of time, the more additional 
comments on the documents, the better.
Whether or not a statement in a document is the truth one can never be sure, 
however, when possible, the accuracy of the statement can be substantiated by cross- 
referencing between documents from different sources regarding the same subject. 
Keith Jenkins argues that “as the past has gone, no account can ever be checked 
against it but only against other accounts.”4 Having had access to documents in all 
five languages involved, I was able to do this to a large extent. However, in many 
cases, as mentioned above, matters relating to these small territories and this 
relatively small theatre of war, at least in the first two years of the Second World 
War, has resulted in some difficulty finding references on the same subject/case in 
more than one of the countries examined.
HISTORIOGRAPHY
4 Jenkins, Rethinking History. 1991, p. 11
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Primary Sources
This thesis is primarily an historical one and is thus dependent upon primary sources, 
mainly those from the governments involved. Hence, the research conducted for this 
thesis took place at the national archives of the countries involved, holding the 
Government records, i.e. PRO (Kew, London, UK), NARA (Maryland, US), Statens 
Arkiver (Copenhagen, Denmark), Riksarkivet (Oslo, Norway), Ljodskjalasafnid 
(Reykjavik, Iceland) and LandsskjalasavniQ (Torshavn, the Faroe Islands) and also 
the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (Hyde Park, New York, US).
The main practical challenges at the archives were not of a linguistic nature, as I 
understand the written language of all the parties concerned, i.e. English, Danish, 
Norwegian, Icelandic and Faroese. The indigenous Greenlanders have their own 
language, but none of the records concerning Greenland were written in Greenlandic, 
only in Danish. Rather, the problem was scrutinizing the archival indexes for 
references to the North Atlantic territories.
As the North Atlantic territories for the main part of the war played a very little role 
relative to the war as such, finding documents, which concerned the North Atlantic 
territories, proved difficult. Much time was thus spent on searching through other 
categories, which did not have any references to any of the North Atlantic territories 
in their titles, but where there was a chance of a periphery inclusion of aspects 
relating to the North Atlantic territories. Searches of this nature often gave results.
Only on very few accounts did I not succeed in getting access to a file requested. In 
the case of Statens Arkiver in Copenhagen, 4-5 files were lost or unaccounted for, 
and in PRO I experienced two files, which I had applied for, being retained by the 
Foreign Office. This I found very peculiar, because on the notice of withdrawal I 
could see, that the withdrawal had taken place two weeks into my stay at PRO, 
although the file had been released some years previously. Also, the titles of the files 
were very specific about the Norwegian Consulate in the Faroes, and thus not files 
most likely to have had many requests of access since their release. The decision to 
retain the documents was based on Section 3 (4) of the Public Record Act from 1958, 
which read:
16
Public records selected for permanent preservation under this section 
shall be transferred not later than thirty years after their creation either to 
the Public Record Office or to such other place of deposit appointed by 
the Lord Chancellor under this Act as the Lord Chancellor may direct:
Provided that any records may be retained after the said period if, in the 
opinion of the person who is responsible for them, they are required for 
administrative purposes or ought to be retained for any other special 
reason, and where that person is not the Lord Chancellor, the Lord 
Chancellor has been informed of the facts and given his approval.5
In other cases the documents had never been accessible, that is they never reached an 
archive. Especially in the case of Iceland, documents from the Danish side have been 
few. Some have disappeared, others destroyed, and unlike other Danish 
representatives, i.e. Hilbert, Reventlow and Kauffmann, little or no personal details 
or accounts are available of the Danish representative in Iceland, Fontenay. Thus, 
creating a profile of him has been difficult, as only sporadic comments have been 
made on his personae by his colleagues in London, Washington, Nuuk and Torshavn 
and the Americans and British in Iceland.
5 Section 3 (4) o f the Public Record Act, 1958
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Existing literature on the North Atlantic Area during Second World War
Some aspects of this thesis have been dealt with previously, in particular the role of 
Kauffmann, in Finn Lpkkegaard’s PhD Thesis, Pet Danske Gesandtskab I 
Washington 1940-19426 (turned into a book) written in 1968, on the Danish Legation 
in Washington 1940-1942, while Bo Lidegaard’s Henrik Kaufmann. I Kongens 
Navn7 deals more specifically with the Danish Ambassador to the United States 
during the Second World War. Whereas the former does not devote any attention to 
Danish representatives outside the United States, the latter, Bo Lidegaard’s book, 
does. However, the attention paid to Kauffmann’s colleagues in Lidegaard’s book is 
limited.
Whereas three PhD thesis have been written about the occupation of Iceland, The 
British Occupation of Iceland, 1940-19428 by Donald F. Bittner, The United States 
Occupation of Iceland 1941-19469 by John J. Hunt, Georgetown University, 1966, 
and Thor Whitehead’s Iceland in the Second World War10, none pay much attention 
to the Danish representatives; their main focus is on the military and economical 
aspects of the British and American occupation of Iceland. An article by Solrun B. 
Hardarson, however, examines the British and American role in Iceland’s 
independence course, and makes references to the roles of Fontenay, Kauffmann and 
Reventlow. However, as with the rest of the literature mentioned, no one has yet 
examined the Faroe Islands and the role of the Danish representatives there during 
the Second World War.
Apart from two articles written by Danish historian, Nils A. Sprensen titled 
“Militaere aspekter af den britiske haersaettelse af Faer0eme”, (“Military Aspects of 
the British Occupation of the Faroe Islands”), and “Storbritannien og Det faer0ske 
Styre 1940-45” (Great Britain and the Faroese Administration 1940-45) no research 
has been made into British foreign policy in relations with the occupation of the
6 Finn L0kkegaard, Det Danske Gesandtskab I Washington 1940-1942. Udgiverselskab for Danmarks 
nyeste Historie, Copenhagen, 1968
7 Bo Lidegaard, I Kongens Navn. Henrik Kauffmann i Dansk Diplomati 1919-58. 2nd ed. WSOY, 
Finland, 1999, p. 29
8 Donald F. Bittner, The British Occupation o f Iceland, 1940-1942, University o f Missouri, 1974
9 John J. Hunt, The United States Occupation o f Iceland 1941-1946, Georgetown University, 1966
10 Thor Whitehead, Iceland in the Second World War 1939-1946. Pembroke College, Oxford, March, 
1978
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Faroe Islands. The most extensive work on the British occupation of the Faroe 
Islands is a historical overview of the period 1940-45 Stndsarini 1940-45, Vol. 1-5,11 
written by local journalist Niels Juel Arge. Arge has done a thorough research into 
war documents and interviewed people on the islands, in order to outline all events 
that took place during the war both on land and at sea. His books have provided a 
beneficial background knowledge into how the occupation was experienced by the 
Faroese people, and hence the events that took place in or near the Faroes during the 
Second World War.
Thus, less than a handful of academic studies of a lengthier volume have been 
written on the situation of Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland during the war; most 
often these island groups are only briefly mentioned in context with a broader study, 
or just ignored. The non-existence of the Faroes is, for example, illustrated in a 
passage by Helge 0 . Pharo in The Origins of the Cold War in Europe, edited by 
David Reynolds, where he mentions overseas territories during Second World War 
belonging to Denmark and Norway that were strongly affected by the war, then 
informs the reader that “Greenland was the one remaining Danish colonial 
possession, a remnant of the Dano-Norwegian empire in northern waters.”12
In his comprehensive work on British foreign policy during the Second World War, 
Sir Llewellyn Woodward only mentions the Faroe Islands twice, once to mention 
that the British occupied the islands, and once to indicate that amongst neutrals in 
south-eastern Europe the occupation of Narvik and the Faroes was “merely a sign of 
our inability to deal with the main problem of turning the Germans out of Norway”.13 
Also Winston S. Churchill’s “The Second World War” only mentions the Faroes 
briefly.
The period of British occupation does though have great interest amongst Faroese 
historians, because of the political and national separation from Denmark it caused. 
In a study of the evolution of political relations between Denmark and the Faroes,
11 Niels J. Arge, Stndsarini 1940-45, Vol. 1-5, Forlagid Hvessingur, Torshavn, 1985-1990.
12 Helge 0 .  Pharo, “Scandinavia” in Reynolds, D., ed., The Origins o f the Cold War in Europe, Yale 
University Press, London, 1994, p. 204
13 Sir L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. I, Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office, London, 1970, pp. 121-2
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Olavur Christiansen’s book “Villinistfggir upplystir” (roughly translated “Tracks 
Revealed”) embraces some incidents of British, Danish and Faroese relations during 
the occupation, especially personal relations between authorities from all three 
parties.
DANISH DIPLOMACY
The purpose of this short introduction to Danish diplomacy is to give the reader an 
understanding of the institutional background of the Danish representatives in the 
North Atlantic territories, London and Washington, that is, an understanding of the 
allegiance to the King at the time the ties with Copenhagen were severed as a result 
of the German occupation of Denmark. As the reader will discover, the sense of 
loyalty towards the King varied a great deal amongst the Danish representatives 
abroad. In some cases it was almost the overriding notion, when they were pushed to 
take a personal stance with respect to where their loyalties lay.
Gordon A. Craig argues that “for professional diplomats, wartime is the most 
uncongenial of atmospheres. The institutional forms within which they are 
accustomed to work and the distribution of responsibility for the definition and 
executive of foreign policy are subject to pressures and demands to which they are 
not accustomed.”14 In the case of the Danish representatives in the North Atlantic 
territories, Britain and the United States during Second World War, on top of the 
added pressures that war placed their institution under, their communications with 
the Foreign Ministry in Copenhagen were severed. An added factor to the situation 
of the Danish representatives in allied countries was, that because Denmark was 
occupied by the enemy, they were dependent upon the goodwill of their host 
government to remain in their position and uphold Danish interests.
An additional aspect to the situation, which the Danish representatives found 
themselves in, was that according to the Danish Constitution paragraph 19 it is the 
King, who represents and acts on behalf of the Kingdom in international matters. 
This is still the case today. However, at the turn of the century, the impact of this
14 Gordon A. Craig “Diplomats and Diplomacy During The Second World War,” in The Diplomats 
1939-1979, edited by Gordon A. Craig & Francis L. Loewenheim, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N ew  Jersey, 1994, p. 11
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paragraph had a wider scope since it would be the King along with his Government, 
and not the parliament, that were in charge of Danish relations with other countries. 
As a consequence Danish foreign affairs policies were formed by the King together 
with his Government, and traditionally most of the Danish representatives sent 
abroad were employed by the King. Bo Lidegaard thus points out that the Danish 
diplomatic service was very much attached to the King and had a strong feeling of 
loyalty towards him.15
OMISSION OF CANADA
There is one country’s presence in the North Atlantic area during the Second World 
War which does not get any attention in this thesis, and that is Canada. The reason 
for the omission is that the Canadian interest and presence in Greenland and Iceland 
had very little, if no effect on the situation of the Danish representatives or their role 
in the respective territories.
In Iceland the Canadian presence was of no importance to the relationship between 
the Danish representatives and the occupiers. And, in general the Canadian presence 
in Greenland was not very much wanted by either the Danes or by the Americans and 
not much consideration was shown the Canadian Consul in Godthaab by either party. 
Only some of the native Greenlanders seemed to prefer the idea of a Canadian 
protection rather than an American on, as the Canadians “were perceived as more 
knowledgeable about the Arctic than the Americans.”16 Even the Canadian 
Government paid little attention to their consul in Greenland as American Consul 
Penfield noted. “The Canadian Consul continued to reside peacefully in Godthaab 
more or less ignored both by the local authorities and by Ottawa.”17
STRUCTURE AND LAYOUT
The structure of the thesis is geographical, in the sense that each occupied North 
Atlantic territory is dealt with in separate chapters. Because of it’s structure being 
subject based, that is the chapters are divided into each territory and the Danish
15 Bo Lidegaard, I Kongens Navn. 1999, p. 29
16 SA, Ministeriet for Grpnland (Grpnlands Styrelse/ afl. 1988/Direkt0r K.H. Oldendows papirer. 
Grpnland under krigen. 1940-45/pk. 3, memorandum o f conversation with M iss Balle, 11.01.41
1717 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/29, Quarterly Political Report by 
Penfield, January-March, 1941, sent from Godthaab to Secretary o f State, 07.04.41
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representatives in charge of that area, there are no fixed start- or end dates to the 
thesis, as no territory’s occupation time-span was the same. The first two chapters, 
however, are chronologically based on the period up till the German occupation of 
Denmark on April 9th 1940. The thesis is divided, apart from the Introduction and 
Conclusion, into five chapters. The first chapter looks at the North Atlantic 
protectorates and it’s mother country, Denmark, and the issues that were dominating 
these territories in the eve of the war and in the first period after the outbreak of war.
The first chapter’s aim is to provide a historical background for the answer to one of 
the main questions set in this thesis: “How were the Danish representatives in the 
North Atlantic territories, London and Washington DC able to exert influence on the 
British and the Americans in their policies towards the North Atlantic territories, 
when they were representing a government, which was under the influence of the 
enemy (Germany)?” The position of the Danish representatives in the occupied 
North Atlantic territories was dependent upon the goodwill of the British and the 
U.S. How could the Danish justify their country’s lack of resistance to the Germans 
(enemy) and her feeble attempts to uphold her neutrality prior to the German 
occupation? The chapter provides the historical parameters for understanding the 
position of the Danish representatives during the war as well as the historical 
relationship between Denmark and the North Atlantic territories and Denmark’s 
relationship with Britain, U.S. and Norway.
The second chapter also sets the parameters for the answer to the questions set in 
Chapter I, only in this chapter the focus is on the British and the U.S. The chapter 
deals with the policies and aims of the British and Americans with regard to the 
North Atlantic territories and the Anglo-American relationship with regard to the 
hostilities in Northern Europe. What is of interest in this chapter is the aspect of 
neutrality and how it affected British policies towards Scandinavia, the North 
Atlantic territories and the United States. Although the British attitude towards the 
smaller neutral states had undergone a change in late 1939 -  early 1940, their 
policies towards the North Atlantic remained influenced by the fact that the Faroe 
Islands, Iceland and Greenland were part of the neutrality declaration issued by the 
Union of the Kingdom of Denmark and Iceland at the outbreak of war in September
22
1939. With the German occupation of Denmark the British attitude towards the 
neutrality of the North Atlantic changed.
Chapter IE focuses on the British occupation of the Faroe Islands and the role of 
local Danish Governor, Hilbert, and Danish Minister in London, Reventlow, in the 
formation of British policies towards the Faroes. The chapter focuses on the time- 
span from when the British first arrived on April 13th 1940 till they left in 1944. The 
aim of this chapter is to examine how the Danish representatives with respect to the 
Faroe Islands were able to influence the British in their policies towards the Faroe 
Islands. The chapter examines the positions of Hilbert in the Faroes and Reventlow 
in London, the means they managed to acquire and utilise in order to attain this 
influence. This despite the change of status quo of Hilbert’s and Reventlow’s statuses 
following the German occupation of Denmark. The chapter also focuses on the 
relationship between the Danish, Norwegian and the British in the Faroes and in 
London, as this highlights the extent of influence the Danish were able to exert on 
the British, despite representing a government under the influence of the enemy. The 
chapter also examines some events, for example external factors, such as the ‘Flag 
incident’, the ‘Battle of the North Atlantic’, the Danish signing of the Anti- 
Comintern Pact and the state of emergency on August 28th 1943 which also had an 
influence on British policies towards the Faroes and their attitude towards Denmark 
and Danish subjects abroad. The question asked is whether or not these events made 
any difference to the influence Hilbert and Reventlow exerted on the British 
authorities in the Faroes and in London. The level of influence exerted by the Danish 
representatives is also compared to that of the influence exerted by the local Faroese 
and the Norwegian consulate, which were the strongest opponents to the Danish 
representatives in the Faroe Islands.
Chapter IV deals with the British and American occupation of Iceland and 
concentrates on the period from when the British occupied the island on May 10th 
1940 till Iceland left the Union with Denmark on May 17th 1944. Because Iceland 
declared herself in charge of foreign affairs immediately after the German occupation 
of Denmark, the role of Danish Minister in Iceland, Fontenay, was limited. However, 
he too was able to exercise some influence on the British and Americans when it 
came to Icelandic constitutional matters. Unlike the Faroe Islands in Chapter IE,
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where there only was one country occupying the islands, Iceland had two occupying 
forces, first the British and then the Americans. Three major events took place in 
Iceland during the Second World War: the occupation of Iceland by the British, the 
American take-over, and the Icelandic decision to leave the Union with Denmark. Of 
these, the Icelandic plans to leave the Union with Denmark was the most critical 
point in the relationship between the 4 countries involved. Did the change in the 
occupying forces make any difference to the level of influence exerted by the Danish 
representatives? Did the events in Denmark, mentioned in Chapter El, have the same 
effect on the relationship between the occupying forces and the Danish 
representatives with regard to Iceland?
Chapter V is divided into two parts. The first part concentrates on Greenland and the 
politics of all parties involved surrounding the American presence in the island. The 
second part examines the power struggle that arose amongst the Danish 
representatives abroad from the lack of a Danish Government in exile. Greenland 
turned out to be a key issue in this power struggle. Thus, firstly the chapter examines 
the situation of the Danish representatives who were in charge of Greenland, that is 
both of the Danish Governors in Greenland and the Danish Minister in Washington
D.C. Since Greenland still plays an important role in Danish and U.S. relations, the 
end-date with regard to the chapter on Greenland in this thesis is the end of the 
German occupation of Denmark, when the anomaly of Danish representatives abroad 
in general seized to exist. The focus in this chapter is on the two Danish 
representatives in Greenland, Svane and Bruun, and their relationship with the State 
Department, American forces occupying the island and the Danish Minister in 
Washington DC, Kauffmann. However, as the Greenland Agreement, which 
facilitated the U.S. take over of the protection of Greenland while Denmark was 
occupied by the Germans, had been signed by the Kauffmann, he was the Danish 
representative the State Department had most of its correspondence and relationship 
with. Therefore his role and his level of influence is also examined.
Whereas the previous chapters demonstrated that there was more or less harmony 
between the ideas and aspirations of the Danish representatives in the Faroes, Iceland 
and London, this was not the rule in the case of the Danish Governors in Greenland 
and the Danish Minister in Washington. The Greenland case thus, unlike the case of
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the Faroe Islands and Iceland, saw a contest for influence over and support from the 
occupying power amongst the Danish representatives, rather than between Danish 
representatives on the one side and the natives on the other, as was the case in the 
Faroes and in Iceland. The Greenland case saw a shift of power taking place from the 
Greenland Governors to Henrik Kauffmann and this was very much down to who 
had more success in influencing the Americans. How did this come about and what 
were the decisive factors causing this shift of power?
The late entry of the U.S. in the war and the American interest in Greenland meant 
that the State Department, to a much lesser degree than the Foreign Office in 
London, was affected by the events in Denmark. This makes a distinction in the 
relationship between the Danish representatives in Greenland and Washington DC 
and their occupiers and host country compared to that of the Danish representatives 
in Iceland, the Faroe Islands and London. This chapter examines how this affected 
the extent of influence exerted by both parties on the Americans.
The extent to which the role of Greenland played in the level of influence Kauffmann 
was able to exercise on the Americans, and the extent to which this was an 
instrument in gaining the status he subsequently achieved amongst the Danish 
representatives in exile, is also of interest. This because of the fact that during the 
German occupation of Denmark there was no Danish Government in exile, as was 
the case with the Norwegian Government in exile. Subsequently a power struggle 
between the Danish Minister in London and the Danish Minister in Washington DC 
emerged, which to some extent affected the representatives in the North Atlantic 
territories, as Reventlow and Kauffmann did not always agree upon which policies 
should be followed, while the connection with the Government in Copenhagen was 
cut off.
The conclusion of the thesis is that the Danish representatives all in all were very 
successful in gaining influence on the occupying powers and succeeded in most 
cases to maintain status quo with regard to Danish interests in the North Atlantic 
Territories or in those cases, where change was inevitable or unavoidable, to secure 
Danish interests to the utmost degree in such a way that when the war was over, as 
little damage was done as possible.
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The thesis shows that, although the prerequisites were different for each 
representative in charge of his respective territory, they all managed to influence the 
occupying power to some degree. In each case the Danish representatives had to 
compete with at least one other party for influence on the occupying power. Each 
chapter introduces those particular prerequisites present in each respective territory 
and demonstrates the different ways or means, which the Danish representatives 
applied in order to be able to influence the occupying power.
In the case of the Faroe Islands, Hilbert and Reventlow’s experience and 
resourcefulness as compared to that of the Faroese independence movement proved a 
strong tool in securing Danish interests in the Faroes.
In Iceland Fontenay acknowledged that there was little he could do to prevent 
Iceland from leaving the Union with the Danish Kingdom. He therefore carefully 
chose his battles and concentrated on maintaining good relations between Denmark 
and Iceland and in that way secure Danish interests in an independent Iceland. He 
therefore did not cause much trouble when the initial plans to leave the Union 
surfaced. But when Iceland contemplated leaving the Union prematurely he stepped 
in alongside with Reventlow and influenced the occupiers to try to halt the Icelandic 
plans as he foresaw that such a move by Iceland would seriously damage Danish- 
Icelandic relations.
In the case of Greenland the main problem was the divergence in the policies and 
aims of the Governors in Greenland and the Danish Minister in Washington with 
regard to the situation of Greenland. Being the most resourceful of the three, 
Kauffmann succeeded in influencing the Americans to his advantage; an advantage 
which he would use in his greater strategy of securing future Danish interests on a 
world basis rather than just locally.
The thesis demonstrates that it was not only external factors such as events or the 
constitutional status of the territory that determined the differences between the 
representatives and their handling of the situation, they found themselves in. The
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differences also lay in their personality and the way they each interpreted their role 
after they lost contact and hence guidelines from the Government in Copenhagen.
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CHAPTER I: DANISH AND NORTH ATLANTIC AIMS AND POLICIES WITH 
REGARD TO THEIR NEUTRALITY. SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE 
AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AND TELL APRIL 9th 1940
The position of the Danish representatives abroad in the aftermath of the German 
occupation of Denmark on April 9th 1940 was much dependent upon the goodwill of 
the host countries. The conducts of Danish affairs and in particular her neutrality 
policy prior to the German invasion weighed heavily against the Danish 
representatives abroad. This was especially the case in those territories that were 
occupied by the Allies following the German invasion of Denmark. One of the main 
critiques of Denmark’s policy during the war by opponents to the Danish 
representatives was the lack of resistance and subsequent submission to German rule. 
This criticism was, however, not only limited to external observers, but was also 
present in Denmark at the time, even within the military ranks. Recently the debate, 
which has more or less lain dormant for all these years, was rekindled by Danish 
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen in his bO^-anniversary speech for the 
August-rebellion of 1943 where he criticised the decisions taken by the Government 
in the early stages of war, the quick capitulation in April 1940 and the co-operation 
with the Germans during the occupation.1 The aim of this chapter is thus in the first 
instance to uncover the reasons behind the decisions that resulted in the lack of 
resistance put up to the breaches of her neutrality and the subsequent invasion by 
German. This, as mentioned earlier, was a decision that was to mark the Danes, both 
at home and abroad, throughout and in the aftermath of the war.
An associated question is on which basis the Danish Government decided not to 
rearm in order to defend herself and what the justification for this decision was? This 
latter aspect is important to the thesis, because the justification given back in the 
early stages of war was to form the main argument in the campaign to restore the 
Danish image in the aftermath of the German occupation of Denmark, and also the 
morale of the Danes.
1 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ”60-aret for bruddet med besaettelsesmagtten”, DR Nyheder, 29.08.2003, 
http://www.dr.dk/nvheder/htm/baggrund/tema2003/60%20aaret%20for%20bruddel/22.htm
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Throughout the thesis the situation of the Danish representatives and their success in 
influencing the British and Americans is at times compared with that of the 
Norwegian representatives in the same respective countries and territories. The 
Danes were, namely, given a too favourable treatment, compared to the treatment the 
Norwegians received, it was felt by some Norwegians. They deemed that the 
difference in the effort put in by each country in defending their neutrality, freedom 
and democracy should be reflected in the attitude of the host countries towards the 
representatives.
The focus is then set on the situation the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland found 
themselves in at the outbreak of war and up till the German occupation of Denmark, 
which broke off the connection with the Government in Copenhagen, and thus 
marked a shift in the history of the territories and the roles of the representatives of 
the Danish Government in those territories. What were their thoughts, aims and 
prospects with regard to the escalating hostilities on mainland Europe? And how did 
they prepare for the prospect of being cut off from Denmark like they had been 
during the Great War?
The purpose of this chapter is also to get an understanding and historical background 
to the relationship between Denmark and the three North Atlantic territories.
While Iceland was well underway in the process of breaking away from Denmark 
and had achieved independence within the Union of the Danish Kingdom and 
Iceland, the Faroe Islands, although they had their own parliament, was on par with a 
Danish county, while Greenland was a colony; the different stages of independence 
of these territories was reflected in their aims, hopes and policies towards the 
belligerents.
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
In 1380 King Haakon died and his son Olav Haakonson inherited the Norwegian 
Kingdom, which also by then comprised Orkney Islands, Shetland Islands, The Faroe 
Islands, Iceland and Greenland. Four years earlier Olav had inherited the Kingdom of 
Denmark from his mother, who was the daughter of King Valdemar “Atterdag” of
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Denmark, who died the previous year, in 1375.2 Although part of a joint kingdom, 
these islands were still seen as belonging to Norway throughout the period.
In 1468-1469 the Orkneys and Shetland Islands were handed over to the Scottish 
King, while the Faroes, Iceland and Greenland remained part of the Danish- 
Norwegian Kingdom until 800 years later when, at the peace negotiations in Kiel in 
January 1814, a deal was signed between Sweden, who had joined the winning side 
against Napoleon, and Denmark, who, after fighting against Britain, had lost most of 
its navy and was economically in a dire state. The result of these negotiations was 
that the Danish King Frederic VI handed Norway to the Swedish King, but the 
negotiators manage to draft a deal, which stated, that this hand over did not include 
Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Iceland.3 Due to lack of historical knowledge 
amongst the Swedish negotiators, this clause was not questioned, and thus 
Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands became parts of the Danish Kingdom.
Denmark was occupied by Germany on April 9th 1940. In the beginning it was 
officially only a military administration, under which the Government was acting 
free and undisturbed. Thus, although the German invasion of Denmark did not mean 
a clear cut-off in communications between the Government in Copenhagen and the 
representatives abroad, the representatives, and especially those serving in allied 
countries, were conscious that orders from Copenhagen were given under the 
influence of the occupying power, despite the Government ‘officially’ acting on its 
own terms. April 9th 1940 thus marked a change in the role of the Danish 
representatives abroad. Because of the absence of a government in exile they would 
have to get by on their own. Therefore an insight to the period of Danish foreign 
policy and history leading up to the war is needed in order to understand the state of 
affairs of their home country on which their new position was founded upon.
2 Hans J. Debes, Fprova s0ga. “Nordurlond og F0rovar”, Vol I, F0roya Skulabokagrunnur, Torshavn, 
1990, pp. 204-5
3 Hans J. Debes, Fprova s0ga. “Fra kongligum einahandli til embaetisveldi”, Vol III, Fproya 
Skulabokagrunnur, Torshavn, 2000, p 219
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B. DENMARK
In the annual Political Review of 1939, the British Minister in Copenhagen described 
the Danish attitude towards the international situation as being swayed by two 
conflicting emotions. The first, was the fear that the Western democracies would 
prove unwilling or unable to call a halt to Nazi aggression. The second, was the fear 
that if a stand was taken against Nazi aggression, the result would be a war in which 
Denmark could not fail to suffer severely economically, and in which her political 
neutrality and territorial integrity would be hanging by a thread.4
Because of her geographical location, Denmark would always be worse positioned as 
a neutral in comparison with her other Nordic counterparts in the event of a 
European conflict. With Germany as her neighbour on her southern border, her fate 
would constantly be at the mercy of her stronger neighbour, and this fact was always 
present in the foreign policies conducted by Denmark. Also, with regard to her 
political and economic situation, the Danish situation as compared to the position of 
other neutrals, was atypical, since owing to her intensive agricultural production she 
was probably further from self-sufficiency than any other European country, and 
moreover because all but an insignificant part of her export on which her economic 
life was based were sold to Great Britain and Germany.5 Nevertheless, these factors, 
which counted against her upholding strict neutrality towards the belligerents, also 
proved to be her strongest card with regard to maintaining her position as a neutral in 
a European conflict. These factors consisted of her exports to both Britain and 
Germany, upon which both belligerents were reluctant to lose out on, in the case of 
the British the idea of being cut off by their biggest supplier of bacon was an 
unthinkable thought to most British people, and ironically this was the first reaction 
of the public and newspapers when the possibility of a German occupation of 
Denmark was looming. The Germans imported wheat from Denmark, but to them the 
most benefiting result of Danish neutrality was free passage through her straits, on 
which the German fleet was quite dependent (upon). Danish neutrality thus suited 
both belligerents, but only as long as her neutrality was respected by the other and
4 PRO, FO 371/24782, Political Review for the Year 1939 by Howard-Smith, Copenhagen, 18.01.39
5 PRO, FO 371/24782, Political Review for the Year 1939 by Howard-Smith, Copenhagen, 18.01.39
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she upheld a fairly even neutrality policy towards both belligerents. This latter aspect 
will be touched upon later in the chapter.
1. Defending her sovereignty
The situation Denmark found herself in meant that she had to rely upon the goodwill 
of her neighbours to secure her sovereignty. Another option, which presented itself 
after the Great War, was joining the League of Nations. However, despite the fact 
that Denmark found the League as a good forum to correspond with the Germans on 
foreign relations matters, such as the issue of the border, the Danes did not find that 
the League served the defence problem in a sufficient way. The last option thus, was 
a return to neutrality.
1.1 League of Nations
When the League of Nations hit the Italio-Abyssinian crisis, the confidence of the 
Danes, along with other small member states, in the League’s ability to perform 
collective security vanished. Hence the decision of Denmark and other former 
neutral states to sign the Pact of July 1st 1936, which was to distance themselves 
from Article 16 (sanctions against belligerents) and therefore was the first step in the 
direction away from the League. Denmark was thus back with her problem of how to 
deter Germany from violating her sovereignty. Although the Danish Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Munch, ideologically believed in world peace being achieved through 
international systems, like the League of Nations, he nevertheless acknowledged that 
the League had its faults. The main one being that some of the major states had not 
adhered to it, amongst them Germany, and therefore the system would not work to its 
fullest degree. It would certainly not solve Denmark’s problem with Germany if the 
latter decided to invade the former. Economically, Denmark would face problems 
with regard to her exports to both belligerents, but this time she was prepared and 
had struck deals with her Nordic neighbours as well as with other fellow small 
neutral states, for example the Dutch and Belgians, on the matter of supplies, which 
she might be short of, in the case her imports from Britain or Germany were cut off.
In 1938, when it was evident that Britain and France would only stand by and do 
nothing in the wake of German aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Danes still 
thought that there was a good chance that Denmark would succeed in maintaining
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her neutrality, as she did in 1914. Their reasoning was based on the fact that from a 
geopolitical perspective there was no reason for the conflict to spread into Kattegat 
and the Baltic Sea since the German fleet rearmament was superior to the Russian 
fleet in the area, and both the British and the French fleets were based in the Atlantic 
and Mediterranean. The Danish waters therefore would not be in a worse position 
than in 1914.
1.2 Neutrality
In 1939 the faith in the League began to falter. At the Nordic Radical Meeting held in 
Copenhagen in February 1939 former Norwegian Prime Minister, Mowinckel, who 
also was president of the League of Nations in the late 1920s and Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Koht’s Liberal predecessor as Foreign Affairs Minister, was reported to 
have said that “Scandinavian faith in the League of Nations had been destroyed when 
the British Prime Minister declared that small nations must look after themselves if 
they got into difficulties. They [the Scandinavians] were still faithful members of the 
League, but they must be free to decide issues of peace and war themselves.”6
Following the realisation that the League of Nations would not secure her 
sovereignty in the event of war, Denmark along with other small states fortified 
neutrality policy, the aim being to maintain Danish independence and to lead 
Denmark through the hostilities without being involved in any dispute. However, 
with tension building up in Europe following Germany’s rise to power and the 
subsequent reaction in France and Britain, it seemed that it was only a matter of time 
before a war broke out.
After a momentary sigh of relief, coupled with warm approbation of Mr. Neville 
Chamberlain’s part in the Munich Agreement on September 29th 1938 Denmark 
came to view the settlement as a diplomatic defeat for Great Britain and France, 
which virtually placed Denmark at the mercy of Germany. Denmark’s sole policy 
was thus to maintain an honest and unconditional neutrality towards all sides. This 
aim, it was argued, would be best achieved by the Rigsdag (Danish Parliament), the
6 PRO, FO 371/23663, Ramsay, Copenhagen, to FO 09.02.39
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press and the population observing a complete impartial attitude towards the Powers 
engaged in the conflict.
The Danes realised that they would never be able to put up a sufficient defence
against their stronger neighbour to the South. When the Germans began to revive
their power, the defence question became the overriding issue of the Governments of
the 1930s. Susan Seymour argues that in the years after 1933 there was a
very gradual change of attitude among the originally pacifist Social 
Democrats and their leader, Stauning. Where the working class had once 
felt unwilling to fight for a state which was hostile to them, now, with a 
left-wing Government, they had something worth defending.7
Stauning, who was the Danish Minister of Defence from 1933-35, thus advised the 
Government from going ahead with their program of disarmament, but this was not 
equivalent to suggesting that Stauning neither then nor later, when he was the Prime 
Minister, had moved as far as to advocating rearmament. There was still a strong 
pacifist element within the Social Democrats and the Radicals, with whom the Social 
Democrats cooperated. The leader of the Radicals, Munch, was a pacifist, who 
believed that “military means could never give Denmark security.”8 To him it was 
not the size of the military forces that was important, but only that they were 
adequate enough to observe and defend Danish neutrality from accidental breaches. 
As long as the defence policy would not depart from this attitude, Munch was happy 
for small changes to occur in the defence budget. Thus, when the Government passed 
a law, which meant a small increase in the number of troops, this did not jeopardise 
the coalition with the Social Democrats. This law was passed after much criticism 
from the opposition and especially the military. Commander-in-Chief of the Danish 
Army, Lieutenant General With, was one of those voicing strong opposition to the 
state of the Danish defence, however, prior to the law being passed by the 
Government, he was given the feeling that he at last was making some progress with 
his talks with the Social-Democrats, referring to a recent talk with the Prime
7 Susan Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-45, Odense University Press, 1982, p. 
53
8 Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-45, 1982, p. 53
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Minister, Stauning, where the latter agreed on the point that the Social-Democrats 
were now willing to allow a larger military force.9
The British, however, were sceptical with regard to the Government’s plans to step
up the rearmament in order to provide Denmark with adequate defence; they felt sure
that the Government would only pass a bill on rearmament, which was so
insignificant that it would make little difference to the actual defence matter, in order
to quieten the opposition:
Since the fate of Czechoslovakia has lent force to the old opposition 
criticism of the neglect of the defence forces by the Socialist-Radical 
Government of M. Stauning, it seems probable that the military service 
Bill mentioned by General With will be passed after the elections in 
April; and its present discussion is doubtless intended rather to deprive 
the opposition of one of their main planks in the election campaign than 
to deal effectively with the problem of the defence of Danish neutrality in 
the event of war, as it can hardly be seriously thought that the increase 
from 8.000 to 12.000 men in the Danish army would appreciably alter 
Denmark’s military position as against Germany.10
To the dismay of General With and the Conservatives, the British seemed to be right.
The position of Denmark at the time of the outbreak of hostilities was set forth in a 
speech made by the Prime Minister in the Rigsdag on the 1st September. After 
announcing to the House that the Privy Council had decided to issue a declaration of 
Denmark’s neutrality on that day and to notify by Royal Decree the application of 
the rules of neutrality promulgated on May 31st 1938, he stated that the necessary 
measures had been taken to enable the Army and the Navy to perform their tasks for 
the assurance of the country’s neutrality. The required military forces would be 
provided in the course of the next few days. The Fleet was manned, and deficiencies 
would now be made up.11 However, although the Prime Minister gave the impression 
that the Danish military was adequate to defend her neutrality, the reality was quite 
different.
9 PRO, FO 371/23657, N  3941/64/63, August 1939, Conversation between Ramsay and With
10 PRO, FO 371/23637, Ramsay, Copenhagen, to FO, ’’Danish Defence,” 04.03.39
11 PRO, FO 371/23637, Howard Smith, Copenhagen, to FO, “Effect o f the war on Danish internal 
life,” 11.11.39
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2. Defence policy
“Of their desire for neutrality there was no doubt but would it be permitted to them? 
That was the question,”12 Ramsay wrote in a report to FO in the beginning of 1939. 
Although Danish Prime Minister Stauning, his Foreign Affairs Minister, Munch, and 
their followers, believed that Danish neutrality would be permitted by the 
belligerents, and therefore refrained from strengthening her defences, there was 
much discontent both within political and military circles with the Government’s 
defence policy; the strongest coming from their political opponents, the 
Conservatives13, and from General With.
The belief that the Germans actually would occupy the country was not present 
within the military. Instead the conviction was that the Germans would like to 
establish aerodromes in Denmark in order to gain better control over the sea- 
passages to Norway and South Sweden.14 However, that did not diminish the feeling 
that the defence measures taken were inadequate. Munch was not much thought of 
within the Danish General Staff, who were in strong opposition to the policy the 
Government was taking on defence; it was far from adequate should Danish 
sovereignty come under threat by the belligerents. To the British it was even being 
suggested within military ranks that Munch very much was influenced by the 
Germans; “In answer to a query whether the influence of German propaganda was 
noticeable in Denmark, he replied: “Of course. The Government is riddled with it, 
and Dr. Munch is being whispered to all the time from behind the curtains””15
General With’s verdict on Denmark’s state of affairs, should a European war break 
out, was that the Danish army was ‘absolutely defenceless’ and that it was both 
pitiable and ridiculous to talk of the Danish Army. “It does not exist”16, General 
With stated, and he continued to pronounce that the dire state of the Danish defence 
was due to Munch, who in the previous Government under Prime Minister Zahle had 
been appointed the post as the Minister of Defence, and in his time there had
12 PRO, FO 371/23637, Report from Ramsay, Copenhagen, to FO, “Defence question in Denmark,”
02.02.39
13 PRO, FO 371/23637, Ramsay, Copenhagen, to FO, 03.05.39
14 PRO, FO 371/23637, R. Sutton-Pratt, Military Attache, Copenhagen, to FO, 02.03.39
15 PRO, FO 371/23637, R. Sutton-Pratt, Military Attache, Copenhagen, to FO, 02.03.39
16 PRO, FO 371/23657, N  3941/64/63, August 1939
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discouraged any idea of rearmament.17 General With’s open criticism, through public 
speeches where he attempted to arouse public opinion for some pretence at national 
defence, prompted Munch to bring up the question of dismissal of General With in 
the Cabinet.18 The General remained in his post, but his criticisms were not 
dampened as will be evident in the section on the Danish signing of the Non- 
Aggression Pact later on in this chapter.
Not everyone in the Danish Military shared With’s attitude that Denmark should put
up an adequate defence to meet an eventual attack on her. Even amongst the Danish
General Staff the despair, felt by many in political circles with regard to the situation
Denmark found herself in, was detected. In a report from Copenhagen in the Spring
of 1939, the Military Attache R. Sutton-Pratt wrote:
He [Major-General von Stemann, Chief of Staff]19 appeared somewhat of 
a defeatist, arguing that nothing Denmark could do could improve her 
position if she fell out with Germany. He scoffed at the idea of 
constructing defences across South Jutland, saying that Germany would 
merely “bypass” them by sea, and that Germany would herself erect a 
mighty line across her own frontier, though he did not elucidate why this 
need agitate Denmark. He expressed the view that Germany would find 
more advantage in using Denmark as a larder and keeping her as a 
contented neutral.20
The divide in Denmark with regard to the defence policy was clear. Reporting from 
Copenhagen, Ramsay, pointed out that in a leading article in Nationaltidende. 
published in August, the socialist press attacked the agitation for increased defence 
measures as being injurious to the nation. The paper expressed the opinion that this 
was scarcely the moment to seek cheap advertisement for a government, which had 
no control for the situation, whether calm or agitated. “Denmark”, it concluded, “is 
the only country where nothing has been done to protect the country in the event of a 
catastrophe”.21 Although there was disagreement amongst the political parties
17 PRO, FO 371/23657, N  3941/64/63, August 1939
18 PRO, FO 371/23657, N  3941/64/63, August 1939
19 Major-General von Stemann was regarded as the successor to Lieutenant-General With as 
Commander-in-Chief o f the Danish Army.
20 PRO, FO 371/23637, R. Sutton-Pratt, Military Attache, Copenhagen, to FO, 02.03.39
21 PRO, FO 371/23437, Ramsay, Copenhagen, to FO, 30.08.39
37
regarding the extent of the Danish defences, all responsible parties were determined 
to keep Denmark outside the military conflicts of other nations.22
After the country had been occupied by the Germans, the defence-policy chosen, or 
rather the lack of it, was defended on the grounds that it was evident that no matter 
how much the Danish Government rearmed, she would not be able to prevent a 
German invasion, if the Germans set their minds to do so, and therefore the 
Government would rather try to strengthen the other areas of Danish society, so that 
in the event of a German occupation, the Danish identity, society and constitution 
would survive despite being under the duress of another power. It has later been 
argued by Palle Roslyng-Jensen that despite the absence of a free government and 
some of its politicians, who fled the country after the Germans invasion, the 
Ministries kept functioning and hence the infrastructure of the country continued as 
normal. Also, Roslyng-Jensen argues that perhaps the Government only is a symbol 
of a sovereign state. Thus, with the King remaining in the country and with the rest 
of the institutions in place, the daily life of the Dane was practically unchanged by 
the occupation23, which was what Stauning and Munch hoped to achieve with their 
chosen policy of non-resistance. So in one sense, the policy chosen by Stauning, 
Munch, and their Government was a success. However, their inability, or 
unwillingness, to resist a German invasion was to prove a disaster in their relation 
with Great Britain.
a) Scandinavian alliance?
Stauning chose to ignore the attacks of the Conservatives over the defence question, 
and he concentrated instead on arranging for common neutrality laws and mutual 
economic exchanges with the other Scandinavian States to meet the probability of 
the outbreak of another European war. However, despite the common notion of a 
Nordic Community amongst the Scandinavian states, when it came to crucial issues, 
such as a common defence policy, they were unable to reach an agreement, which 
indeed remained the case after the war had ended.
22 PRO, FO 371/23656, Ramsay, Copenhagen, to Halifax, 03.07.39, speech by Mr. Alsing Andersen, 
the Danish Minister of Defence at a Nordic Labour meeting 02.07.39
23 Palle Roslyng-Jensen, “Befrielsesjubilaeet og den nyeste besaettelseslitteratur. Idealister og 
’’Materialister” i besaettelselforskningen”, Historisk Tidsskrift. 95:2, 1995, p. 397
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The British expressed the wish that the Scandinavian states would form an alliance to
withstand the German threat and thus relieve the British in that area. However, in
Scandinavia talks of such an alliance had mixed reviews. In a memorandum in
February 1939 Lieutenant-Colonel Mjollner, head of the Air Defence Bureau of the
Danish Ministry of Defence, presented his views on the probable effect on
Scandinavia of a war between the UK and Germany. He was
personally....strongly of opinion that the Scandinavian States ought to 
enter into a defensive alliance. On...asking whether in speaking of 
Scandinavia he included Denmark, he replied that he did and that, 
although the Danes had officially repudiated the idea of such an alliance, 
they had done so because they thought feeling in Norway and Sweden 
was against it. In other words, the grapes were sour.24
An alliance of this kind was in his view the only thing, which could cause 
the Germans to hesitate to occupy Denmark, as a war with all three 
countries would engage a considerable number of German troops and 
would mean the loss of all supplies from Norway and Sweden, including 
Swedish ore. It would also mean that their submarines could no longer 
use the deep channel in Norwegian waters on their way to the Atlantic.
In the absence of a Scandinavian alliance Germany would, he said, 
overrun Denmark at once. When I [Military Attache at the British 
Legation in Copenhagen] remarked that the Danes did not seem to think 
so, he answered that they knew very well it would happen, but dared not 
admit it. It was an absolute fact that Denmark was under Germany’s 
thumb.25
3. Relations with Norway
Mjollner’s comment about ’sour grapes’ amongst the Scandinavian states comes as 
no surprise, because relations between the three states had been strained since the 
turn of the century. The cause was the Greenland dispute between Denmark and 
Norway, which had to be resolved at the International Court in the Hague, the return 
of the archives, and the less voiced, but nevertheless noted, Norwegian claim to the 
Faroes. Despite the effort to emphasise the notion that at national level both nations 
had put their differences behind them, and that with cooperation on several levels
24 PRO, FO 371/23654, Memorandum by C.L.P., Conversation with Mjollner, head o f Air Defence 
Bureau of the Minister o f Defence, 10.02.39
25 PRO, FO 371/23654, Memorandum by C.L.P., Conversation with Mjollner, head of Air Defence 
Bureau of the Minister o f Defence, 10.02.39
26 Politiken, “Danmark og Norge,” 21.07.39
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relations were officially good, there was no denying that under the surface all was 
not yet resolved. This was especially the case with the dispute over Greenland, a 
dispute that was still fresh in peoples minds, and felt particularly by the Norwegians, 
who felt wrongly done by in the Hague verdict.27
4. The Non-Aggression Pact
Another aspect of the pre-war period, which shook the foundation of a strong Nordic 
common stance on neutrality, was when Denmark, as the only Scandinavian state, 
signed the Non-Aggression Pact. Following pleas from the European neutrals for the 
United States Government to assist in their quest to have their neutrality respected by 
the belligerents, Roosevelt sent a message to the belligerents demanding non­
aggression pledges to the neutral states.28 The reaction from Hitler was an offer of a 
non-aggression pact to the neutrals. Stauning subsequently indicated that the Danes 
had been forced into signing the Non-Aggression Pact as a result of events that were 
outside their control. He said that it became “necessary for the Danish Government 
to answer affirmatively when, as a result of President Roosevelt’s message and of 
Reichschancellor Hitler’s reply to it, negotiations were offered us in respect of a so- 
called pact of non-aggression.” Stauning tried to play down the impact of this pact 
in his speech and pointed out that it was no different from treaties the Danes had 
signed with other countries relative to the use of arbitration and not of force should 
disputes arise, and as members of the League of Nations, the Danes had a pact of 
non-aggression with all the other great powers belonging to the League, namely, 
Russia, France and England, but not with Germany who was not in the League.
Munch also ‘blamed’ President Roosevelt for the non-aggression pact, and like 
Stauning he too pointed out that the pact was in exact conformity with the policy of 
impartial neutrality.30 Although this fact was acknowledged both by the British and 
sceptics in Denmark, they nevertheless feared the further implications of the pact, 
that is, the actions it would entail even though in words it conformed to impartial 
neutrality. It turned out that this fear was not unfounded. It was stated in a protocol
27 Politiken, ’’Danmark og Norge,” 21.07.39
28 Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance, 1982, p. 43
29 PRO, FO 371/23655, Speech by M. Stauning at Kolding, 18.05.39
30 PRO, FO 371/23655, Speech by Dr. Munch on the island o f Langeland, 18.05.39
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annexed to the pact that Germany would not undertake to place any obstacle in the 
way of the maintenance by Denmark of normal trade in time of war, even with a 
State at war with Germany. However, although this assurance was repeated verbally 
to the Danish Government immediately before the outbreak or war by a special 
emissary from Berlin, it was not long before Germany sought to evade them on the 
ground that Britain, by placing food-stuffs on the list of conditional contraband and 
by making no practical distinction between conditional and unconditional 
contraband, had introduced a new element into the situation.31
4.1 Reactions in Denmark to the Non-Aggression Pact
The Non-Aggression Pact spurred new criticism from General With towards the 
Government. However, this time he voiced his concerns to the British. It can only be 
guessed what the motive behind this move was, but by making a point of telling the 
British that he was ‘forced’ by Munch to attend the great military celebrations in 
Berlin in connection with the signing of the Pact, he made a firm point to the British 
that he not only disapproved of the Pact, but also did not support the policy chosen 
by his Foreign Affairs Minister; “I did not want to go but Munch forced me,”32 he 
said. It could also be argued that With was trying to arouse the British to be more 
vigilant and take a firmer policy with regard to coming to the rescue should Denmark 
be invaded by the Germans. To Major Kirkman, the Military Attache in Copenhagen, 
General With called attention to several strategic points in Denmark, which, if they 
fell into German hands, would harm British interests in Scandinavia. He also 
mentioned the iron ore traffic and how this would be secured by German bases in 
Denmark and Southern Norway. General With had also suggested that there was a 
chance that the Germans would bomb Swedish vessels to hinder iron ore reaching 
Britain, however this idea was dismissed by the British in a later file33 since such an 
action would harm the German need for Swedish iron ore more than they would gain 
by denying the British the little ore they receive.
31 PRO, FO 371/24782, Political Review for the Year 1939 by Howard-Smith, Copenhagen, 18.01.40
32 PRO, FO 371/23657, N  3941/64/63, August 1939
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28.08.39
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Judging from the comments made to the talk with General With, it seems that the
British were content with finding that his account of the situation of the Danish
defence corresponded with their intelligence. However, if General With had hoped
that his comments would impel the British to take action, he would have been
disappointed. In the comments by Lascelles of the Foreign Office on the cover to the
file of Major Kirkman’s talk with General With it was apparent that With’s accounts
corresponded to the British views of the Danes:
This melancholy account of Danish material and moral weakness
contains little that is new to us the frontier is undefended, the army
negligible and public opinion defeatist Meanwhile it is the opinion of
the Chiefs of Staff that we could not prevent Denmark from being over­
run. All we could do, it seems, is to cut off the supply of fertilisers to 
Denmark and thus in time reduce her value to Germany as a larder.34
In the end of his notes Lascelles also pointed out that it may well be that With was 
pro-British, however, he would soon step down from his post, and his successor, 
General von Stemann, was thought to be much less well-disposed towards the 
British.
General With’s comments were followed up by the Foreign Office with a report from 
General Kirkmann, who had been travelling around in Scandinavia, where he found a 
good deal of difference in opinions as to what actions were expected by the Germans 
towards Scandinavia. In Norway he found that certain officers there, who had 
recently been attached to the German army, were of the impression that the Germans 
would walk into Denmark as soon as the war broke out. According to H.M.’s 
Minister in Oslo, M. Koht had heard from the Danish Government that they did not 
expect such an action from the Germans, however, General von Stemann had 
considered it “quite possible”.35
Despite their differences due to historical disputes the Norwegians rated the Nordic 
community and solidarity higher and were not ready to alienate Denmark from it 
although she signed the Non-Aggression Pact, whereas the rest of the Nordic 
countries including Norway refrained from doing so themselves:
34 PRO, FO 371/23657, N  3941/64/63, August 1939
35 PRO, FO 371/23657, N  3981, M .I.2/723, from Major Kirkman, War Office, to Lascelles, FO,
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...he [Norwegian Minister at Berlin] remarked, [that] it was desirable to 
make the best of the Danish decision to accept the offer of a pact from 
the German Government and to represent this as fully compatible with 
Nordic solidarity.36
The nature of the Non-Aggression Pact and the change it would bring to the Danish 
situation with regard to the other Scandinavian countries, and Britain, was played 
down by the Danes. It was argued that “those who tried to make out that Denmark’s 
co-operation minus an active military league in the North was valueless were doing 
the cause of Nordic co-operation a disservice...”37 and it was also strongly pointed 
out that the pact did not entail any alteration to Denmark’s position as a neutral and 
independent state. It was also, however, stressed by the Danish Minister of Defence 
that those who thought otherwise were not ‘responsible statesmen’38, thus trying to 
undermine the critics.
a) Dr. Munch’s position to the Non-Aggression Pact
If the Defence Minister was uncertain, it did not change the Foreign Affairs
Minister’s belief in the Pact. Munch felt secure that the Non-Aggression Pact would
save the Danish from being attacked by the Germans. When Ramsay raised the point
of Germany not having mentioned Denmark amongst those countries, which were
given assurance against attacks, Munch replied that such an assurance was
“superfluous after the signature of the non-aggression pact”.39 However, Munch had
said that there was only
one point on which the Germans did not feel quite comfortable and that 
was the question of the flight of aircraft over Danish territory. They did 
not mind flights along the Belts and Sound, which were provided for in 
the new Danish neutrality regulations, but they could not tolerate flights 
over land, viz., Jutland and Zealand, and they expected the Danes to 
prevent it. Munch had replied to Herr von Renthe-Fink that Denmark 
would do her best to defend her neutrality, but to me [Ramsay] he 
remarked that at night aircraft flying at a great height would be almost 
impossible to detect and quite impossible to deal with. The German 
Minister had admitted that this was a difficult question.40
36 PRO, FO 371/23655, Collier, FO, to Dormer, Oslo, 24.05.39
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Ramsay was not convinced by Munch and in his comments to the report of the talk 
he wrote:
I think it would provide a very convenient excuse if at any time the 
German Government want to withdraw their assurance and invade 
Denmark. I asked Dr. Munch whether he felt confidence in the German 
assurance. He said he did. I said I gathered the military officers seemed 
to hold other views. He waved that remark aside with a, for him, unusual 
gesture of the arms.41
Unsurprisingly the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact also sparked off criticism 
abroad, especially in the Allied Press. In France the national papers Le Temps and Le 
Soir suggested that Denmark had signed the pact in a panic. They were also critical 
with regard to the fact that the act could not be construed as neutrality.42 Defending 
their deed the Danish newspaper Social-Demokraten, the organ of Stauning’s party, 
argued that “not only does the pact in no way threaten Danish exports but it even 
specifically guarantees that Germany in the event of war will not regard exports to a 
third party as an unneutral act.”43 It was acknowledged that “in regard to Danish 
military policy it was necessary to maintain a neutrality defence also after the 
conclusion of the pact in order to show the world that they, like the other 
Scandinavian countries, would insist on their neutrality.”44
5. Neutrality and the awareness of belligerents’ views on Danish neutrality after the 
outbreak of war
At the opening of the 92nd Ordinary Session of the Danish Rigsdag on October 3rd
1939 Stauning gave a picture of the state Denmark found herself in.
There was no ground for alarm in the country, as Denmark’s neutrality 
had been recognized and her relations were friendly with all powers, but 
this fact made it all the more necessary to maintain the most complete 
impartiality towards the belligerent nations. While they were thus spared 
the serious worries with which others had to contend, they had good 
reason to be dismayed at the difficulties brought upon them by the war.
Their present stocks, although considerable, would only last a limited 
time if new supplies were not assured. The possibility of a shortage of
41 PRO, FO 371/23657, N  4037, letter from Ramsay, Copenhagen, to Halifax, F.O., 28.08.39
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fuel and raw materials which had to be reckoned with in the event of 
normal supplies being interrupted, had already necessitated the stoppage 
or restriction of various undertakings, and they must undoubtedly be 
prepared for increased unemployment in the event of their being unable 
to maintain trade with the outside world. He hoped, however, that the 
negotiations now being carried on with the belligerent powers would lead 
to satisfactory results. 5
From his public statements it seemed that Stauning still genuinely believed that 
Danish neutrality would be respected by the belligerents, but he acknowledged that 
the time ahead would be difficult, and to preserve their neutrality the Danes would 
have to walk a tight rope and be vigilant not to offend either of the belligerents. 
Despite this official conviction that Danish neutrality would be respected, it was 
suggested by his critics that this was just a front, because Stauning and his followers 
did not dare to think otherwise.46
Whilst Stauning and Munch were confident that Danish neutrality would be 
respected by the belligerents their Minister in London was not so sure. From 
discussions amongst British officials and politicians mixed messages were received 
as to the value of the neutrality declarations made by the smaller states in Europe at 
the outbreak of war. The further the war advanced the stronger and more widespread 
was the notion, even within the juridical community, that neutrality no longer was 
applicable. Reventlow, therefore, was anxious that the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister were made aware of these sentiments, so that this aspect would be taken 
into account in future considerations.47
In Copenhagen, British Minister, Howard-Smith was left with the impression that 
Munch’s attitude to neutrality in practice was not far from that in London. In 
response to the criticism and accusation of German violations of Scandinavian
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neutrality prior to the British rescue of prisoners of war held in a German vessel in 
Norwegian territorial waters, known as the ‘Altmark’ incident (which will be 
discussed later in this chapter) Munch merely replied that he did not pay much 
attention to criticisms made in newspapers, neither at home or abroad, and that in any 
case, international law was “always altered during a war”.48 From these statements 
Howard-Smith gathered that Munch “did not consider that this indiscriminate sinking 
of neutral vessels was any more illegal than our stopping German exports.”49
Although the Danish approach and attitude to belligerents’ breaches of her neutrality 
was being criticised by both the British and the Germans, there is evidence that the 
Danish officials, in each incident, looked in the Neutrality Act to see what action 
should be taken.50 However, as was noted earlier, owing to their difficult position the 
Danes found it troublesome to make a firm stand, especially towards Germany, 
because Danish neutrality depended upon the belligerents’ goodwill.
5.1 Danish yielding to German pressure to mine the Straits
The British were right in feeling dismayed over Danish neutrality51. One example of 
the Danes complying to German demands was the mining of Danish straits, which 
the Germans demanded after submarines were sighted passing through the straits on
their way to the Baltic Sea. Whether or not the submarines were British, or in fact
German, which many believed, was never revealed, but the essence was that the 
Danish yielded to the German pressure to uphold their neutrality by controlling the 
passage through the straits. Letting submarines pass through the passages was not in 
compliance with Danish neutrality, the Germans pointed out.52
There were controversies surrounding the incident. Passing through the Danish straits 
deep under water was against the neutrality rules as stated by the Danish and since 
the passage of the submarines had not been sighted by the Danish Marine, and only 
by the German Navy, there was only the German’s word that it had taken place (they 
also claimed that their ships had been shot at by one or more submarines).
48 PRO, FO 419/34, Howard-Smith, Copenhagen, to Halifax, FO, 14.02.40 (46)
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51 PRO, FO 371/24782, Political Review for the Year 1939 by Howard-Smith, Copenhagen, 18.01.40
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Nevertheless, since the passage had occurred in Danish territorial waters, it was their 
neutrality which had been breached, and therefore the Germans were entitled to put 
forward an accusation that the Danes did not fully control their waters, hence the 
necessity of mining the straits. This was a clever move by the Germans to stop the 
British from entering the Baltic, because the move would be contested by the British, 
however the Danes did not find that the German allegation of being shot at by the 
submarine would be a substantial argument to base the case on.53 The fact, that the 
Danish refer to the incident as an ‘allegation’54 gives a good indication that they were 
not too convinced that there was any basis in the German story, but nevertheless they 
found themselves unable to withstand the German pressure.
5.2 Neutral’s view of the belligerents’ attitude
The attitude in the Danish Press by the end of 1939 was that it was the neutral states,
that were the victims in the war because of the measures taken by the belligerents.
Socialdemokraten. the paper of the Social Democrats, wrote: “The war now appears
to be assuming a special form by the threatened intensification of the blockade and
what we may term the unrestricted mine warfare... Modem war seems to us
treacherous and unchivalrous, in addition to which it hits those who are not
participating.” (emphasis in original) And it was also stated that:
.. .Neutral ships are torpedoed now if there is anything in the cargo which 
can be termed contraband. There will always be disagreement as to the
justification for this This new war, this remarkable war, affects the
neutrals most of all. And they can do nothing! They can protest here and 
there but it is felt that in the last resort the belligerent Powers will do 
what it is primarily in their best interests to do, and only that.55
5.3 Criticism of the Danish policy by Danes
In an open letter addressed to Christmas M0ller, the leader of the opposition and the 
chairman of the Conservative party, Colonel Giersing, Commanding Officer for the 
Life Guards, violently attacked the Government’s foreign policy. He blamed 
Stauning and Munch personally for “having carried neutrality to such an exaggerated 
length that Denmark was now completely isolated with her defences so weak that she
53 SA, 6.P.5a/1961/372, Memorandum from UM regarding the decision o f November 20th, 1939, to 
mine Danish territorial waters south o f the Straits.
54 SA, 6.P.5/161/372, Memorandum from UM regarding the decision o f November 20th, 1939, to mine 
Danish territorial waters south of the Straits
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was incapable of protecting herself.”56 Despite protests from the leader of the 
Conservative Party, who refused to “believe that the Prime Minster had meant the 
words he had said in the New Year’s speech, namely that Denmark was incapable of 
resorting to arms, was certain that any violation of Danish neutrality or infringement 
of her independence would be resisted by armed force.”57 He nevertheless concluded 
that “the Prime Minster’s speech, however, had been so unclear, that it gave rise to 
doubts, both at home in Denmark and abroad, concerning Denmark’s true 
position.”58
Colonel Giersing’s outburst was followed by reactions in the national newspapers the
next morning, bringing the Government and especially the Minister of Foreign
Affairs under fire; National Tidende wrote:
It is Dr. Munch’s responsibility that Denmark finds herself in her present 
position. While Sweden builds up her defences, Denmark demobilises 
her troops. While Finland continues her heroic struggle, the Danes are 
told by their Prime Minister that they can do nothing, dare not do 
anything and consequently have no wish to do anything.59
Weeks after the outbreak of war Stauning stated the Danish policy with regard to the 
war as being to
maintain an honest and unconditional neutrality towards all sides. It must 
be their aim to maintain Danish independence and to lead Denmark 
through the conflagration without being involved in any dispute. This 
aim would be best achieved if the Rigsdag, the press and the population 
observed a completely impartial attitude towards the Powers engaged in 
the conflict.60
Danish attempts to uphold an appearance of strict neutrality were in vain. Unlike 
their neighbour to the East, Norway, their situation, due to their geographical 
location, dependence upon trade with the belligerents and near absence of an army, 
did not allow them to follow the laws of neutrality to the full. Danish neutrality was,
56 PRO, FO 371/24782, Howard-Smith, Copenhagen, to FO, Report on Political Situation in Denmark,
20.01.40
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nevertheless, to be judged in comparison with Norwegian neutrality for the 
remainder of the war. Danes in exile, therefore, were in a constant struggle to restore 
the Danish reputation in order to get some goodwill from their host countries.
C. NORWAY
While Denmark’s neutrality policy was based upon the goodwill of the belligerents 
and the aim to ensure that the goodwill would continue once her territorial neutrality 
inevitably was violated, the Norwegian neutrality policy was based on different 
grounds. Their first and foremost task “was to make sure that Norway was still intact 
and its citizens alive at the end.”61 Unlike Denmark, who had a long history as a 
sovereign state, Norway had just recently, in 1905, left the Union with Sweden. 
Thus, although the Norwegian neutrality policy was not indifferent to the political 
and ideological aspects of neutrality, and Norway politically and culturally was 
closer to the Allies, the policy adopted by the Norwegian Government was a strict 
policy of “neutrality in deed,”62 which meant that overall the policy favoured 
Germany, since the traffic in Norwegian waters of German vessels carrying iron ore 
from the north of Sweden was much greater than that of British vessels.
1. Reactions to British violations of Norwegian neutrality
From the outbreak of war till mid-February Norway was encountering a fair share of 
violations of her neutrality, in her territorial waters in particular. These incidents, 
however, were mainly of a minor scale, since both the British and the Germans were 
interested in keeping the Norwegian territorial waters neutral. However, as the war 
progressed the belligerents became more and more assertive and used the Norwegian 
territorial waters to test each other’s nerves and the Norwegian conduct of neutrality, 
to see if she was more favourable to one of them.
While Denmark found it difficult to maintain a strict neutrality policy, Norway 
succeeded for the most. In one instance, however, the Norwegians interpretation of 
the laws of neutrality was put to the test: the ‘ Altmark’ incident.
61 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2nd ed. BasicBooks, United States o f America, 1992, p. 242
62 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 1992, p. 242
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a) The ‘Altmark’ incident
On February 14th, 1940, a German vessel, ‘Altmark’, entered Norwegian territorial 
waters on its way home to Germany. Aboard the vessel were about 300 British 
seamen, who had been taken as prisoners from vessels captured and sunk by the 
German battle cruiser ‘Admiral Graaf von Spee’. The ‘Altmark’, a former merchant 
vessel but now a naval auxiliary flying the German official service flag 
(Reichsdienstflagge) , which was distinct from the war flag, was hailed thrice by 
Norwegian torpedo boats. The first time the ‘Altmark’ was let go, because she had 
dismounted her anti-aircraft guns before entering Norwegian territorial waters. The 
second time, however, she was asked by the Norwegians whether she had any 
persons onboard belonging to the armed forces or the merchant marine of any 
belligerent country, to which the captain falsely denied. Again, no action was taken 
by the Norwegians. The third time she was stopped by the Norwegians the captain 
would not let the Norwegians search the vessel on the ground that she had already 
been visited. By this time the British were aware of her presence in the territorial 
waters of Norway and forced her into J0ssing Fjord by the British destroyer 
‘Cossack’ where they released the 300-odd prisoners and took them back to England.
In the context of the argument developed in the thesis, the question of whether or not 
Norway was negligent in the ‘Altmark’ incident is not so important. Rather it is the 
consequences of the incident on Anglo-Scandinavian relations and the change of 
British attitude towards neutrals that is of interest. The ‘Altmark’ incident turned out 
to be the redemption the British had been waiting for. From the outbreak of war both 
the British and the Germans had, with relations to Scandinavia, constantly been 
watching each other’s move in Scandinavia, testing the neutrality and the vigilance 
of the Governments in Copenhagen, Oslo and Stockholm. Although Scandinavian 
neutrality per se suited both the British and the Germans, the situation got out of 
hand for both parties and soon they could not tolerate the slightest violation of 
Danish neutrality by the other, and were quick to reprimand the Danes, if they felt 
that the other was shown more favour.
63 E. Borchard, ’’Was Norway Delinquent in the Case o f the Altmark?”, The American Journal o f  
International Law. (34) No. 2, April 1940, p. 289
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The importance of the ‘Altmark’ incident to the thesis is in the change of British 
attitude towards the neutrals, of which the incident became a milestone. Beforehand, 
as will be evident in Chapter II, the British had been held back in their plans for the 
North Atlantic because the islands belonged to the Kingdom of Denmark and Iceland 
and were thus included in the neutrality declarations made by Denmark and Iceland 
at the outbreak of war. The impact of the ‘Altmark’ incident on British policy of war 
and policy towards the North Atlantic will be examined more thoroughly in the next 
chapter.
The British were well aware of that they, in the eyes of the neutrals, were in the 
wrong in the ‘Altmark’ incident. They tried, therefore, to fend off the Norwegian 
protests by highlighting the long-standing highly appreciated friendly relationship 
between the two nations. The British also argued that the points the Norwegians were 
protesting were merely technical, and thus should be looked upon with a “sense of 
proportion.” The British also thought that the Norwegians should try to distinguish 
between substantial breaches of neutrality and plain mistakes, which nevertheless did 
not mean that they should not be looked in to by the British,64 but the Norwegians 
were not persuaded. They pointed out that firstly, the iron-ore transport was not a 
Norwegian issue but a matter between Sweden and Germany, and secondly, that the 
British should not be so quick at judging the Norwegians’ defence of their territorial 
waters, when the British themselves were not able to hinder German u-boats sailing 
into Scapa Flow.65
In a memorandum discussing how Danish Ministers abroad should be instructed as to 
how the Danish Government perceived the ‘Altmark’ incident it was advised that the 
representatives should show a certain, yet indirect, support for the Norwegian cause. 
This attitude was adopted because in the end Denmark found herself in the same 
situation as Norway with regard to belligerents’ neutrality breaches within their 
territories. The Danes, however, were not so sure that they would have reached the 
same conclusion and understanding of events, had they been faced with the same
64 SA, 10.H .35a/l909-45/0002, Reventlow, London, to UM, Copenhagen, Ges. No. 717, 29.03.40, 
citing an article in the Times 28.03.40
65 SA, 10.H .35a/l909-45/0002, Oxholm, Oslo, to UM, Copenhagen, Ges. No. 305, 26.03.40
51
situation.66 Despite their instructions it appears that Danish authorities found that the 
British had some point in their reply to the Norwegian authorities regarding the 
Altmark incident. This was, however, based on the actual juridical interpretation of 
Article 10 in the XIII Haag-Convention (le simple passage). As was repeatedly 
suggested by the British representatives in Denmark, the Danes would go to great 
lengths to remain neutral and stay out of the conflict; realising the change of the 
British mood towards the neutrals, it is therefore not be surprising that they showed 
understanding for the British argument.
Despite their protestations the Norwegians could also make sense of the British 
actions as they realised that it must have been frustrating to stand by and see an 
enemy vessel go by with 300 countrymen onboard, and the Norwegian Press 
exclaimed understanding to the moral indignation and psychological factors of the
AftBritish action. Nevertheless, although there were some discrepancies in the 
reactions to the ‘Altmark’ incident within Scandinavian countries, the overall policy 
was to show support and draw a similar line on breaches of their neutrality, in order 
not to provoke an escalation of belligerent activities in their waters. However, as it 
turned out, they were not successful. Shortly after the ’Altmark’ incident, Danish 
Minister in London, Reventlow, informed his Government in Copenhagen that the 
British tone towards the neutrals had changed. A clear signal was given that patience 
with the neutrals was up, and this made Reventlow certain that the ‘Altmark’ 
incident would not be a ‘one off’ incident69 and quoted the Daily Mail stating that 
“hopefully the World would understand by now that Britain in the future would act 
in the exact same way under similar situations”,70 (translated) and the Yorkshire Post 
for stating that what happened in the ‘Altmark’ incident would show the World that 
the British would not be bluffed, neither by the Nazis nor the neutrals.”71 (translated) 
The realisation in Denmark of the change of mood in Britain was noted and the effect 
it had on the Danes was applauded by the British Minister in Copenhagen:
66 SA, 10.H .35c/l909-45/0002, Memorandum discussing how Danish Ministers abroad should be 
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it is apparent that various factors, such as the Altmark incident...[has] 
tended of late to bring home to Danish opinion more fully than before 
Britain’s determination to see the war through to a victorious end and her 
refusal to allow Germany to break all the rules of international law 
without taking effective counter-measures. Although the Altmark 
incident....at first gave rise to some criticism of Great Britain in the 
Danish press, a more favourable tone prevailed after the first excitement 
was over, while public opinion was divided between a genuine fear that 
the incident might prove a dangerous precedent for further belligerent 
operations in territorial waters, Danish and Swedish, as well as 
Norwegian, and sympathy with the humane aspects of the British exploit.
There is no doubt that as a result of this episode German prestige suffered 
a serious blow in Danish eyes and that British prestige was considerably 
enhanced.72
The Danes got further indications that the mood in Britain towards the neutrals had 
changed since the ‘Altmark’ incident when Chamberlain gave the British Press free 
run and said that there would be no more censorship on articles dealing with the 
neutrals and he more or less encouraged the press to be more vigorously in their 
writings about the neutrals.73 It was also reported that although Chamberlain was 
very critical of the Norwegians handling of the ‘Altmark’ incident, he nevertheless 
did not give any juridical motive for his criticism, and that was very much in line 
with what his Minister of Foreign Affairs Halifax, told Reventlow’s Norwegian 
colleague the previous day.74 From a Danish correspondent with connections within 
the Foreign Office in London he depicted the impression that within the FO it was 
openly believed that the British action taken in the incident had very weak grounds in 
international law, but strong grounds in the humanitarian aspect. The humanitarian 
aspect was also stressed by the head of the Northern Department at the FO in a 
conversation with the Norwegian Minister in London,75 Reventlow reported to 
Munch.
The British had achieved what they set out to do and the Danes and Norwegians were 
right to fear that the incident would create precedence, especially since the reactions
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Hf\reported from the United States to the incident were in favour of the British actions. 
Reventlow pointed out that it was being put forward that the British through the 
‘Altmark’ incident in a matter of 24 hours had achieved more prestige worldwide and 
had managed to calm American critics of the British warfare, than 6 months of 
political statements had managed so far. Reventlow also brought to attention a 
statement made by Churchill in a speech at the Guild Hall the previous day, where he 
referred to Norwegian neutrality as ‘one-sided neutrality’ .77
The Daily Mail wrote in the aftermath that if German warships were allowed to make 
use of Norwegian territorial waters then there should be no reason why the British 
could not do the same. The communist paper, Daily Worker, had a completely 
different take on the incident. The romantic notion, of the British handling on 
humanitarian grounds, which the British Government was trying to attach to the 
incident, was far from the reality of the situation, the paper argued. Rather it was a 
carefully calculated move by the British to show the Scandinavian countries that the 
British had lost their tolerance towards them, following the Scandinavian adamant 
wish to stick to their neutrality and not letting allied troops use their territory for 
transit, and now wanted to teach the Scandinavians a lesson and show them that their 
neutrality was worth much to the British. The paper also accuses the British of 
bringing the war to the neutrals, then causing havoc, complaining and threatening the 
neutrals for not complying to British demands, in order to conceal the fact that they 
breached international law.78 The British arguments were thus questioned by the 
Danes, and looking in hindsight the Daily Worker, was probably not that far from the 
truth.
D. THE FAROE ISLANDS, ICELAND AND GREENLAND
On the eve of the Second World War a joint declaration of neutrality79 was made by
the so-called ‘Oslo states’, which included the declaration of neutrality of the three
76 SA, 5.F.8/1909-45/0002, Reventlow to Munch, UM, 20.02.40
77 SA, 10.H.35c/1909-45/0002, Reventlow to UM, Copenhagen, 24.02.40, accompanied by the 
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Conventions, especially V and XIII. However, due to developments and technical changes in warfare,
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island regions in the North Atlantic, Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands. Thus, 
when the war broke out these islands in the North Atlantic were neutral territories 
and this clearly posed some manoeuvring problems to those powers wanting control 
over the North Atlantic.
Iceland had already gained much independence at the outbreak of the Second World 
War and was internationally recognised as a sovereign country. The Faroese 
independence movement, meanwhile, had not advanced as quickly as it had in 
Iceland prior to the war, and had therefore, in the late 1930s, reached the same point 
as the Icelandic movement had been in late 1910s, that is, that there were heavy 
debates as to whether the Faroes should follow Iceland and break away from the 
Danish Constitutional Rule and thus have the opportunity to break with the Union or 
stay as part of the Danish Kingdom.
1. Danish concerns about their territories in the North Atlantic 
On the eve of the outbreak of war the Conservative members of the Parliamentary 
Committee of Twenty-One, which was formed the previous autumn to consider 
questions relating to Danish defence, addressed an open letter to Stauning pointing 
out that no steps had yet been taken to call the Committee together, criticising the 
failure of the Government to take measures of preparedness during the present crisis 
and demanding “rapid and resolute action and the calling up of increased forces for 
the army and navy if Denmark in a rapid maintenance of neutrality in her territory”.80 
However, whether that would include the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland it did 
not say, but it would be tempting to guess that it would not, because the territories in 
the North Atlantic were very seldom mentioned in considerations regarding the 
Danish situation in a possible war, and it seems that they were not at all included in
which had appeared in the meantime, some adjustments or additions had to be made, but as a whole, 
the declaration was not much different.
Article V o f the Hague Convention: Rights and duties o f Neutral Powers and persons in War on Land, 
which laid down the code o f conduct, in article (I) o f the rights and duties o f neutral Powers; (II) o f 
belligerent interned and wounded soldiers attended to in neutral countries; (III) o f neutral persons; and 
railway material. § 1, Inviolability o f Neutral Territory: ‘T his principle is the most basic o f all. It is 
absolute. It must be respected by the belligerents and defended by the neutrals....), § 2, Abstentation 
from lending Assistance to the Belligerents, § 3, Requirement o f strict impartiality in other cases. 
Article XIII: Neutrality Law in time o f Naval War.
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the definition of ‘Danish defence,’ because there were no references made to the fact 
that they would need defence against enemy attack.
In an article in the Danish Communist paper, Arbeiderbladet, in March 1939 the 
Icelandic refusal to meet the German request for airbases on their island was noted, 
but the Danes were not sure whether that request also included a naval base. The 
Danes were thus aware of the increased interest in Iceland shown by the Germans. 
According to the Icelandic Prime Minister, the German demand for airbases was 
based on some old Most-Favoured-Nation treaties between the two countries, 
however the Icelanders refused to let the Germans use these rights as an argument, as 
no other nation was enjoying these rights. The Danes were also worried that this 
move by the Germans was a confirmation of the rumours that she was planning on 
using Iceland as a operational basis for planes and submarines to attack the North of 
the British Isles. It was also acknowledged that the Faroes, because of their strategic 
position north of Scotland, were in immediate danger.81
In June 1939 the magazine Greenland worried that while the rest of the world was 
hastily preparing for war nothing had been heard of whether the Danish Government 
had taken the situation of the Faroe Islands and Greenland into account and made 
sure that these areas also were provided with enough provisions and security in the 
event of war breaking out.82
2. The Faroe Islands
In 1816 the Faroe Islands became a county of Denmark and the old L0gting, possibly 
the oldest parliament in Europe, was reinstated, but only as a county council to the 
Danish administration in the islands, which was represented by an Amtmand 
(Governor). The L0gting, however, exercised power over a wider area of county 
issues than other counties in Denmark, while the Governor only exercised the same 
powers as his colleagues in Denmark. At the outbreak of war the Rigsdag, the Danish 
Parliament, put into force a law, that gave the county administrators increased 
authority over issues, which otherwise were under Parliamentary jurisdiction. In
81 Arbeiderbladet, ’’Naziregeringeen kraever Flyvebaser paa Island”, 22.03.39
82 Grpnland, Nr. 26, 3. Aargang, Juni 1939, p. 6, ”Har Grpnland og Faerperne Reservelagre hvis der 
udbryder Krig?”
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relations to this move to spread out the power in the event of a war crippling the 
central administration in Copenhagen, the Governor in the Faroe Islands, was given 
similar powers. This meant that he would be able to exert authority, in line with 
recommendations from the Lpgting and Landsnevnd (County Committee), to pass 
laws, such as ban of exports and restrictions on goods, if needed.
In the 1880s an independence movement arose amongst Faroese students in 
Copenhagen, which was later to be run from the Faroes. Joannes Patursson was the 
front man of this movement, the same man, who in 1906 founded the ‘Home Rule 
Party’, demanding independence from Denmark. Although the independence 
movement in the Faroes had not progressed as far as that in Iceland by the outbreak 
of war, the Faroes had not been completely untouched by the liberal and nationalist 
movements in the rest of Europe. One example was the status of the Faroese 
language, which in 1910 was allowed as a supplementary language in the schools. In 
1918 a law was passed by the Lpgting that Faroese orthography should become an 
obligatory subject in the schools. In the following decades the language was given 
further eminence, but by the outbreak of war the Faroese language was still not 
recognised as the legal language in courts, despite the proposal being passed by votes 
in the Lpgting in 193883 -  the obstacle being the Danish Governor, who was reluctant 
to pass any legislation with regard to the Faroese language. The language question 
became one of the issues that created tension between the Faroese and Danish during 
the occupation; another one was the flag issue, which became the most potent issue 
between the islanders and the Governor, which the British got involved in during 
their occupation of the Faroes.
2.1 Reactions in the Faroes to the hostilities (pre-occupation of Denmark).
The immediate worries amongst the Faroese at the outbreak of war were the aspect 
of supplies and the islands neutrality.
83 Edvard Mitens, Eg minnist. Skrivstovustiori L0gtinsins. H.N. Jacobsens Bokhandil, Torshavn, 
1969, 248
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a) Supplies
Mitens, who was the chairman of the L0gting from 1939 to 1949, points out in his 
diary, that when in 1938 there was a momentary danger for war breaking out, the 
Landsnevnd (County Committee) decided to stock up on wheat supplies. However, 
the Faroese believed that they, along with the Nordic countries, would be able to stay 
neutral in the conflict, as they had successfully done in World War I. Therefore no 
further immediate actions were taken in response to the looming conflict, until in 
1939 they made additional moves to assure that enough supplies were in the island, 
should war break out.85 In 1939 there were 158 sloops and schooners and 10 
trawlers. Faroese fisheries took place predominantly in waters around Iceland and 
Greenland. Thus despite the outbreak of war, the Faroese continued their fishery.
At a meeting in the Governor’s office (participants were members of the Landsnevnd 
and the Governor himself) on Friday September 1st 1939, and the following couple of 
days, the looming war situation was discussed, but only in terms of the supply 
matters. A proclamation was made on the situation in which, amongst other things, it 
was stated that since Denmark had declared her neutrality there was nothing that 
indicated that she would be drawn into the war. Therefore there was no reason why 
the Faroes should fear loosing her supplies from Denmark, so there was no need to 
worry. It was calculated that supplies on the islands would last for 3-6 months, but, 
to be on the safe side, there were some goods, which would be barred from being 
exported and hoarding was banned.87 Making withdrawal of more than DKK 300 
was also banned.88 On October 16th 1939 the British consul informed the governor 
that he had received a message from Britain stating that a new rule regarding 
supplies to the Faroes was put in order. This rule stated that goods could only be sent 
to the Faroes if the receiver signed a statement that they would not export the goods
89on to Germany.
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Although there are few records of concerns amongst the Faroese politicians with the 
outbreak of war, apart from the supply situation, there are suggestions that the 
authorities in the Faroes did take the war situation and the subsequent rules that 
followed seriously. When in doubt, as to whether some goods could be exported and 
where they could be exported to according to the contraband rules of the British, the 
matters were seriously dealt with, and there is a strong indication that they did not 
want to make any mistakes. The reason for this probably was that they knew that 
they would lose the cargo, if everything was not in order. The Danish Governor, 
however, downplayed the gravity of the British contraband rules. To one of the 
chairmen of the Faroese shipping company he stated that he only saw these rules as a 
piece of information and it was his belief, that the shipping company first and 
foremost should follow the Governor’s advice rather than the British Consul’s 
advice, because he, the Governor, would always put the safety of the voyage first and 
not the contraband rules of a third country. This, the governor remarked, was his own 
decision and not the decision of the Danish Foreign Affairs Ministry, however the 
latter knew of his standpoint.90 This episode gives an indication of the character of 
Governor Hilbert and his lack of ability to cooperate with other authorities, and his 
manoeuvres to diminish the authority of others, especially rivals. This characteristic 
will become clearer and examined further in Chapter III.
b) Relations between the Danish Governor Hilbert and the British Consul Lutzen 
This attitude of the Danish Governor prior to the British occupation of the Faroes is 
interesting taken into account that he would be their closest cooperative partner 
during the occupation. However, it is more likely that it was not the British per se 
which the Governor had a problem with. In Chapter IE we will see that the Governor 
mainly kept himself to a close group of people, mainly other Danes in important 
positions on the islands. He was subsequently accused for having little regard for the 
locals, because of this elitist attitude.91 Thus, the attitude of the Governor towards the 
British Consul was probably due to the fact that the British Consul in the islands was 
a local businessman. Or, it could be speculated, that in the British Consul the 
Governor saw a rival in terms of authority over the islands.
90 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr. 1. Udskrift af Faero amts dagbog. (A.I.-). p. 24
91 PRO, FO 371/32761, Memorandum by Mr. Turville Petre o f the Royal Institute o f International 
Affairs
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In a separate incident, the Governor again showed lack of respect for the British
Consul Liitzen. On September 24th 1939 the Governor was informed by the Torshavn
Radio telegraph that he has received a message from Wick Radio concerning a
submarine sinking an oil-tanker near the Faroes. Hilbert decided (pointing out that
this decision was taken in accord with the telegraph personal) that it was not
necessary to inform the British Consul of the incident. As to why he did not inform
the Consul, the Governor did not expand on, but it created a situation between the
two. Whether or not this was part of a power-struggle between the two, one can only
guess, but after the arrival of the British, relations between Hilbert and Liitzen turned
sour. It certainly is interesting that Hilbert chose to withhold this information,
because he had as such nothing to gain by withholding it. Hilbert’s remark, however,
to the Consul, when the latter confronted him about the incident and said that he
would appreciate that the governor would inform him of incidents like this in the
future, does give a sense of some kind of battle between the two of them:
[the Governor] did not see it necessary to inform the Consul, since the 
matter was taken care of by the local authorities -  and the Governor 
assumed that the British Admiralty would contact the Consul himself, if 
his assistance was wanted.92
This is again an example of how very resourceful in guarding his power and 
subsequently Danish interests in the islands Hilbert was. Although he was not a 
popular man, he nevertheless was highly successful at influencing the British and 
thus almost without error succeed in being in control over internal affairs despite the 
presence of a foreign power on the islands and despite being cut off from his home 
Government.
c) Neutrality
Local politician Joannes Patursson pointed out to the Ldgting that although the Faroe 
Islands were included in the Danish neutrality declaration, it was worth remembering 
that while the Scandinavian states had national services, the Faroe Islands and 
Iceland in accordance to the national defence law of Denmark from 1848 had no 
defence at all. While Iceland, owing to their dependent signature of the neutrality
92 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr. 1. Udskrift af Faerp amts dagbog. (A .I.). pp. 
15-6.
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declaration, was master of their own fate, the Faroes were tied with the fate of 
Denmark in the conflict, and therefore would be dragged into the war, if Denmark 
was attacked. This reality concerned Patursson, and he hoped that the other members 
of the Lagting would bear it in mind.93
After the outbreak of war the Governor informed the population of what the 
neutrality declaration entailed, the guidelines and rules to be followed, and if 
breached, what the punishment or fines were; for example, passing on information, 
which might be to the advantage of one belligerent state against the other, would be 
penalised with jail up to 6 years. However, depending on the circumstances, the fine 
could be much less and jail could be avoided. Openly offending a foreign nation’s 
flag would also be fined or in extreme cases punished with a jail-sentence. Subjects 
should also refrain from making comments in larger groups of people or arrange 
demonstrations against any belligerent.94
3. Greenland
In the aftermath of the decolonisation of South America, the July Revolution in 
France, and the rise of the free trade movement the Danish King decided to lift the 
monopoly on Iceland and in the West Indies colonies. This decision consequently 
prompted questions regarding the situation of Greenland, which remained a closed 
territory to the outside world with all trade going through the “Enehandelen” (Royal 
Greenland Trade Company), which was established in 1776 introducing a state- 
administered trade monopoly fully supportive of the Danish colony policy. In 
Copenhagen there were certain circles of businessmen and other influential people 
with strong finances, who saw the opportunity of having Greenland ‘opened up’, 
because she was rich in natural resources. Their argument was also that the 
indigenous population, who lived a basic life based on their hunting, should be 
brought to a civilized stage. These demands were met by the Royal Greenland Trade 
Company’s assertion that open trade on Greenland would lead to the exploitation of 
the Greenlanders and also the argument that the introduction of and subsequently the
93 SA, 8.H .la/1909-45/0002, Faer0eme: Indre forhold og forholdet til Danmark I-III, Joannes 
Patursson to F0roya L0gting, 05.09.39
94 FL, Futin, II Verdenskrig 1940-45, 7.A., Neutralitetsbestemmelser, militaere forhold, 
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influence of the European way of life would damage the Greenlanders and their 
natural adaptation to living in such a hostile physical environment. The Danes were 
thus faced with a dilemma whether to open up Greenland to free competition and let 
the Greenlanders make it on their own at their own risk, with the possible chance of 
much trouble and direct danger to their livelihood; or should the Danes continue their 
‘protection-policy’ and ward off the blows of the side-effects of free competition and 
modem civilisation, and help when help was asked for, with the risk of creating 
helplessness and lack of initiative amongst the Greenlanders.95
Discontent with how the island was run, and the subsequent problems it caused for 
the local population, resulted in an early 20th century proposal from those, who 
wanted the best for the Greenlanders, recommending changes in the structure of 
Greenland. It proposed that district councils should be established as well as a 
‘Landsrad’ (Greenland Council) for North-Greenland and one for South-Greenland, 
which then should meet regularly. In 1908 a proposal was passed in the Danish 
Parliament, where the ‘Enehandelen’ and the administration of Greenland were 
separated and district councils and Landsrad established. The role of the district 
councils was to take care of social and general matters and to administrate the 
allocation of social means and goods. In the Landsrad the inspectors were ‘born’ 
leaders, while the other members were selected by the district councils. To the local 
Greenlanders, the establishment of these Landsrad meant that it provided them with a 
forum, where they had the opportunity to meet with fellow Inuit from other districts 
and discuss common issues that affected their daily lives. Although this system had 
its weaknesses, especially because the separation of Trade and Administration was 
impracticable, this set the basis for how Greenland was governed locally, while the 
main authority lay with the Greenland Committee (Gr0nlands Styrelse) in 
Copenhagen.
3.1 Reactions to U.S. interest in Greenland
A leading article in Greenland in March 1937 put the question as to whether 
Denmark seriously was contemplating selling Greenland to the Americans. It
95 Mads Lidegaard, Gr0nlands Historie, Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck A/S, Gullander, Skjern, 
1991, p. 139
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mentioned the sale of the West Indies Islands and connected the American goodwill, 
that stemmed from that sale, with the moral back-up the Americans put behind the 
Danish case when the Dano-Norwegian dispute over Greenland was fought out at the 
International Court at the Hague. Also, the article questioned the apparent rise of 
American interest in the island, for example Charles Lindberg’s flight to Greenland 
and his extensive flights over the island, of which the public learned little; hence 
suspicions arose as to the purpose of these reconnaissance flights. Moreover, a 
sudden interest of the American Minister to Denmark, Mrs. Bryan Owens, in 
Greenland fuelled suspicions. So did a 3 month long expedition that took place 
simultaneously as the U.S. Government sent a ship of war to the waters of Greenland 
‘on a scientific expedition’ with several experts within the fields of geology, 
engineering and military, onboard, caused concern in Denmark. The Danish public 
was only given a ‘laconic’ notification about this, and it was explained that it was a 
result of the ‘warm affection’ the American Minister felt towards the island. The 
author, the editor of the magazine, was also suspicious of the invitations that several 
Danish ministerial officials along with Prime Minister Stauning had received from 
President Roosevelt inviting them to Washington. Stauning, however, was never able 
to go in the end. His plans to go were put back three times, due to illness and 
extensive workload at the Rigsdag. The article, however, questioned what the real 
reason for the sudden reluctance to meet up with Roosevelt was. The reason, it was 
believed, was that in the meantime, the rumours of the intended sale of Greenland to 
the U.S. had spread and had aroused great interest within diplomatic circles as well 
as amongst the public. Also, the editor believed that Stauning was afraid of further 
attacks and accusations from the association “Luk Gr0nland op” (Open Up 
Greenland), which was very critical of the Danish policy of monopoly in Greenland. 
In the end the editor nevertheless reassured the reader that at the present moment the 
Danish Government had been able to verify that no form of negotiation of a sale of 
Greenland has taken place whatsoever.96
Two years later, in 1939, the issue re-emerged. The news that Senator Lundeen 
proposed to Congress that the United States should buy Greenland from Denmark in 
order to use the island as a naval base caused much uproar in Denmark. Danish
96 Gr0nland, Nr. 3, Marts 1937. Redakt0r: Th. Damsgaard Schmidt. A/S 1. Ihrich. Kbhvn.
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Prime Minister Stauning’s only comment was that the Danish Government was 
unaware of the existent of such a proposal. The Chairman of the “Luk Grpnland Op” 
society, Damsgaard Schmidt, was, however, not too convinced by the Prime 
Minister’s reply and in an article in the society’s paper reminded the reader that it too 
was a Radical-Socialist Government which in 1917 claimed to know nothing of any 
negotiations with the United States regarding the Danish West Indies, and only few 
days later the Danes were informed that the islands had been sold.97
3.2 Relations with the Faroe Islands
The vast unexploited natural resources of Greenland also aroused interest in the 
Faroes during the 1920s. Since the Greenlanders only conducted their hunting from 
traditional kayaks the rich fishing grounds outside the Greenland coast laid 
practically untouched. The Faroese fishing vessels therefore exercised their rights as 
associates of the Danish Kingdom to access the Greenland waters, as they practically 
were part of the common waters of the Kingdom. The Danes found it difficult to 
deny the Faroese trawlers the right to fish in Greenland, because they were aware of 
the increased support the independence movement gained in the island, and therefore 
wanted the Faroese to recognise the benefits of being an associate of the Danish 
Kingdom. The Greenlanders, however, did not take well to the Faroese presence in 
their waters, because they feared that the Faroese, with their advanced trawlers 
would clear the waters and leave nothing for the Greenlanders, who were confined to 
coastal fishing in their small boats. Thus, despite the fact that they were offered 
work, both on land and on the ships, by the Faroese, who also taught the 
Greenlanders how to progress from small coastal fishing to trawling the high seas, 
the Greenlanders wanted the Faroese presence to be contained. The Faroese, 
however, were more successful in their negotiations with the Danes and were granted 
some natural harbours on the East-Coast from where their fishing was conducted 
during the summer months.98
97 Gr0nland, Nr. 25, 3 Aargang, Maj 1939, p. 2 ’’Grpnlands skaebne allerede beseglet?”
98 Lidegaard, Gr0nlands Historie, 1991, pp. 177-8
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4. Iceland
Like the Faroe Islands and Greenland, Iceland had spent the last 1000 years under the 
rule of another country, first Norway, then the kingdom of Denmark-Norway and 
since 1814 the Danish Kingdom. The early period of Danish rule in particular saw an 
extreme economic exploitation of the island and political domination by the Danes. 
Coupled with the longstanding wish for reforms and the nationalistic movement in 
the 20th century, this resulted in a strong independence movement in the island and 
amongst Icelanders abroad. In 1918 a temporary solution was reached with the 
Government in Copenhagen, which granted Iceland sovereignty over all aspects 
except foreign affairs, which would remain in the hands of Copenhagen. This was the 
Act of Union, which was to be revised in 1940, and if neither the Althing or the 
Danish Rigsdag could come to a joint decision on the future of the Act by 1943, 
either party could unilaterally sever the union, provided its decision had a two thirds 
majority in the respective assembly and was ratified by three/quarters of the voters in 
a national referendum." To the Icelanders the Act of Union thus was an important 
step towards their independence.
According to this Danish-Icelandic Act of Union of November 30th 1918 Iceland was 
a free and sovereign state united with Denmark by a common King and by the 
agreement embodied in the Act. One of the provisions of this act was that Denmark 
was entrusted with the safeguard of Iceland’s foreign affairs. According to paragraph 
1 of the Icelandic constitution it was a limited monarchy, and the King had the 
highest power in all affairs of the state subject to the reservations set forth in the 
constitution.
a) Icelandic situation at the outbreak of war
The Great War showed that because of her dependence on the sea-lanes to Denmark, 
which were easily cut off by the belligerents, Icelandic neutrality could not rely on 
the connection with Denmark in time of war; instead it showed that “within the limits 
set by her neutrality, Iceland was firmly placed in a British sphere of influence.”100
99 The Act o f Union is printed in full in translation in British and Foreign State Papers 1917-18. CXI, 
London, 1921, pp. 703-06
100 Thor Whitehead, Iceland in the Second World War 1939-1946. D. Phil. Thesis, Pembroke College, 
1978, p. 12
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Iceland’s three main objectives in the late 1930s with the looming war in sight were 
to a) expand their export market and credits, b) to deal with the German threat, and c) 
to solve the danger of wartime privation.
By the end of March 1939 the Danish Minister in Reykjavik reported to Copenhagen 
that concerns were voiced at the Althing regarding the situation of the island in the 
event of war breaking out and what preparations/precautions were in place. 
Especially the question as to what Denmark would do in order to secure the safety of 
the island was voiced.101 With the lack of British willingness to meet Icelandic 
wishes on these areas,102 the Icelanders thus looked to the West to the United States 
in order to break out of their difficult position.
4.1 Icelandic relations with U.S.
In the United States the American-Icelandic arctic explorer, Dr. Vilhjalmur 
Stefansson, whom most Icelanders considered as their international icon, did his best 
to arouse American interest in the island. It was his enthusiastic pioneering of the 
idea of a northern air route which made him a “natural advisor to the American 
aviation industry,”103 and upon whose expertise the U.S. military later relied.
Throughout the 1930s Iceland began steadily to grow her trade with the United
States. This was, as mentioned before, a direct result of the British unwillingness to
meet Icelandic needs and by 1938 US share in Icelandic exports had risen from 2.6
per cent to 9.1 per cent.104 In an attempt to further their relationship with the
Americans, the Icelandic Government decided to participate in the 1939 New York
World Fair. The importance of this move and the economic motivation behind it was
expressed by Jonas Jonsson in an article in Timinn:
With the great market difficulties in Europe the Icelandic nation places 
its hope on America...the great free continent which has all the products 
we need, and which can buy everything we have to offer. It [the Icelandic 
nation] knows that America is the future market for the Icelanders and 
one-third of the [Icelandic] kin live there.105
101 SA, 9.D.44/1909-45/0002, From Fontenay, Reykjavik, to the Prime Minister’s Office, Copenhagen
31.03.39
102 PRO, FO 371/23656, FO to the Secretary of Treasury, 29.07.39
103 Whitehead, Iceland in the Second World War 1939-1946, p. 19
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The New York World Fair turned out to be a turning point in Icelandic-American 
relations. The Icelanders had appointed Vilhjalmur Thor and Thor Thors as 
commissioners to the Fair, and this was a symbolic move in more than one sense. 
While Vilhjalmur Thor “was a brilliant executive of the self-made type and an 
influential member of the progressive/co-operative hierarchy which in earlier times 
had initiated the economic relationship with Britain,” his colleague, Thor Thors, was 
“a high-ranking parliamentarian and brother of the industry minister, Olfaur Thors, 
the leader of the Independence Party.”106 They therefore represented not only the 
move to greater economic independence and self-sustainability, but also the move 
towards greater political independence and the move away from Denmark.
The Icelandic Government was well aware that the war could sever all seaways 
eastward and that the Icelanders thus could only rely upon their trade with the United 
States. During their stay in the United States in connection with the World Trade Fair 
the commissioners explored all possibilities for exports and raising loans in the 
United States. Their hard work did not go by without result and they were able to 
establish lasting contacts with the State Department, with whom they urged to open 
an American consulate in Reykjavik. That was not established until after the war 
broke out though, because the State Department found that the trade with the island 
was too insignificant for a consular post.107
In the meantime an Icelandic National Union was set up in the United States to 
further cultivate the bonds between the Icelandic-American community and the ‘old 
country’. The Icelandic community in the U.S. was at the time numbering about 
40,000 people.108 Its chairman was the aforementioned Dr. Vilhjalmur Stefansson. 
For the World Trade Fair Stefansson wrote, at the request of the Icelandic 
Government, what would be one of the more influential pieces of work in their 
relations with the United States, namely the booklet Iceland, The First American 
Republic. It argued that Iceland geographically belonged to North America and
106 Whitehead, Iceland in the Second World War 1939-1946, p. 31
107 Cordell Hull, Memoirs, (2 vols,; New York; The Macmillan Company, 1948), I, p. 754
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Stefansson would later use this booklet to illustrate his theory to the State 
Department in association with the Monroe Doctrine. This will be elaborated on in 
Chapter IV.
4.2 German interests in Iceland
The increased German interest in the island was of concern of the Icelanders, and 
especially the activities of the new German Consul-General, who within his first few 
weeks, had covered most of the roads in Iceland. To respond to the increased 
German influence some politicians proposed to introduce measures to control 
German correspondence, and also to put in measures to prevent Icelandic territory 
being used as a base of operation not only by the Germans, but by any foreign power 
in time of war. The Icelanders were aware that their island could be of interest to the 
belligerents in terms of use of their fjords by foreign submarines as a refuelling base 
or actual airbases on the island. They were also considering the possibility of being 
occupied. It was subsequently reported to London that “While the main object of all 
Icelanders is to maintain their independence, it is, I think, generally realised now that 
in the event of a European war this will be difficult in view of their defenceless 
state.”109
It was correctly recognised by the British that the greatest danger of German success 
in Iceland lay in the economic sphere;110 during 1936-37 Germany exceeded the 
British share in Icelandic exports and became Iceland’s second most important 
trading partner.111 The British, however, did not have to worry as such, because 
while the Germans had a strong economic foothold the Icelanders did not particularly 
savour the German influence on their island. As it was reported to the British early in 
1939:
M. Jonas Jonsson, head of the ‘Progressive Party’....is confident that 
Iceland will always be friendly to England, but he pointed out the 
difficulty of preventing German influence when Germany’s purchases 
are so great. Nevertheless, the Icelandic Government disliked this 
influence and has turned down the Lufthansa proposals for this reason.
109 PRO, FO 419/33, Report on a visit to Iceland by Mr. Gage, 02.06.39
110 PRO, FO 419/33, Report on a visit to Iceland by Mr. Gage, 02.06.39
111 Whitehead, Iceland in the Second World War 1939-1946, p. 15
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He hoped very much that we would make the Government’s task easier 
by economic assistance.112
However, although the majority of the Icelandic population sympathised with the 
Allied cause they nevertheless “desired to maintain the strictest neutrality and 
continue ‘normal trade’ with all belligerents.”113 This determination of the Icelanders 
to remain neutral became evident to the British during the trade negotiations, which 
took place from October 1939 to January 1940, and the subsequent Icelandic 
rejection of the British offer of assistance should the Germans attack the island.
4.3 Anglo-Danish-Iceland relations
Since Icelandic foreign affairs were still under Danish control, Iceland did not have
its own diplomatic service. However, in some cases Icelanders were appointed to
posts within the Danish diplomatic service and on its representations abroad, and
therefore took part in matters related to Iceland along with their Danish colleagues.
Although Icelandic members of staff at the Legation in London were more or less in
charge of Icelandic affairs and Icelandic delegates were sent from Denmark to
negotiate with the British, when matters related to trade and commerce, the Danes
were always present and Halifax continued to correspond with Reventlow with
regard to Icelandic matters.114 In the case of the Icelandic trade negotiations with
Britain, Reventlow thus worked alongside Sveinn Bjomsson, the Icelandic Minister
in Copenhagen, who led the Icelandic trade delegation to London. Also present was
Petur Benediktsson, an Icelandic, who worked at the Danish Legation in London and
who was appointed Icelandic Consul in London in February 1940. Although they
operated as equals representing Icelandic interests, Reventlow’s role was more like
that of an observer, to whom both parties turned to for advice when matters became
complicated. Especially it seems that Reventlow’s presence carried much weight
with the British, who regularly consulted him for guidance, whereas the Icelanders
employed Reventlow’s status to achieve more influence with the British;
On the November 8th the Icelandic and Danish Ministers in London, 
accompanied by the Icelandic Minister at Copenhagen as head of the 
Icelandic delegation now in London for the negotiation of a war trade
112 PRO, FO 419/33, Report on a visit to Iceland by Mr. Gage, 02.06.39
113 Solrun B. Jensdottir Hardarson, “The ‘Republic o f Iceland’ 1940-44: Anglo-American Attitudes 
and Influences”, Journal o f Contemporary History. (9) No. 4 (October) 1974, p. 28
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agreement with HMG, called on me to urge, on behalf of the Icelandic 
and Danish Governments, that the agreement should not involve the
cessation of Iceland’s normal trade with Germany M. Bjdmsson
added that his Government’s chief fear was that if their protests in this 
matter were ignored by HMG, the German Government would use that as 
justification for ignoring protests against any acts they themselves might 
subsequently commit against Icelandic interests.115
a) Anglo-Icelandic trade negotiations October 1939-January 1940
The Anglo-Icelandic trade negotiations proved to the British, that despite Iceland’s
recent attainment of independence, and thus a relatively undeveloped diplomatic
service, they were no push-over. As determined as the British were to stop Iceland’s
trade with Germany completely, just as determined were the Icelanders to maintain
their neutrality. The situation was at loggerheads and Reventlow tried his best to use
his influence. In an aide-memoire to the Foreign Office he raised the issue of having
received information to the effect that, during the negotiations that took place in
London about an Icelandic-British Trade Agreement, demands had been made to
Iceland that all export of goods to Germany should cease;
In the opinion of my Government such a demand is at variance with 
international law, as the export here in question only embraces goods 
which are conditional contraband and which are part of the ordinary 
consumption of the civil population, and are, moreover, of normal 
proportion...My Government are aware that the undertaking of an 
obligation of this character would be regarded by Germany as a breach of 
neutrality. If Iceland were brought into such apposition it would mean a 
serious difficulty for the impartial policy of neutrality which is carried 
out by the five northern countries according to a common point of
The Icelanders felt that Iceland should be treated on the same basis as the other
Scandinavian states by the British and these appeals were also supported by the
Danes.117 The British, however, although appreciating the logical force of the
argument, did not agree; their argument was that
the only reason why the principle of normal trade with Germany had 
been conceded in the case of those other States, was that such trade could 
not, in fact, be prevented, for reasons of geography, which did not 
operate in the case of Iceland or of other countries in a similar 
geographical position. It was not conceded to Denmark or to Sweden
115 PRO, FO 419/33, Halifax, FO, to Howard-Smith, Copenhagen 30.11.39
116 PRO, FO 419/33, Aide-Memoire by Danish Legation, London, 08.11.39
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because they were Scandinavian States but because they were, for 
blockade purposes, contiguous to Germany; and if it was a question of 
principle for the Icelandic Government to claim treatment as a 
Scandinavian State, it was equally a question of principle for HMG to 
treat on the same basis all countries not contiguous to, or in free 
communication with, Germany. On this principle Iceland was really in 
the position of, say, an American State; and if HMG were to refrain from 
exercising their belligerent rights in her case, they would be placed in a 
difficult position when dealing with countries like Argentine, Brazil &co, 
against which those rights were now being enforced.1 8
And:
It is true that the belligerent rights accruing to HMG are not exercised to 
the full in the case of the other Scandinavian countries. This is solely 
because it is physically impossible to prevent exports from those 
countries from reaching the enemy; and in no way detracts from the right 
of HMG as a belligerent Power to prevent contraband from reaching the 
enemy whenever or wherever it is physically possible to do so.119
This resulted in Bjomsson concluding that
as there is such a great distance between the views of His Britannic 
Majesty’s Government and those of the Icelandic Government regarding 
the rights of Iceland according to international law as a neutral country to 
trade equally with the belligerent parties, I do not think that a further 
discussion of this question will serve any useful purpose. I therefore, 
confine myself on behalf of the Icelandic Government to declare that 
they have not changed their former opinion in this respect and that 
therefore I am obliged on behalf of the Icelandic Government to protest 
against the opinion of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.120
While the trade negotiations took place the British handed Reventlow a proposal in 
which the British ‘confidentially but formally’ offered assistance in case the 
Germans attacked Iceland or in the event of German reprisals on Icelandic 
shipping121, which was the main worry of the Icelanders. This offer was given by the 
end of the negotiations, when the outcome the British had hoped for did not seem to 
materialise. Therefore, to make a last try to woo the Icelanders, the offer of 
assistance was given on the conditions that her trade with Germany would seize. 
After receiving the offer, Reventlow asked to speak to the author of the offer, L. 
Collier, Head of the Northern Department, where he informed the latter that the offer 
had been forwarded to his Majesty’s Ministry for further steps. To his Government
118 PRO, FO 419/33, Halifax, FO, to Howard-Smith, Copenhagen 30.11.39
119 PRO, FO 419/33, Halifax, FO, to Reventlow, London, 02.12.39
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71
he stated that during the conversation with Collier he planned to add a comment 
saying that the Icelandic Government no doubt would appreciate the friendly gesture. 
However, at the same time Reventlow wanted to point out to the British that in his 
personal opinion, keeping in mind that Iceland along with the other Nordic countries 
was determined to remain outside any form of alliance-policy, it was most likely that 
the reception of the offer by the Icelandic Government would be treated in light of 
this principal fact. Reventlow also notified his Government in Copenhagen that he 
intended to make a swift move, and thus by-pass his Foreign Affairs Minister in 
Copenhagen, in order to make the Foreign Office aware of this detail and at the same 
time raise their awareness that communications to Iceland were slow, and that they 
therefore should not expect an immediate answer. The potential wait for a reply 
should therefore not be perceived by the Foreign Office as a sign of any serious 
reservations by the Icelanders’ behalf to the reception of the offer.122
The offer was not accepted by the Icelanders, who replied to the British that they 
would only accept the same assistance for maintenance of shipping and commerce as 
was offered to other neutral states by the British123.
c) Case study: Danish and Icelandic reactions to the landing of a British sea-plane in 
Iceland
A good example of the compliance of diplomats on both sides to respect each other 
and the willingness to keep the relations good between the two countries was the 
incident, when a British sea-plane breached Icelandic neutrality.
In September 1939 a British sea-plane landed in Raufarhofn on the east coast of 
Iceland and was detained by the Icelandic authorities. Despite being detained and 
having knowingly breached the neutrality of Iceland by landing without permission 
inside Icelandic territorial waters, the pilot departed the island despite having been 
given orders from the Icelandic authorities to wait for instructions. However, upon 
the arrival of an Icelandic airplane with the instructions, that he was to fly to
122 SA, 9.D .10/1961/372, Reventlow to Munch 18.01.40
123 PRO, FO 371/24778, N1592/133/15, Reventlow to Halifax, 07.02.40
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Reykjavik with the Icelandic plane, the English pilot made his escape as the pilot of 
the latter went ashore.
Following the escape of the pilot the Icelanders and Danes felt certain that the breach
of Icelandic neutrality had been intentional. Reventlow therefore felt the need to
renew the demarche already given:
With reference to my note of the 29th September regarding the landing 
and departure of a British seaplane at Raufarhoefn at East Iceland...In 
view of this, as it would seem, intentional violation of the neutrality of 
Iceland, and in addition to my former demarche regarding this seaplane, I 
am now instructed to lodge a renewed protest on behalf of the Icelandic 
Government.124
Reventlow informed the Foreign Ministry in Copenhagen that the British had turned 
to him for advice as to what deal would be acceptable to the Icelanders in order to 
restore relations between the two nations following the incident. It seems like 
Reventlow did not want to put himself on the spot by making the wrong suggestion, 
because in his report he said that he hesitated to answer, which prompted the Under 
Secretary to admit in strictest confidence that the British were ready to return the 
pilot to Iceland. Reventlow then said that if the Icelanders would accept an 
unconditional apology, this would be the preferred option, but he found it most 
urgent that whatever move the British make it would not expose the Icelanders to the 
German threat; Reventlow then declared himself unable to give an answer, but 
suggested that he should confer with his Icelandic colleagues. According to an 
agreement with Bjomsson Reventlow would then ask the Foreign Affairs Ministry in 
Copenhagen for advice on what reply to give to the British. Since the approach by 
the British was made to Reventlow strictly personally, Reventlow requested that no 
correspondence would take place between Copenhagen and Reykjavik on the 
matter.125
Reventlow and Bjomsson jointly requested, most directly, that the pilot was returned 
to Iceland. Upon the British demand that in return for the pilot the Icelandic 
Government would show equal treatment should the Germans commit a similar
124 SA, 10.G.3/1961/372, Islands Neutralitetsforanstaltninger, Reventlow to Halifax, FO, 03.10.39
125 SA, 10.G.3/1961/372, Islands Neutralitetsforanstaltninger, Reventlow to UM, Copenhagen,
04.10.39
73
violation of Icelandic neutrality, Reventlow answered on behalf of the Icelandic
Government that they wished not to make any difference between the two
belligerents. The British further asked whether their decision would be made known
to the public in Iceland and Denmark. Reventlow replied that he believed that such a
statement would be in everyone’s interest. Reventlow then put a request to his
Foreign Affairs Minister that the statement should be narrowed to only say that the
126British were sorry and that the pilot was sent back, as had been declared.
This incident gives an indication of the importance the Foreign Office placed upon 
correct diplomatic conduct and the willingness not to harm relations with Iceland. 
However, it could be questioned whether the correct conduct was due to the fact that 
it was Iceland in particular, or whether it was the concern of appearance of respecting 
neutrality. The fact that the British placed much importance in the outcome being 
made public, could indicate the latter. The incident also showed the discrepancies 
that occurred between the Foreign Office and the Service Departments. In this case, 
the Foreign Office was able to repair the damage, without it having any further 
repercussions. This was not the situation, however, in the Flag-case, which will be 
examined in Chapter III.
E. CONCLUSION
In order to address on of the main questions raised to the hypothesis, namely how 
come the Danish representatives were able to influence the British and Americans in 
their policies towards the North Atlantic territories, an introduction is needed to the 
particulars, which would form their positions during the Second World War. Thus, 
the questions raised in the chapter firstly and foremost deal with the historical 
background to the situation, Denmark would find herself in on and in the aftermath 
of April 9th 1940, and which would shape others’ opinion of the position of the 
Danish representatives abroad during the war. Secondly, the chapter outlines the 
historical background of the relationship between Denmark and the three territories 
in the North Atlantic.
126 SA, 10.G.3/1961/372, Islands Neutralitetsforanstaltninger, Telegram from Reventlow to UM, 
Copenhagen, 10.10.39 (374)
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The Danish Government’s reluctance to rearm in order to defend her country, even 
when it was evident that her policy of neutrality was unlikely to succeed, caused 
much discontent both at home and abroad. On April 9th 1940 the Danes were faced 
with the stark reality that in line with the arguments and heavy criticism of the 
opposition and the British, her foreign policy and defence policy had failed. Since 
Denmark was unable to defend herself, because she had put more importance to 
securing the welfare and well-being of her citizens rather than spending money on 
rearmament in order to defend her neutrality, freedom and democracy, the Danish 
argument for abiding to German demands on April 9th 1940, was exactly that they 
did not want to see the Danish infrastructure and subsequently society fall apart. 
Their moral, however, suffered, not only during the war, but also in the aftermath; it 
has taken the Danes almost 60 years to come to terms with the decisions taken by the 
Government in the early period of war, and as mentioned earlier in the chapter, the 
debate was recently rekindled by Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen. In 
a speech to mark the anniversary of the August 1943-rebellion against the co­
operative policy with the Germans during the war, Rasmussen dismissed the pacifist 
policy of the Social Democratic Government in the pre-war/early-war period. The 
speech rekindled the debate, which was also present during the war, i.e. whether it 
was morally right of the Danish Government to choose co-operation with Nazi- 
Germany rather than fight; a debate which would haunt the Danish representatives 
abroad, as their integrity would be questioned by their opponents seeing that they 
represented a government which co-operated with the enemy.
As mentioned earlier the Stauning Government justified their policies by stating that 
their decision to co-operate would increase the chances of the Danish population 
maintaining an undisturbed life during the German occupation, and thus not suffer 
the oppression their neighbours in Norway felt. These arguments have also been 
raised by contemporary historians in reply to Prime Minister Rasmussen’s attack on 
the policy of co-operation. Palle Roslyng-Jensen argues, that it is easy to take a 
moral standpoint today and to look back critically at the decisions taken at the time, 
but one must not forget the circumstances they were taken in and the lack of
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awareness of the Stauning-Government of the costs, their policy would have on the
127Danish morale.
These arguments, both for and against, were to shape the criticism and defence of the 
Danish representatives and their positions in the North Atlantic territories and in 
London and Washington.
Despite a strong sense of a Nordic Community amongst the Scandinavian states, who 
in 1938 jointly signed a neutrality declaration, the prospects of a Scandinavian 
military alliance were slim due to internal tensions. Neither a request to the other 
Nordic countries for a common stand against a possible German pressure on them to 
abstain from their neutrality, nor any plea to the British produced a result in favour of 
the Danish situation. Hence the Danes were more or less forced into signing the Non- 
Aggression Pact. Although the Danish decision to sign the Non-Aggression Pact 
with Germany marked a break from the joint line taken by the Scandinavian 
countries, this was not considered as a major change in relations between the Nordic 
Countries. Rather it was the earlier Danish-Norwegian dispute over Greenland, 
which had to be settled at the International Court in the Hague, which was the main 
reason for this tension between the two countries. As will be evident in later 
chapters, relations between Danish and Norwegian representatives abroad were 
marked by this tension, which was intensified by the different approaches taken by 
the Danes and Norwegians to violations of their neutrality and the fight put up 
against the German invasion of their countries.
Although the Prime Ministers and their Foreign Affairs Ministers in Denmark and 
Norway believed that their neutrality would be respected by the belligerents, not 
everyone was so convinced. These doubts were intensified in the aftermath of the 
‘Altmark’ incident, when a noticeable change in the British attitude towards the 
neutrals was observed.
127 DR Nyheder, 29.08.03,
http://www.dr.dk/nvheder/htm/baggrund/tema2003/60%20aaret%20for%20briiddet/22.htm
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As Denmark was not able to defend herself she was neither able to provide sufficient 
defence to her protectorates in the North Atlantic. The only measures Denmark took 
after the outbreak of war was to advocate the case of Iceland and the Faroes to secure 
them the most favourable terms in trade by diplomatic means. While the outbreak of 
war did not cause much concern as such in the Faroe Islands or in Greenland, except 
for the concern about whether or not they would get enough supplies, the situation in 
Iceland was quite different. Having gained sovereignty within the Union of the 
Danish Kingdom in 1918, she was in charge of all internal affairs and thus needed a 
secure economy to run the country. Iceland, like all other countries, had been hit hard 
by the economic crises in the 1930s and was therefore dependent upon her exports. 
The Great War had taught her that her connection with Denmark was of no use in 
time of war. Rather Iceland was firmly placed within the British sphere of influence 
and was at the mercy of British naval power. As a consequence the British could 
easily control Icelandic trade if they wished to do so in order to stop her from trading 
with Germany. Iceland, however, maintained her rights as a neutral to continue her 
trade with Germany, not so much because she wanted to, but out of necessity, 
because Britain could not meet her needs after the war broke out. Realising the 
problematic position she was placed in the event of another European conflict, she 
therefore had turned her attention to the United States and through consistent efforts 
she had created good connections, both commercial and political, with the Americans 
by the outbreak of war.
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CHAPTER II: BRITISH AND AMERICAN POLICIES TOWARDS THE NORTH
ATLANTIC AREA PRIOR TO THE GERMAN INVASION OF DENMARK.
With the aim of this thesis being to examine the extent to which Danish 
representatives were able to influence American and British policies towards the 
North Atlantic territories during Second World War, this chapter looks at the 
historical background, which would form these policies and attitudes. The German 
occupation of Denmark marked a shift in the position of these territories. A closer 
look at the period before April 9th 1940 is therefore useful in order to get a better 
understanding of what happened in these territories and their relationship with 
Denmark in the period after Denmark was occupied. This chapter thus deals with the 
period leading up till the German occupation of Denmark on April 9th 1940 with a 
focus on the Anglo-American relationship and attitude towards Denmark and her 
territories in the North Atlantic. The questions asked are: What were the U.S. and 
British attitudes towards Denmark prior to the Danish capitulation to the Germans? 
What were their policies towards the North Atlantic area prior to April 9th 1940? 
These questions interlink with the question of the influence exerted by Danish 
representatives in the aftermath of the German occupation of Denmark, which will be 
dealt with in the following chapters. Thus, did these policies and attitudes of the pre- 
April 9th 1940 period form the basis for their policies and attitudes towards the 
Danish representatives in the North Atlantic, London and Washington DC in the 
aftermath of April 9th 1940, or was there a shift in attitude caused by the change of 
status quo following the Danish submission to the German threat? This chapter will 
introduce the reader to the ambiguous relationship, especially by the British towards 
Denmark and her subjects during the war.
The reader is introduced to the issues that became the deciding factors in British and 
American policies towards the territories in the North Atlantic, namely ‘neutrality’ 
and the statuses of Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland within the Danish Kingdom 
and the limits these issues posed to British plans and actions in the North Atlantic 
and Scandinavia prior to the German occupation of Denmark and Norway on April 
9th 1940.
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As this chapter will show, during the 1930s the British did not have a dedicated 
policy towards Denmark; rather it was an ad hoc policy responding to economic and 
military issues and the greater European question. However, with the rise of the 
German threat the focus on securing the sea-lanes in the North Atlantic became 
significant to the British. The increasing German interest in the Danish North 
Atlantic territories was noticed in London, but as the territories were comprised by 
the Neutrality Declarations signed by Denmark and Iceland in 1938 and renewed 
after the outbreak of war in September 1939, the neutrality aspect had to be taken 
into account in their North Atlantic strategic plans. This was also the case for the sea- 
lanes between Denmark and Norway. They way which Denmark and Norway 
respectively upheld their neutrality shaped the British attitude towards these 
countries in the early stages of the war. In the latter chapters, the reader will see 
whether this was to have any decisive outcome on the relationship between the 
Danish representatives and their host countries or occupying powers, under whose 
command their positions in the North Atlantic territories were dependent upon.
However, first the main traits of Anglo-American relations up till the outbreak of war 
are introduced, as are the aspects that influenced the relationship between the two. 
The British relied heavily on the support from the United States in order to win the 
war, and much consideration was therefore put into keeping a good relationship with 
the Americans. It was therefore of utmost importance to avoid upsetting the 
American public and hence avoid making it more difficult for Roosevelt to convert to 
a more pro-active policy towards the hostilities in Europe. This aspect, as will be 
shown in this chapter, was very much in the minds of the British when breaching the 
neutrality of the small European states was considered. British policies towards the 
North Atlantic territories and Denmark in the early stages of the war and until the 
entrance of the United States into the war was therefore influenced by the attitude of 
the U.S., or rather the fear of damaging the Anglo-American relationship and the 
prospects of an early U.S. departure from isolationism.
The aim is also to introduce the main actors and offices that were in charge of 
policies towards the North Atlantic. Very few matters with regard to the territories in 
the North Atlantic ever made it so far in the system as to reach Roosevelt’s or 
Churchill’s desk. The aim for those wanting to influence British and American
79
policies towards the North Atlantic was thus to identify those dealing with the area in 
the Foreign Office and State Department.
The second part of the chapter deals with British and American relations towards 
Denmark and Norway. British attitude towards Denmark and her representatives 
abroad, and subsequently towards the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland, 
throughout the war was influenced by the way they saw the Danes responding to 
their difficulties with Germany, both before and after the Germans occupied 
Denmark. In addition the ‘Altmark’ incident is introduced. While, as mentioned 
before, Britain did not have a distinct policy towards Denmark prior to this, the 
incident marked a change in British attitude towards the neutrality of Scandinavia 
and subsequently the North Atlantic. The chapter will nevertheless also show, that 
Britain found herself in an ambivalent position with regard to her attitude to the 
Danish lack of upholding her neutrality. This, because Britain had not seen herself as 
able to provide Denmark any help to stand against the German threat, which 
Denmark was not able to do alone. There was therefore some sense of sympathy and 
liability to be found amongst some British officials towards the hopeless situation 
Denmark found herself in.
Finally the focus is set on the North Atlantic territories, examining their disparate 
statuses within the Danish Kingdom and how the varying levels of independence 
influenced British policy-making towards each of them. These differences in their 
statuses would also form the different levels, which the Danish representatives’ 
extent of influence would be exercised. The chapter also looks at the level of interest 
in the area paid by the British and the Americans, and which considerations were 
made to the area in the event these territories were cut off from their mother-country 
in the event of a German invasion of Denmark. This last part of the chapter thus 
highlights the motives behind the British, and subsequently U.S., decision to occupy 
the North Atlantic territories.
A. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
Anglo-American relations during the war were not so much a case of a “special 
relationship”, an alliance between two nations with strong historical bonds, and a 
shared cultural and ideological background, as Winston S. Churchill liked to profile
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it.1 Rather it was the case of one nation in decline as a Great Power and the other on 
the rise of becoming superpower, and the formers’ ambivalence in realising the need 
for help from the latter, the United States, while at the same time recognising that 
that help would entail a shift in power between the two of them.
In the period after World War I the relationship between the two were strained. 
B.J.C. McKercher argues that, “the crisis in Anglo-American relations in the late 
1920 stemmed from the naval question, more specifically from the dispute between 
Britain and the United States over cruiser limitation.”2 The crisis in the relationship 
also stemmed from competition in other aspects such as in financial and trade issues.
1 .Britain
During the 1930s Britain reluctantly had to admit that her days of imperial
supremacy had surpassed, as she no longer saw herself capable to meet her
commitments and responsibilities towards her dominions. Despite emerging from the
Great War as one of the victors, the war had nevertheless had its toll on the British.
The heavy cost of being in war meant that she no longer was capable of maintaining
and guarding her vast territorial empire, which was more or less open for newly
rising economic powers such as Germany and the United States in search for new
markets. Peter Smith points out that:
Britain’s main competitors, the newly unified German Empire and the 
rapidly expanding USA were soon in the forefront...with large and well- 
protected domestic markets, these nations were quickly transformed into 
modem industrial states, thereby denying Britain access to traditional 
export markets. By the end of the century, higher productivity had 
enabled them to challenge British markets throughout the world.3
With the looming conflict with Nazi Germany Britain also had to acknowledge that 
she could not win a war, especially if it was fought on different fronts, without the 
support of one or more allies. The Great War had hit hard on her economy and she
1 The phrase was first recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary as being referred to by Churchill in a 
speech in the House o f Commons in connection with Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s preparations to 
visit the United states in late 1945. 415 H.C. Debs. 1299, 07.11.45
2 B.J.C. McKercher, “From Enmity to Cooperation: The Second Baldwin Government and the 
Improvement o f Anglo-American Relations, November 1928-June 1929”, A Quarterly Journal 
Concerned with British Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), p. 67
3 Peter Smith, “Anglo-American Religion and Hegemonic Change in the World System, c. 1870- 
1980”, The British Journal o f  Sociology, Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 90-91
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was behind in the rearmament programme compared with Germany. Thus, the main 
objective was to delay any conflict with the Germans. It could be argued that because 
they knew that their rearmament program had not progressed as far as the German’s, 
British leaders, and especially Prime Minister Chamberlain, refused to recognise 
Nazi Germany as a serious threat, and clutched to the notion that this conflict could 
be solved peacefully and without going to war.4 Unwilling to acknowledge the threat 
no specific policies were put into place to address the German menace and British 
policies up till the outbreak of war were hence marked by uncertainty and 
unpredictability; decisions were largely taken as ad hoc responses to immediate 
crisis.
a) British ambiguity with regard to the Americans
The end of World War I changed the old European world order. It meant the end of
the German-, Austrian- and Ottoman Empire, while a revolution and a civil war
transformed Russia. As already mentioned, Britain emerged weak from the Great
War and so did France. The only major power, which emerged from World War I
strengthened, was the United States.
The USA, which had entered the war in 1917, emerged from the war as 
the wealthiest and potentially the most powerful nation in the world.
From being Britain’s major debtor nation it had become its major 
creditor. The world’s financial capital had moved from London to New 
York. America’s industrial productivity and its share of export markets 
continued to increase. By contrast British industrial production had been 
severely strained and German production almost destroyed. The USA did 
not yet want to act as hegemonic power, however.5
The British on one hand felt dismayed by the Americans and their isolationism and 
although they knew that if they were to succeed in destroying the Nazi regime help 
from the Americans in one form or another would be essential. They were not, 
though, confident that that help would be given, at least not when they wanted it, and 
when and if the help was provided the British feared that it would cost them much in
4 David Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941, The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1982, p. 9
5 Smith, “Anglo-American Religion and Hegemonic Change in the World System, c. 1870-1980”, 
1986, p. 95
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compromise; “there was a lurking fear that American help would prove more of a 
liability than an asset.”6
Alan P. Dobson argues that “Britain fought two battles for survival during the 
Second World War: one was the conventional military struggle, the other was an 
economic one.”7 Material and economy-wise there was little hope in getting any help 
from the Americans because the Johnson Act prohibited the Americans from 
providing loans to governments that had failed to pay their Great War debts, and the 
Neutrality Act banned sales of arms and provisions of credits to belligerents. The 
prospects of having these two Acts revoked with the consent of the American public 
were slim. “Chamberlain believed that costly alliances might not be necessary
o
because total war could be averted.” However, not everyone in Whitehall was of the 
opinion that the United States should be kept outside; at the Foreign Office, Anthony 
Eden and some of his senior officials, believed that Chamberlain neglected the 
opportunity for co-operation with Britain’s friends.
The role, which the British would wish the Americans to take on in the early stages 
of the conflict, was that of a mediator, possibly at the closing stages of negotiations 
or as a host of an international conference; they also hoped “that the U.S. though 
unreliable in the short term, might be ‘educated’ or ‘wooed’ into a realistic 
acceptance of its ‘responsibilities’ as a world power,”9 and thus would take upon 
herself a more active role in the conflict. The British, however, also recognised that 
using propaganda to swing the American mood in their direction would do more 
damage than good; as the situation was illustrated in a report from their envoy in the 
United States: “Sir Robert Lindsay, the British Ambassador in Washington, in an 
important despatch written in March 1937, set out the limits of diplomacy. He 
warned that U.S. neutrality must be accepted as ‘something that it is useless to call 
into question’...’America is the despair of the diplomat’”10 and that “not only were 
the Americans uncooperative, but there was little that could safely be done about it.
6 Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941, 1982, p. 13
7 Alan P. Dobson, “The Export White Paper, 10 September, 1941”, The Economic History Review, 
New Series, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Feb., 1986), p. 59
8 Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941, 1982, p. 9
9 Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941, 1982, p. 10
10 PRO, FO 371/20561, Lindsay to Eden, desp. 247, A2378, 22.03.37
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The British had to place their faith in what was sometimes called ‘the educative 
power of events’,”11 rather than in direct propaganda, which would certainly 
backfire, as the Americans were very much conscious about the British likening them 
to “a youthful adolescent”12 and therefore any propaganda by the British would be 
perceived as patronising.
2. American attitude towards the British
William Wallace argues that the Anglo-American relationship should be seen as 
“built upon an existing network of economic, social and cultural ties”.13 Although 
there was a strong sense amongst the Americans that the two countries shared a 
common liberal political tradition, characterized by the rule of law and respect for 
the individual, and that they also shared a common language and numerous ties of 
kinship, there was, however, also a deep conviction that Britain was not a genuine 
democracy, and especially amongst the newer immigrants, those of Polish, Irish and 
Italian descent, who achieved considerable prominence within the Roosevelt 
coalition, there retained suspicions of Britain that derived from their families’ 
European background. The mistrust towards the British also stemmed from the 
relatively new history of American Independence and they resented any move, which 
had the smallest indication of United States committing herself to help the ‘old 
country’, which subsequently entailed some loss of independence. However, 
“anglophile or Anglophobe, Americans could not escape their national past,”14 and 
there was a general sentiment of support for the British cause in the war against the 
Germans, just as long as the Americans themselves would not be involved.
2.1 The United States Administration
The nature of the U.S. Administration was that it was comprised by two groups of 
officials: the professional diplomats, that is, service men, who had long-term 
experiences in the field of diplomacy, and officials, who were ‘politically’ appointed 
by the President. This created a friction between the two levels, which resulted in
11 Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941, 1982, p. 11
12 Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941, 1982, p. 12
13 William Wallace, the Foreign Policy Process in Britain, London, RIIA, 1975, p. 217
14 Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941. 1982, p. 24
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loopholes and opportunities of manoeuvring, for those who wanted to have influence 
on American policy.
Since Government Departments are not entirely governed by personal or emotional 
considerations their views of foreign governments and their policy towards those 
governments repose largely on other foundations; this includes, not least, the views 
expressed and the reports sent home by their representatives on the spot;15 therefore 
it was of vital interest for the British to have a good insight to the attitude of the most 
prominent members of the State Department and those surrounding President 
Roosevelt and the U.S. Ambassador in London. It is important to point out here, that 
because of his medical condition and subsequent immobility, President Roosevelt, 
more so than any other U.S. President before or after, was very much reliant upon his 
advisors, and in many cases based his interpretations and views of people as well as 
situations, on secondary impressions. The President, therefore, preferred to form 
personal relationships; James Leutze argues that this was his reason for starting the 
correspondence with Churchill, who was First Lord of the Admiralty at the time, and 
why he personalised this correspondence by referring to himself as ‘former naval 
person’.16 Thus, to foreign representatives and other key actors wishing more 
influence on the President it was of importance that they could meet the President in 
person.
Richardson Dougall also describes Roosevelt as a president
whose off-hand style of running the White House and foreign policy in 
general and whose penchant for using special envoys and for 
communicating directly with them, with ambassadors abroad, and even 
with the under secretary of state was maddening at times to the courtly 
southerner [Hull] to whom the Department of State had been entrusted.17
Those exercising most influence around Roosevelt were Assistant Secretary of State 
Adolf A. Berle, who played an important role in the relations with Denmark during 
the war, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, 
who was Berle’s friend and ally, whom Roosevelt brought in to get more dynamism
15 PRO, FO 371/24248, Minute by Perowne, 23.01.40
16 James Leutze, “The Secret o f the Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence: September 1939 -  May 
1940”, Journal o f Contemporary History, Vol. 10 (3) Jul., 1975
17 Richardson Dougall, “The U.S. Department o f State. From Hull to Acheson”, in The Diplomats 
1939-1979, Gordon A. Craig & Francis L. Loewenheim ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
N ew  Jersey, 1994, p. 40
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and creative thinking in the foreign affairs team around him. Both Berle and Welles 
had direct access to the President and often by-passed Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull, which would create tensions within the State Department during the war. 
However, this was a tension that created loopholes for those, who wanted to have 
some influence, to exploit. Other trusted foreign affairs advisors were Felix 
Frankfurter, Dean Acheson and Harry Hopkins, whose absolute support for the 
British was decisive in the first year of the war.
Outside the United States the one actor that caused the British much concern, with
regard to their US-aspirations, was the American Ambassador in London, Joseph
Kennedy, because he was seen as working against them and their cause in neutral
Europe and the United States:
Another form of American activity that is undoubtedly having an 
undesirable effect on neutral opinion, and particularly on the smaller 
European neutrals, but for which we are hardly responsible to the same 
extent, is Mr. Kennedy’s propaganda campaign against us...It must be 
presumed that Mr. Kennedy’s defeatist propaganda has had an adverse 
effect on our interests not only in the States but in other neutral countries 
and on the home front as well.18
It was therefore up to the British to orchestrate their policies and moves in such a 
way that they would cause as little upset and gain as much favour and sympathy in 
the United States as possible.
1940 was an election year, and although Roosevelt was running for the third time, 
this time around the foreign policy matter became the outstanding issue in the 
campaign; the Democrats were afraid of the suspicion amongst the public that 
Roosevelt would push the country into war, and the Republicans tried to avoid the 
issue of foreign policy, because they realised that the issue might split the party and 
that many of their members sympathised with Roosevelt’s foreign policy.
2.2 American public opinion
Although public opinion played a part in the concerns of Roosevelt and the State 
Department when discussing the extent of American help to the Allies, Philip E. 
Jacob argues, that American public opinion on neutrality was not a single notion, but
18 PRO, FO 371/24248, comment on sleeve o f Foreign Office Minute by Perowne, 29.01.40
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divided into four kinds of neutrality, “personal neutrality”, “commercial neutrality”, 
“military neutrality”, and “financial neutrality.” The reaction of opinion to events 
was strikingly different with respect to these different phases of the neutrality issue.19
Whereas “personal neutrality,” which was the individual’s attitude toward other 
nations, was influenced by atrocities, such as those committed by the Germans 
leading up to and following the Munich Conference on September 29, 1938. Another 
incident that had much impact upon the “personal neutrality” opinion was on 
November 10th, when the anti-Semitic drive in Germany reached a new peak in the 
‘Day of the Broken Glass.’ American “commercial neutrality,” which was based on 
trade relationships with the belligerents, was on the other hand not much affected by 
these events and the opinion remained that the United States should stick to 
neutrality towards the European powers;20 nor did Germany’s annexation of 
Czechoslovakia changed the opinion of the Americans and the opinion of half of the 
population remained that the Neutrality Laws should not be altered in order for the 
United States to be able to sell war materials to England and France.
A month after the war broke out the United States found a majority of its population 
to be in favour of lifting the arms embargo, however the majority of these did not 
necessarily see this as a sacrifice of commercial neutrality either technically or 
practically;
Thirty-six per cent of those favoring repeal of the embargo in a Gallup 
poll [Gallup, October 18, 1939] said they would not do so if repeal would 
help only the Allies. Thirty-five percent of those urging repeal on the 
succeeding ballot gave as the main reason for their stand, “To improve 
business in this country,” while only 22 per cent said “To defend 
democracy.” Twenty-seven percent felt repeal of the embargo would help 
keep the U.S. out of war. [Gallup, October 24, 1939]21
As for “military neutrality” the percentage of the people that wished no involvement 
of the U.S. military in the conflict remained very high throughout the period, and 
events in Europe did only marginally influence opinion; the same is said with regard 
to “financial neutrality”; Jacob describes the opposition of Americans to lending
19 Philip E. Jacob, “Influences o f World Events on U.S. “Neutrality “ Opinion”, Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Vol. 4 No. 1 (Mar.) 1940, pp. 48-9
20 Jacob, “Influences o f World Events on U.S. “Neutrality” Opinion”, 1940, p. 52
21 Jacob, “Influences o f World Events on U.S. “Neutrality” Opinion”, 1940, pp. 57-8
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money to aid one side in winning a war as the “most immovable, the least responsive 
to international events.”22
This examination of public opinion by Jacob corresponds with the observations the 
British envoy made, because in February 1940 the British Embassy in Washington 
reported that “American opinion will not object to any of our measures which are 
justified under international law and which are found to be necessary to the winning 
of the war. But it is most necessary to prove to it beforehand that they are necessary 
to the winning of the war.”23 Jacob’s division of the notion of neutrality in American 
public opinion also shows that although the average poll showed a strong opposition 
to American departure from her neutrality policy, there were was some leverage to 
operate within. The crucial point for the British and Roosevelt thus became to shift 
the focus of the planned actions over to those areas, which were least offensive to 
American public opinion.
a) Propaganda?
The prospects of shifting the Americans from their isolationism were not 
encouraging. The British, as noted earlier, were warned by their ambassador, that the 
Americans guarded their neutrality fiercely and would not react positively to any 
attempts of alterations.24 The use of propaganda was thus strongly denounced, since 
any approach of this kind would have the opposite effect on the American public, 
which already perceived the British as patronising in their behaviour towards them.
Because of their limited means of affecting the American mood, the British had to 
make sure that they would get the sympathy of the American public and “place their 
faith in what was sometimes called ‘the educative power of events’. Although 
calculations were made as to what effect a German attack on Britain would have on 
American public opinion, especially if the attack was devastating in terms of number 
of casualties or the destruction of historical places
22 Jacob, “Influences o f World Events on U.S. “Neutrality” Opinion”, 1940, p.62
23 PRO, FO 371/24248, Chancery, British Embassy Washington to The American Department, FO,
03.02.40
24 PRO, FO 371/20561, Lindsay to Eden, desp. 247, A2378, 22.03.37
25 Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941, p. 11
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some spectacular act of violence’ such as an indiscriminate air attack on 
London might cause ‘an explosion of American feeling’ resulting in the 
participation of the U.S.A. at an early stage.26
The main issue for the British was to be considerate in their own actions, rather than 
putting their hopes into enemy atrocities out-cancelling their own misgivings. This 
latter ploy, however, was present in British calculations with regard to breaches of 
neutrality, as will be evident later in this chapter.
With the nullification of propaganda as a tool to influence American opinion towards 
the war in their favour, the British were anxious not to cause any upsets with their 
American counterparts. Recognising the importance of the American goodwill and 
the effect the attitude of the Americans towards the British would have on other
neutral states, “good relations with the U.S., the price of which just now is above
01rubies,” the American Department at the Foreign Office requested the other 
Government Departments to take into consideration how their policies would affect 
the attitude of the Americans in favour of the British. However, the plan failed to be 
executed to the full, due to the failure of the British services to inform and explain to 
the Americans their decisions taken. But, the scheme succeeded in changing the 
behaviour of some of the service departments, where increased efforts were made to 
test the waters with the Americans on possible actions that would infringe the laws of 
neutrality. This was especially the case within the FO, where there were a larger 
number of members, who believed in furthering relations with the Americans, than in 
the other departments.
An example of this was when plans for laying mines in Norwegian territorial waters, 
in order to stop the iron-ore traffic from Northern Sweden to Germany, were 
underway in December 1939. A note within the Northern Division of FO revealed 
that after having tested their grounds on what reaction Roosevelt would have to the 
suggestion of British mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters, the British came to 
the conclusion that the President’s reactions were “more favourable than had been
26 PRO, FO 371/22829, A2856/1292/45, minute by John Balfour, head o f the American Department 
within FO, 14.04.39
27 PRO, FO 371/24248, comment on sleeve o f Foreign Office Minute by Perowne, 29.01.40
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98hoped.” It might be kept in mind, however, that this message was conveyed to the 
Northern Division through the First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill, who more than 
anyone wanted to lay mines in the territorial waters of Norway and therefore was not 
too pleased to see his plans being stalled by those, who appreciated the significance 
of the neutrality aspect in the situation.
There were doubts within the Northern Department regarding the reliability of 
Roosevelt’s message to Churchill, “The First Lord’s message from Mr. Roosevelt is 
altogether cryptic” it was noted.29 Nevertheless, other reports received by the Foreign 
office supported the notion of American approval of British actions in Norwegian 
waters; this was especially the case after the ‘Altmark’ incident, as will be seen in the 
section on the ‘Altmark’ incident.
B. BRITISH AND AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH NEUTRAL DENMARK 
AND SCANDINAVIA
During the 1930s Britain did not have a dedicated policy towards Denmark; rather it 
was the case of officials following a framework of policies, economic, ideological 
and military, which they were then able to apply to individual countries such as 
Denmark.30
Anglo-Danish relations mainly consisted of commercial matters; Britain was the 
largest importer of Danish bacon and butter, and British commercial relations with 
Denmark were thus left in the hands of the Board of Trade, whereas the Northern 
Department was the office, which mainly dealt with Danish relations within the 
Foreign Office. However, it was not within these departments that the decisions 
throughout the 1930s, which had a major impact upon Denmark, were taken.
As mentioned earlier, the British did not have a specific policy towards Denmark; 
her destiny was thus more a result of other, greater, decisions with regard to Europe, 
such as the Stresa-Conference, the Anglo-German naval pact and the Hoare-Laval
28 PRO, FO 371/25660, N 7 3 18/64/63
29 PRO, FO 371/25660, N7318/64/63, December 1939
30 Susan Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-1945, Odense University Press 
Denmark, 1982, p. 18
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pact. The British believed that through these efforts they would succeed in bringing
about peace in Europe, which the smaller states would automatically benefit from.
Policies towards Denmark were thus very much a bi-product of the larger European
policy, and decisions taken were not always in accord with what the Northern
Department wished. They were therefore seldom a result of any moral or ethical
concerns for a small neutral state in danger of being overrun by it strong neighbour -
perhaps because the general belief in British circles was that Germany would not
invade Denmark, and if so, it would only be to annex Schleswig, and not the whole
country. Susan Seymour subsequently argues that:
before the spring of 1939 the British...did not give any serious 
consideration to the problems, which Denmark faced as a result of the 
growing power of Germany and the increasing likelihood of war in 
Europe. Danish interpretations which present British reactions and 
assumptions as a considered and consistent policy from 1933 to 1940 are 
wide of the mark.31
The only policy that seems to be clear and constant with regard to Denmark is that 
there was little the British could do if the Germans decided to overrun the country. 
Susan Seymour argues that “the Danish impression, which they drew from such 
evidence as the Anglo-German naval pact of 1935 and the comments made to 
Stauning in April 1937, of a conscious British decision to leave to their fate cannot 
be substantiated.”32 However, from minutes and reports of the Foreign Office it 
seems quite clear that the British knew and had accepted, that there was little they 
could do for the Danes, either defence-wise or trade-wise.33
The British view of their responsibility towards Denmark was naturally influenced 
by what they saw of the Danes’ own response to their difficulties with Germany.34 
The British were dismayed by the Danish failure to rearm and respond to the 
growing German threat; the British expected the Nordic states to form an alliance, 
but soon realised that it would not happen. The British believed that a Scandinavian 
alliance would deter any German aggression, as a fight against all the Scandinavian 
countries would engage a considerable number of troops and would mean the loss of
31 Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-1945. 1982, pp. 85-6
32 Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-1945, 1982, p. 78
33 PRO, FO 371/23654, From Cabinet Offices and C.I.D to FO, 02.05.39
34 Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-1945, 1982, p. 80
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all supplies from Norway and Sweden, especially the Swedish ore. The reason why 
such an alliance was not perceived to be possible was because relations amongst the 
Nordic countries on this issue had turned sour, especially after Denmark’s suggestion 
for such an alliance was not met by a positive reaction in either Norway or Sweden.35
There were sentiments that the British should come to the Norwegian rescue if the
Germans would attack
The assumption of the “defeatist” -  that this country would not defend 
Norway against Germany -  is of course wrong; and a glance at the map 
ought to show them that we could never allow so vital a strategic position 
for attack on Great Britain to fall into German hands without a fight.
It is thus all the more significant, as a measure of the disrepute into which 
we have fallen, that even a German attack on Norway is not thought, in 
that country itself, to be enough to rouse us. I venture to suggest that the 
Legation at Oslo might be authorized to make it plain, by whatever 
means that they think best, that, in their own interest, HMG would 
always oppose by force a German occupation of Norway.
The British, nonetheless, were not willing to give Denmark the same reassurance, 
because there was a general feeling, both within the FO and the C.I.D. (Committee of 
Imperial Defence) that the British would not be able to do anything to prevent a 
German invasion of Denmark. However, the feeling was also that a German invasion 
of Denmark would only be of advantage to the Germans in a short war.37 In the long 
run it would prove too costly compared with the gains achieved by invading 
Denmark. The British thus left the Danish to their own devices knowing that there 
was a risk that Germany would invade Denmark -  a risk, which, as we will see 
further arguments for in the following pages, the British were willing to take.
In general the British relationship with Denmark was seen increasingly in the light of 
its bearing on Anglo-German rivalry, both in economic and strategic terms, and their 
traditional friendship suffered as a result.38 By September 1939, the British had 
decided to use economic pressure as a weapon against Germany in wartime. Initially 
they would seek to do this by agreement with the neutrals, but the need to take
35 PRO, FO 371/23654, Foreign Office 15.04.39, German-Danish relations and the minority question, 
p. 12-3
6 PRO, FO 371/23652, Dormer to Foreign Office, 23.03.39, comments on sleeve by Collier
37 PRO, FO 371/23654, Comment by Lascelles to memorandum by H.W.A.F.-P. 24.04.39.
38 Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-1945, 1982, p. 95
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unilateral action was not ruled out and, in the case of Denmark, they might even be 
prepared to risk provoking the Germans to interrupt Danish exports to Britain.39 The 
objective of Britain’s economic warfare was namely to deprive Germany, not to 
spare the neutrals from the effects of the war.40 Apart from Britain, the largest 
importer of Danish goods was Germany. The British were, therefore, more interested 
in reducing Danish exports to Germany, especially at the outlook of the Danish- 
German non-aggression pact, than securing their own trade with Denmark 41 42 This, 
however, did not match the public mood in Britain, where the prospect of ‘no bacon 
on the breakfast table,’43 was the main matter the newspapers were concerned about, 
once they realised that economic warfare with Germany and the non-aggression pact 
between Denmark and Germany, also would affect Danish trade with Britain.
Realising the defeatist attitude of the Danes and their unwillingness to make any
attempts military-wise to deter the Germans, the real basis for the indifferent attitude
of the Foreign Office officials was that they were not deterred by the thought of a
German invasion of Denmark and they even went one step further:
There are reasons, which I need not go into now, why, in present 
circumstances, it might be a positive advantage for us, politically and 
strategically, if the Germans were to raise the whole Scandinavian issue 
by attacking Denmark; and that in that case I should count the loss of our 
Danish food supplies as a minor evil,44 Collier said.
Thus, the British had some liability in the difficult situation Denmark found herself 
in, resulting in her seeing no other option but to surrender and co-operate with the 
Germans, when the latter invaded Denmark on April 9th 1940.
1. The possibility of Germany breaching Danish neutrality and occupying the 
country
It was in connection with the German invasion of Czechoslovakia and rumours of a 
German ultimatum to Romania, that the British realigned their European policy, and
39 Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-1945, 1982, p. 89
40 Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-1945, 1982, p. 88
41 It was not only Britain that relied on Danish exports -  in 1938 Denmark was Britain’s second 
largest customer in Europe.
42 Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-1945, 1982, p. 47
43 Evening Standard, 27.05.39, “N o Bacon on the Breakfast Table”
44 PRO, BT 11/1211, Collier to Carter, 10.02.40
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ultimately decided which countries would be offered guarantees that a German 
aggression towards them would be a casus belli and that the eventual liberation of 
these states would be a war aim; Denmark was not to belong to this category, 
because the decision as to whether she should or not came to rest upon the fact of 
whether she would defend herself in the event of an attack or not, and the lack of 
military preparations taken by the Danish Government was not taken as a sign that 
they put enough effort into defending themselves.
In July 1939 the British were made aware of German plans to occupy Denmark in 
case of war breaking out between Britain and Germany, and that such an occupation 
not only would entail Jutland, but the whole of Denmark.45 However, the Chiefs of 
Staff had already by this time concluded that the British could not do anything to 
prevent Denmark being overrun.46
At a Chiefs of Staff meeting on May 1st 1939 the effect of a possible German attack
on Denmark on the British situation was considered, and the likelihood of such an
German attack was weighed up in pros and cons, for example it was concluded that
the Germans would only consider overrunning Denmark if they foresaw a short war:
if she were confident of victory within a short while -  say, six months -  
it would no doubt pay her to seize the country and the supplies actually in 
it, for immediate use. These supplies could not, however be renewed, at 
any rate in so far as food stuffs are concerned, since Danish agriculture is 
absolutely dependent on imports of fodder, which His Majesty’s 
Government would be in a position to cut off. If, on the other hand, 
Germany contemplated a longer struggle, she might think it more 
profitable to respect Danish neutrality and thereby ensure a constant, if 
limited, flow of Danish foodstuffs.47 
And later in the meeting it was concluded that if the Germans intend to occupy
Denmark, there was very little Britain can do to prevent it and it would only result in
a “useless dispersion of forces.”48 A couple of weeks earlier, on April 18th, Halifax
had come to the same conclusion:
Lord Halifax is inclined to doubt whether in fact the Danish Government 
are seriously prepared to defend their country; and this doubtful factor is
45 PRO, FO 371/23656, Letter from R. Sutton-Pratt, Lieutenant-Colonel, Military Attache, to Dormer, 
Oslo, 10.07.39
46 PRO, FO 371/23656, N3386/64/63, comment by Lascelles 18.07.39
47 PRO, FO 371/23654, C.O.S. 897, 01.05.39
48 PRO, FO 371/23654, C.O.S. 897, 01.05.39
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clearly of the utmost importance in considering what action, if any, can 
be taken by His Majesty’s Government to prevent German expansion 
into Denmark.49
The final conclusion with regard to Denmark was that “even if we did guarantee 
Denmark, we could not by force of arms prevent Germany rapidly over-running the 
country, should she decide that it was to her interest in war to do so,”50 and in 
February 1940 Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, confirmed 
verbally that “Britain, on account of Denmark’s proximity to Germany, would be 
unable to provide help in case of a conflict with the southern neighbour.”51
After the outbreak of war the main objective of British policies towards Denmark 
was to control her trade to Germany as much as possible. Since Denmark shared 
borders with Germany, control for trade across the border was near to impossible, but 
with the contraband the British sought to deprive the Germans of as much imports as 
possible.
2. British attitude to Denmark and Danish neutrality
In August 1939 Britain declared that they would respect Danish neutrality, subjected
to it being respected by the Germans too;
The British Minister in Copenhagen, Sir P Ramsay, having been 
informed by the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German 
Government’s statement regarding the observation of Danish neutrality, 
has conveyed an assurance so the Danish Government that so long as 
Danish neutrality is respected by Germany it will of course be respected 
by the British Government, who have no desire that Denmark should be 
involved in a war which they still hope may be avoided.52
Although British treatment of Denmark in particular has to be seen against the 
background of British policy towards the neutrals in general53, it can be argued that
49 PRO, FO 371/23654, Annex I, 18.04.39
50 PRO, FO 371/23654, (Sd) D. Morton to E.W.H. Lloyd, Esq., Food (Defence Plans) Department,
02.05.39
51 Carsten Holbraad, Danish Neutrality: a study in the foreign policy o f a small state. Oxford, New  
York, Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 69
52 Daily Telegraph. 31.08.39, “Britain to respect Danish neutrality.”
53 The British did not see it as necessary to spare the neutrals from the inconvenience caused by the 
war because they were convinced they were fighting for a just cause, that they would not be defeated, 
or, if they were, that the consequences could not be worse than those o f a refusal to attempt to check
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the British attitude towards Danish neutrality was also very much determined by the 
way the Danes upheld their neutrality and that this set a precedence to the British 
negative attitude towards the Danes in Denmark and in exile throughout the war. 
However, British attitudes towards Danes were not only determined by how the 
Danes conducted their policies; comparisons were often drawn with the situation in 
Norway, and how the Norwegians managed their neutrality. This aspect of British 
attitude and policy towards Denmark and Danes was not only present before the 
German occupation of Denmark and Norway, but certainly also after.
Foreign Office’s attitude towards Denmark was coloured by Collier who clung to his 
views of Danish pusillanimity and resented the constraints, which the presence of 
neutrals put upon the conduct of the war. It was soon realised that if Denmark was 
invaded by the Germans the Danes would not put up a fight, because they “love their 
country and would prefer to see it occupied than destroyed.”54 Collier’s view of the 
Danes was also shared by Gallop in Copenhagen, who in October 1939 reasoned 
that:
The primary cause of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs is to be 
found in the faint-heartedness and defeatism of the Danish 
people....Danes, therefore are to be counted among the more timorous of 
our friends and the less confident of our supporters.. .55
Although this defeatist attitude of the Danes was somewhat understood by the
British, seen in the light of the situation she found herself in
Denmark’s position amongst neutrals is....a peculiar one, conditioned by 
the two material facts that (1) owing to her intensive agricultural 
production she is probably further from self-sufficiency than any other 
European country, and (2) all but an insignificant part of her exports on 
which her economic life is based are sold to Great Britain and 
Germany,56
the British were not too complacent with the Danish tolerant approach to neutrality 
breaches, neither when it was against themselves.57
German expansion the British tended to see the neutrals as tools to be used in the war effort,
particularly in the pursuit o f economic warfare.
54 PRO, FO 371/23656, N3386/64/63, comment by I.G. Calvin 24.07.39
55 PRO, FO 419/33, Gallop, Copenhagen, to Halifax, 01.10.39
56 PRO, FO 371/24782, Howard-Smith, Copenhagen, to FO, 18.01.40, Political Review for the Year 
1939
57 PRO, FO 371/23658, Letter from Dormer to Lord Halifax, 22.09.39
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The notion that the Danes were too tolerant was set in comparison with the attitude 
of the Norwegians to breaches of their neutrality, especially that of their Foreign 
Minister, Koht. Although the British appreciated that there was a general feeling of 
goodwill amongst the Norwegian public and authorities towards the British rather 
than the Germans, when it came to Koht there was no difference made between the 
two belligerents; he was determined not to let any infringement pass by without a 
protest, no matter which side had committed the breach of Norwegian neutrality.
The disciplinary position of Koht in the matter was much more preferred by the 
British than the less stem attitude of his colleague in Denmark.58 Thus, although 
some members of the Norwegian Government worried that the stringent attitude of 
their Foreign Minister Koht would harm their relations with Britain, and he was 
subsequently ‘dismissed’ once the Government was in exile in London, because he 
was too much of an historian than politician in this approach59, it seems that to the 
British his strict attitude was preferred to the relaxed Danish attitude.
Susan Seymour argues that the British may have been subconsciously trying to 
convince themselves that Danish behaviour was pro-German so that they would feel 
less guilty at their inability to defend Denmark and even justified in sacrificing 
Denmark in the interests of a long term victory.60 “The Anglo-German agreement of 
June 1935, whereby the British agreed to allow Germany a fleet of up to 35% of the 
size of the British fleet which would naturally be concentrated in the Baltic, 
provoked considerable concern in Denmark.”61
The British, although it was not their intention that the pact would be interpreted 
differently by the Germans, were left embarrassed, because it left the Danes in a 
more difficult situation vis a vis Germany than before. The increased presence of the 
German Navy in the Baltic meant that if the Danes already were intimidated by the
58 PRO, FO 371/23658, Dormer, Oslo, to Halifax, FO, 22.09.39
59 Koht would not let down his indignation to the fact that the British had breached Norwegian 
neutrality; not even after the Norwegian King and Government had fled Norway to stay in exile in 
Britain would he let the matter rest, but kept wanting justice done -  in his mind the fact, that he and 
the rest o f the Government along with the King were safe in London and subject to British goodwill, 
made no difference to his will to see justice done.
60 Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-1945, 1982, p. 159
61 Seymour, Anglo-Danish Relations and Germany 1933-1945, 1982, p. 80
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fact that they shared border with the Germans, they now became even more unsettled 
and exposed to encounters with the Germans, especially on the matter of upholding 
neutrality in their waters.
Another area, where the British could have felt that they failed the Danes, was in 
their unwillingness to commit to any guarantee to Denmark, in case she was invaded 
by the Germans. In a letter marked “secret” to E.M.H. Lloyd, Esq., Food (Defence 
Plans) Department, May 1939 D. Morton revealed that although no decision had 
been made to make the same guarantee to Denmark as had been made to Poland, 
“there is agreement between the Military Authorities that, even if we did guarantee 
Denmark, we could not by force of arms prevent Germany rapidly over-running the 
country, should she decide that it was to her interest in war to do so.” The British 
therefore recognised that they could not force the Danes to concede to any conditions 
which would affect Danish economy policy in wartime as unneutral and likewise 
they could not prevent the Danes from accepting any guarantee from the Germans, 
because the British themselves were unable to give the Danes any guarantee of 
assistance or protection in the event of a German invasion. The British thus were 
wary with their language when approaching the Danes, so that they would not cause
ZTQ
any conflict or highlight this problem. Thus, despite their preference to the 
Norwegian method, the British recognised that they had kind of forced Denmark into 
the impossible situation she now found herself in. Therefore, although the British 
held a critical attitude towards the Danes, because of her lenient neutrality policy, 
they showed some understanding to the situation. This is the outline of the 
ambiguous relationship the British had towards the Danes, which also was present in 
their attitude towards the Danish representatives in the North Atlantic territories, 
London and Washington DC.
3. U.S. relations towards Scandinavia: Roosevelt’s appeal to Hitler 
Despite appeals from the smaller neutral European states the United States stayed 
true to their isolationism and shied away from the evocation that as the most 
powerful neutral they inexorably had the obligation to take a more active role to
62 PRO, FO 371/23654, (Sd) D. Morton to E.W.H. Lloyd, Esq., Food (Defence Plans) Department,
02.05.39
63 PRO, FO 371/23654, Telegram (N2437) from Ramsay to FO, 12.05.39
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secure peace and raise the security of other neutral states, except on one occasion, 
however, the outcome was not what the Americans, neutrals or allies had sought, 
namely the German pressure on the small neutral states to sign a non-aggression pact 
with her.
On Pan American Day, April 14th 1938, President Roosevelt voiced a warning to the 
totalitarian states to keep out of the western hemisphere and on the following day he 
made demands for non-aggression pledges from Hitler and Mussolini to thirty 
nations, including the Scandinavian state.64
Whether or not it was the direct cause, the appeal of Roosevelt to Hitler resulted in 
Hitler’s offer to the Scandinavian neutral states of the Non-Aggression Pact. This 
gesture was made in order to prove to Roosevelt that the northern neutral states did 
not need to feel threatened by Germany, and hence there was no need for the appeal. 
Following Roosevelt’s appeal, Hitler sent his Ministers in the Scandinavian countries 
to their respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs to formally ask, whether they felt that 
their countries were menaced by Germany, to which, upholding their neutrality, they 
replied in the negative.65
The reactions in Scandinavia to Roosevelt’s initiative were that President Roosevelt 
acted too hastily “and would have done better had he prepared the ground a little 
beforehand.”66 In Denmark Foreign Affairs Minister Munch was not too keen to 
follow Roosevelt’s suggestion to the Nordic countries to make an appeal to Germany 
for peace, because he thought that such an appeal would not be positively received. 
The Danes therefore were, reluctantly, in the process of writing a reply to Roosevelt 
when the peace signing (Peace For Our Time) took place in September, and the reply 
therefore was no longer relevant. Prime Minister Stauning later stated that 
negotiations of a non-aggression pact were offered to Denmark by Germany “as a 
result of President Roosevelt’s message and of “Herr Hitler’s reply to it.”
64 Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance, 1982, p. 43
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Although the official British reaction to Roosevelt’s initiative was appraisal and 
HMG immediately welcomed his ‘statesmanlike initiative,’ which offered ‘a real 
opportunity of averting the catastrophe which overhangs Europe’, privately the FO 
was less placid. Cadogan clearly thought the appeal amateurish and worthless and 
Sargent, the Deputy Under-Secretary, pointed out its ‘obvious shortcomings’, namely 
that they could never trust Hitler’s promises again and that he could destroy
ZTQ
countries’ independence by other means than invasion. It nevertheless showed the 
British that the U.S. was willing to take some steps with regard to the conflict, which 
was an encouraging sign.
4. Reactions to the Danish signing of the non-aggression pact with Germany 
It was, as mentioned earlier, in the interests of the British that the Scandinavian 
countries would be able to withstand German pressure on their own as long as 
possible, but when Hitler offered the neutrals the non-aggression pact it was noted 
within the Foreign Office that if Denmark decided to sign the Non-Aggression Pact 
on her own, which had been indicated by the Danish Press, it would be an important 
break in the policy of “northern co-operation”.
The Danish signing of the pact did not otherwise give the British any further qualms 
as such; as long as the pact did not interfere with Danish exports and imports to 
Britain, the Board of Trade and Foreign Office did not seem to mind it; it was not 
seen as an unneutral act. However, it had to be taken into account that it was signed 
before the beginning of the war,69 a Foreign Office report concluded. It nevertheless 
nurtured the negative attitude amongst the British of the Danes and Lascelles 
comments to the report were: “Those Danish plans make unpleasant reading, and are, 
I fear, typical of the knock-kneed attitude of the Danes as a whole.”70
Here again is evidence of the ambiguous relationship the British had with the Danes. 
On the one hand the British disapproved of the weakness the Danes showed versus
68 Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, p. 48
69 PRO, FO 371/23657, N  3853/64/63, August 1939
70 PRO, FO 371/23654, handwritten notes on the cover o f N  2422/64/63, 11.05.39
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Germany, on the other hand they did not seem to mind as long as it did not interfere 
with their own economic affairs.
5. Case study: the mining of Norwegian territorial waters to stop the traffic of 
Swedish iron ore to Germany and ‘Altmark’.
The case of British plans to mine the territorial waters of Norway, and especially the 
turn the mood took after the ‘Altmark’ incident, gives a good picture of the British 
sentiment towards neutrality and how that sentiment was closely connected with their 
concerns of American opinion in the period leading up to the occupation of the Faroe 
Islands and Iceland.
The greatest worry within British circles with regard to Scandinavian neutrality was 
how to stop the iron ore traffic from the mines in Gallivare in northern Sweden, upon 
which German war production depended, and which was primarily trafficked from 
the Norwegian town of Narvik in the north along the Norwegian coastline to 
Germany. The British believed strongly that if they could block this traffic Germany 
might be beaten. Along with the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Churchill believed 
that the denial of Swedish ore to Germany could in itself decide the outcome of the 
war.
Considerations within the British ministries to stop the iron ore traffic began at the 
outbreak of war. The Norwegian situation was assessed by staffs at the Foreign 
Office as to what action would serve the British cause best, and also the likelihood 
for a German breach of Norwegian neutrality. It was concluded that Norway was of 
greater importance to Germany than she was to Great Britain, and therefore the 
British believed that it was unlikely that Germany would attack Norway 
unprovoked.71
Because this traffic took place within the territorial waters of Norway, a neutral state, 
there was little Britain could do except to try to influence the Norwegian authorities. 
Despite British willingness, especially within the Foreign Office, to solve the iron
71 PRO, FO 371/23657, Memorandum from Industrial Intelligence Centre (Department o f Oversea 
Trade) to The Secretary, The Joint Planning Sub-Committtee, Committee o f Imperial Defence,
30.08.39
ore problem via the diplomatic path, there was not much faith amongst the Service 
Departments that this course of action would succeed, rather the best bet for the 
British would be to wait for Hitler to commit some atrocity towards the Scandinavian 
countries and hence permit the British to take action without the consent of the 
Norwegians.72
Although it was assessed that import-wise Norway was more dependent on the Allies 
than she was on Germany and therefore a strong economic pressure upon her 
exercised by the Allies was plausible, it nevertheless seemed important that such an 
action should be exercised “to its fullest extent compatible with international 
law”.73The efficiency of an economic pressure compatible with British international 
obligations was not considered to be high. The fear amongst the Norwegians for 
German repercussions, that would inevitably follow the stoppage of the iron ore 
traffic, would overshadow the effect of British economic pressure.74 Nevertheless, 
the option of economic pressure was considered, and so was the option of talking the 
Norwegians into taking firmer action against the iron ore traffic, by demanding that it 
should take place outside their territorial waters, hence forcing it out on international 
waters, where the British with their superior naval fleet would put an end to it. This 
latter option would, of course, have to include a guarantee from His Majesty’s 
Government that they would defend the Norwegians against the German reprisals, 
which the British were sure would bring about a change in the Norwegian attitude 
towards the iron ore; and the British were willing to give the Norwegians such a 
guarantee. The reason behind the British willingness of giving such a guarantee lay 
in the belief that although the Norwegian Government showed little willingness to 
budge to British pressure on the matter, the British were aware, by reports from their 
Minister in Oslo and elsewhere, that amongst the Scandinavian states the British 
were likely to find the most sympathy amongst the Norwegians, especially within 
private interests:
co-operation with British blockade measures in the fullest degree
compatible with technical neutrality might be hoped for from Norwegian
72 PRO, CAB 21/1391, Letter from Sgt. A.T. Cornwall-Jones to Air Commodore J.C. Slessor, D.S.O., 
M.C., Air Ministry, 20.02.40
73 PRO, FO 371/23658, War Cabinet, C.O.S. report (39) 7, 04.09.39
74 PRO, FO 371/23658, N 4218/64/63, Northern Department, Chief o f Staff Committee report on 
Norwegian Neutrality, September 1939, comment by Collier
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private interests, if not from the Government, provided only that the 
average Norwegian was persuaded that his country could, and would be 
protected by Great Britain, if necessary by force, against possible 
German reprisals.75
During the visit of the Norwegian Trade Delegation in London, the British presented 
them with an offer along these lines, but the Norwegians were adamant to follow 
their principles of neutrality.
6. Concerns about reactions to possible breaches of Norwegian neutrality 
Churchill, who was the strongest advocate for British action in Norwegian territorial 
waters despite Norwegian neutrality, argued that if the desired result could not be 
attained by diplomatic or economical pressure he would not refrain from suggesting 
that the British should employ the same measures as adopted in the Great War, that 
is, sowing mines in Norwegian territorial waters and thus forcing the traffic out of
7f\the three-mile limit, where they could be intercepted by the British.
That Churchill did not have much regard for the neutrality issue was apparent;
“Small nations must not tie our hands when we are fighting for their rights and
freedom.. .Humanity, rather than legality, must be our guide,”77 he stated in a note in
December 1939. That sentiment, however, was not shared by everyone, especially
not within the Foreign Office, whose main concern was the reactions to such a move
from the Americans and other neutral states;
from the start, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, expressed 
reservations which continued to weigh with him to the end: he did not 
believe that even if the whole traffic through Narvik were cut off the 
economic effects would be decisive, and asked whether an operation of 
doubtful legality would not cause the Allies to lose more in respect, 
especially in the U.S.A., than they might gain in other ways.78
The reliance upon help from America entailed a predominant cautiousness amongst 
the British not to make any moves that would harm U.S. opinion and attitude towards 
them. “The absolute centrality of the relationship with the United States can be seen
75 PRO, FO 371/23658, War Cabinet, C.O.S. report (39) 7, 04.09.39
76 PRO, ADM  205/2, Minutes o f Meetings in First Lord’s room, 18.09.39
77 PRO, FO 371/25660, W.P. (39) 162, Note by the First Lord o f the Admiralty, 16.12.39
78 David Dilks, “Great Britain and Scandinavia in the “Phoney War”, Scandinavian Journal o f History 
(2) 1977, pp. 33-4
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in the day to day conduct of British policy, in which virtually every initiative of any 
significance had to be carefully scrutinised in the light of its possible impact on
79American opinion,” Ludlow argues.
Although Churchill tried to downplay the fears of American repercussions in the 
event of Britain breaching neutrality, the British were given an insight of the 
American standpoint on neutrality, when the British cruiser Orion in December 1939 
tried to overhaul the German ship Arauca after the latter had entered American 
territorial waters. The Orion fired a warning shot across the bow of the Arauca, 
which fell within the three-mile limit. The reaction of the State Department was firm 
and the British were reminded of the principles of neutrality. Whereas the Admiralty 
and War Department tried to justify the British action, the members of the Foreign 
Office wanted to smooth things over with the Americans by giving them reassurance 
that this would not happen again.80
a) International reputation and opinion at home
While the plans to mine Norwegian territorial waters were in progress the British 
Government was approached by two of the Dominion Prime Ministers, Mr. Menzies 
and General Smuts, who took strong exception to the proposal. Menzies argued that 
not only would such an action have a bad effect in neutral countries, but it would also
01
present arguments to Germany to which she would not otherwise have.
The Prime Minister in the Union of South Africa pointed out that such an action 
would “involve Scandinavia in a war without power to safeguard her and that this 
would damage the Allied image, whose real strength was its morality basis, which in 
prolonged war, just as in the last war, will secure an eventual victory.”82 However, 
the British could not only focus their worries on reactions and views of the 
Americans and other neutral states, their concerns also lay with the reaction and 
opinion of the British public, and although they knew that their strong point with the
79 Peter Ludlow, “Britain and Northern Europe, 1940-1945”, Scandinavian Journal o f History,, (4) 
1979, p. 128
80 PRO, FO 371/24234, A 462, 18.01.40
81 PRO, PREM 1/419, telegram from Mr. Menzie to Rt. Hon. Neville Chamberlain, 12.01.40.
82 PRO, PREM 1/419, telegram from the Prime Minister in the Union o f South Africa to the High 
Commissioner in London, 12.01.40.
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public was the moral basis of the conflict and the objective to protect small states 
from the Nazis, they also were aware of the effect the inactivity of the ‘Phoney War’ 
had had on the British public and some kind of action would therefore be welcomed. 
It was thus reckoned that if the objective of the action in Norway was portrayed as 
being “protection of Norwegian neutrality” and the British, rather than taking action 
themselves, asked the Norwegians to guard their neutrality and immediately prohibit 
all vessels carrying iron-ore from Narvik making use of their territorial waters, it 
would change the picture from ‘pressure’ to ‘concern’ from the British side. “If they 
refused to do so, or if the Germans refused, I presume we should, it appears to me, be 
on stronger ground in the eyes of public opinion in taking forcible action involving 
Norwegian neutrality.” 83
It was not only concerns for reactions in the United States or the rest of the 
Commonwealth that affected British attitude towards neutrality and neutral states. 
Their reputation amongst the neutrals and possible future allies was also a concern of 
the British, and they became aware early on that their reputation was not exactly 
what they would wish for. In October 1939, for example, a report from the British 
Embassy in Copenhagen informed London that the Danes “are to be counted among 
the more timorous of our friends and the less confident of our supporters, and the 
failure of Great Britain to accomplish a miraculous rescue of Poland, or to stage a 
series of spectacular successes on the outbreak of war, has disheartened them to an 
extent disconcerting in a people who, it might have been imagined, were familiar 
with our capacity for “muddling through... [and].. .losing all battles except the last.”84 
It was this picture that the British wanted to escape, however Britain’s reputation 
suffered further blows during the ‘the Phoney War,’85 because there was much talk 
but no action taken with respect to the Russo-Finnish war and the lack of initiative 
and action thus added damage to their reputation and credibility as a strong power 
and possible winner of the war. This lack of credibility in Scandinavia resulted in 
Norwegian, Danish and Swedish reluctance to give up their neutrality and join the 
British side. Consequently, Britain could not afford to take any further risks at
83 PRO, FO 419/34 Dormer to Halifax 08.01.40 (10)
84 PRO, FO 419/33, Gallop to FO, 01.10.39
85 Frangois Bedarida, “France, Britain and the Nordic Countries”, Scandinavian Journal o f History (2) 
1977, p. 7
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damaging her reputation and credibility or to lose out again to Germany in the North 
because of apparent indecisiveness or lack of willingness to take action; this could 
explain the prompt decision and implementation of the occupation of the Faroes 
immediately after the German invasion of Denmark.
b) The ‘Altmark’ incident
Sowing mines in Norwegian territorial waters was also found undesirable by the 
British Government, as it was believed that it could not be legally justified, and thus 
would damage British reputation internationally, and especially it was feared that this 
legal aspect, or rather a show of disrespect for international law, would have a 
damaging effect on relations with the United States. Hence, an action was looked 
for, which would justify operations in the Scandinavian theatre. That came, when a 
German vessel, ‘Altmark’, sailing down the Norwegian coast was reported to be 
containing British prisoners from merchant vessels onboard, and a request of a joint 
Norwegian and British inspection of the ship was refused by the Norwegians.87 It 
was concluded that “we know now that the release of the prisoners from the 
‘Altmark’ gave impetus to German planning for an invasion of Scandinavia. It was 
judged that if Britain would violate neutrality for that purpose, she would certainly
oo
go further to starve Germany of ore.”
Although the British action in the ‘Altmark’ incident could not be legally justified,
the British gained much sympathy from amongst others the United States and other
neutral states, even Scandinavian, because of the humanitarian aspect of the incident.
From Denmark it was reported that:
Although the ‘Altmark’ incident....at first gave rise to some criticism of 
Great Britain in the Danish press, a more favourable tone prevailed after 
the first excitement was over, while public opinion was divided between 
a genuine fear that the incident might prove a dangerous precedent for 
further belligerent operations in territorial waters, Danish and Swedish, 
as well as Norwegian, and sympathy with the humane aspects of the 
British exploit. There is no doubt that as a result of this episode German 
prestige suffered a serious blow in Danish eyes and that British prestige 
was considerably enhanced.89
86 Dilks, “Great Britain and Scandinavia in the “Phoney War”, 1977, pp. 33-4
87 Dilks, “Great Britain and Scandinavia in the “Phoney War”, 1977, p. 41
88 Dilks, “Great Britain and Scandinavia in the “Phoney War”, 1977, pp.29-51
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Even in the Norwegian Press there was sympathy for the British actions in the 
incident; “one can understand the moral indignation of the British when they had to 
remain passive towards an enemy vessel, knowing that it carried 400 countrymen 
onboard.”90 It was being put forward that the British, through the ‘Altmark’ incident 
had, in a matter of 24 hours achieved more prestige worldwide, and had managed to 
calm American critics of the British warfare, than 6 months of political statements 
had managed so far.91
In the aftermath of the ‘Altmark’ incident it was noted by the Danish Minister in 
London that the tone in the British press towards the neutrals had changed, giving a 
clear signal that the patience with the neutrals was up. This made Reventlow certain 
that the ‘Altmark’ incident would not be a ‘one off incident.92 He quoted Daily Mail 
stating that “hopefully the World would understand by now that Britain in the future 
would act in the exact same way under similar situations, and the Yorkshire Post for 
stating that what happened in the ‘Altmark’ incident would show the World that the 
British would not be bluffed, neither by the Nazis nor the neutrals.”93 (translated) 
Further indications that the mood in Britain towards the neutrals had changed since 
the ‘Altmark’ incident were given when Chamberlain gave the British Press free run 
and said that there would be no more censorship on articles dealing with the neutrals 
and he more or less encouraged the press to be more vigorous in their writings about 
the neutrals.94
Although the ‘Altmark’ incident changed the British attitude towards the neutrality 
of the Scandinavian countries, they were still reluctant to commit any obvious 
breaches of their neutrality in order to stop the iron-ore traffic. To overcome their
90 SA, 5.F.8/1909-45/0002, Danish Legation, Oslo, to UM, Copenhagen, 19.02.40, refers to an article 
in Aftenposten
91 SA, 10.H .35c/l909-45/0002, Reventlow to UM, Copenhagen, 24.02.40, accompanied by the 
Whitehall Letters No. 103 containing remarks to the ‘Altmark’ incident.
92 SA, 5.F.8/1909-45/0002, Reventlow, London, to UM, Copenhagen, 19.02.40
93 SA, 5.F.8/1909-45/0002, Reventlow to UM, Copenhagen, 19.02.40
94 SA, 5.F.8/1909-45/0002, Reventlow to Munch 22.02.40, quoting Chamberlain: ..."T il Slut tillader 
jeg  mig at anf0re, a t det er mig bekendt, at Mr. Chamberlain den 17. ds. udtalte sig til ledende britiske 
Pressemcend i Retning af, at der intet var til H inder fo r  at Bladene behandlede det norske incident 
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neutrality quandary the British planned to hook up the sowing of mines in the 
Norwegian waters with a Royal Marine Operation. Whereas the British were afraid 
that if they would only carry out the former plan, they would be accused of violating 
the neutrality of a small nation, they would overcome this criticism if, at the same 
time, they took vigorous and effective action against Germany herself in her own 
waters.95 The same opinion was voiced by the department of the FO, which dealt 
with the United States Press; they sensed that the attitude there was that “the effect 
on public opinion of the Narvik operation, if carried out separately, would be bad; 
but that there should be no great difficulty if it were combined with the Royal Marine 
Operation.” The report from the department continued to stress that “The Prime 
Minister attached great importance to the psychological effect of the Royal Marine 
Operation...96 Another benefit of tying the Royal Marine Operation with the Narvik 
operation so that they would be carried out simultaneously was partly that the former 
operation would deflect some of the attention from the fact that the British were 
violating Norwegian neutrality, but also because “the Royal Marine Operation was a 
vigorous and aggressive action, and would be accepted as such by the world at 
large.” It is concluded that “the war in its present phase was largely psychological, 
and in world opinion points won or gained by the two sides were measured in 
psychological terms.”97
The psychological factor played much with the British policy-makers, because for 
some time there had been signs and indications that the British would take some 
action in the direction of stopping the supply of iron ore from Scandinavia to 
Germany. Therefore, they had reached the point where going back on the plans and 
taking no action was not an option, as this would make the British appear indecisive 
and weak.
C. BRITISH AND AMERICAN POLICIES TOWARDS THE NORTH ATLANTIC 
TERRITORIES
Despite the general belief back in 1939-40, and it is still a prevailing belief today, 
that Germany had plans to take the territories in the North Atlantic, this was not the
95 PRO, CAB 65/6, War Cabinet 78 (40), 01.04.40
96 PRO, CAB 65/6, War Cabinet 80 (40), 03.04.40
97 PRO, CAB 65/6, War Cabinet 82 (40), 05.04.40
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case. However, a strong presence of German activities in the area and an active 
German Consul in Reykjavik seemed to provide confirmation to the belief, and hence 
the concerns, for a German move towards occupation of the islands in the North 
Atlantic.
1. British policies towards the Faroe Islands
Plans to occupy the Faroe Islands and Iceland were in progress during the Great War, 
but the course of events on mainland Europe made this an unnecessary move. 
Nevertheless, some of the material gathered back then, such as maps of the islands, 
proved useful in the initial stages of planning prior to Second World War, which 
began in 1938, after reports of increased German activity in the islands.
The first serious planning took place a year later in November 1939, when the 
possibility of a German invasion of Denmark no longer could be disregarded. At a 
meeting in the Plans Division it was agreed that “in the event of a German invasion 
of Denmark, it is for consideration that we should take immediate steps to establish 
bases in the Faroe Islands and Iceland.” However, the status of the islands posed 
some problems and questions, when the planners learnt that “The Faroes are in a 
position vis a vis Denmark analogous to one of our own colonies. There is a 
Parliament of sorts, but the Danish Governor’s word is law.”98
The plans to occupy the Faroe Islands did not only entail the prevention of German
presence on the islands, but it was also the prospect of having bases in the islands,
and thus providing the Northern Convoys with a stronger defence, that attracted the
British to the idea of occupying the islands:
A fleet based in the Faroes would be ideally situated for control of our 
Northern Approaches, with particular reference to the interception of 
raiders breaking out, and well placed to cover the Northern Patrol. It 
would not, however, provide such good cover to the Scandinavian 
Convoy as a fleet operating from Scapa, but is equally well placed for 
this purpose as at the Forth and much better than at the Clyde [and] if it 
can be assumed that Scapa Flow is about the limit of action of bomber 
squadrons based on Sylt. We can accept the fact that for the present at
98 PRO, ADM 1/10739, PD 09116, 1939, m in.l, “Use o f Faroe Islands and Iceland”, Plans Division,
02.11.39
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least the Faroes would be immune from attack by aircraft based in North 
Jutland."
The status of Faroe Islands as long as Denmark remained neutral impeded the British
from taking any further measures in their plans to occupy the islands, and
precautions were also taken regarding Iceland’s status, which was different from that
of the Faroes. It was concluded by the Naval Intelligence Department that “if
Germany invades Denmark, there seems no reason why as a counter measure we
should not occupy the Faroes;”100 further it said:
In such circumstances, Iceland, however, could still regard herself as a 
neutral, and unless there were any German threat to Iceland, there would 
not appear to be sufficient excuse for stepping in until we were asked by 
the Icelandic Government to do so.” It was then concluded that “short of 
Iceland coming in as our ally, or asking to be placed under British 
protections, there is no way, consistently with international law, in which 
we can make unrestricted use of her harbours. Similarly, we could only 
make unrestricted use of the harbours in the Faroes by Denmark coming 
into the war, or by the Faroes breaking away from Denmark and coming 
in on our side. The question could, however, be put to the Foreign Office 
to see if any political action is possible.101
Though, it does not appear that the British Government made any further 
consideration into this possibility of using political power to break the Faroes away 
from Denmark despite it being assumed by those reporting from the Faroe Islands 
prior to the occupation, that there was a general wish amongst the islanders to “join 
the British Empire on a similar status to that of Isle of Man.”102 Thus, despite the 
early plans and considerations to occupy the islands, the decisive turn in events that 
determined the fate of the Faroes and Iceland during the war was the German 
occupation of Denmark and Norway on April 9th 1940. It seems quite evident that it 
was the neutral status of the territories, which held the British back, despite the fact 
that on the eve of the German invasion of Denmark there was a meeting at the War 
Cabinet in which a request from the First Lord of the Admiralty to amplify 
instructions regarding attacks on enemy war vessels in Neutral Territorial Waters 
following the ‘Altmark’ incident; this entailed the orders that
99 PRO, ADM  1/10739, PD 08116, 1939, min. 1, 02.11.39
100 PRO, ADM  1/10739, N.I.D. 00120/40, 03.04.40
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if enemy surface vessels took refuge in, or were found inside, the 
Territorial waters of Norway, the Faroes or Iceland, they were to be 
attacked, except when this would endanger life in towns and villages.” It 
was stressed, however, that “an endeavour should be made to engage the
1 Q O
vessels before they entered Territorial Waters.
British attitude towards respecting the neutrality of the small European states 
underwent, as we saw in the previous chapter, a change in late January early 
February. However, although the ‘Altmark’ incident presented the British with the 
excuse to show the neutrals less respect than hitherto, an excuse they had been 
looking for with regard to the plans of mining the Norwegian territorial waters, the 
British still refrained from advancing their plans in the North Atlantic. The fact that 
the British did not go ahead with their plans until Denmark was occupied therefore 
shows, as was pointed out earlier, that the other factors, such as the fear of 
repercussions in their relationship with the United States, still weighed heavily in the 
decision making.
2. British policies towards Iceland
While the main objective of all Icelanders is to maintain their 
independence, it is, I think, generally realised now that in the event of a 
European war this will be difficult in view of their defenceless state. My 
impression is that responsible Icelanders understand that in this event 
they will, as in the Great War, have to sacrifice some of their 
independence to exigencies of the situation. As a protection they realise 
that the Danish connexion is useless. They would, I believe, consider 
asking for the protection of the US, if they thought it would be 
obtained.104
The interesting point with the neutrality declaration is that despite being under the 
Danish crown, Iceland was given a separate section and signatory. This decision can 
partly be explained by the fact that Iceland in 1874 was given the right to decide and 
legislate in domestic matters and this right then was extended by the ‘Home Rule’ 
system, which was established in 1903, it gave the Icelandic Government the right to 
orchestrate their own national policies in financial-, legal-, church-, and educational 
affairs. On December 1st 1918 a law was passed by the Danish Government, which 
recognised Iceland as a sovereign state, but part of the Danish Kingdom. This law
103 PRO, CAB 65/6, War Cabinet 84 (40), 08.09.40
104 PRO, FO 419/33, Report on a visit to Iceland by Mr. Gage, 02.06.39
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was to last until 1940 when, if no agreement for a renewal of the law was reached 
after three years, the law would seize to exist, and Iceland would become a republic, 
which they did immediately after the war. However, at the signing of the declaration 
Iceland was not in command of its foreign affairs, these were still under Danish 
control, which is why it is quite interesting to find that Iceland was given a separate 
signature and her own amendments to the declaration, whereas the other two 
dominions under Danish rule, Greenland and the Faroes were included in the Danish 
declaration.
The British view of Iceland’s status was raised in April 1939, when Lieutenant 
Colonel Macnamara asked the Prime Minister whether he would make it clear “that 
the independence of the kingdom of Iceland was viewed by the British in the same 
light as the independence of France.”105 His Majesty's Government acknowledged 
the special status of Iceland, however they “do not find it possible to accept the 
comparison as set forth.”106 However, as will be evident in Chapter IV, the British 
readily accepted and respected Iceland’s declaration of independence from the 
Danish King and Government following the German occupation of Denmark, and 
treated her independently established diplomatic corpse on par with that of other 
countries.
Although the British attached great importance to their relations with Iceland,107 she 
was not seen as being likely to face any threats as a result of the looming conflict in 
Europe. Thus when the British at first were made aware of increasing German 
interest108 in Iceland, they did not pay too much attention to the reports and no 
alarms were raised. In March 1939 attention was again brought to the increasing 
German interest in Iceland when the Naval Intelligence Office forwarded a report to 
the Foreign Office on the matter. It was reported that Iceland would soon receive a 
visit from Herr Himmler, chief of the Gestapo, acting as the leader of a large 
expedition of genealogists for the purpose of investigating German ancestry in
105 PRO, FO 371/23654, Parliamentary question, Lieutenant Colonel Macnamara, 03.04.39
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107 PRO, FO 371/23654, reply to Parliamentary question, Lieutenant Colonel Macnamara, 03.04.39
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Iceland.109 However, despite these reports and the realisation within the Foreign 
Office that the “German menace” in Iceland was a real one110, the matter seemed to 
be played down by the higher circles of decision makers and no action was taken. 
These reports were later followed by information of other activities and increased 
German interest in the island, such as the visit of Luft-Hansa representatives to 
Reykjavik with the purpose of establishing a base in Iceland for a proposed air route 
between Germany and America, and their desire to have their own radio-station in 
Iceland. However, the British had their worries eased on the aviation matter, when 
the Icelandic Government decided not to grant permission to any foreign flying 
company to maintain an air-service to Iceland.111 Nevertheless, the German presence 
in Iceland could no longer be ignored by the British and because the German colony 
was by far the largest colony of foreigners in Iceland, the increasing German 
activities also made the Icelanders a bit disconcerted, because they found some of 
these activities highly dubious.112
Following the visit of German cruiser “Emden” to the island, it was advised by the 
Foreign Office that a visit of one of H.M.’s ships to Reykjavik would prove to be 
great value as a demonstration that H.M.’s Government also were interested in the 
future of Iceland.113 At this stage, however, the main concern was not the loss of 
Iceland as a strategic point, although German bases on the island certainly would 
pose a serious threat to the British mainland. Rather the worry was the that the use of 
Iceland by the enemy “would be a great source of embarrassment to us,”114 and based 
on this the Committee of Imperial Defence argued that “this should be prevented and 
all diplomatic and other means possible in peace should be directed to ensuring that 
Germany is not in a position to make use of Iceland in war.” The conclusion in July 
1939 was that “although Iceland might prove useful to us in a war as a base for 
armed merchant cruisers and aircraft employed in trade operations in the North 
Atlantic we consider that the advantages to be gained by its use are not very great as
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we already have adequate bases in the north of the British Isles,”115 and the view 
does not seem to have changed in the course of the following months and following 
the outbreak of war with Germany, because in November greater emphasis was still 
placed on the Faroe Islands.116
Bittner notes that with respect to Iceland, it was pointed out that if Denmark was 
attacked Iceland might declare her neutrality and this would preclude active British 
use of Icelandic facilities.117 Although this passage by Bittner is quite confusing, 
since Iceland signed the neutrality declaration as independent from Denmark, it may 
be contemplated that he refers to the considerations the British had regarding the 
independent status Iceland had within the Danish Kingdom, and the British foresaw 
that it would be more difficult to negotiate with an Icelandic representative that acted 
completely independent of Danish influences, however limited that influence might 
be. As Bittner argues, “generally throughout the staff work no mention was made of 
a forced occupation without the consent of the Icelandic Government. Iceland’s 
neutrality and status under international law was always stressed as compared to the 
actual crown colony status of the Faeroe Islands.”118
2.1 British attempts to influence Icelandic neutrality
Acknowledging that Iceland, although being part of the Danish Kingdom, was 
technically independent of Denmark and therefore would still regard herself as 
neutral, if Denmark was to be overrun by Germany, the British apprehended that 
unless Germany posed a real threat to Iceland, there "would not appear to be 
sufficient excuse for stepping in until we were asked by the Icelandic Government to 
do so... [and] that, short of coming in as our ally, or asking to be placed under British 
protection, there is no way, consistent with international law, in which we can make 
unrestricted use of her harbours.” Until that occurred the British could do little. It 
was also considered in a memorandum on Iceland in March 1940, that the British 
should “try to “nurse” Iceland to sever her ties with Denmark, when the Act of Union
115 PRO, FO 371/23656, Committee o f Imperial Defence. Deputy Chiefs o f Staff Sub-Committee. 
“The Strategic Importance o f Iceland,” July 1939
116 Donald F. Bittner, The British Occupation o f Iceland. 1940-42. University o f Missouri-Columbia, 
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expired in 1943”119, with the ultimate goal being “to draw Iceland within the Empire, 
with Dominion status, though an alliance or defensive guarantee would be 
satisfactory enough.”120 However, this was only contemplated at the lower 
bureaucratic levels, and did not seem to find much serious support elsewhere. The 
British thus came to the decision that the goal should be “to ensure that the Icelandic 
Government will ask for our protection at the earliest possible moment.” The First 
Sea Lord and Churchill agreed to the final recommendation that the Foreign Office 
see if a political solution to the problem was possible.”121
The immediate Icelandic objective of the neutrality declaration of 1938 was to avoid 
the same situation she found herself in during the Napoleonic Wars, where Denmark 
had allied herself with France and Iceland thus became embroiled in the conflict 
against her will and had her communications with Denmark cut off by the subsequent 
British naval blockade. It was during this period that the Icelanders discovered that, 
“although their seat of government was in Copenhagen, their Atlantic island fell 
within the power sphere of London.”122 She thus became ‘neutral’ and relied on 
having made bi-lateral agreements with Britain in order to survive from starvation in 
the event of her ties with Denmark being severed yet again by another war.
The British realised that they had the upper hand in their relations with Iceland 
because of her dependence upon trade with the British Isles, and trade negotiations 
became the predominant tool by which the British tried to influence Icelandic 
neutrality to their advantage. Although plans had been underway during First World 
War to occupy Iceland, the British eventually found that it would not be necessary; 
by applying a stringent blockade control over Icelandic foreign trade, censorship of 
post and telecommunications, and thus holding the ultimate sway over Icelandic 
livelihood during the Great War, the British consul repeatedly dictated terms to the 
Icelandic authorities. An occupation, in order to control the island, was therefore not 
necessary.
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The British were aware that memories of these former British policies towards the 
Icelandic were still fresh when then war broke out because in his report from Iceland 
in June 1939, Mr. Gage warned the British to be careful in their economic and 
commercial policies towards Iceland this time around and quotes M. Jon Arnason, 
Export Manager, saying that “while Iceland disliked German methods, they had no 
reason to like British” and he recalled the exploits of Mr. Cable, HM Consul-General 
during the Great War, whom he described as Iceland’s biggest dictator.”123 It was 
therefore important that the British were careful in their policies such that they did 
not alienate themselves in the eyes of the Icelanders. British concerns with the 
increased German presence and interest in Iceland were thus not only in terms of 
strategic military matters. Economically and commercially they understood that with 
the declared neutrality of Iceland they could not force her to break off trade with 
Germany against her will and the fact that they were not able to meet her needs, 
whereas Germany gladly stepped in, did not work in their favour. As Mr. Gage’s 
report showed, quoting M. Jonas Jonsson, Head of the Progressive Party, saying that 
he was confident that “Iceland will always be friendly to England” but he pointed out 
“the difficulty of preventing German influence when Germany’s purchases were so 
great,”124 summarised the situation, and was also acknowledged by the British in 
London.
Financial and commercial difficulties have hitherto stood in the way of 
meeting Icelandic requests for permission to raise a loan in this country 
or for other forms of help, which, from the standpoint of the country’s 
finances, is badly needed. Germany on the other hand, has been willing 
and anxious to take more Icelandic produce, particularly fish, with the 
result that the influential class of trawler owners are now becoming one1 2Sof the most pro-German elements in Iceland.
The obstacle in the Foreign Office’s efforts to counter the increased German 
influence on Iceland was the Treasury, which was unwilling to meet Icelandic need 
and demands. In a pledge to the Treasury, the Foreign Office sent a memo where it 
was pointed out that “although it is understood that Iceland’s reputation stands very 
highly in British banking circles, it is realised that, in present circumstances, purely 
commercial and financial considerations may be adduced to justify the refusal of
123 PRO, FO 419/33, Report on a visit to Iceland by Mr. Gage, 02.06.39
124 PRO, FO 419/33, Report on a visit to Iceland by Mr. Gage, 02.06.39
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further financial assistance; but Lord Halifax feels that the question must be viewed
1from a wider standpoint, taking into account the strategic position of the island.” 
a) British offer to the Icelandic Government
The British eventually recognised that they could not stop Iceland trading with 
Germany as long as that trade was within the confines of the Neutrality Act, however 
they came to the conclusion that they could offer the Icelandic assistance in the event 
of a German attack on the island in exchange with her ceasing trade with the latter. 
This conclusion, nevertheless was based upon the realisation that in the event of a 
German attack on the island the “H.M.G. would be obliged to intervene in their own 
interests, whether or not they have given any previous guarantee to the Icelandic 
Government, since they could not contemplate the establishment of German forces in 
Iceland.”127 The Icelanders, however, did not accept this offer because it was not in 
concurrence with her neutrality, and the British therefore did not take the matter any 
further at this stage. It may be concluded that in November 1939 the British were still 
deterred by the neutrality of small states and they came to the conclusion that an 
invasion of Iceland based on the threat alone was not sufficient. They would 
therefore stick to their decision that it was not desirable to take matters further with 
Iceland without her invitation,128 such a move would create more animosity than 
wished for and would harm relations not only with Iceland, but also with Denmark it 
was believed.
Bittner states, that although Britain imposed a naval blockade on Germany where 
Iceland became the northern anchor around which the Royal Navy established and 
maintained this blockade, Icelandic neutrality was not infringed and she had no direct 
involvement in the war, until April 1940 that is.129 The exception was the incident of 
the landing of a British seaplane on the east coast of Iceland.
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c. Case study: British sea-plane landing in Iceland
In September 1939 a British sea-plane landed in Raufarhofn on the east coast of 
Iceland and was detained by the Icelandic authorities. Despite being detained and 
having knowingly breached the neutrality of Iceland by landing without permission 
inside Icelandic territorial waters, the pilot departed the island despite having been 
given orders from the Icelandic authorities to wait for instructions. However, upon 
the arrival of an Icelandic airplane with the instructions, that he was to fly to 
Reykjavik with the Icelandic plane, the English pilot made his escape as the pilot of 
the latter went ashore. The British pilot later claimed that, contrary to the statements 
by the Icelandic authorities, he had not given his word that he would follow their 
instructions, but this was even questioned at the Foreign Office, where Lascelles 
remarked that ‘his story sounded to me distinctly thin.”130 The crucial fact in this 
incident, though, did not seem to be whether the pilot acknowledged having breached 
Icelandic neutrality or not, but that the Foreign Office realised that the situation was 
viewed as very grave by the Icelandic Government, and that if the British wanted to 
remain on friendly terms with the Icelanders, they would have to do what it took to 
meet Icelandic demands rather than questioning them; and the British even turned to 
the Danes for advice regarding which approach they believed would be most 
acceptable by the Icelandic Government.131
Typically for the war departments their concerns were more with regard to the 
material matters than the diplomatic implications of the incident, and the Air 
Ministry’s immediate worry was the plane itself132, and how they could get the plane 
back to Britain. However, the Air Ministry also pointed out that they “have always 
supported the principle that military aircraft which landed in neutral territory must be 
interned, with the crew,” and that it was to the interest of the Air Ministry to uphold 
this principle.133
130 PRO, FO 371/23666, Comment by Lascelles to telegram from Consul-General Bowering, 
Reykjavik, to FO 28.09.39
131 SA, 10.G .3/1961/372, Islands Neutralitetsforanstaltninger, telegram from Reventlow, London, to 
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, 04.10.39
132 a new American type, which was extremely valuable and the only one which the British had which 
could operate so far afield
133 PRO, FO 371/23666, Air Ministry to Cadogan, FO, 27.09.39
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The incident created a diplomatic crisis with strong objections and protests from both 
Iceland and Denmark134, and although the Air Ministry tried to wriggle their way out 
of the situation by suggesting that the British should request the release of the 
machine on the ground that it should be treated “as the equivalent of a warship object 
to put into a neutral port under stress of weather,” this argument was dismissed by 
the legal advisors, as it was found that the argument “would definitely not wash: 
aircraft cannot for these purposes be treated like warships, and the obligations to 
intern them is perfectly well established.”135 It was subsequently suggested by the 
Air Ministry that the British might induce the Icelandic authorities to connive at a 
get-away, either by straightforward political pressure or by bribery. This option, 
however, was dismissed by Lascelles at the Foreign Office, who thought that it 
would be extremely difficult because, although the Icelanders were “poor but 
honest,” they were also stubborn and it was therefore not likely that they would meet 
this suggestion with a positive attitude. Lascelles also pointed out to the Air Ministry 
that such an approach to solving the situation would surely create a very undesirable 
precedent; the Air Ministry (and still more the Admiralty) were in general very keen 
on ensuring that neutrals observed the rules about interning enemy ships and aircraft 
-  in Iceland itself there were a number of German ships for the continued 
immobilisation of which the British should wish to hold the Icelandic Government
1 o z :
responsible -  and the British could not have things both ways.
The Foreign Office therefore was resolute that the Air Ministry would have to own 
up to the Icelandic authorities and return the pilot to the island, because not only 
would a reluctance to meet Icelandic demands harm Anglo-Icelandic relations, and 
Anglo-Danish relations, but the rumours of the incident were already spreading like
134 SA, 10.G.3/1961/372, Letter from Reventlow to Viscount Halifax, Secretary o f State for Foreign 
Affairs, 03.10.39
135 PRO, FO 371/23666, Comment by Lascelles to telegram from Consul-General Bowering, 
Reykjavik, to FO, 28.09.39, subject: “Landing o f a British sea-plane inside Icelandic territorial 
waters.”
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subject: “the seaplane is understood to have escaped.”
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wild-fire and “would be a godsend to German propaganda.”137 It was also concluded, 
that “gesture of respect for International Law would have positively good effect.”138
In the end, and after much delay, the pilot was returned to Iceland to serve his 
sentence and relations between Britain, Iceland and Denmark restored.
This incident of the British sea-plane breaching Icelandic neutrality by landing 
without permission showed that both parties were interested in upholding the laws of 
neutrality. It must, however, be pointed out that the British sentiment to respect 
Icelandic neutrality and the willingness to meet their demands and thus restore 
relations with Iceland lay, not surprisingly, with the Foreign Office, while the Air 
Ministry was not as able to look upon the situation in its wider diplomatic context; 
their main issue was to secure the sea-plane and crew and were not willing to return 
the pilot unless the Icelandic Government promised that they would regard this 
gesture as the end of the incident.139
As Bittner also argues, the overall impression is that until the spring of 1940 the 
British respected the Icelandic desire for neutrality; but this was to change. On April 
8th 1940 the War Cabinet held a meeting after which British military forces would be 
permitted to engage in combat operations in Icelandic waters. Previously specific 
authorization had to be given to Royal Navy to fight German vessels within neutral 
waters. On this date blanket approval was granted to His Majesty’s ships to attack 
German surface ships and submarines within the territorial waters of Norway, the 
Faeroe Islands, and Iceland without having to receive special permission from the 
Government. In addition to approving these standing orders to the fleet, the War 
Cabinet ordered that no public announcement would be made of these new 
instructions to the Navy.140
137 PRO, FO 371/23666, Comment by Lascelles to draft from Bowering, Reykjavik, to FO, 28.09.39  
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3. Greenland
There are no indications of any distinctive Anglo-American common policy towards 
the North Atlantic territories prior to the German occupation of Denmark. However, 
it does not seem that the British were troubled with the prospect of increased 
American influence on the islands following the Icelandic attempts to create stronger 
economic and trade relations with the United States, rather the opposite, because any 
further American involvement in the North Atlantic territories, would increase the 
chances of an U.S. entry in the war, while at the same time provide the Icelanders 
with another trade option than Germany. When the Foreign Office received reports 
from Scandinavia, making the British aware that there were fears amongst the 
Scandinavians that Iceland would move away from the Nordic community and 
instead look towards Britain and United States, a result of rising separatist movement 
and attempts to build stronger trade relations with the United States, the British did 
not think that the fears were grounded and they saw no problem in the Icelandic wish 
to create stronger trade relations with the United States “since this can only mean a 
disservice to the German trade relations with Iceland, which is a problem in the eyes 
of the British.”141 (emphasis in original)
D. U.S. RELATIONS TOWARDS THE NORTH ATLANTIC TERRITORIES 
While there was a general feeling amongst some of Roosevelt’s closest advisors 
within the State Department that the United States should concentrate on defending 
the Western Hemisphere rather than supporting the Allies,142 Roosevelt himself 
hoped to do both. However, although the Americans had a defined Western 
Hemispheric policy, there are no signs that they had any specific policy with regard 
to the Greenland, Iceland or the Faroe Islands.
U.S. relations towards the North Atlantic territories before the late 1930s were 
mainly confined to scientific explorations in the area. However, with the Monroe 
Doctrine of 1823 (later modified), the Americans had a specific policy towards parts 
of the North Atlantic. The Monroe Doctrine was created in response to the
141 PRO, FO 371/23657, comments by Addis and Lascelles to report by Kenney forwarded by Sir. E. 
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expansionist mood in Europe and was a tool for the Americans to ensure that no 
foreign power would gain a foothold in their backyard and threaten the hard-won 
freedom of the American people. Thus, the Doctrine stated, that the United States 
would not recognise any transfer and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer 
any geographic region of this hemisphere from non-American power to another non- 
American power.”143 In the original Doctrine the eastern limit of the hemisphere was 
the meridian of 20° west of Greenwich, thus cutting straight through Greenland, 
while the western followed the International Date Line, however these lines were 
later modified to serve the change of interest within the United States as the war 
progressed; thus, after the outbreak of war and the occupation of Denmark, the lines 
were adjusted slightly to include Greenland and Iceland in the Western Hemisphere, 
but not the Faroe Islands.
There was little interest within the United States with regard to the North Atlantic 
territories, that is, until Charles Lindberg flew from the United States to Denmark via 
Greenland in 1933 and thus not only showed how important aviation would become 
but also that the shortest route between the north-west of America and European 
mainland was along the lines which crossed southern Greenland; and when Senator 
Lundeen proposed to the Congress that the United States should buy Greenland of 
Denmark in order to use the island as a naval base, and also because of the island’s 
importance in connection with the establishment of northern air routes. After the 
proposal the State Department saw an increased interest from both the public and the 
industry in the status of the territories in the North Atlantic.144
Despite the growing interest in Greenland and Iceland following the outbreak of war, 
the Division of Research and Publication within the Department of State 
acknowledged that there was very little history of American interest in the area. For 
example there did not appear to have been any serious discussion of Greenland at the 
time of the purchase of Alaska, and the issue of a possible acquisition of Greenland 
seemed only to have taken form in connection with negotiations with Denmark for
143 Lawrence Martin, “The Geography o f the Monroe Doctrine and the Limits o f the Western 
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the purchase of the Danish West Indies; no reference to the purchase of Iceland was 
found by the Division of Research and Publication.
When Denmark in the 1920s requested the British Government to recognise Danish 
sovereignty over Greenland the British Government reserved the right to be 
consulted in case the Danish Government should at any time contemplate the 
alienation of this territory. Upon learning about this the United States Government 
informed Great Britain and Denmark that she was not disposed to recognise the 
existence in a third government of the right of pre-emption to acquire this territory in 
case the Danish Government should desire to dispose of it.145
Roosevelt recognized by 1938 that there was a risk of the Germans establishing bases 
on Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands along with the Azores and Cap Verde 
Islands. To prevent this the Americans would have to actively join the international 
policy that the European democratic side had adopted and at the same time, move 
public opinion towards a more positive attitude of a “stronger foreign policy.”146 
Nothing then happened until after the German invasion of Scandinavia. An example 
of this lack of interest in the North Atlantic is that the United States had no 
diplomatic representation in the area until after Denmark was occupied, despite 
having had plans to establish a consular office in Reykjavik already in April 1939. 
This plan, however, had been put on hold, at least until war broke out, the reason 
being that trade with the island had been so small in 1939.147
E. CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the reader to the Anglo-American 
relationship prior to the war and the relationship between the British and Americans 
with Denmark and her territories in the North Atlantic, as these relationships were to 
form the foundation of the position the Danish representatives abroad would find 
themselves in on the eve of the German invasion of Denmark on April 9th 1940. The 
extent to which the Danish representatives were able to influence the British and
145 NARA, RG59, Decimal File 1940-44, box 5390, Memorandum by Division o f Research and 
Publication, Memorandum 21.02.40
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Americans very much depended upon the attitude of the host-govemments and 
occupying powers of the territories where the Danish representatives were situated, 
hence the focus on the issues and events, which had an impact on the opinion others 
held of Denmark and those representing her abroad.
As this chapter has shown the neutrality question played an important part in the 
Anglo-American relationship in the early stages of war and especially the British 
relationship with Denmark, Norway and the North Atlantic territories prior to and 
after the German occupation of Denmark on April 9th 1940. The ambiguous 
relationship the British had with the Danes during the war stemmed from the policies 
each country on its part applied towards the neutrality aspect. The British were 
dismayed by the Danish lack of resistance to the German threat to her neutrality. 
However, despite acknowledging the difficult situation Denmark found herself in 
with regard to Germany and acknowledging that Denmark could not defend herself 
on her own, Britain was not willing to offer Denmark any support on par with the 
offer given to Norway. The British therefore were somewhat answerable to the 
situation, which the Danish representatives in the aftermath of the German 
occupation would have to face much criticism for. This, therefore, can provide a 
good reasoning to understanding the following chapters, where the focus is on the 
Danish representatives in the North Atlantic territories and in London and 
Washington DC, and the extent to which they were able to exert influence despite 
representing a government which collaborated with the enemy.
British policies with regard to the North Atlantic were simple: they had to hinder the 
Germans getting a foothold there, because with bases in the North Atlantic the 
Germans would not only pose a direct threat to the British isles, but they would also 
increase their effectiveness in intercepting the channel of supply from the United 
States, upon which the British relied heavily. However with limited military 
resources and subsequent reliance on the Americans, with whom they had an 
ambivalent relationship, means to combat the German menace were small. To 
hamper the German rearmament by cutting off the iron-ore traffic from Sweden to 
Germany therefore became the foremost goal of the British in the first period of the 
war, but there was one obstacle: the declared neutrality by the Scandinavian states.
124
Although the British were very much influenced by their concerns of American 
attitude towards them and the prospect of an American departure from isolationism 
to take a more active role in the war on the allied side, and despite of a direct 
correspondence taking place between F.D.R. and Churchill, there is no evidence of 
any joint Anglo-American policy towards the North Atlantic, nor that the matter is 
taken up at any stage by either part.
Like the neutrality of Scandinavia had obstructed British plans to stop the iron-ore 
traffic, so the neutrality of the North Atlantic clearly imposed restrictions on British 
plans there, but their considerations with the neutrality of the territories was also 
influenced by their different stages of independence, and that restriction was not 
lifted until the German occupation of Denmark. The examinations of the neutrality 
question present in British plans with regard to the Faroe Islands and Iceland shows 
that there are strong incentives that the British were deterred by the neutrality of the 
North Atlantic territories.
In the case of the Faroe Islands, because she was a Danish dependency and thus 
comprised by the Danish declaration of neutrality, the notion was that nothing could 
be done as long as Denmark herself was free and neutral. However, the possibility of 
Denmark being overrun by the Germans and thus losing her neutral status was taken 
into consideration, because that would change the situation of the Faroes, it was 
concluded, and the obstacle of Faroese neutrality could justifiably be overlooked. 
That, however, was not the case of Iceland. Because of her separate signature of the 
declaration, her neutrality would not be affected by a German occupation of 
Denmark.
Despite a majority of goodwill in Iceland towards the British, Iceland, like so many 
other countries, was hard hit by the economic crisis in the 1930s and she therefore 
relied heavily upon her trade. Although being within the British sphere of influence, 
Germany was successful in increasing her influence on the island, partly due to the 
lack of alarm raised in Britain to reports of increased German activity in Iceland, and 
partly due to British failure to meet Icelandic commercial and trade needs, to which 
the Germans responded to.
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Since the likelihood of German plans of establishing bases in Greenland were 
perceived as unlikely the British did not pay the island much attention. To the 
Americans the island did not attract much interest either as long as she remained 
under Danish possession and her position thus was consistent with the Monroe 
Doctrine.
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CHAPTER III: THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF THE FAROE ISLANDS: THE
ROLE OF GOVERNOR HILBERT AND DANISH MINISTER IN LONDON 
COUNT REVENTLOW
The previous chapters introduced us to the historical background to the British 
decision to occupy the Faroe Islands. They also outlined the ambiguous relationship 
between Britain and Denmark following the reluctance of the Danes to put up a 
sufficient fight against the German threat to her neutrality.
Whereas Chapter I and II deal with the background to the situation, which the Danish 
representatives found themselves in on the eve of the German occupation of 
Denmark, this chapter and the following chapters will focus on the representatives, 
their personalities and their means to influence the British and the Americans in their 
policies towards the respective North Atlantic territories.
In this chapter the role of the Danish Minister in London and the Governor in the 
Faroe Islands and the extent of influence they were able to exert on the British is 
examined and compared to their Faroese and Norwegian counterparts’ efforts. The 
Faroese case shows clear indications of the British ambiguity in their relationship 
towards the Danish representatives, however despite this, the chapter will show, the 
Danish Minister in London and the Danish Governor in the Faroe Islands were able 
to exert much influence on British policies towards the islands. The chapter will 
introduce the reader to the various variables and means through which the Danish 
representatives were able to achieve this influence. The comparison with the efforts 
of their Faroese and Norwegian counterparts also highlights the capability of the 
Minister in London and the Governor in the Faroes in making the most of the 
situation, the British ambiguity and the means available to influence the British to 
their and Denmark’s advantage.
The case of the Faroe Islands differs from that of Iceland and Greenland in that the 
British throughout their occupation of the Faroes continuously were the centre of 
attention in an internal struggle between the Danish authorities on the one side and 
the Faroese independence movement and the Norwegian Consulate on the other side,
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both parties pursuing to influence the British to their own advantage. This tri­
polarity, i.e. between the occupiers, the Danish representatives and the locals, is not 
as present in the cases of Iceland and Greenland as it is in the case of the Faroes.
The German occupation of Denmark on April 9th 1940 required a substantial change 
in the administration and governance of the Faroe Islands. Although connections 
with the Government in Copenhagen were not completely severed by the German 
occupation of Denmark, communications with Copenhagen became restricted, 
especially after the British occupation of the islands four days later on April 13th. The 
fact that the Government in Copenhagen evidently was acting under German duress 
begged for a change in the administration of the islands.
The change of status quo introduced both new actors and new roles for existing 
actors with regard to the external and internal relations of the Faroe Islands. The 
most important actors were Governor Carl Aage Hilbert, Danish Minster in London 
Count Eduardo Reventlow, the Norwegian Consul in the Faroes Thorstein Petersen 
and his secretary Nils Ihlen, British Consul Frederic Mason, Lawrence Collier and 
E.O. Coote of the Foreign Office, Christopher Warner, head of the Northern 
Department at the Foreign Office, and John Dashwood likewise of the Northern 
Department, who was the office clerk, who mostly dealt with matters related to the 
Faroe Islands.
The first part of the chapter will introduce the initial plans by the British with regard 
to the occupation of the Faroe Islands. The declared policy by His Majesty’s 
Government at the outset of the occupation was to become the decisive element in 
the Anglo-Danish-Faroes relations during the occupation. The declaration was from a 
political point of view loosely worded and because of the ambiguous situation in 
Denmark the British refrained from making a more clearly worded declaration 
throughout the occupation. This was to cause the British Consul on the islands, 
Frederic C. Mason, great difficulty, as he, more than once, would be caught in the 
middle of internal struggles between local ‘Home Rule’ politicians, demanding 
independence from Denmark, and the Danish Governor, Carl Aage Hilbert, both 
parties hankering for moral support from the occupying forces. Why, then, did the 
British not make their declared policy clearer?
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The importance placed on the islands by the British very much relied upon the utility 
factor. Despite initial plans to use the islands as a flight- and fuelling base, the 
decision to build an aerodrome was put on hold. The postponement of an aerodrome 
on the Faroes and the subsequent decision to build an airbase in Iceland instead 
diminished the importance attached to the Faroes. As a result matters related to the 
Faroes rarely reached War Cabinet, but were mainly dealt with by office clerks at the 
Northern Department at the Foreign Office. Information about the islands were 
limited, so London very much relied upon the reports from their Consul on the 
islands to form their knowledge of the situation there during the occupation. The 
British Consul Mason incidentally was young and inexperienced and hence easily 
influenced. Thus, the party exerting most influence on Mason would be the most 
successful in shaping British attitudes and consequently influence their policies 
towards the Faroe Islands.
The second part of this chapter will look at the Danish contingent, of which the most 
important were Governor Hilbert and Count Reventlow. The Governor was true to 
the pledge he had made to his King upon his appointment and his mission was to 
keep the Faroes from changing as little as possible while cut off from Denmark and 
the King. Hilbert’s only downfall was his elitism, which along with his stem 
aspiration to keep the Faroes’ status quo blinded him to opportunities that could have 
eased Anglo-Danish-Faroese relations during the war. The problem, which the 
Danish representatives, especially in the Faroe Islands and Iceland, were faced with, 
was that their loyalties were constantly under scrutiny by the local independence 
movements. Hence, although they were granted by the British to continue in their 
positions, which they had been appointed to by a free Government prior to the 
German invasion, they had very little room for manoeuvre. Now their Government 
was controlled by the Germans they could no longer take instructions from 
Copenhagen, but neither could they officially denounce their Government, like the 
Danish Minister in Washington had done. By doing so they would in effect resign 
from their original appointment and this would only add fuel to the independence 
campaign to have them removed from the islands. The status of the Danish 
representatives thus very much depended upon event in Denmark. The signing of the 
Anti-Comintern Pact, the continuous collaboration of the Government and the lack of
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resistance had its negative effect on the British attitude towards the Danish 
representatives. However, in late August 1943 things changed in Denmark. 
Following continual pressure and hardship by the Germans on the Danes, which 
culminated in unrest and strikes in different Danish cities on August 29th, the so- 
called August-revolt, the Government in Copenhagen resigned despite of refusals by 
King Christian to accept the resignation. Subsequently, martial law was declared by 
the Germans and this marked the final stage of co-operation of the Danish 
Government with the Germans, after which an intermittent government, the so-called 
Ministerial Government because it was run by the Ministries, was established and 
Danish subjects abroad officially joined the Allies. By this time, however, the 
conducts of the Danish Government had had so much damage on the Danish 
credibility and attitude amongst the British, that there was little difference, if any, to 
notice in their relationship with the Danish representatives with regard to the Faroe 
Islands.
Like Hilbert the Minister in London, Count Reventlow, was of the old school of 
diplomats dedicated to the pledge made to his King. He was therefore more reluctant 
to join the “Free Denmark” movement than some of his colleague, amongst them the 
Danish Minister in the United States, Henrik Kauffmann, who in the aftermath of the 
Second World War has been deemed more of a politician than a diplomat, as will be 
shown in Chapter V. His problem of joining the “Free Denmark” movement, 
therefore, did not have the added connotation of his change of position having effect 
on the internal affairs of his host country. Rather it was that with no Government in 
exile there was no ‘highest body’ of authority to which the representatives could 
refer. After the German occupation of Denmark a power vacuum was therefore 
created. The struggle for this power came to stand between Reventlow, Kauffmann 
and the Danish Office in London. The question was which tactic would win over 
most sympathy amongst the Danish diplomatic corps: to remain true to their 
appointment or to officially denounce their Government. This aspect of the situation 
of Danish representatives in exile will, however, not be examined in this chapter but 
in Chapter V.
The third part deals with the main Faroese actors. There was a clear divide between 
those, who saw the war and the break in communications with Copenhagen as an
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opportunity to achieve more independence, and those who wanted the islands to 
remain as part of Denmark. On some issues, however, both sections were to meet in 
agreement, when it was evident that it would gain the population. The main 
opposition to Governor Hilbert came from the leader of the independence movement 
Joannes Patursson, and Thorstein Petersen and Nils Ihlen at the Norwegian 
Consulate. They hoped that the British would help the Faroes gain independence 
from Denmark. Since the British, upon occupying the islands, had promised to 
respect Danish rights over the islands and not to interfere with internal affairs as long 
as Denmark was under German duress, the main objective of the Home Rulers was to 
undermine the competence of the Danish Governor. This was done by trying to 
portray Hilbert as the representative and adherent of a Government collaborating 
with the enemy.
A. BRITISH POLICIES AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FAROES DURING 
THE OCCUPATION
When the British occupied the Faroe Islands, Churchill stated:
We are also at his moment occupying the Faroe Islands, which belong to 
Denmark and which are a strategic point of high importance, and whose 
people showed every disposition to receive us with warm regard. We 
shall shield the Faroe Islands from all the severities of war and establish 
ourselves there conveniently by sea and air until the moment comes when 
they will be handed back to the Crown and the people of a Denmark 
liberated from the foul thraldom in which they have been plunged by the 
German aggression.1
With no clearer instructions of his and the military forces’ code of conduct whilst in 
the Faroes, Consul Mason stated that “it is anticipated that the measures taken by His 
Majesty’s forces to ensure the safety and protection of the Faroe Islands will entail a 
minimum of disturbance to the normal life of the islands and no modification of their 
internal administration,”2 when he was handed the formal complaints to the 
occupation from the Danish Administration and Faroese Parliament, the Lpgting. 
The uncertain situation of occupied Denmark during and after the war inevitably put 
the future of the Faroe Islands into question. Thus, although the British stated that 
their presence on the islands would only last as long as Denmark was occupied and
1 PRO, FO 371/29279; FO 371/32761, Statement made in the House o f Commons on the 11th April, 
1940, by Mr. Churchill, First Lord o f Admiralty
2 PRO, FO 371/24783, Report by Consul Mason to Viscount Halifax, 15.04.1940
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that during the occupation they would stay out of internal politics, the British 
themselves were reluctant to make any further commitment to either the Danes or the 
Faroese. Hence, after a meeting at the Foreign Office it was decided that with regard 
to British relations with the Faroe Islands “it would be better for the present not to 
define these too closely.”3
Nils Arne Sprensen argues that one possible reason for British reluctance to let the
Faroes sail their own sea with regard to the independence question was due to the
fact that Denmark, like Britain, was a colonial power. Although it may be a
contributing factor to the British policy towards the independence movement on the
islands, it might be questioned because there were also voices within the Foreign
Office as to whether the Faroes should be invited to join the British Empire in the
light of Denmark being occupied by the Germans. These ideas, however, never
reached the Faroes despite it being assumed by those reporting from the Faroe
Islands prior to the occupation, that there was a general wish amongst the islanders
“to join the British Empire on a similar status to that of Isle of Man.”4
It was reasoned that
Short of Iceland coming in as our ally, or asking to be placed under 
British protections, there is no way, consistently with international law, 
in which we can make unrestricted use of her harbours. Similarly, we 
could only make unrestricted use of the harbours in the Faroes by 
Denmark coming into the war, or by the Faroes breaking away from 
Denmark and coming in on our side. The question could, however, be put 
to the Foreign Office to see if any political action is possible.5
Though, it does not appear that the British Government made any further 
consideration into the possibility of using political power to break the Faroes 
away from Denmark.
It was not until after the August 1943 crisis in Denmark that the British finally 
decided what their policy towards the Faroes in relation to Denmark was to be. 
Before that, the policy laid out had been rather weak in its formulation and always 
dependent upon the situation in Denmark.
3 PRO, FO 371/24784, N 4680/4220/15, report o f meeting in Sir Orme Sargent’s room 18.04.40
4 PRO, ADM 1/10739, PD 08116, 1939, min. 1, Use o f Faroe Islands and Iceland, Plans Division,
02.11.39
5 PRO, ADM 1/10739, N.I.D. 00120/40, 03.04.40
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1. Objective for occupying the Faroe Islands
Besides denying the islands to the Germans, one of the major reasons for occupying 
the Faroe Islands, along with the use of the islands as a fleet and refuelling base, was 
building an aerodrome on the islands in order to provide a base for the 
reconnaissance flights that covered the Northern Patrol and Atlantic Convoys. 
However, only a month after the occupation it was concluded that there was no 
suitable site for an aerodrome on the islands, and when it was decided to build an 
aerodrome in Iceland, shortly after she was occupied, the military importance of the 
Faroes diminished rapidly, not only in the eyes of the Air Ministry, but also the 
Navy, which in the end primarily used the Faroes as a refuelling base.
Compared to other British concerns during the Second World War the occupation of 
the Faroe Islands was a microscopic affair. Consequently, when issues related to the 
Faroes had to be decided upon, they were rarely debated in the War Cabinet, but 
usually dealt with in sub-committees concerned with the area. Even there, not much 
attention was paid to the Faroe Islands, since after it was decided not to build an 
aerodrome in the islands, there was little interest shown by officials in Britain. It was 
only when issues were raised by officials on the islands, that matters of the Faroes 
were attended to. Hence, the flow of initial stages of foreign policy making in 
relation to the Faroes during the occupation was more or less a one-way process, 
brought to attention by the British Consul, Frederic C. Mason, who was the official 
link between the British Government and the occupation forces, the Danish 
Governor, and the local politicians on the islands. The exception was the question of 
an aerodrome in the island, which was solely dealt with by the service departments.
In addition to this procedural flow of policy making was the pressure put on officials 
in the civil departments, particularly at the Foreign Office, by the Danish Minister in 
London, who, usually based on information from Hilbert, would do his best to 
influence the British to operate for the cause of continuous Danish governance of the 
Faroes.
While the occupation of the Faroe Islands was a cut across several Government 
agencies, the four most important were the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Air
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Ministry, conducting the military aspects, while the Foreign Office handled the 
diplomatic aspects, as the Faroes were, in principal, still a neutral territory. Other 
Government departments, for example the Ministry of Information, the Ministry of 
Economic Warfare, the Ministry of Shipping, the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, and the Treasury, were involved too. Unlike the War Office or Air 
Ministry, the Admiralty was an operational headquarter; it exercised supreme 
command over the Royal Navy in all seas and oceans. Whereas the Chiefs of the 
Imperial General Staff and the Air Staff could only issue broad strategic directives to 
Command or theatre commanders-in-chief, the First Sea Lord (and Chief Naval 
Staff) could, if he so wished, personally control the day-to-day dispositions of fleets, 
task forces, squadrons and convoys, even individual ships.6 This ability to act 
independently came to have a decisive consequence for British policies towards the 
administration on the Faroe Islands after the ‘Flag incident’, (examined later in this 
chapter), which the Admiralty caused.
The fact that the plans to build an aerodrome on the islands did not materialise until 
1943 and Iceland hence became the major base for the flight squadrons diminished 
the importance of the occupation of the Faroes. The occupation thus turned into a 
mere preventative operation, because it was still vital, that the Germans would not 
get a stronger foothold in the North Atlantic than they already had achieved by their 
invasion of Norway. It can therefore only be questioned whether an aerodrome on 
the islands from the start would have made much difference in the attention paid to 
the Faroes by officials in London; and if so, would Hilbert and Reventlow have 
succeeded to influence the British in the same way? Although neither the Danes nor 
the Faroese had anything to do with the decision whether or not to build an 
aerodrome in the islands, the decision process nevertheless is interesting and the 
outcome, as argued, was to have a bearing upon the importance attached to the 
occupation of the islands by the British.
6 Corelli Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely. The Royal Navy in the Second World War, 
Penguin Books, 1991, p. 52
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a) Building an aerodrome on the islands
An airbase in the middle of the North Atlantic would enhance the security of the 
Atlantic Convoys as well as provide cover and support to the Northern Patrols, 
whose purpose was to stop German ships breaking through the blockade, which 
stretched from Northern Scotland to Iceland. However, it was concluded 
immediately after the occupation, that there was no suitable site in the islands for an 
aerodrome, and plans for such an air base were abandoned at first, despite there 
actually being two areas, that could be used for combined bases for sea- and 
airplanes.
As mentioned in Chapter I, plans to occupy the Faroe Islands and Iceland came about 
after the Foreign Office received reports of increased German activity in and around 
the islands. When it became evident that an occupation of the Faroes was inevitable, 
and that it was only a matter of time when it would take place, plans for the 
utilization of the islands began to take shape in the Plans Division of the Admiralty.7 
These plans were, however, stalled in 1940 only to re-emerge in 1943, when the 
British looked to lose the Battle of the Atlantic.
Prior to the decision to build the aerodrome in the Faroe Islands, the military 
presence in the islands was limited. A month after the Royal Marines, about 200 
men, had occupied the islands they were relieved by a battalion of the Lovat Scouts, 
a force of some 800,8 whose main objective was to defend the islands from any 
German attempt to occupy them. Despite the arrival of the Lovat Scouts, and later 
the Royal Air Force, the command of the islands remained with the Navy, as the 
Naval Officer-in-Charge assumed the charge as Fortress Commander. By the time 
the construction of the aerodrome commenced the islands saw the arrival of the first 
Pioneer Corps, soon followed by the Royal Air Force, which would be the strongest 
single force in the islands.9 The question of command of the islands was raised by 
the War Office and the Air Ministry, whose forces on the Faroes soon outnumbered 
those of the Navy by far and therefore felt that the command should lay with them.
7 PRO, ADM  1/10739, PD 08116, 1939, m in .l, Use o f Faroe Islands and Iceland. Plans Division,
02.11.39
8 PRO, FO 649/1, General Report - 1942, From the British Occupation to August 1942, by the British 
Consulate in Torshavn, 06.09.42
9 PRO, AIR 15/483, Air Ministry to Sgd. P. B. Joubert, 30.06.42
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But, despite these criticisms nothing was changed as the command of the islands had 
been deemed a naval one from the outset. The decision to build an aerodrome in the 
Faroes would thus require cooperation between the service departments, and would 
inevitably cause conflicts of interests as the different organisational commitments 
and general objectives would overlap and thus interfere with the operational 
procedures of each department, as was the case in the Battle of the Atlantic.
b) The “Battle of Air” in the “Battle of the Atlantic”
The decisive particulars in the decision-making process with regard to the aerodrome 
in the Faroe Islands were very much linked to the conflicting interests of the 
Admiralty and the Air Ministry coupled with the troubles the Atlantic Convoys and 
Northern Patrol encountered in the North Atlantic in forms of U-boat and ‘Wolf 
Pack’ operations orchestrated by the German Admiral Donitz. Although limited by 
resources, with only 14 submarines at his disposal in the autumn of 1939, Donitz had 
great success in his Atlantic campaign, reaching the highest weekly total of sinkings 
for the whole war in the period from the start of war until end of 1940: 1.5 million 
tons in the last six months of 1940.10
The growing threat posed by U-boats to merchant vessels en route to Britain was 
made clear to the War Cabinet by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston S. 
Churchill, in a report where figures of losses due to U-boat attacks on British trade 
during the first fortnight of the war reached a total of 147.000 tons and 28 ships.11 In 
1941, Donitz’s U-boat successes were recognised by Hitler, who increased the 
priority given to the Atlantic Battle. Later, Donitz changed tactics, and increased the 
number of cruisers in the Atlantic, and had at one point nearly 100 boats at sea at any 
one time operating in ‘wolf packs.’12 This was the beginning to a battle so fierce and 
exhausting to the British Government that questions at times were raised whether 
Britain would win the war. Barnett thus argues that, “Britain’s fate depended on the 
conduct of the month-in, month-out battle of attrition in the Atlantic waters.”13
10 Clive Ponting, Armageddon. The Reality Behind the Distortions. Myths. Lies, and Illusions of 
World War II. Random House, N ew  York, 1995. p. 146
11 PRO, ADM  205/2, report o f the First Lord o f the Admiralty, Churchill, to the War Cabinet
12 Ponting, Armageddon, pp. 146-7
13 Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 251
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Thus, in order to achieve its object the Navy was in badly need of more maritime 
patrol aircraft as the successes of Admiral Donitz in the Battle of the Atlantic could 
only be diminished by adequate air cover, both in number and in technology. 
However, requests for more coastal aircraft were not met by the Royal Air Force, 
whose objectives lay in other theatres, mainly the bombing of German cities, and this 
struggle over aviation was to dominate the decision-making in the Battle of Atlantic, 
and was dubbed as “the Battle of Air” by First Sea Lord.14
Whether or not the construction of the aerodrome marked a shift in the attention 
given to the Faroe Islands in London is not clear. The aerodrome, however, was the 
first real investment made by the British on the islands, and in the aftermath of the 
decision to build it was taken, the British began to scrutinise their relations with the 
islands. As will be shown in the next section, the change of situation in Denmark and 
how the Danes responded to the German occupation had its effect on British attitudes 
towards the Danish representative in London. Although their commitment of 
interference with internal matters the British had respected the rule of the Governor 
in the Faroe Islands. However, by August 1943 the British question their policies 
towards the Faroes. “Various reports which we have received from time to time have 
suggested that there might be a certain amount of feeling among the officers and men 
in the Faroe Islands Force that our policy with regard to the Faroes is too pro-Danish 
and makes things difficult for them in their relations with the Faroese.”15
So how did it British policies towards the Faroes become too pro-Danish? Upon the 
arrival of the occupational forces it was noted that “the Governor has agreed to give 
His Majesty's Government all facilities and the Islands have in fact been occupied by 
a force of marines. All necessary discussions and negotiations will be carried on by
H.M. Consul in consultation with the Officer Commanding H.M. Forces in the 
Island.”16 The Consul thus became the main channel for British policies towards the 
islands, and for the main actors on the Faroes the quest was to exert as much 
influence on him as possible in order to have the policies sway to their favour.
14 Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 459
15 PRO, FO 371/36799, M 4803/464/15, draft o f memorandum from Warner and Coote, FO, to Lt. Col. 
C.P. Dawnay, WO, 30.08.1943 (although this is a draft, the changes suggested are mainly o f a 
grammatical nature and have no bearing on the content and message o f the memorandum.)
16 PRO, FO 371/24784, N4680/4220/15, report o f meeting in Sir Orme Sargent’s room 18.04.40
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The arrival of the extra forces, in connection with the building of the aerodrome, 
however, shifted the power slightly from Mason and the capital, Torshavn. The 
British camp in Vagar, the island where the aerodrome was built, became by far the 
largest British contingency in the Faroes. Thus, while the original occupying forces 
had been spread out in the islands, with the headquarter in Torshavn, the new forces, 
or rather their chiefs-in-command, were placed outside the Danish Governor’s realm 
of influence, as the Governor rarely left the capitol. It was subsequently only after 
the arrival of these new forces in Vagar, that London began to receive reports, that 
were critical of the Danish authorities in the islands.
2. Consul Frederic Cecil Mason
Frederic C. Mason was only 26 years of age when he was appointed as British 
Consul in the Faroe Islands. His appointment, which took place immediately after the 
decision to occupy the islands was taken, was a clear indication of how taken aback 
Britain was by Germany’s invasion of Denmark. Although plans had been made to 
occupy the islands no date was set and when given the instructions to go to the 
Faroes, Mason had already been told that he was to be sent to Iceland as an official at 
the Consulate there. The appointment therefore came as a surprise to Mason, who 
was only given “a quick verbal briefing and a letter signed by Lord Halifax the 
Foreign Secretary appointing me to be the new Consul.”17 With no other guidelines 
but the speech, given by First Lord of the Admiralty in the House of Commons on 
April 11th, he left for the Faroes on H.M.S. “Suffolk”, which also carried the 
occupying forces to the islands.
The Faroe Islands were therefore looked after by a young Consul, who, upon arrival, 
had no previous experience in the diplomatic service abroad. He had prepared 
himself to be posted to Iceland, and hence had limited knowledge about Faroese 
relations, internal as well as external, especially vis-a-vis Denmark. It was thus only 
natural that he engaged in a close professional relationship with the Danish 
Governor, who, older and more experienced in the field, more or less became his
17 S0rensen, N ils A., “Storbritannien og Det faer0ske Styre 1940-45”, Historie (2) 1998, Jysk Selskab 
for Historie, p. 194 (based on interview with Mason by S0rensen in 1993)
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mentor in the early stages. This professional relationship, however, also became a 
close private relationship epitomised by Hilbert being the best man when Mason 
married a Danish girl, Karen Rorholm, in 1941.18 It can therefore be questioned 
whether this close relationship, especially in the early stages, made Mason 
unintentionally reluctant to disrespect Hilbert by declining his requests or question 
the subjectivity of his advice. It was certainly insinuated by the Norwegian Consul 
Wendelbo that Mason was in Hilbert’s pocket. However, “he would only remain in 
Hilbert’s pocket as long as everyone else, caught in Hilbert’s web, chose to remain 
silent and passively observe the tragic situation,”19 (translated) Wendelbo argued, 
which is possibly why Wendelbo and the rest of the Norwegian Consulate along with 
the Home Rulers made it their prime target to distort the image of Hilbert and his 
juridical right to remain in his post as Governor of the islands after the German 
occupation of Denmark. This aspect will be examined further in section C in this 
chapter.
In the case of the Faroe Islands, it was always Consul Mason, sometimes pushed by 
the Danish Governor on the islands, other times by request of the military staff or 
local politician, but mostly by his own initiative, who presented the Foreign Office 
with the problems in question. At the Foreign Office, it was primarily John 
Dashwood in the Northern Department, who dealt with Faroese issues, which then 
had to be approved by his superiors Laurence Collier, Christopher Warner, Clarke or
E.O. Coote. In London, the Danish Minister, Count E. Reventlow, tried to influence 
these policy-makers in the Foreign Office to serve the Danish interests in the islands 
and help the Danish Governor on the islands do his job.
Being the British Consul on the islands, Mason was the most important source of 
information from the islands to the Foreign Office, as all correspondence from the 
islands to the world outside had to go through him. Thus, every letter or request from 
the Faroe Islands that arrived at the Foreign Office for further distribution would 
entail comments by Mason on the jacket. The Foreign Office would seldom get 
reports from the military officials on the islands, as all their communication would
18 Olavur Christiansen, Villinistiggir Upplvstir, Forlagid F0royaklettur, Torshavn 1998, p. 126
19 RA, UD/9974/2.23, De ulpnte stasjoner: Torshavn. Bind II, from Wendelbo, Torshavn, to 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry, London, 01.09.42
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go directly to their respective departments, unless it concerned a matter, which had to 
be dealt with or was at interest for the Foreign Office, and in those cases it would go 
through Mason. Thus, it can be argued that Mason exercised an almost monopoly on 
the information the Foreign Office received from the Faroes, hence also on the 
impression they would base their considerations upon in the various matters; until the 
arrival and set up of base-camp Vagar, where the airport was built, that is.
It could be argued that this situation to some extent was exploited by the Governor 
and the Danish Minister in London, as they were aware that their correspondence 
would be read, both by Mason and by office clerks at the Foreign Office before being 
distributed further, and thus could influence the British conception of issues without 
directly approaching the officials themselves. At the Foreign Office reports and 
memos were usually processed by Dashwood before being discussed by his 
supervisors. Their impression of the matter would therefore very likely be swayed by 
Dashwoods interpretation, which again depended upon the information Mason chose 
to pass on to the Foreign Office.
An indication of how much Mason was influenced by Hilbert during his stay on the
islands is shown when Mason’s second successor (his first successor, Price, stayed
only on the islands for few a months) Norman Vorley reported to London after his
arrival to the Faroes. In his reports Vorley clearly did not share Mason’s gusto for
Hilbert, and found him rather pompous
I have always attached importance to “first impressions” and mine are 
unfavourable regarding “Governor” Hilbert; his weakness is as evident as 
his colossal vanity...I assure you I have not been influenced by the 
opinions of Captain Corbett, R.N., or Colonel Mackay (O.C. Troops), 
both are definitely adverse concerning his reliability.20
It was also pointed out in a report by the Consulate in Torshavn that
The Governor is personally too pompous and unbending for the 
Faroese...and it is only recently that he has shown himself ready to 
accept advice and assistance from many influential people who could 
support him. He travels little and surrounds himself in Thorshavn with 
Danish or strongly “Samband” (Unionist) Faroese people. He is seldom 
seen in the streets, and when he occasionally makes speeches in public he 
emphasises with almost Goebbelsesque insistence the Danishness of his
20 PRO, FO 371/36819, from Norman Vorley to Warner 08.07.43
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Faroese audience, in the same way as the opposition emphasise their 
Nordic qualities, the Norwegian connexion etc.
Although Mason would be much under the influence of Hilbert during the remainder 
of his stay on the islands, and despite the British promise and intention not to 
interfere with internal relations, there is one incident in particular that stands out in 
the history of the British occupation of the Faroe Islands: the Flag case.
a) The Flag Case
Although promising ‘not to intervene in internal political issues’ upon his arrival, it 
only took Mason 11 days before he had to do just that in the ‘Flag incident’; but that 
case was atypical for the remainder of the occupation. However, relations between 
Mason, Hilbert and the Faroese politicians were marked by this incident afterwards.
It is generally assumed by people in the Faroes that Mason is to be credited for the 
fact that the Faroe Islands today have their own flag, ‘Merkid’, and are not still 
obliged to fly ‘Dannebrog’ as they were prior to the occupation. However, although 
Mason did make the decisive decision in the flag question, he was forced into 
making a hasty decision under pressure from Danish, Faroese and British officials 
because of organisational misunderstandings between the Admiralty and the Foreign 
Office.
Prior to the war the Faroe Islands did not have a national flag, and therefore the 
Danish ‘Dannebrog’ was used. A flag, ‘Merkid’, with a red and blue cross on a white 
background, had been designed by the independence movement, but was forbidden 
by the Danish authorities on the islands. However, after Denmark was occupied by 
the Germans, all vessels flying Dannebrog had to be identified as enemy vessels, also 
the Faroese, which now, after the British occupation of the islands, technically 
belonged to the allies. Being aware that the British sooner or later would demand that 
Faroese vessels no longer fly ‘Dannebrog’ because of security reasons, Hilbert 
brought up the question of which flag should replace ‘Dannebrog’ even before 
Mason arrived on the islands. The then acting British Consul, Mr. Valdemar Liitzen,
21 PRO, FO 649/1, Faroe Islands: General Report -  1942 (From the British Occupation to August 
1942) 06.09.42
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told Hilbert that Faroese vessels without a doubt would continue to sail under 
‘Dannebrog’. The same answer was given by Consul Mason shortly after his arrival. 
Nevertheless, internal political struggles, and amongst those a demand by the 
independence movement for recognition of the ‘rebel’ flag ‘Merkid’, kept Hilbert 
agitated and eager to find a solution that would fall in his favour. After informing 
Reventlow about the situation, an official at the Danish Ministry in London, Gustav 
Rasmussen, was appointed to design a new flag.22 Though, the matter did not seem to 
be too urgent, as Mason had reassured Hilbert that ‘Merkid’ under no circumstances 
would be considered as an option, and that the decision would rest with the Danish 
Administration in cooperation with the Ldgting.
The preparations for launching the new flag, therefore, had not progressed much by 
April 21st when two Faroese vessels entered Torshavn harbour flying ‘Merkid’ and 
with ‘FAROES’ painted over ‘DENMARK’ on the bow.23 It took everyone by 
surprise, Consul Mason, Governor Hilbert, and the Foreign Office, and when asked, 
the skippers told them that they had been ordered to do so by harbour officials whilst 
in Aberdeen. However, when the Admiralty reported the following day to the 
Foreign Office and Consul Mason, they admitted having ordered the Faroese vessels 
to fly under a different flag than the Danish, but the Admiralty denied having 
anything to do with what flag was chosen.24
This turned out to be the biggest crises in Anglo-Danish-Faroe relations during the 
war, because the Danish authorities refused to recognise ‘Merkid’ and saw this 
gesture as a British way of signalling their support to the independence movement. 
Also, it caused great confusion at the Foreign Office, as they were bypassed in a 
matter, which they had to be consulted in, and they were therefore anxious to find the 
culprit, something, as it turned out, was almost impossible to do, due to the 
organisational muddle within the service departments, where too little information 
was shared between the departments.
22 N iels Juel Arge, Stridsarini 1940-45. Vol. I, Forlagid Hvessingur, Torshavn, 1985, p. 81
23 Arge, Stridsarini 1940-45,Vol. I, p. 70
24 PRO, FO 371/24783 Report by Dashwood, His Majesty’s Government’s Attitude with regard to the 
Administration o f and existing Constitution in the Faroes, 20.09.41
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An inquest was made into why ‘Merkid’ had been chosen by the Admiralty, and 
according to information the Admiralty had received, the British Consul on the 
Faroes together with the Faroese Authorities had made arrangements “for Faroese 
owned vessels to fly a Faroese National flag of apparently new design.” 
Consultations with the Naval Control Service Officer at Aberdeen showed that ‘the 
Customs War Department insisted on the Faeroese vessels wearing the (offending) 
flag before he gave them clearance.’ Thus, the Admiralty denied that the Naval 
Control Service Officer had, himself, anything to do with the choice of flag.” 25 The 
whole report from the Admiralty left the Foreign Office baffled, as events and 
arrangement, that they had no recollection of, were mentioned, as well as Naval
9 f\departments and titles, that were unfamiliar to them.
The Foreign Office was not able to establish who was to blame for the mistake and 
concluded, that the blame had to lie with the Faroese skippers, who had taken 
advantage of the ignorance of the Admiralty to recommend ‘Merkid’, which had 
hitherto not been recognised officially, as the alternative to ‘Dannebrog’. However, 
taken into consideration that the Admiralty was able to exercise supreme command 
over the Royal Navy, and hence decisions could be taken without informing or 
counselling the other departments, it seems likely that this is what has happened. The 
following account of the events seems to support this explanation.
According to interviews with the skippers in question, Niels Juel Arge was able to 
uncover some of what really happened, however not what the exact organisational 
procedure of the matter was. On April 13th the sloop ‘Eysturoyggin’ was embarked 
by three British officers near the Orkneys, who immediately stroke ‘Dannebrog’ and 
hoisted ‘Merkid’, which the skipper, by chance, had onboard. When the sloop 
reached Kirkwall in the Orkneys, the skipper was given a letter to the authorities in 
Aberdeen, where they arrived on the 15th. The next day people came onboard and 
asked for the flag, according to which several copies were made immediately, and 
the following day ‘Merkid’ was painted on the bow and ‘FAROES’ written on the
25 PRO, FO 371/24783, Report by Dashwood, His Majesty’s Government’s Attitude with regard to the 
Administration o f and existing Constitution in the Faroes, 20.09.41
26 PRO, FO 371/24783, Report by Dashwood, His Majesty’s Government’s Attitude with regard to the 
Administration o f and existing Constitution in the Faroes, 20.09.41
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wheelhouse instead of ‘Dannebrog’ and ‘DENMARK’. Hence, according to the 
investigations made by the Admiralty into their own handling of the matter, their 
officials in Orkneys and Aberdeen were operating according to what they believed to 
be correct instructions from the Foreign Office, whereas the Foreign Office, from 
their point of view, could not understand how the Admiralty could have gotten the 
wrong impression of the matter. When the vessels arrived in Torshavn flying 
‘Merkid’, Mason was instantly put under pressure, both from Hilbert and the ‘Home 
Rulers’, to make a formal decision as to what flag should be used. Hilbert 
immediately announced that he under no circumstances could accept ‘Merkid’, and 
that a British acceptance of the flag would be a breach of their stated policy of not 
interfering with internal politics. Mason thus constructed a third flag, a white cross 
on a green cloth, and intended to implement this to solve the problem. But, when the 
Faroese learned about his plans to authorise a green flag instead of ‘Merkid’, they 
gathered in large crowds to demonstrate against the plan.
Mason had maintained from the outset, that the flag decision would have to be 
decided by the local authorities, but when Hilbert was not able to secure a majority 
against the use of ‘Merkid’ within the War Committee, set up by him and the 
L0gting at the beginning of the occupation, he left the decision with Mason, but 
emphasised his objections if Mason was to implement ‘Merkid’.27 It can be argued, 
that because this incident took place at an early stage, Mason was not yet much 
influenced by the more experienced Hilbert, and therefore acted according to his own 
judgements, which, after the agreement in the War Committee and demonstrations, 
told him that there was a strong wish shared by most Faroese, for the vessels to sail 
under ‘Merkid’. It does not seem that there has been much time either for Mason to 
confer with his superiors in London from when the decision was handed to him, 
because of the deadlock situation in the administration on the islands, till the decision 
was taken. There is no correspondence about the flag situation prior to April 25th, 
which is when he authorised the Faroese vessels to sail under ‘Merkid’.
In order to restore Hilbert’s confidence in the British, Mason had to, at Hilbert’s 
request, make a public statement saying:
27 Arge, Stndsarini 1940-45, Vol. I, pp. 64-78
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“I am to state that the present arrangement made for the use of the 
Faroese flag at sea is a temporary practical measure designed to avoid 
that necessity for Faroese-owned ships to fly the British flag like other 
Danish shipping. His Majesty’s Government have no intention of 
intervening in the question of which flag should be flown on land in the 
Faroe Islands, and in general they desire that the Islands shall continue to 
be administered by Your Excellency in co-operation with the Fproya 
L0gting, subject only to such security regulations as may be necessary 
for the safety of the occupying forces.”28
The Flag incident left Anglo-Danish relations strained. On April 26th, immediately 
after the Flag-case, the British noted that “the British Council and troops are very
90popular, but Governor is not entirely convinced of our intentions.” For the
remainder of the occupation the Governor and the Minister in London would
subsequently request,30 and be given, reassurance by the British that they would not
interfere with internal affairs on the islands. The Foreign Office even went a step
further following a report handed to them by Iversen, one of the more active
members of the Danish Council after his visit to the Faroes:
We have already made a declaration that we wish the administration of 
the Islands to be conducted by him [Hilbert] in collaboration with the 
Lagting, and have generally shown that he has our full support. We have 
followed up that declaration by arming the Consul with a further 
declaration for use in support of the Governor if he encounters serious 
trouble from the Lagting. This was done as the result of a request to that 
effect by Mr. Hilbert.31
Thus, Hilbert’s mistrust of the British did not have a lasting effect, as he soon 
realised that the British would stick to their policy of non-interference, whether they 
agreed on the issues or not. Thus, in the end the Flag incident indirectly presented 
Hilbert with an upper hand with the British in his struggle against the Home Rulers. 
This decision by the Foreign Office, which would prove the strongest weapon against 
the independent movement, also demonstrated how easy it was for the Danes to sway 
the British in their favour during that first period of the occupation. The decision was 
taken by Dashwood, an office clerk, following a report by a member of the Danish 
Council and conversations with Hilbert. It might only be guessed if the Danes had
28 PRO, FO 371/29278, From Mason to His M ajesty’s Principal Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs, 
FO, 25.04.1941
29 PRO, FO 371/24783, Report by Dashwood, His Majesty’s Government’s Attitude with regard to the 
Administration o f and existing Constitution in the Faroes, 20.09.41
30 PRO, FO 371/29278, report by Warner, FO, on conversation with Hilbert, 18.09.41
31 PRO, FO 371/29278, from Dashwood to Hambro, 06.09.41
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been as successful had the independence movement had the same channels of 
communication and influence, and the same experience in diplomacy, as the Danes 
possessed. As will be demonstrated later in the chapter, exactly this lack of 
entrepreneurship and lack of diplomatic education amongst the leaders of the 
independence movement would harm their chances of having much influence on the 
British.
B. THE DANISH GOVERNOR ON THE FAROE ISLANDS AND THE DANISH 
MINISTER IN LONDON
As has already been established, one of the main actors in Anglo-Danish-Faroese 
relations was the Danish Governor on the Faroe Islands. The centrality of his 
position was stated by a report by Iversen to the Foreign Office in 1941: “A close 
connection exists between the British authorities and the governor. However, as 
British authorities refrain from interfering with local administration, all necessary 
arrangements must be made through Danish administration (Governor).”32
1. Governor (Amtmand) Carl Aage Hilbert
C. A. Hilbert was appointed the post as Governor (Amtmand) in the Faroe Islands in 
1936. He was thus, at the time of the occupation, already involved in the internal 
politics, especially in the conflict with those who wished for more independence to 
whom he was the acting symbol for what they opposed.
Prior to the occupation, Hilbert had only advisory powers and no legislative powers, 
as these lay with the Government in Copenhagen. While the Lpgting functioned as 
an advisory council to the Governor and the Danish Government, but nevertheless 
possessed considerable influence on laws made by the Danish Government for the 
islands. However, with the looming conflict and German threat the Danish 
Government had taken a precautious step to increase the powers of the County 
Governors and provide him with the powers of an interim-govemance in case the 
country was invaded and communications with Copenhagen were severed. When 
connections with the Danish Government eventually were severed on April 9th 1940
32 PRO, FO 371/29278, report by Iversen, Danish Council, Visit to Faroe Islands 15.08 -  02.09.41,
07.09.41
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the future of the administration of the Faroes, despite this precaution taken, was 
uncertain. Heavy critique from the opposition to the validity of the Danish 
administration representing a government under German rule and the subsequent 
arrival of the British forces, who were in war with Germany, could easily have 
diminished the Danish claim to continuous governance of the Faroe Islands. 
However, after some hefty debates at the Ldgting, Hilbert, with help from his 
supporting parties, the Unionists, Social Democrats and the Home Rule Party, 
succeeded in gaining the right to assume the functions of government.33 This entailed 
that all laws should be proposed either by the Governor or the L0gting, that they 
should be discussed freely by the L0gting, and most important of all: that the 
Governor would have the right of veto.34 This, as could be expected, did not go down 
well with the Home Ruler’s, who criticised the British for allowing this ‘dictatorship’ 
to go by unnoticed “as everyone knows that Britain has gone to war against 
dictatorship in Germany, and that the British war aim is to liberate the small 
countries.”35 Thus, the Governor became the sole representative of the Danish Crown 
and Government in the islands, and consequently had to guard Danish interests and 
policies towards the islands against the independence movement, which saw the 
occupation as an opportunity to gain more power as all ties with Denmark were 
severed and the British occupying forces had the power to oppose the Governor, who 
maintained his position only because it was in the British interest to do so. This was 
because the British had a moral obligation to the Danish Government, having 
promised to only guard the islands from the enemy and not interfere with internal 
relations. Also, although it was speculated by officials in London before the 
occupation whether the Faroes could possibly join the British Empire after the war, it 
was not considered a desired option.
After the flag incident Danish authorities, both on the islands and in London, made 
sure that the British would not commit a ‘mistake’ again, which would weaken the 
Danish position in the islands. When Merkid was accepted by the British, questions 
were raised with regard to the British support of the Danish administration. Time and
33 Splvara, H.A:, Lpgtingid 150, Bind I, Lpgtingid, Torshavn, 2002, p. 238
34 PRO, FO 371/24783, FO 371/29278, N 5610, Report by Dashwood, His Majesty’s Government’s 
Attitude with regard to the Administration o f and existing Constitution in the Faroes, 20.09.41
35 Dagbladid. 11.05.40
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time again Hilbert presented his position as becoming weaker in light of the 
independence struggle, and therefore asked for British reassurance that they still 
were sticking to the line they announced upon their arrival, and in London 
Reventlow would advocate the same to Warner, Clarke or Dashwood, and each time 
the British would issue such a statement. Subsequently all statements from Mason 
would end with these lines “...in general they [His Majesty’s Government] desire 
that the Islands shall continue to be administered by Your Excellence in co-operation 
with the F0roya L0gting, subject only to such regulations as may be necessary for the 
safety of the occupying forces.” The Foreign Office even went as far as to ask 
Mason to issue a letter of confirmation, which Hilbert then could use if he would feel 
the need to do so. By doing so, they gave Hilbert the ability to refer to British 
backing in issues without actual approval of the British in the matter concerned.
Hilbert and Reventlow also tried to justify the Danish reluctance to curtail their 
persistence of not letting any constitutional changes taking place in the Faroes, 
despite strong local wishes to do so, by indirectly portraying the Faroese as difficult. 
Hilbert, for example, touched upon the departure of Fortress Commander Crowther 
in a letter to the Foreign Office and praised him because “he has succeeded in 
reconciling firmness with fairness -  an important success with a people who are 
sometimes difficult to handle.”37 This view of the Faroese was also presented to the 
Foreign Office in a report by Iversen (one of the more active members of the Danish 
Council in London), who, after his visit to the islands, was all but impressed by the 
locals. He defended Hilbert’s position by implying that amongst the Faroese 
“whatever is consider wrong to-day and not in their personal interest is viewed as the 
fault of the Danish administration and in particular as the fault of the Governor.”38 
He too, therefore, urged the British to show their support as “the character of the 
Faroese is such that a definite demand, they understood was voiced by British 
authorities...would be adhered to by the Faroese without discussion.”39 These 
representations of the locals seem to have influenced Dashwood, because despite
36 PRO, FO 371/29278, from Mason to H .M .’s Principal Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs,
25.09.41
37 PRO, FO 371/29279, from Mason to H .M .’s Principal Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs,
26.10.41
38 PRO, FO 371/29278, report by Iversen, Visit to Faroe Islands. 15.08.-02.09, 1941, 07.09.41
39 PRO, FO 371/29278, report by Iversen, Visit to Faroe Islands. 15.08.-02.09, 1941, 07.09.41
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having never been in the Faroes, he refers to the L0gting as “little better than a Parish
Council in this country, and the mentality of the majority of its members is
correspondingly limited.”40 Another indication of the success of the Danes in
influencing the Foreign Office’s appreciation of the Governor in the first year or two
was when Hilbert made an official visit to London in September 1941. In a letter to
the Government Hospitality Fund Warner wrote
Since the separation of the Faroes from Denmark, as a result of the 
German occupation, the Governor has been obliged to take on his own 
shoulders the main responsibility for the maintenance of the local 
administration and for the promulgation of such laws and orders as have 
from time to time been necessary. He is therefore virtually in the position 
of the supreme civil authority in the Faroes and it is consequently of great 
importance that he should be well-disposed and work in close 
collaboration with the commanders of the British garrison and the Consul 
at Thorshavn. In point of the fact he has, from the first days of the 
occupation, shown himself most helpful and friendly and the Consul has 
recommended that, while the Governor is over here, the opportunity 
should be taken of showing official appreciation of his attitude, since this 
would not only encourage him personally, but would help to strengthen 
his hands in dealing with certain recalcitrant elements in the Faroes 
which have tended to upset the working of the existing administration 
which it is to the interest of HMG to maintain.41
The Foreign Office, however, as mentioned earlier, also received reports from the 
islands that indicated the opposite, namely that the “Danish policy towards the 
Faroes is in general somewhat narrow and unsympathetic to Faroese sentiments...the 
Danes in the islands tend to form a small exclusive set with little contact with the 
population in general.”42 These reports were not dismissed, although their tone 
surprised the Foreign Office, and considerations were made as to whether they 
should be more cautious in supporting Hilbert, especially after the Danish 
Government capitulated, and whether they should instruct him to be less rigid. It was 
also anticipated by Clarke at the Foreign Office that Mason probably was more 
influenced by the Governor, than hitherto perceived, and was portraying the locals 
according to Danish official opinion; “I suspect that Mr. Mason’s view was an
40 PRO, FO 371/29279, report by Dashwood, His Majesty's Government’s Attitude with regard to the 
Constitutional position in the Faroes, 01.11.41
41 PRO, FO 371/29326, Warner, FO, to Crankshaw, Government Hospitality Fund, 09.09.41
42 PRO, FO 371/32761, Memorandum by Mr. Turville Petre of the Royal Institute o f International 
Affairs.
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expression of Danish official opinion rather than that of the Faroese in general.”43 
However, as long as Mason seemed to be supporting Hilbert, and no serious crisis 
broke out, the Foreign Office did not pay much attention to reports indicating 
Hilbert’s flaws in representing the Faroese people alongside the Danish Government, 
and correspondingly their policies towards the Faroes were predominantly in favour 
to the requests of the Danish administration, rather than those of the independence 
movement.
With guarding Danish interests being his main objective, it is easy to understand 
Hilbert’s fierce protection of all aspects of Danish interests in the islands, up to the 
point where he was, even by Mason, perceived as inflexible and stubborn in his 
persistence to maintaining the status quo. However, although political events in 
Copenhagen, such as the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941 and 
the full governmental collaboration with Nazi Germany, which under other 
circumstances would have invalidated his position, it was not in the British interest to 
take over the administration of the islands. An indication of this British position was 
when the matter was acute they suggested Hilbert to make a statement emphasising 
“that he [was] merely repudiating (a) Government which [was] temporarily acting 
under duress and that allegiance of himself and members of his Administration to 
King Christian and Denmark [remained] unimpaired.”44
a) Hilbert and the “Free Denmark” movement
With no connection with their Government in Copenhagen and with the absence of a 
government in exile Danes abroad felt the brunt of not having a central authority 
outside Denmark. Soon after the German invasion of Denmark “Free Denmark” 
movements were established by Danes in exile. However, the association’s goal was 
not to act as an authority but to rally Danes together to do their bit, whether it be to 
collect money, raise awareness of the Danish situation or to recruit men to serve the 
Allies in order to liberate Denmark. As will be demonstrated in chapter V the lack of 
a government in exile created a power vacuum and a competition for that power
43 PRO, FO 371/32761, Minute by Clarke on a memorandum received from Mr. Turville Petre,
20.11.42
44 PRO, FO 371/29279, telegram from FO to British Consulate, Torhsavn, 06.12.41
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amongst the Danes in exile, especially those in London and in Washington. Hilbert, 
however, did not embrace the idea of a Danish Government in exile.45
The Foreign Office in London expressed much interest in the establishment of a Free 
Denmark movement in the Faroes, since this movement also recruited men to fight 
on the allied side (in order to liberate Denmark essentially). The “Free Denmark”
xL
Faroese branch was established on November 11 1941, but Hilbert did not officially 
express his sympathies with the movement, although he initiated the steps to its 
establishment and everyone knew that his sympathies lay with the movement. The 
reason for him refraining from publicly joining the movement was that he was afraid 
of the repercussions it would have on relations with the Faroese, especially those 
who advocated Faroese independence. While most Danes in the islands were 
members of the Free Denmark movement, however the other two important Danish 
officials, Judge Bonnevie and Chief of Police Westerby took the same precautious 
measures as Hilbert and keep a distance from the movement. There was also a 
considerable number of Faroese members.
The “Free Denmark” movement in the Faroes was met by opposition immediately 
after its establishment. According to Hilbert’s diary he was visited by the three party 
leaders, with whom he collaborated with in the L0gting, expressing their concerns 
that the establishment of the movement might cause reprisals from the Germans. The 
three party leaders pointed out that there was a strong belief amongst many Faroese 
that there was a reason why German airplanes so far only had bombed ships and 
harbours. The Faroese believed that the Danish King and Government somehow had 
influenced the Germans such that they would spare the villages. Hence the fear 
amongst the population that the news of the establishment of a Faroese branch of 
“Free Denmark” would change this German attitude towards their islands.46 In a 
closed meeting at the L0gting on November 28th 1941 Home Ruler, Patursson, called 
for the abolition of the association. He based his argument on the fact that the Faroes 
had declared their neutrality and that the “Free Denmark” movement was not neutral,
45 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (A.IV), Den ffie danske bevaegelse o f  
Faerperne. Indberetning til Statsministeriet fra amtmand C.A. Hilbert, p. 2
46 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (A.IV), Den frie danske bevaegelse of  
Faerperne. Indberetning til Statsministeriet fra amtmand C.A. Hilbert, p. 3
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therefore it could not exist in the Faroes. According to Hilbert the attitude of 
Unionist, Samuelsen, was more moderate. He was of the belief that the L0gting 
should not start a precedence of abolishing societies or associations expressing their 
sympathies with either side, just because the Faroes were neutral. Samuelsen had 
also pointed out that so far private expressions of sympathy for the German cause, as 
well as for the British cause, had been tolerated. To further his argument Patursson 
pointed out that what the association sets out to accomplish was a free Denmark, thus 
to work against the present policies of the Danish Government and its consulates and 
actively support the British cause. There were unneutral acts and therefore would 
initiate German reprisals.47
As for the reaction amongst the Faroese population to Hilbert’s declaration of joining
the Free Danes, Hilbert wrote in his diary
I do not think that my declaration of joining the Free Danes on the whole 
has had any effect upon the Faroese. Most of the Faroese, who have not 
themselves joined the movement, see the movement as irrelevant. Some 
may well understand that a return to a free and fully democratic Denmark 
will have some effect upon the future status of the Faroe Islands, but as 
for the issue of Danish freedom for the sake of Denmark itself does not 
interest the Faroese any more than Norway’s or any other occupied 
country’s liberation.48 (translated)
Although supported by the British Hilbert wanted full adherence at least from the 
three parties with whom he collaborated before taking any action. The declaration of 
Hilbert joining the “Free Denmark” movement and consequently denouncing the 
Danish Government in its present form was made on December 1st 1942.
In the end the “Free Denmark” movement in the Faroes did not achieve much and 
was mostly regarded by the locals as a social gathering; the Norwegian Consul 
Wendelbo even compared it with a knitting club where Danes and those supporting 
the Danish Governor met for coffee and a good gossip.49 The British, who had put
47 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (A.VI), Den frie danske bevaegelse of 
Faerperne. Indberetning til Statsministeriet fra amtmand C.A. Hilbert, p. 7
48 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr. 1. Indberetning til Statsministeriet vedr. de 
politiske forhold pa Faerperne siden krigens udbrud i September 1939, (A.II.), bilag nr. 16, NR. 4066, 
Letter from Hilbert to Reventlow 13.02.43
49 RA, UD/9974-2.23, De ulpnte stasjoner: Torshavn. Bind II, from Wendelbo, Torshavn, to 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry, 01.09.42
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much hope to the movement, were not impressed either. In a report to the Foreign 
Office the Consul wrote that “it has not yet shown itself at all helpful in the mater of 
salvage, Red Cross collection or propaganda, and can hardly be said to justify its 
existence as yet.”50 Thus, its establishment had only served the independence 
propaganda in the islands as it had “been subjected to attacks from the Home Rulers 
and others who saw in it something “unneutral.””51
In 1942 there were talks within Danish circles in Britain about sending those Danish 
soldiers, who had voluntarily joined the British army to the Faroes. At first instance 
it was believed that such a move would strengthen the Governor’s position in the 
islands. More significantly, it would provide an enormous boost to the morality of 
Danes, both at home in Denmark and abroad, to know that Danes were guarding this 
segment of free Danish land alongside the British against the common enemy. Such a 
move would also strengthen the bond between the Danish and the Faroese, it was 
believed.52 The issue, however, failed to get support. Reventlow pointed out that the 
situation in the Faroes was too complicated and that sending Danish troops to the 
islands would only make matters worse. The same sentiment was shared by John 
Christmas M0ller, a Danish politician in exile in London, who went to visit the 
Faroes in the summer of 1942. ’’The question was raised, whether some Danish 
volunteers could be sent to the Islands amongst the British soldiers. In one way I 
should like it, but I think it will be wiser not to send either Danish or Norwegian 
soldiers to the Islands to prevent any incidents.”54 The same J. Christmas M0ller, the 
former leader of the Conservative Party, was to cause much controversy, not only in 
the Faroes, but also amongst the Danish representatives, as he initially remained in 
the Danish Government after the German occupation, but only left Denmark after the 
Germans started to put more pressure and demands on the Danish Government. He 
was subsequently the subject of much criticism and speculation with regard to what 
his morals and motives were.55 That debate, however, did not have much bearing on
50 PRO, FO 649/1, General Report on the occupation, August 1942
51 PRO, FO 649/1, General Report on the occupation, August 1942
52 SA, 8.H.25/1961/372, Overfprelse af danske soldater til Faerperne, from Spdring, Leith, to Danish 
Council, London, 04.01.42
53 SA, 8.H .25/1961/372, Overfprelse af danske soldater til Faerperne, from Reventlow, London, to 
Consul Schacke, Leith, 18.06.42
54 SA, 8.H .27/1909-45/0002, letter from J. Christmas Mpller to Warner, FO, 26.08.42.
55 Dimmalaetting, 10.11.42, ’’Aabent brev til J. Christmas Mpller” by Thorstein Petersen
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Anglo-Danish-Faroe relations as such, although it was a strong feature in the conflict 
between the Governor and the Home Rulers. It will, nevertheless, be examined more 
thoroughly in Chapter V, where the focus will be set on the power struggle amongst 
the Danes in exile, as Christmas M0ller became the Chairman of the Danish Council 
after his arrival in London, and thus became one of the contenders for that power.
b) Reactions in the Faroes to the Danish signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact 
The signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact by the Danish Government increased the 
pressure of Danish representatives abroad to officially denounce their Government in 
Copenhagen, as their opponents grasped the opportunity to further question their 
allegiance. The situation was no different in the Faroes. “I have noted that in his 
letter M. Ihlen enquires whether there will be any change in the Danish 
Administration of the Faroes following the adherence of Denmark to the Anti- 
Comintern Pact and that he is apparently under the impression that the Governor is in 
regular communication with the Copenhagen Government.”56 The British, however, 
decided to let the doubts be in Hilbert’s favour and continued to give him their 
support. “It is not the intention of His Majesty’s Government that there should be any 
change in the Administration of the Faroes in consequence of the Danish 
Government’s signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact and that we have no reason to 
believe that Mr. Hilbert is in correspondence with the Danish Government as 
suggested by M. Ihlen, except with our approval and consent in regard to minor
en
routine and humanitarian matters,” Warner at the Foreign Office informed the 
Norwegians in London. The situation, nevertheless, begged for the Danish 
representatives to manifest where their allegiances lay in order to remove all doubt.
Following the news of the Danish signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact Reventlow 
declared that “although he remained loyal to his King he did not see himself fit to 
take orders from the Nazi-controlled Danish Government and that he from now on 
would act as a representative of the ‘free Denmark’.” In the aftermath of this 
declaration Hilbert received a demarche from the British consul, questioning whether
56 RA, UD-10440/25.3 Norden. Nordisk samarbeid.. . .Faer0yene. Politiske forhold. Bind I & II, from 
Warner, FO, to Rasmus Skylstad, UD, London, 29.12.41
57 RA, UD10440/25.3 Norden. Nordisk samarbeid....Faer0yene. Politiske forhold. Bind I & II, from 
Warner, FO, to Rasmus Skylstad, UD, London, 29.12.41
58 SA, 8.H .22/1961/372, letter from Mason to Hilbert 03.12.41
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the Governor and the Ldgting planned to take any steps with regard to the Danish 
Government’s accession to the Pact. Although Mason did not question Hilbert’s 
loyal cooperation nor where his sympathies lied in the war, he nevertheless wanted 
an official declaration confirming that Hilbert’s administration was completely 
independent of the German-controlled Government in Denmark. Mason was of the 
belief that it was desirable to see the Governor make such a declaration to the 
L0gting. Such a declaration at this important point in the war would be of huge 
importance to future relations between the Faroe, Britain and a free Denmark, the 
British stressed. It would remove the ambiguity of Hilbert’s position in the islands 
and the British relation to his administration, and thus would mark a new era for the 
natural development of the Faroese nation as this element of dispute would be taken 
out of the equation,59 the British argued. According to Hilbert, Mason also suggested 
that Hilbert should declare that the Faroese should expect that Denmark after the war 
would give all Faroese national wishes a fair treatment in accordance with the wishes 
the majority of the population expressed. By doing so the Governor would secure 
continuous cooperation with the majority of the L0gting and at the same time tie in 
Faroese interests with the interests of the “Free Denmark” movement. Mason also 
expressed that although the Governor and the Danish Government hitherto had 
enjoyed the support of His Majesty's Government in matters concerning the Faroese 
wish for independence, he could no longer vouch for such support after the Danish 
Government had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. Hilbert, however, refrained from 
making any promise to Mason until he had had communication with Reventlow on 
the matter. Hilbert also wanted to confer with some of the Faroese politicians and 
county chiefs. At a meeting with Unionist Johan Poulsen and county chief Djurhuus 
they agreed that the situation begged for a reaction of some sort. However, the action 
chosen should the one that would be least damaging for Faro-Dano relations. A very 
difficult situation would arise if the wrong action was taken and the Governor was 
dismissed by the Government in Copenhagen as a result, like his colleague in 
Washington was. Incidentally Olavur Christiansen points out that the British were 
clear about what would happen should Hilbert abdicate or be dismissed. In such a 
case the Danish Legation in London would be allowed to appoint a successor, but 
only with British approval. This attitude of the British was unknown to the Faroese,
59 SA, 8.H.22/1961/372, letter from Mason to Hilbert 03.12.41
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it appears. According to Christiansen the belief amongst the politicians and members 
of the Lagting was that should Hilbert leave his post, the administration of the island 
would be fully taken over by the Faroese.60 This explains why the Home Rulers were 
so anxious to have Hilbert removed from his post.
To the British it was vital that some action was taken by the Governor since the 
situation of the Faroes as occupied by the British would become very awkward if the 
acts of the Danish Government were not condemned.61 The change of the British 
attitude towards the change of the future status of the Faroes with regard to 
independence therefore was not due to the success of the Home Rulers’ campaign. 
Instead it was due to events in Denmark.
Hilbert refrained from taking any action until he had conferred with Reventlow. 
However before he had had time to correspond with Reventlow, he received a 
telegram from London on December 2nd 1941. It announced the steps Reventlow had 
taken as a result of the Danish signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, namely that he no 
longer could take orders from the Danish Government. Hilbert wished to follow suit, 
but realised that without a demand from the British that he should do so, it would be 
difficult to get the back-up from the L0gting, which was needed in order to cause as
f\ 9little damage as possible to the Faro-Danish relations. Hilbert thus was in a similar 
situation as the Danish representative in Iceland, which will be examined in Chapter 
IV. Compared to their colleagues in London and Washington Hilbert and Fontenay, 
the Danish Minister in Reykjavik, were aware that any action from their side on this 
matter would have a bearing upon the sentiment of the local population towards 
themselves as representatives of the Danish Government and would be an invitation 
to criticism by the independence movement.
Hilbert also conferred with the other two Danish officials on the islands, Judge 
Bonnevie and Chief of Police Westerby. They, however, were less willing to take 
any steps that would remove them further from their duty, which was to serve the
60 Christiansen, Villinistfggir upplvstir, p. 121
61 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (A.IV), Den frie danske bevaegelse o f  
Faerperne. Indberetning til Statsministeriet fra amtmand C.A. Hilbert, pp. 4-5
62 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (A.VI), Den frie danske bevaegelse of 
Faerperne. Indberetning til Statsministeriet fra amtmand C.A. Hilbert, p. 9
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Danish Government’s cause in the Faroes. Judge Bonnevie noted that if a joint 
declaration was made by the governor and L0gting along the lines of Reventlow’s 
declaration, he (Bonnevie) would have to review his position in the light of the 
reaction of the Danish Government. Westerby, on the other hand, noted that if it 
became necessary to make a statement on their behalf, he would like it to be made
/TO
after the matter had been discussed by the Danish officials and L0gting. In a report 
Hilbert noted in brackets that the talk between the three Danish officials 
unfortunately bore the brunt of bitter comments from Judge Bonnevie, guided 
towards Revenltow, whom he accused for using the opportunity to create havoc. 
Hilbert made a note that these comments were a characteristic of Judge Bonnevie’s 
instability.64
In the following days Hilbert realised that he would not succeed to get a majority of 
the L0gting behind his declaration, and he noted that this did not please the British. 
The British, however, accepted the fact based on the general fear amongst the 
Faroese population of the effects such a declaration would have on their safety. The 
matter lay dormant until August 29th 1943, when the Danes finally revolted to the 
German pressure and the Government stopped their collaboration with the Germans 
and resigned. For the reminder of the war and until the liberation of Denmark on 
May 5th 1945, Denmark was run by an interim-government, the so-called Ministerial- 
Govemment, because the country was run by the Ministries and its officials. August 
1943 thus marks the beginning of Denmark as a formal ally. However, by now her 
reputation and credibility was so tarnished that it was difficult to reverse the damage 
her earlier chosen policies had had on the attitude of the British.
Hilbert was well aware of, and understood, the general fear amongst the Faroese that 
a wrong action from him would cause German reprisals against the islands. He also 
expressed that he did not understand why the Danish Government had seen it
63 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (A.VI), Den frie danske bevaegelse of 
Faerperne. Indberetning til Statsministeriet fra amtmand C.A. Hilbert, p. 9
64 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (A.VI), Den frie danske bevaegelse of 
Faerperne. Indberetning til Statsministeriet fra amtmand C.A. Hilbert, p. 10
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necessary to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact.65 In other cases Hilbert also showed 
general understanding for the situation he and the Faroe Islands found themselves in.
With regard to the Flag incident Hilbert expressed in a report that the British stand in 
the question was very unfortunate, albeit Hilbert justly acknowledged with just that 
the British did not take this step in order to disrespect Danish interests in the islands. 
Neither was it a sign that the British supported the independence movement in the 
islands. Rather, Hilbert reasoned, it was for practical reasons that the British chose to 
use a flag, which already existed on the islands, and which had local sympathy. 
Hilbert was moreover of the belief, that the British were not aware of the political 
implication of their decision. Hilbert concluded this passage in the report by stating 
that his stand in the Flag incident was the same as his stand with the L0gting, namely 
that it was his duty to maintain status quo while the Danish Government was unable 
to govern the islands. Hilbert also pointed out in the report that the British, as 
mentioned earlier, had stated that they would not intervene in internal political 
matters on the islands, except in such cases where it was needed military-wise, and 
according to Hilbert the British followed this line exceptionally. Hilbert especially 
appreciated this fact since he acknowledged that with the increased trade, especially 
in fish export, and the strong pro-British sentiment amongst the Faroese, the British 
could easily have taken advantage of the situation and persuaded the Faroese to break 
with Denmark and join the British Empire.66
c) Hilbert’s relationship with other Danish authorities on the islands 
As shown earlier in this chapter, it was pointed out by Mason’s successor that Hilbert 
held anti-Faroese feelings and was regarded as pompous by other British on the 
islands. Not surprisingly Hilbert’s popularity was non-existent amongst the Home 
Rulers and the staff at the Norwegian Consulate, as will be evident later in this 
chapter, who deemed him elitist, because he would not interact with the local 
population but kept himself to a small excluded group of people, predominantly 
Danes. These sentiments, however, could always be questioned on the basis of their
65 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (A.VI), Den frie danske bevaegelse of 
Faerperne. Indberetning til Statsministeriet fra amtmand C.A. Hilbert, p. 7
66 SA, Privatarkiver: C.A. Hilbert, arkiv nr. 6685, Pk nr 1. Indberetning til Statsministeriet vedr. de 
politiske forhold pa Faerperne siden krigens udbrud i September 1939 (1. del), p. 44
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fundamental differences with regard to the future of the Faroes. There is, however, 
further evidence that Hilbert was a difficult actor even to his fellow Danish on the 
islands, Chief of Police Westerby and Judge Bonnevie, to whom he also seemed to 
feel slightly superior. These latter two, however, were not held in high esteem with 
the British either, as they found the British presence in the islands a great disturbance 
to their posts.
In a report to the Home Office in 1945 on the civil protection on the Faroes during 
the war and Police Chief Westerby’s relation to it, Hilbert patronised Westerby and 
his lack of competence for his job, especially after its realm was increased by the 
outbreak of war and the subsequent British occupation of the islands. Although he 
found him difficult and incompetent, Hilbert nevertheless appreciated the awkward 
situation Westerby found himself in, once the islands were occupied by the British. 
Westerby contacted Hilbert on the question of what jurisdiction the British had, in as 
much as if they were to make some inspections and to what extent were they allowed 
free rummage. Later, in 1942, Westerby again found his position in relation to the 
British presence in the islands awkward. This was when it was reported on the 
Danish Radio that the Danish Government had put into force a law stating that any 
help given by Danes to enemies of Germany would be punished severely.
It was not only Hilbert, who had his troubles with Westerby. The British also had a 
problem with Westerby, because he created panic rather than calmed the population, 
and Captain Crowther saw him as “a real danger”. The British found him so 
difficult that not only did they request Hilbert to remove him, but they also contacted 
Reventlow in London about the problem. Although Hilbert agreed with the British 
and fully realised that Westerby was a problem, he nevertheless would not take the 
action that the British wished, because this could harm Dano-Faroe relations and it 
would not look good, if it became known that Westerby was removed from his post 
following British requests for this; such a move could have consequences, in as much 
as Hilbert’s opponents would get the idea that Hilbert was giving way to British
67 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (A.VII.), Indberetning til Statsministeriet 
vedr. civilbeskyttelsen pa Faerperne m.m., p. 1
68 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (A.VII.), Indberetning til Statsministeriet 
vedr. civilbeskyttelsen pa Faerperne m.m. Bilag 2, Letter to Reventlow from Hilbert 27.05.41
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pressure and therefore was weak. Hilbert also maintained that Westerby’s reluctance 
or incapability to cooperate with the British did not stem from him being 
authoritarian towards the Danish Government in any way. Hilbert was quite sure that 
Westerby was pro-British. Rather his behaviour towards the British stemmed from 
his character as indecisive and nervous in situations where decisiveness and calmness 
are called upon.69
In a letter to Reventlow Hilbert revealed that when Westerby was appointed the post 
as Chief of Police in the Faroes, Hilbert himself worked in the Department of Justice. 
There were many, including himself, that were surprised of the appointment, because 
he was the youngest of the 2nd rated applicants. Hilbert had heard rumours that the 
transfer of Westerby had taken place, because the Head of Police in the county, 
where Westerby served, had declared that there was no use for him there. Hilbert 
thus pondered upon what the reason for that would be, but he did not come with a 
direct answer. He only stated that Westerby has been difficult to work with, even 
before the war broke out. 70
The estranged relationship between Hilbert and Westerby was captured by an 
incident in 1943, reported by former county clerk (amtsfuldmaegtig) H.N. Olesen, 
following his dismissal by Westerby after Olesen refused to reveal the Governor as 
the informant in a recent fraud case, which Olesen worked on without Westerby’s 
knowledge. When Hilbert wanted the police to take some action against a sheep and 
a couple of geese, which had visited his garden and partly destroyed it. Westerby 
refused to take any action, as such matter would normally not be attended to by the 
police, Westerby informed county clerk H.N. Olesen. Olesen subsequently accused 
the police of being too passive.71 The incident indicates Hilbert’s reservations to 
Westerby’s competence, since he chose to by-pass him in the fraud case. It also 
showed Westerby’s indifference to Hilbert’s request for help, even though the matter 
was out of normal police work.
69 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (A.VII.), Indberetning til Statsministeriet 
vedr. civilbeskyttelsen pa Faerperne m.m. Bilag 2, Letter to Reventlow from Hilbert 01.06.41
70 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (A.VII.), Indberetning til Statsministeriet 
vedr. civilbeskyttelsen pa Faerperne m.m. Bilag 2, Letter to Reventlow from Hilbert 01.06.41
71 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 3 (B. VIII), Chartek maerket Politimester 
Westerby, letter from H.N. Olesen to Hilbert, 24.03.43, p. 2
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With regard to Judge Bonnevie, Hilbert found him to be rather difficult as the war 
went on and he seemed to think that the war has taken its toll on the former. The 
judge’s fear of drifting mines had resulted in him refusing to sail the sounds and 
straits in order to perform his duty in some of the islands. Hilbert also reported that 
the Judge’s attitude towards the British is quite unfriendly. He had been difficult with 
regard to the lack of a courtroom on the islands, after the British took over Skansin, 
the fortress, where the courtroom was situated.72
In his report on Bonnevie Hilbert reflected upon their long friendship. They were 
colleagues back in the days when they worked in the Department of Justice. Hilbert 
also mentioned that Bonnevie used to do his job without anything to remark. Hilbert 
indicates that the war-situation had caused Bonnevie a nervous breakdown. For 
instance, after becoming ill with flue twice within a short period of time, Bonnevie 
phoned Hilbert and claimed that he had become ill because the building, which 
housed the L0gting and which doubled as Bonnevie’s court-room, was a health risk, 
and not suitable for a court-room. On the other hand, he had no objection to the 
building being suitable for the Faroese politicians, because they, he said, had been 
elected to the L0gting. Bonnevie, on the other hand, had been appointed the job, and
n * i
therefore it was not because of free will that he was there.
Like Westerby Bonnevie found his position awkward with the British presence and 
occupation of the islands. He distrusted the British and did not believe that they 
would keep the promises of non-intervention. It was Bonnevie’s conviction that the 
British should have taken over the Faroes completely, so that there would be no 
question as to who was in charge, and whom one was accountable to. To this Hilbert 
reminded him, that immediately after the occupation, both he, Westerby and Hilbert 
agreed that measures had to be taken, so that as little as possible would be put in the 
British hands.74
72 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 3 (B. IX), Chartek maerket Dommer Bonnevie, 
report by Hilbert, p. 1
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The German invasion of Denmark and the subsequent British occupation of the 
Faroe Islands did not only land Danish subjects in the Faroe Islands in an ambiguous 
position. The status of the Danish Minister in London in the eyes of the British 
officials also depended upon events in Denmark.
2. Danish Minister in London Count Eduard Reventlow
In the meetings of the Lpgting’s Committee in the days following the German 
occupation of Denmark, the main subject was how to deal with the change of status 
quo. A request was made to the Governor that he should contact his colleague 
Reventlow in London and make sure that the latter would somehow try to provide 
help to the Faroese situated in Denmark.75
Hilbert was aware that although the British had promised that they would not 
interfere with internal issues there were some issues, which would only be resolved 
to Hilbert’s advantage with help from them, and therefore he wrote to Reventlow to 
highlight the situation and make sure that Reventlow would do what was in his
Hf \power to influence the British from London.
Count Eduard Reventlow, who was the Danish Minister in London at the outbreak of 
war, had already been posted in London once, as legations secretary from autumn 
1913 -  1919. Back then he had established few contacts, which he revived when he 
returned as Minister on January 1st 1938. In his autobiography I Dansk Tieneste he 
mentions several British officials, especially at the Foreign Office, as his friends or 
‘close contacts’,77 amongst these Christopher Warner, then Chief of Northern 
Department, with whom he regularly met for lunch or dinner. Reventlow had 
therefore good prerequisites for influencing issues of Danish interest.
The German invasion of Denmark and the subsequent ambiguous situation that arose 
from the Danish Government still being in power inevitably raised the question of
75 FL, Lpgtingid, Gerdabok fyri ’’Storu Landsnevnd” 1940, Meeting in Storu Landsnevn, 19.04.40
76 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr. 1. Indberetning til Statsministeriet vedr. de 
politiske forhold pa Faerperne siden krigens udbrud i September 1939. (A.IL), bilag 9 (Letter from 
Hilbert to Reventlow 26.11.40)
77 Reventlow, E., I Dansk Tieneste, Thaning & Appels Forlag, Copenhagen, 1956, pp. 112-147
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the status of Danish nationals abroad. If the Danish Government was collaborating 
with their occupiers then the Danes were in effect enemies to the allies.
On April 12th it was argued in a Foreign Office minute that
it might be a good idea to find out what attitude the Danish diplomatic 
and consular representatives in foreign countries are adopting as regards 
taking orders from the German controlled Danish Government. If we can 
show that Danes in neutral countries outside the grip of the Gestapo are 
refusing to collaborate with the Germans, this might be a good 
propaganda point. We have heard that the Danish Minister in Washington 
does not intend to take orders from the German controlled Danish
78Government.
Despite initially expressing his wishes to return to his family in Denmark, Reventlow 
announced, according to instructions received from the King of Denmark a couple of 
days after the occupation, that he would stay in England as long as His Majesty's 
Government would allow him to do so. Contrary to his colleague in Washington, 
Kauffmann, Reventlow felt that he could not, as a loyal subject of his King, adopt the 
same position as representative of the Free Denmark movement regardless of the 
wishes of the King and Government.
When Denmark was occupied by Germany, Reventlow’s position was taken up for 
revision at the Foreign Office and it was concluded, that his position “should not be 
considered as being in relations with the Danish Government so long as that 
Government remained under German control;” however, “it was further agreed that 
there would be no objection to the Danish Minister continuing to act in a semi­
official capacity in the way of helping Danes, and with other problems affecting 
territories not under German control.”79 Thus, despite reservations by the British 
Government towards Reventlow as a representative of the Danish Government, and 
Lord Halifax’s conclusion that they could not recognise him as an accredited 
diplomatic representative, Reventlow was not debarred from continuing to act, semi­
officially, on behalf of Denmark in case of problems arising out of the occupation of
78 PRO, FO 371/24784, FO Minute by Mr. Cavendish Bentinck, 12.04.40, subject: Attitude o f Danish 
diplomatic and consular representatives to the German-controlled Danish Government
79 PRO, FO 371/24784, N4680/4220/15, report o f meeting in Sir Orme Sargent’s room 18.04.40
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the Faroe Islands.80 Hence, to the British it was not Reventlow, who was the 
problem, but the government he represented. Therefore, when he severed his 
connections with Denmark after her signing the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 
25th 1941 his status was taken up for revision at the Foreign Office as to whether they 
were “going to recognise him as qualified to make official representation to us 
regarding the Faroes or not.”81 The conclusion was “to continue to recognise Count 
Reventlow after his break with Copenhagen;”82 and so when Denmark on 29th 
August 1943 came under military administration it did not affect the Foreign Office’s 
position towards Reventlow as such, but it did put their stance towards the Faroe- 
Danish relations into perspective. However, despite feeling more sympathetic 
towards the ‘Home Rulers’, it was not expressed officially, because it was not the 
relations on the islands that were of greatest concern to the British, but the relations 
in Denmark and with Denmark. As S0rensen argues, “4 million Danish were more
83interesting to the British decision-makers and ministers than 30.000 Faroese.”
Despite maintaining in his autobiography that he, until November 1941, when 
Denmark signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, did not intervene in British policies 
towards Danish interests (for example the Faroes), but only provided assistance when 
asked for,84 documents from the Foreign Office suggest otherwise, and it is apparent 
that his visits were frequent, up to the point where Dashwood commented on a 
document that “there is no need for Count Reventlow’s interventions -  in fact it 
seems to me just what we have been trying to stop him from doing.”85 Tried they 
might have, but it is quite clear, that Reventlow was one of the strongest ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ when it came to Faroese issues, because, not only was he able to use 
Hilbert as a channel, and thereby was unmistakably able to raise awareness of 
matters to Foreign Office officials, who inspected all letters going to and from the 
Faroes; because he was their best source of knowledge in Faroese relations on 
location he was also able use his channels in London, although there were some 
reservations within the Foreign Office to his frequent requests.
80 PRO, FO 371/24784, Paper by Dashwood, FO, regarding the status o f Danish nationals in Britain, 
18.04.40
81 PRO, FO 371/29279, comment by Collier 02.12.42 on letter from Warner to Reventlow 04.12.41
82 PRO, FO 371/32761, FO minute by Clarke, 13.07.42
83 S0rensen, “Storbritannien og Det faerpske Styre 1940-45”, p. 218
84 Reventlow, I Dansk Tieneste. p. 127
85 PRO, FO 371/29279, notes by Dashwood on letter from Warner to Reventlow, 04.12.41
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a) Defence of the islands: a case study of Reventlow and Hilbert influencing British 
policies towards the Faroe Islands
In the recurring questions about defences on the islands, Hilbert, Reventlow and 
Mason are easily recognised as the policy entrepreneurs, pushing the matter into 
agendas at the Foreign Office and the War Office, which was responsible for the 
defence of the islands.
With no aerodrome and a fleet base, that was of little use but as a refuelling 
base, the importance of the Faroe Islands to the British service departments, 
especially the War Office, decreased substantially, and so did the emphasis on 
placing adequate defence on the islands. This caused much dismay amongst the 
British officials in the islands, Mason and the Fortress Commander. The 
dismay was also felt amongst the inhabitants on the island, especially after 
German bombers succeeded, due to lack of detecting apparatus, to surprise 
attack the islands and cause much damage on November 22nd 1940.
A few days later, on December 6th Count Reventlow visited the Foreign Office, after 
the matter was brought to his attention in a letter from Hilbert. Rather than only 
requesting more anti-aircraft (A.A.) defence, Reventlow made the officials aware of 
the rising belief in the islands that Britain was unable to defend the islands. He also 
pointed out that this could damage their conduct in the islands as such an impression 
could result in the lack of cooperation from the locals. Reventlow also referred to the 
promise, made by Churchill on April 11th, and indicated that if the islanders felt 
unsafe then Britain had broken their promise to protect the islands from enemy 
attacks, which was the stated reason for occupying the islands in the first place. 
Skilful as he was, Reventlow refrained blaming the British for the lack of adequate 
defence and instead implied “that the Governor, not being an expert, might possibly
q z :
have formed a wrong impression of the state of [the] anti-aircraft defences,” and 
hence placed the blame for lack of action on insufficient information from the Danish 
Administration in the islands.
86 PRO, FO 371/24784, memo by Dashwood on talk with Reventlow, 06.12.40
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To make sure the matter would not be laid aside Reventlow wrote an aide memoir 
about the defence and A. A. conditions in the Faroes five months later, which he sent 
to the Foreign Office. On June 6th 1941, Christopher Warner, head of the Northern 
Department, informed Reventlow that the requests were passed on to the departments 
concerned and that a definite recommendation had been made for further A.A. guns. 
Four months later, after the matter had been stressed to the War Office by Anthony 
Eden, Foreign Secretary, because of its political significance,87 the Chiefs of Staff 
decided “to allot a further four light A.A. guns for defence for the Faroe Islands.”88 
Acknowledging that allocating these was principally to give moral support to the 
Faroese,89 as four more light A.A. guns would not provide adequate defence, it was 
as much as the service departments felt they could spare.
Having occupied the islands, the British Government was well aware of the increased 
threat of attacks from the Germans this would entail. Based on the likelihood of a 
German attack and assessments of the scale of such an attack by air it was reasoned 
that factors, such as the relative importance of the objectives at the anchorage, the 
size of the enemy bomber force within range, and the distance of the enemy bases 
from the anchorage would be decisive. It was concluded that with German airbases 
in Norway, “both Iceland and the Faroe Islands are within range of German air forces 
based in Norway and if a reasonable proportion of their present strength were to be 
employed, some 30 tons of bombs per day might be expected to be brought to bear 
on the Icelandic objectives, and about 50 tons per day against those in the Faroes.”90 
However, due to lack of defence equipment, the War Office was reluctant to provide 
any more A.A. guns, as placing these on the Faroes would deprive other theatres of 
adequate defence. Also, because of the scattered nature of the islands and townships, 
it was acknowledged by the Foreign Office that despite their wish to do so, they 
“could hardly hope...to deal adequately with indiscriminate attacks on towns and 
installations in the Faroes which have little or no military or strategic importance.”91 
It was however judged that this situation could be considerably improved “if it
87 PRO, FO 371/29278, Warner, FO, to the Under-Secretary o f State, War Office, 31.10.41
88 PRO, FO 371/29279, FO memorandum, 31.10.41
89 PRO, FO 371/29279, message to A.C.O.S. 587 (repeated to N.O.I.C. Faroes, War Office and 
Foreign Office) from Admiralty, 28.11.41
90 PRO, ADM  199/671, Report from Air Ministry titled “Iceland & Faroe Islands, observations on the 
likely scale o f enemy air attack on certain anchorages,” 10.07.40
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should prove possible to carry out the project for constructing an aerodrome in this 
region.”92
When Mason raised the issue again in November 1941 the Foreign Office, having 
pushed the matter through once, felt that it should not fall within their responsibility 
to request for more A.A. defence, but that the matter should be raised by the military 
forces on the islands to their respective departments. And, as Dashwood noted, 
Mason did not make any recommendations for improving the present situation, and 
therefore the request did not appear to be too urgent. Nevertheless, a party containing 
representatives from the service departments was sent to the Faroes to look into the 
defence question.
Coupled with the recent developments of radar equipment the problem was in the 
end alleviated by the War Cabinet in their decision to “provide a form of warning 
system of the approach of enemy aircraft” by locating “radiolocation stations in 
certain parts of the Islands.”94 This seemed to be the perfect solution for all parties 
concerned, especially the Service Departments back in London, as it would not drain 
the War Office of defence guns and would provide both the Navy and the R.A.F. 
with better warning systems for their fleets. Also, it relieved Consul Mason of 
criticism from locals for the passive British stance in dealing with the problem. Thus, 
although Mason had the power of selecting the information passed to the Foreign 
Office, it was Reventlow, who, with his bargaining skills, was able to present the 
problem in such a way, that it became difficult for the British not to improve 
defences. By linking the defence problem with the political situation from the start, 
Reventlow was certain that the matter would reach the top at the Foreign Office, as it 
was in their responsibility that all British conducts abroad were as successful as 
possible, and thus would be responsible to Denmark, if anything went wrong in the 
Faroes whilst under their control. Hilbert’s impact on the defence issue, however, 
was rather limited, and it could be discussed that the reason for this was that in this 
case the responsibility would be placed with the British, and thus not put pressure on
92 PRO; FO 371/29279, note by Dashwood to M ason’s letter to Eden. 03.11.1941
93 PRO, FO 371/29279, note by Dashwood 19.11.41 on letter from Mason to Anthony Eden 03.11.41
94 PRO, FO 371/29279, letter from Mrs. Lightfoot to Dashwood, 17.12.41
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his position. However, when issues were perceived to bring his position in conflict, 
he was just as much a policy entrepreneur as Mason and Reventlow.
This pattern of bargaining in the British policy making process towards the Faroes 
dominated the British-Faroe-Danish relations bar one major incident: the use of 
‘Merkid’, as was demonstrated earlier in this chapter.
C. THE FAROESE: HOME RULERS AND UNIONISTS
As was demonstrated in sections A and B, the extent of success in influencing the 
British policies depended very much upon the central position of the Danish 
representatives in the flow of information from the Faroes to London. Because most 
of the important authorities in the Faroes were Danish and since Mason quickly was 
encapsulated by the Governor and his administration, there were very few Faroese, 
who were in a position to exert any influence on British opinion. There was one 
Faroese, however, who was in a position to have some influence on the British. 
Thorstein Peteresen, a local advocate and the leader of the People’s Party, was also 
the Norwegian Consul on the islands. As will be demonstrated below Petersen’s 
dislike of Hilbert’s personae, nevertheless, came to overshadow his goal to sway the 
British from their initial statement not to interfere with internal affairs and support 
the wish for independence. Subsequently his and his secretary Ihlen’s continuous 
attacks on Hilbert and the Danish administration would cause much irritation with 
the British, as they stirred trouble to the otherwise problem free occupation.
1. Situation in the Faroe Islands after the outbreak of war
According to Hilbert the events on April 9th 1940 came as a complete surprise to 
everyone in the Faroes. There was little contact with the outside world. Except for 
radio broadcasting and some foreign newspapers, which were all out of date 
(newspapers only arrived ever so often to the islands), and apart from radio messages 
of increased British interests in the territorial waters of Norway and the German 
exploitation of this, there was no inkling amongst those in the Faroes that the war 
arena would expand to Scandinavia or Denmark in particular. Thus, the news of the 
German invasion of Denmark and Norway came as a surprise to the islanders. The 
immediate thought was how the Faroes, with its around 30.000 inhabitants, would 
cope supply-, economical-, administrative-, and political-wise without the support
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from Denmark, upon which the islands were quite dependent within these particular 
areas of interest.
Supply-wise the islands were well equipped and as for the economy, there was no 
reason that any immediate problems should arise from the situation. Administratively 
the only solution would be to continue as before, at least for the moment. Politically, 
however, there were reasons for Hilbert to worry, especially after the increased 
attention the independence movement had enjoyed over the last decade or so. Hilbert 
knew he could expect some immediate political demands from the Lpgting, or at 
least some divisions within it, as a consequence of the Danish Government no longer 
being accessible. As it turned out it was exactly on the political front that the main 
problems during the occupation would arise, not because of the British but because 
of Hilbert’s ambiguous position.
As has been mentioned earlier in this chapter and which was continuously pointed 
out in reports from the islands, when compared to Iceland, relations between the 
British troops and the locals were excellent. The Danes appreciated the good 
relations between the British and the Faroese,96 because that meant one less possible 
source of trouble for internal affairs, especially as news from Iceland told of 
estranged relations between the locals and the occupying forces there. It may also be 
worth noting, that Hilbert pointed out in his diary that they always semantically 
chose to use the word ‘protection’ rather than ‘occupation’.97 By referring to the 
occupation as ‘protection’ Hilbert thus probably saved the British from possible 
trouble from the locals, as it has a much more positive connotation than the term 
‘occupation’. This may be seen as a conscious move by Hilbert in order to keep 
relations between him and the British cordial.
According to Hilbert’s diary the Governor made every effort to get into contact with 
the Government in Copenhagen in order to get instructions with regard to the new
95 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 3 (B. VI), Diverse vedr. Faerperne, ’’Faerperne 
under Krigen”, p. 2
96 SA, 9K.4/1961/372, Amerikanske Troppers Ophold i Island under krigen 1939-, From Reventlow, 
London, to Konsul Schacke, Royal Danish Consulate, Leith. 12.05.43
97 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 3 (B. VI), Diverse vedr. Faerperne, ’’Faerperne 
under Krigen”, p. 4
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situation. His attempts, however, failed and he did not receive any information until 
July 4th, 86 days later. This was in form of a radio address, a transmitted speech by 
Prime Minister Stauning in which he informed the Folketing (Danish Parliament) 
that Hilbert had been instructed to continue to perform his duties according to 
conduite. Hilbert stressed this point in his diary, because of the constant criticism and 
questioning of the right/legality of him remaining in his post following the German 
occupation of Denmark.98 As the main argument of this thesis points out, and which 
has already been argued earlier in this chapter with regard to Hilbert’s and 
Reventlow’s status in the eyes of the British, and which will be argued further with 
regard to the Danish representatives in Iceland and Washington, the ambiguous 
position of the Danish representatives during the German occupation of Denmark 
continued to raise questions in their host countries, especially amongst their enemies 
and sceptics. This ambiguous status of the Danish representatives resulting from the 
German occupation of Denmark and the collaborationist mood of the Danish 
Government was not lost on the ‘Home Rulers’ (the collective term used by the 
British for those advocating Faroese independence). Their main objectivity was to 
undermine the authority of Danish Governor by constantly questioning his 
relationship and sentiment with the Government in Copenhagen.
2. Faroese relations with the Governor and the British
Although the wish for Faroese independence by the outbreak of war had not 
progressed as far as that in Iceland the opportunity, which the British occupation and 
the subsequent loss of communications with Denmark, presented, was not lost to the 
‘Home Rulers’. Immediately after the German occupation of Denmark they raised a 
proposal in the Lpgting that the Faroes should, like Iceland, declare their 
independence from Denmark. However, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter, the 
proposal did not meet the necessary support, neither from the majority of the L0gting 
nor from the British. Such a move would not have been legal either according to the 
Danish constitutional laws, under which the Faroe Islands remained despite the 
German occupation. Instead it was agreed by a majority of the L0gting that the 
administration of the islands during the occupation should be in cooperation between
98 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert, arkiv nr. 6685, pk, Nr. 1, Indberetning til Statsministeriet vedr. de 
politiske forhold pa Faerperne siden krigens udbrud i September 1939 (1. del), p. 7
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the Danish Governor and Lpgting, with the Governor holding the right to veto. The 
constitutional position of Iceland in the Danish Kingdom, as will be demonstrated in 
the next chapter, was slightly different and they were therefore able to justify 
declaring their independence to the British.
A report handed to the Foreign Office by Iversen from the Danish Council following 
his visit to the Faroes in August-September 1941 described the political situation in 
the Faroes as
The Governor is today supported in Lagting by 17 members out of 24 -  
representing the party supporting status quo, the samband-party of the 
social democrats, which actually constitutes the balance of power. The 
remaining members consist of Homerule Party members and are anti- 
Danish." [sic]
As for the political parties the report stated:
Samband-party. [Unionist] Support the continuation of connection with 
Denmark, perhaps wishing for certain alterations -  financial, 
administrative etc.
Socialist party. May support the Danish connection, may not. Not a very 
large party, is however more or less the balance of the scale.
Homerule party. The leader of this is the old politician Johannes 
Patursson...who in reality advocate the Faroes should be placed in the 
same position as Iceland -  independent etc.
From a historical point of view Patursson considers the Faroese as 
Norwegians and his party is undoubtedly anti-Danish -  pro-Faroese. He 
is said to be supported by businessmen like Thorste[i]n Petersen (now in 
America) and H[K]jolbro in Klaksvig (a very wealthy Faroese)
General. The islanders are very political minded; politics forms the main 
topic of conversation, however on rather parochial lines.100 [sic]
The report was on the whole very pro-Danish, which is understandable since Iversen
was one of the more active members of the Danish Council. Strangely enough, it did
not mention the People’s Party, which was founded by those, who found the Home
Rule party too lenient. Patursson was one of those, and so was Thorstein Petersen. In
his report to Copenhagen on political conditions in the Faroes, Hilbert explained that,
the reason why Joannes Patursson left his old party 
‘Sjalvsstytisflokkurin’ (Home Rule Party) to start a new party 
‘Folkaflokkurin’ (People’s Party) was that the leader of 
Sjalvsstyrisflokkurin at the time, E. Mitens, did not give the personae
99 PRO, FO 371/29278, report by Iversen, Visit to Faroe Islands. 15.08.-02.09, 1941. 07.09.41
100 p r o , FO 371/29278, report by Iversen, Visit to Faroe Islands. 15.08.-02.09, 1941. 07.09.41
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Joannes Patursson enough ‘space’ within the party; he was not taken into 
account enough to Patursson’s liking. Also, the Sjalvsstyrisflokkurin was 
not radical enough in its pursuit of Faroese independence to his liking.101 
(translated)
Being the draughtsman of the Faroese independence movement, Patursson was too 
old at the outbreak of war to assume a leadership role. The British Consul remarked 
that Patursson was “a highly respected man...over 70 years of age and very viril but 
has evidently passed his best period, and in politics is used rather as a figure-head by 
the younger extremists.”102[sic] Thus, although Patursson was the leader of the 
People’s Party, it was the younger Thorstein Petersen, who became the most serious 
opponent to the administration during the occupation. That came especially evident 
when Petersen went on a business trip to the United States, and subsequently, the 
levels of attacks on the administration dropped.103
The argument of the Home Rulers was that “Hilbert is a stranger in this country and 
he is only here for a limited period. Hence it is easy to understand that he does not 
put much effort into understanding the Faroese people and only socialises with other 
Danish on the islands.”104 They also accused him for continuing to take orders from 
Copenhagen via the Danish Embassy in Stockholm.105 The Home Rulers also found 
it regrettable that they had not succeeded in convincing the L0gting to follow the 
Icelandic lead and break off all ties with Denmark on April 9th. If they had done so 
the islands would not have been occupied, they believed.106 This sentiment did not 
necessarily mean that the Home Rulers were anti-British. They would just rather 
have no foreign power on the island. However, the notion was not lost on Hilbert, 
who would pick up on any chance to portray the Home Rulers to be anti-British, or 
even pro-Nazi, in order to make sure that they did not receive any sympathy from the 
British. One example of this was when an article in Tfmin towards the end of the war
101 SA, Privatarkiver: C.A. Hilbert, arkiv nr. 6685, pk nr 1. Indberetning til Statsministeriet vedr. de 
politiske forhold pa Faerperne siden krigens udbrud i September 1939 (1. del), p. 7 
02 PRO, FO 649/1, Faroe Islands: General Report -  1942 (From the British Occupation to August
1942), 06.09.42
103 RA, UD/9975 De ulpnte stajsoner: Torshavn. Bind I, note from Collier, FO, to Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry, London, 01.10.41
104 Daebladid, “To Gamle Breve”, 07.08.43
105 RA, UD/9974-2.23, De ulpnte stasjoner: Torshavn. Bind II, from Wendelbo, Torshavn, to 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry, 01.09.42
106 SA, Privatarkiver: C.A. Hilbert, arkiv nr. 6685, Pk nr 1, Indberetning til Statsministeriet vedr. de 
politiske forhold pa Faerperne siden krigens udbrud i September 1939 (1. del)., p. 10
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critically viewed the British occupation of the Faroes. It was questioned, why Danes 
and Norwegians received so much sympathy from the Faroese, because their 
countries had been occupied, when the Faroes themselves were experiencing the 
same by the British. The article also criticised a local newspaper for writing that “we 
should be thankful and count us lucky that the British occupied us” ...’’What do we 
have to thank them for”107, the article asked. The article inevitably aroused much 
sentiment and anger, especially amongst the British, and it seems that Hilbert found 
an opportunity to capitalize on the situation. According to his diary he brought the 
issue up at a dinner where some of the British officials were present. In his dinner- 
speech Hilbert expressed his disgust and took distance from the article. Hilbert even 
wrote in his diary that he took up every opportunity to express his disapproval of the 
article to the British.108 Hilbert also enquired the British consul whether the British 
wanted any action to be taken, i.e. if they wish the matter to be taken to court, 
however the consul had no wish hereof, but would leave the matter in Hilbert’s 
capable hands.109 As mentioned earlier in this chapter by the latter half of the 
occupation the British attitude towards Hilbert had changed and they were more 
critical towards his personae and negative sentiments towards the locals.
Hilbert was not only content with turning the British against his opponents. As will 
be evident in the following pages, he was also to do his utmost to have Thorstein 
Petersen and Nils Ihlen dismissed from the Norwegian Consulate.
3. The Norwegian Consulate
Apart from the Danish Governor and the British Consul the only other foreign 
diplomatic service on the Faroe Islands was the Norwegian Consulate. Prior to the 
war the Norwegian presence in the islands mainly consisted of fishermen. However, 
after the German invasion of Norway the Faroes received many refugees, who
107 Tfmin, 19.04.45
108 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr. 1, Udskrift af Faerp amts dagbog. (A.I.), p. 
472
109 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr. 1, Udskrift af Faerp amts dagbog. (A.I.), p. 
472-3
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escaped the occupation in small fishing vessels. Many of these fishing vessels, each 
with a crew of 3 to 8 men, joined the British military on the islands.110
The Norwegian Consul on the Faroe Islands was Thorstein Petersen, a local advocate 
and board member of the Sjovinnubankin, on of the then major banks in the Faroes, 
but also a front figure of the People’s Party. The Consulate’s secretary, Norwegian 
Nils Ihlen, felt equally strongly for the Faroese independence cause as his Consul 
and joined forces with Petersen in his agitation against Governor Hilbert. Petersen 
and Ihlen caused Hilbert difficulties during the occupation and subsequently created 
tension in Anglo-Danish relations, because Hilbert and Reventlow turned to the 
British to have them removed from the islands, or at least from their posts.
3.1 British attitude towards the Norwegian Consulate
The British attitude towards Petersen was clear in a memorandum to the Norwegian
Foreign Ministry by Collier:
M. Thorstein Petersen makes use of his position as Norwegian Consul to 
create trouble for the British authorities. As Manager and Director of the 
Faroese Trade Bank he has tried to obstruct the working of the currency 
control, and as manager and principal shareholder of the newspaper 
“Dagbladid” he tries to make trouble for the British Consul. He is at 
present in the U.S.A. but has left a second in command. M. Patursson 
through whom he continues his agitation. This however, has been on a 
much reduced scale since his departure; and it is felt that, if advantage 
could be taken of his absence to install a regular Norwegian Consul, his 
return would be viewed with much less anxiety.111
Ihlen subsequently sarcastically pointed out that it had to be a coincidence that 
Collier would approach the Norwegians in London on this matter at the same time as 
Hilbert visited London. He also indicated that the Governor exercised too much 
power on the islands and that the situation begged for a strong British authority, who 
would dare to stand against both Danish and Faroese extremists. If nothing was done 
about the situation at least 70 per cent of the population would turn anti-allied, Ihlen 
predicted. By this, he did not mean that they would become pro-German, Ihlen 
stressed, but rather too Faroese nationalist. Also, Ihlen pointed out, it did not help
110 RA, 152/2B08611-54, Faer0yene, Generalkonsul Kildal, Det Norske Generalkonsulat, Torshavn, 
Til Sj0forsvarets overkommando, London, fra 3 sk0ytef0rer i Torshavn, 16.03.43
111 RA, U D /9974-2.23, De ul0nte stasjoner: Torshavn. Bind I, memorandum from Collier, FO, to 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Notes for Conversation with M. Skylstad, 01.10.41
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matter much that the British Consul was getting married to a Danish girl. Ihlen was 
not alone in thinking along these lines. His views were shared by the former British 
Consul on the islands for 30 years, Valdemar Liitzen, who incidentally was a 
Unionist, Ihlen pointed out.112
Although London, the Governor and Naval Officer in Charge (N.O.I.C.) in Torshavn 
had their reservations towards Thorstein Petersen, Petersen was appointed as legal 
adviser to the British military forces on the islands; the position, however, was not as 
a legal adviser to the British Consulate nor the Naval forces. This decision was, 
unsurprisingly, not welcomed by the Danes. They were afraid that Petersen would 
use this appointment in his propaganda, as it would show, that the British trusted 
him. Hilbert therefore tried to convince the British to revoke the decision, but 
without success.113
a) Danish attempts to influence British and Norwegians in London to take action 
with regard to the Norwegian Consulate
Despite the estranged relations between the consulate on the one hand and the Danish 
Governor and the British on the other hand, Danish and British relations with the 
Norwegian contingent in the islands were generally good. There is even suggestions 
that the refugees sided with Hilbert in his attempt to have Ihlen removed. The 
Norwegian Government in exile in London received letters from these Norwegian 
subjects in the islands expressing their dissatisfaction with Ihlen. They accused him 
and Petersen for being more interested in promoting their own positions and 
involvement with local politics.114 There might be an added aspect to these 
accusations. In Norway, at least at the time of the Second World War, the country 
was divided into two, the religious fishing communities of the Northwest, and the 
secular and educated southeast. There was therefore a deep mistrust amongst the 
refugees, who all came from the Northwest towards those from the Oslo-area, where 
Ihlen came from.
112 RA, UD/9974-2.23, De ul0nte stasjoner: Torshavn. Bind I, letter from Ihlen, Torshavn, to 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry, London, 24.11.41
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Following the letters from the Faroes the Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission put 
pressure on the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in London that Petersen should be 
removed from his post and replaced by Ewald Kjplbro, the son of the most prominent 
entrepreneur in the Klaksvfk, the capital of the northern islands, where most of the 
Norwegian refugees were positioned during the war. Ewald Kj0lbro was also 
incidentally the brother of the girl, whom Kaarb0, the author of the letters, was 
engaged to. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Lie, however, was not willing to yield 
to the pressure but suggested that Thingvold, a fishing agent based in Lissabon, 
would be sent to the Faroes as a representative of the Shipping and Trade Mission to 
examine the situation in the islands.115 This reply did not go down well with the 
Shipping and Trade Mission. They would rather see Thingvold take over the position 
of vice-consul in the Faroes instead of Ihlen. Likewise they suggested that Kaarb0 
should take the position as their representative on the islands.116
Defending their position in the Faroe Islands Ihlen wrote to Lie in July 1941 
explaining that all criticism towards the Norwegian Consulate was purely of a 
political nature, that is, the criticism was mainly due to the fact that the Norwegian 
Consul also was the leader of the progressive independence party, the Peoples Party 
and thus posed a threat to the Danish administration. Also, Ihlen pointed out, the fact 
that the Norwegians were immensely popular amongst the locals, to much irritation 
to the Danish and British.117
Although he had the Norwegian refugees against him Ihlen found support for his 
arguments amongst those Norwegians, who had joined the British forces on the 
islands. A letter from Kristian Kahrs, C.O.H.N.M.S. “KOS 5”, addressed to C.in.C 
Royal Norwegian Navy a month later stated that:
On account of the difficult conditions at present prevailing at the Faroe
Islands, I beg to make the following statement:
115 RA, UD/9974-2.23, De ul0nte stasjoner: Torshavn. Bind I, letter from Trygve Lie, London, to The 
Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission, London, 17.06.41
116 RA, UD/9974-2.23, De ulpnte stasjoner: Torshavn. Bind I, letter from The Norwegian Shipping 
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As already known, the Faroe population is very anti-Danish. After the 
British occupation, the feeling towards the British has also cooled off 
considerably, not least on account of the very little elastic and diplomatic 
methods of procedure shown by the British Consul and the N.O.I.C.
The Norwegians, are however, very popular, and the excellent behaviour 
of the crew of “Kos 5” in the service as well as ashore, has increased this 
popularity. As an example I may mention, that on the 29th July, which is 
the national day of the Faroes, the leader of the Self-Government party 
made a very pro-Norwegian speech, after which the Faroese sang 3 
verses of “Ja vi elsker” [Norwegian National Anthem]... .The Danish 
sheriff was present. This popularity enjoyed by the Norwegians, has of 
course been very hard to swallow for the sheriff, and as there is intimate 
co-operation between the latter and the British Consul, one has reason to 
believe that he is the indirect cause of the bad treatment “Kos 5” received 
in Thorshavn...All the crew of “Kos 5” asked me on my departure from 
Thorshavn, to try and get them transferred to another place. Personally I 
am of the opinion that on account of the present difficult political 
conditions there, it would be just as well to take all Norwegian vessels 
away from the Faroe Islands.118
Kahrs blamed the unfair treatment of the Norwegians by the British on jealousy, 
because the Norwegians were far more popular with the Faroese, especially the girls, 
than the British.
Ihlen also found it not advisable to dismiss Petersen as Norwegian Consul. Petersen 
held a central and vital position, both professionally and politically, and his dismissal 
would create much discontent amongst the locals towards Norway and the consulate 
on the islands and would subsequently harm Norwegian interests in the islands. He 
suggested that the best solution would be that the status of the Norwegian Consul on 
the islands would be altered so that he would hold the same rank as the British 
Consul in order to create an equilibrium in the conflict. He suggested that the Foreign 
Minister could appoint an additional Consul, a native Norwegian, to the Consulate, 
who would take over the Consular title, while Petersen would be given the title of 
Honorary Consul.119
118 RA, 152/2B 08611-54, Faer0yene, Generalkonsul Kildal, Det Norske Generalkonsulat, Torshavn, 
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The Norwegians in London were not inclined to succumb to the pressure applied by 
the Danes to have Thorstein Petersen removed, as such a move would cause more 
harm than good to their interests in the Faroes. Instead they decided, along the lines 
of Ihlen’s suggestion, to appoint a second Consul, Thingvold, who would be superior 
to Petersen in rank, in hope to restore some peace in the islands. The situation was 
namely getting out of hand and was beginning to put a strain on Norwegians 
relations with the Danes and British.
Following his arrival on the islands, Thingvold reported to London on the situation. 
He supported Ihlen in the conflict and even suggested that Ihlen should be promoted 
from Secretary to Vice-Consul. Thingvold also found that the Norwegian fishing and 
trade interests were too insignificant for a special appointment to take care of these 
aspects of Norwegian interests in the islands and that once Petersen returned from the 
United States, the Consulate would be adequately manned to also be in charge of 
these matters.120 Thingvold did not last long in his post on the Faroes, mainly 
because he did not get along with Ihlen.121 He was not inclined to support the crusade 
against Hilbert’s administration, which probably explains why he did not relish his 
stay in the islands.
In early summer 1942 Wendelbo, the then Norwegian Consul in Lerwick, Shetland 
Islands, was appointed Norwegian Consul in the Faroes and Thingvold was
1 *y> y
appointed the position in Lerwick. The appointment seems to have been the result 
of a successful entrepreneurship by Petersen, Ihlen and Wendelbo himself. In early 
April Wendelbo wrote to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in London expressing his 
concerns for the situation of the Consulate in the Faroe Islands. He pointed out that 
he had known Petersen for several years and saw him as a dear friend and 
consequently believed that they would work well together. He also mentioned that if 
he were appointed the consular post in the Faroes then Thingvold could take his
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place in the Shetland Islands.123 Later Petersen mentioned Wendelbo as a suitable 
candidate for the post in one of his letters to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.124 It is 
very much possible that this orchestration was not a coincidence, because no sooner 
had Wendelbo arrived he too became one of Hilbert’s strongest critics on par with 
Petersen and Ihlen.
The partnership between Wendelbo, Petersen and Ihlen was highly successful in 
terms of infuriating Hilbert. When the Danes learned that the Norwegians were 
contemplating to appoint Consul Petersen to General-Consul they were not pleased at 
all and did everything to forestall it. Norwegian Foreign Minister Erik Colban was 
approached by Reventlow, who pointed out that Petersen belonged to a group of 
nationalist extremists on the islands, who were at open war with the Danish 
administration on the islands. The Danes were therefore upset by the Norwegian 
decision to promote Petersen to Consul-General, which would only worsen the 
situation in the Faroes. Colban regretted that the Danes felt this way, but the matter 
was outside his realm and would lay with the newly appointed Consul on the islands, 
Wendelbo.'25
The Governor’s frustration with the passive tolerance shown towards Petersen, 
Wendelbo and Ihlen was acute and he took it upon himself to take control by 
announcing that he would issue residence permits to all Norwegians in the island. By 
doing so he would show the Norwegian Consulate, who held the ultimate power on 
the islands.
I shall take steps to ensure that Ihlen applies for a residence permit. This 
will be granted only subject to renewal for short periods at a time, and on 
condition that he abstains from all political activity in the Faroes. These 
steps will be taken immediately without waiting further communication 
from you.126
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In 1942 following Wendelbo’s appointment as Norwegian Consul on the
Faroes and the following promotion of Petersen to Consul-General the Danes
again used their power and position to create problems for Petersen. When
Petersen was to leave for London the Danes delayed his application for a visa
for so long that he missed three connections (ships sailing for Britain). “Still
without visa three connections now missed. As later departure very difficult
please investigate real reasons refusing visa and confirm.”127 (telegram style)
Following this Wendelbo and Petersen wrote to the Norwegians in London
expressing that “we both feel that Petersen is considered persona ingrata by
British Foreign Office. Any work undertaken by this consulate under such
circumstances will be meaningless and useless.”128 Also, when Thorstein
Peteresen and Gunnar Holm-Jacobsen went to the United States on business,
Hilbert tried to stop them from going, because he was
afraid that they would perform political agitation and lobbyism for the 
independence cause in the Faroes. In order to get to the United States, 
Petersen and Holm-Jacobsen first travelled to Iceland, where they applied 
for visa to enter the United States. On instructions from Hilbert Fontenay, 
the Danish Minister in Reykjavik tried to put the journey to a halt by 
pulling all stops to hinder them in getting the visas, referring to the 
American announcement that they to greatest extent try to avoid having 
subjects entering the United States on the purpose of political agitation. 
Fontenay therefore demanded an explicit explanation of the purpose of 
travel as well as a signed declaration from the two men that they would 
only stick to their intended business and would not take any political 
steps while in the United States. After Petersen and Holm-Jacobsen had 
done what Fontenay requested of them, he saw no other option but to 
forward the request to the American Consul, who granted them visas.129 
(translated)
These antics by the Governor did not help Dano-Faroe relations and only fuelled the 
criticism against the Danish administration and increased the frequency of demands 
for independence. Incidentally Hilbert’s activities did not only have repercussions on 
the Faores. Word had gone about in Iceland amongst members of the Althing that the 
Danish minister has tried to forestall Petersen’s and Holm-Jacobsen’s application for
127 RA, UD/9974-2.23, De ul0nte stasjoner: Torshavn. Bind II, telegram from Petersen to Normin, 
London, 30.07.42
128 RA, UD/9974-2.23, De ul0nte stasjoner: Torshavn. Bind II, telegram from W endelbo and Petersen 
to Normin, London, 06.08.42
129 FL, J. Nr. 4079/3, Faer0 Amt, Islands forhold til Danmark, br.bk .l40A .l, Letter from Fontenay to 
Hilbert, 25.02.41
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visa, resulting in much disgruntle and stronger voices in the Althing for a severance
of ties with Denmark and declaring Iceland a republic.130 The Danes, however, did
not react to this, although Hilbert’s actions this time not only harmed their interests
in the Faroes, but also in Iceland, and no reprimand was given to Hilbert. The reason
for this long leash could be explained by the fact that the British, acknowledging that
the Norwegian Consulate was creating more trouble than was needed, more or less
gave Hilbert the go-ahead to deal with the problem in his own way. In his private
notes from the period of 1943-5 Hilbert mentioned a letter, which Consul Vorley
showed him on August 8th 1943. In this letter
the Foreign Office had given him instructions on how to handle the 
radical separatists if they started to cause trouble; amongst other things it 
said that if the People’s Party made an attempt to exploit the situation and 
declare the Faroes as independent from Denmark, then Vorley was to 
announce that the party “was acting illegally as rebels and neither His 
Majesty's Government nor any other respectable country would 
recognize or deal with them.”131 (translated)
Hilbert was “convinced that the Norwegian Government will appreciate the necessity 
of eliminating the harmful effects of Thorstein Petersen’s activity. Should the 
Government contrary to what I am expecting feel unable to meet my requests I shall 
prefer them to explain their reasons clearly rather than ambiguously.”132 It thus 
seems that Hilbert was ready to go to great lengths to have his opponents silenced.
Reventlow promised Hilbert that he would do his best at influencing the Norwegians 
in London to dismiss Petersen as their Consul on the Faroe Islands.133 After 
conferring with the Norwegians, Reventlow, however, was not so confident that he 
and Hilbert would succeed in their quest to have Petersen removed from his post. 
Reventlow suspected that the reluctance amongst the Norwegians in London to make 
such a move was that they feared that it would create a negative reaction back home 
in Norway, especially amongst those, who were hostile to the Social Democratic 
Government. The political and social circles in question, Reventlow pointed out,
130 FL, J. Nr. 4079/3, Faer0 Amt, Sendemand til Island, br.bk. 140A.2, Udskrift af Dagbog for 
Sysselmand K. Djurhuus, Tveraa, vedr0rende Deltagelsen i den faerpske Erhvervsdelegations Rejse til 
Island i Februar Maaned 1941
131 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (B. II), Private optegnelse vedr. perioden 
1943-45, p. 1, Spndag den 8 August 1943, kl. 11.45.
132 SA, 8.H.26/1961/372, Norges stilling til Faerperne, from Hilbert to Reventlow, 18.12.42
133 SA, 8.H.26/1961/372, Norges stilling til Faerperne, from Reventlow to Hilbert, 08.01.43
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were predominantly people advocating the Norse heritage134, and hence the 
Norwegian natural right to the islands in the North Atlantic. Reventlow, nevertheless, 
was pleased to inform Hilbert that their concerns were met with understanding at the 
Foreign Office and that Warner had promised that he would try to influence the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry. The prospects of success, however, were not high 
amongst the officials at the Foreign Office either, Reventlow noted.135
With the possibility of having Petersen removed lessened, the focus for Hilbert and 
Reventlow’s campaign against the Norwegian Consul was fixed on Ihlen.
On August 6th 1943 Consul Vorley informed Hilbert that N.O.I.C. (Naval Officer in 
Charge) and Colonel MacKay wanted Ihlen removed from the islands as soon as 
possible, because they perceived him as dangerous and harmful. Hilbert noted that it 
was perceived by the British that Ihlen’s activities were harming the relations 
between the Norwegians and Danish circles in the Faroes, the political life on the 
Faroes, for example with his exaggerations created mistrust amongst the different 
branches of services. The removal of Ihlen had to take place immediately, as the 
British were aware that there were plans to make him chairman of the planned
1 -7/T
Norwegian Marine club in Torshavn.
In early 1943 some Norwegians skippers situated in the Faroes wrote to the Naval 
Office in London praising the work of the Norwegian Consul and his staff, especially 
Nils Ihlen. They confined that they had heard rumours that the British would appoint 
a liaison officer to act between the Norwegians and the British military on the island. 
On the ground of his previous assistance to the Norwegian skippers, they recommend 
that the post should be appointed to Nils Ihlen.137 This was incidentally around the 
same time Ihlen was removed from his post in the Faroes.
134 SA, 8.H.26/1961/372, Norges stilling til Faerperne, from Reventlow to Hilbert, 28.01.43
135 SA, 8.H.26/1961/372, Norges stilling til Faerperne, from Reventlow to Hilbert, 28.01.43
136 SA, Privatarkiv: C.A. Hilbert. Arkiv nr. 6685, pk. Nr 2 (B. II), Private optegnelse vedr. perioden 
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137 UD, 152/2B08611-54, Faerpyene, Generalkonsul Kildal, Det Norske Generalkonsulat, Torshavn, 
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It was not enough to have Ihlen removed from his post as Secretary at the Norwegian 
Consulate. In September 1943 a Foreign Office minute suggested the expulsion of 
Ihlen from the Faroes on the grounds that he had not abided by the conditions set 
forth by the Govenor, when the former was granted permission to remain on the 
islands only if he refrained from political activities. The minute pointed out that 
“This condition has not been observed and on the 13th September the Governor, 
being unable under present circumstances to exercise his powers to expel undesirable 
aliens, requested HM Consul to approach the Naval Officer in charge with a view to 
his expulsion from the Islands,” and concluded that “Mr. Ihlen is closely associated 
with Mr. Thorstein Petersen and his political activities are of a nature to make trouble 
between the Danish authorities and the Faroese and thus to cause unrest and 
disturbance in the Islands. This is contrary to the interest of HMG and it is, therefore, 
proposed to authorise the Naval Officer in Charge, in his capacity as Fortress 
Commander, to remove Mr. Ihlen to this country.”138
In the beginning of 1943 the Norwegian Foreign Ministry in London recognised the 
troublesome nature of the staff at their Consulate on the Faroes. “Our people on the 
Faores have behaved and are clearly behaving in a manner that is contrary to our 
interests and which threatens our good relationship with Denmark.”139 They had 
subsequently “instructed Wendelbo to maintain good relations with the Governor and 
the British Consul.”140 (translated) The main problem over the following months was 
Wendelbo’s and Ihlen’s refusal to apply for their resident permits, which Hilbert, as 
mentioned earlier had put in force. Hilbert, thus, achieved exactly what he set out to 
do when he installed the residence permits, namely to make it impossible for him to 
stay in the islands, since a renewal of Ihlen’s permit rested upon him abstaining from 
political activities. As would be expected Ihlen refused to abide by Hilbert’s 
instruction, and consequently gave Hilbert the opportunity to demand the removal of 
Ihlen from the islands. Hilbert also succeeded in his efforts to create an excuse for 
the removal of Wendelbo.
138 PRO, FO 371/47281, Foreign Office minute, 16.09.43
139 RA, UD/9974-2.23, De ul0nte stasjoner: Torshavn. Bind II, UD-notat (Norwegian Foreign 
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In addition I would be grateful if you would endeavour to obtain from the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry a final official instruction to Mr. Wendelbo 
ordering him to ask for recognition within a short timelimit, thus 
enabling me to announce publicly, in case no such application should 
have been received within the timelimit, that Wendelbo has received no 
recognition and accordingly cannot act as consul. Finally, though I much 
regret the necessity of this step, I feel compelled to request you to 
demand from the Norwegian Government the annulation of Thorstein 
Petersen’s appointment as consular representative for Norway in the 
Faroes.141
As expected Wendelbo found it in conflict with his personal beliefs to ask Hilbert for 
recognition of his appointment. After conferring with the Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry in London, upon which he was informed that the consequence of his 
standpoint would be his dismissal, Wendelbo stuck to his principle.142
Following Wendelbo’s dismissal, the Norwegian appointed Otto Jacob Lange Kildal, 
a long serving member of the Norwegian diplomatic service, whose only wish was to 
join the military. His lack of interest in the post was evident in his efforts to convince 
the Foreign Ministry in London that, with the Norwegian colony on the island only 
consisting of 20 men and 13 women, there really was no need for a General-Consul 
on the island.143 The work at the Consulate was therefore so minimal that it could be 
left in charge of Petersen.144 Kildal’s wish to join the Norwegian army, however, was 
not met by the Foreign Ministry, and he was subsequently sent to Iceland to cover for 
the Norwegian Minister there, Bay, who had fallen ill. No one was appointed to 
replace Kildal.145 Kildal was finally allowed to leave the diplomatic service and join 
the military once Consul Bay was well enough to return to his post.
The explanation for the resentment amongst some of the Norwegians towards the 
Danish Governor on the islands, or rather their support for the Faroese independence 
movement, could be that their memory of Norway’s departure from the union with
141 SA, 8.H .26/1961/372, Norges stilling til Faer0erne, from Hilbert to Reventlow, 18.12.42
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Sweden in 1905, which was initially met by strong opposition by the Swedes, was 
still fresh in the Norwegian’s mind, hence their sympathy for the wish for Faroese 
independence. In a report from his inspection of the Faroes in early 1943, Bredsdorff, 
of the Marine Station in Port Edgar, compared the political situation on the islands 
with that of Norway in 1905. The report roused some interest amongst the 
Norwegians in London, because it also touched upon the future status of the Faroes 
after the war. It questioned whether the British would be willing to give up the 
aerodrome and fuelling station in the islands once the war was over. Also it 
highlighted the wish for independence on the islands and the desire amongst the 
Faroese to maintain consular and cultural ties with Norway, as well as the good 
relations between the locals and the Norwegians on the islands.146 These last 
comments especially raised some interest amongst the Norwegians in London, where 
the report was shown to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
In the end the Danes were able to exercise more pressure on the British than the 
Norwegian Consulate was. Those troublesome elements, which could be laid off 
without creating too much of a controversy, were dismissed and the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister in London consequently ordered the Consulate in Torshavn to 
“maintain good relations with the local authorities and to avoid all conflict of a 
personal nature.”147
D. CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined the influence on British policies towards the Faroe Islands 
exerted by the Danish Minister in London and the Danish Governor in the Faroe 
Islands. Despite representing a government collaborating with the enemy, the Danish 
representatives succeeded in most part to influence the British.
The Faroe Islands never acquired the strategic importance originally placed upon 
them by the British, especially the Admiralty. This was due to the reluctance of the 
Air Ministry to meet the Admiralty’s wish to have an aerodrome built on the islands.
146 RA, 152/2B 08611-54, Faer0yene, Generalkonsul Kildal, Det Norske Generalkonsulat, Torshavn, 
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Torshavn, 26.08.42
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Consequently the level of interest for the islands within the Foreign Office 
diminished and the islands were predominantly dealt with by an office clerk at the 
Northern Department and very rarely reached the Foreign Secretary’s desk. The level 
of interest taken in the islands was also mirrored in the level of intelligentsia on the 
islands, which meant that the Foreign Office acted upon a restricted base of 
information. The British Consul sent to the islands on the eve of the occupation was 
young and inexperienced, and therefore easily influenced by the Danish Governor on 
the islands. This chapter shows that in the first couple of years of the occupation the 
Danish contingencies in the Faroes and in London subsequently were highly 
successful in manipulating the information the Foreign Office based their decisions 
and policies regarding the Faroes upon.
Once in the islands the British realised that they had been landed in the midst of an 
internal conflict between the Danish administration and the independence movement 
supported by the Norwegian Consulate. This conflict reached its peak during the 
occupation owing to the severing of connections with Denmark and the subsequent 
Icelandic decision to declare their independence due to the situation. Initially the 
British decided to stick to their initial declaration of non-interference with internal 
affairs. However, upholding a complete neutrality to the internal conflict was at time 
difficult and often the British ambiguity towards the Danish representatives was 
apparent in their reports, even after the August-revolt in Denmark in 1943, which 
marked the end of governmental collaboration with the Germans. The British, 
nevertheless, stayed true to their promise given to the Danes on the eve of the 
occupation, namely that they would not interfere and would return the islands in the 
same state, as when they were occupied.
As for the local population the British found the Farose “not really quite conversant 
with what really happens and base most of their discussions on erroneous knowledge 
of affairs. They are therefore inclined to listen to any propaganda and may be swayed
1 4 8f. inst. by the Homerule party or any other influence, which may appeal to them.” 
[sic] It was therefore urged that
148 PRO, FO 371/29278, Report, Visit to Faroe Islands. 15.08.-02.09, 1941. 07.09.41
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As the British government is obviously supporting the Danish 
administration and does not intend to interfere with this administration 
except when it might be necessary for quite military defence reasons, it 
would be of great value both from a British as well as a Danish point of 
view that Danish prestige was backed as much as was possible by British 
wishes, by stating their wishes such that the Danish administration can 
consider such expressed wishes as a demand and back their own 
instructions accordingly, as inevitable.149
In London, however, officials were careful not to commit themselves “too definitely 
to the support of the Danish Government and the existing constitutional 
arrangement”150 in case Denmark would succumb to the Germans, and the Faroes, in 
such a situation, would wish for independence or press for inclusion in the British 
Empire, for in such circumstances “H.M.G. might feel that there was no reason why 
the islands should be handed back to Denmark.”151 Therefore, they never elucidated 
their statements, resulting in Reventlow and Hilbert taking advantage of the 
flexibility of the wording and turning every matter of internal conflicts into a matter 
of security to the British control over the islands.
Hilbert and Reventlow succeed through their bargaining skills to get an almost 
unconditional support for their endeavours from the British. But whereas Reventlow 
seems to have acted for Faroese interests on par with the Danish interests, except in 
those cases it would bring about constitutional changes, there are indications that 
Hilbert predominantly acted on behalf of his own position as Governor and the 
responsibility towards the Danish Government and King in retaining status quo on 
the Faroes.
As far as bargaining power goes, Reventlow was the strongest player, not only in 
British policies towards the Faroes, but he also managed to get the Foreign Office to 
interfere with Norwegian policies towards the Faroes, in order to restrict the 
authority of their Consul in the Faroes, local ‘Home Rule’ politician Thorstein 
Petersen, despite it being acknowledged by Collier that the latter “had done nothing
149 PRO, FO 371/29278, Report, Visit to Faroe Islands. 15.08.-02.09, 1941. 07.09.41
150 PRO, FO 371/32761, FO minute by Clarke 13.07.42
151 PRO, FO 371/32761, FO minute by Clarke 13.07.42
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1 S9actually contrary to Norwegian interests.” Thus, Nils A. S0rensen is right, when he 
claims that during the occupation, apart from the flag incident that is, it is evident 
that the Foreign Office listened and followed the requests of the Danish delegation in 
London.153 Hence, despite the reserved attitude of the British towards the Danes due 
to the situation in Denmark, Reventlow and Hilbert were to a great extent successful 
at influencing British policies towards the Faroes. This success was due to their 
entrepreneurship.
In an obituary to C.A. Hilbert in National Tidende on 19.10.53, Hilbert’s handling of 
the Faroes during the war was applauded and especially they way he handled the 
British occupation. With regard to the latter aspect a distinction was drawn between 
how Hilbert succeeded in completing his task while, according to the author, 
Kauffmann (the Danish Minister in Washington) failed, and thus secured continuous 
Danish control over the Faroes. By not protesting nor accepting the British 
occupation, Hilbert had been able to remain in his position as the Governor on the 
islands and thereby maintain Danish authority over the islands, despite the presence 
of the British. If Hilbert had, like Kauffmann, openly accepted the occupation, he 
would have been dismissed by King Christian, acting on German demands. Thereby 
there would have been no officially authorised representative of the Danish 
Government on the Faroes, and the author (Max) was in no doubt that the 
independence movement would immediately have seized the opportunity to declare 
the islands independent after the war.154 Although Hilbert indeed did succeed in 
upholding Danish authority of the islands, he was by no means a popular Governor, 
and that was not only due to his reluctance to give way to the independence 
movement. As this chapter has revealed, he also faced much criticism from his 
British counterparts, and even his Minister in London at times acknowledged that 
Hilbert, with his stern attitude, did not make it easy for himself. Upon Hilbert’s 
departure from the Faroes it was thus remarked in F0rovatf5indi that “Hilbert did not 
have the popularity-gene in him, and he did nothing to seek popularity while in the
152 PRO, FO 371/29312, comment by Collier 02.10 to minute by Dashwood on Mr. Thorstein 
Petersen, his activities and occupation, 25.06.41
153 Sprensen, Storbritannien og P et faerpske Styre 1940-45, p. 199
154 National Tidende. obituary to C.A. Hilbert by Max, 19.10.53
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Faroes; he had come to do his duty as governor, and that is what he tried to achieve 
to full extent.”155
The Faroese independence movement was headed by the grand old man, Patursson, 
and the younger Thorstein Petersen, who, in his post as the Norwegian Consul, was 
able to exert some influence on the British. However, the tactics, or rather lack of 
tactics, of the independence movement meant that the British saw them more as a 
nuisance and source of disturbance to the otherwise good relations between the 
British occupiers and the local people and administration, than an equivalent 
counterpart to the Danish administration. This despite there being some level of 
understanding amongst the British for the arguments of the independence movement.
The outcome of the Atlantic meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill attracted the 
attention of the People’s Party, and in their newspaper, Dagbladid, they embraced 
one of the nine points made at the meeting, namely the one where the United States 
and Britain pledged to guard the right of people and nation, no matter how small they 
are, of sovereignty and right of self-determination.156 The occupation also saw a rise 
in the support for the independence movement amongst the Faroese. This was 
manifested at the elections for the Danish Government in 1943, to which the Faroese, 
according to constitutional law, had to elect two members. One of the members 
elected was Thorstein Petersen. These electoral results gave the British some 
afterthought with regard to their stringent policy of support to the Danish 
administration in the islands, but nevertheless they did not diverge from the promise 
of no interference given at the outset of the occupation.
Despite the lack of success in influencing the British to support their cause of 
following the steps of Iceland and becoming fully independent during the war the 
independence movement succeeded in increasing their support amongst the Faroese 
to such an extent that by the end of the war it was acknowledged by all, Faroese, 
British and Danish that a return to pre-war conditions was impossible.
155 Fe)rovatf5indi. 30.03.46
156 Dagbla5i5, ’’Smatjodanna raettur,” 21.08.41
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CHAPTER IV: ICELAND OCCUPIED BY BRITISH AND AMERICANS: THE
ROLE OF THE DANISH REPRESENTATIVES IN ICELAND. LONDON AND 
WASHINGTON DC?
Since 1918 Iceland was an independent entity within the Danish Kingdom, with its 
own Home Rule Government. This meant that she was in charge of everything but 
foreign affairs. Immediately after the German occupation of Denmark the Icelandic 
Government declared its independence from the Government in Copenhagen, and 
more importantly, that Iceland was taking charge of her foreign affairs. The structure 
of this chapter is based upon the four main events in Iceland during the war: the 
German occupation of Denmark, the British occupation of Iceland, the American 
take-over and finally the Icelandic decision to leave the Union with Denmark. While 
chapter III showed an example of highly active Danish representatives in all aspects 
of the British occupation of the Faroe Islands, this chapter will demonstrate that not 
all representatives with regard to the North Atlantic territories during Second World 
War were equally active. For most of the occupation of Iceland the Danish 
representatives kept a low profile. The chapter will demonstrate why there was such 
a difference in the conduct of affairs between the positions in Iceland as compared to 
that of the Faroes. This chapter will thus deal with a situation based on a different 
constitutional basis as was the case in the previous chapter. What difference, if any, 
did this have on the role of the Danish representatives in relations with Iceland 
compared to that of the Danish representatives in relations with the Faroe Islands?
One difference, as mentioned above, lay in its constitutional status and the fact that 
Iceland, as opposed to the Faroe Islands, was in charge of all her affairs in the 
aftermath of the German occupation of Denmark. The questions asked in the first 
part of this chapter concern how the newly established Icelandic diplomatic corps 
was received abroad, and to what extent the Danish representatives were able to 
influence the British and Americans with regard to Iceland, now that Denmark no 
longer was in charge of Icelandic foreign affairs. Chapter I introduced us to the 
historical background of the Icelandic situation in the North Atlantic, and her 
strategic importance to the British and Americans in the years leading up to the war. 
This chapter takes a more thorough examination of the immediate situation of
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Iceland after the outbreak of war, and the implications the German occupation of 
Denmark had on the course of Icelandic affairs during the war. The question is also 
asked whether this reserved role of the Danish representatives in Iceland was due to 
the representatives themselves, or because of the British attitude towards occupied 
Denmark, whom they represented. The question in the second part of this chapter is 
whether one factor was that the British personnel sent to Iceland, especially the 
diplomatic, was of a different calibre, than that sent to the Faroes (Mason). Did the 
British apply a different attitude and policy towards their occupation of Iceland 
compared with that of the Faroes? And if so, what were the deciding factors for such 
a different approach?
Unlike Mason, Howard-Smith, the British Minister sent to Iceland, was experienced. 
His previous post was as Minister in Copenhagen and he was in fact transferred to 
Reykjavik following the German occupation of Denmark. Did this have any bearing 
on the level of influence exercised by Danish Minister Fontenay on the British, or 
were there other reasons for his relatively passive role?
Although Iceland took charge of her own foreign affairs in April 1940 she remained 
in the Union with the Danish Kingdom till 1944. Hence, did this fact have any 
bearing on the influence the Danish representatives were able to exert? This chapter 
questions to what extent the Danish representatives concerned with Iceland, that is 
the Danish Ministers in Reykjavik, in London and in Washington D.C., were able to 
exercise their influence during the war,
The third part of this chapter examines what bearing, if any, did the occupation of 
Iceland changing hands mid-way through the war have? Did the American attitude 
towards the occupation differ from the British? Did their take-over of the occupation 
bring about any changes with regard to the role of the Danish representatives? Did 
the arrival of the Danish Minister in Washington bring about any change? And did he 
take a more active role than his colleagues in Reykjavik and London had adopted?
The fourth part focuses upon the Icelandic decision to break out of the Union with 
Denmark. What was the standpoint of the Danish Minister in Reykjavik and of his 
colleagues in London and Washington? What stance did the British and the
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Americans take to the Icelandic decision, and what were their considerations, if any, 
to the Danish sentiments in the matter? Subsequently, to what extent did the Danes 
have an influence on the independence question?
A. ICELAND TAKES OVER CHARGE OF HER FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
FOLLOWING THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF DENMARK 
According to the Act of Union Iceland was sovereign and independently in charge of 
all her affairs, with the exception of foreign affairs. However, John J. Hunt argues 
that Iceland, from the ratification of the Act of Union in 1918 “could have conducted 
her own foreign affairs anytime; the only reason she did not was the expense 
involved, the lack of trained personnel after 1918 and Denmark’s impartiality and 
fairness in representing Iceland,”1 and that she had “signed and ratified at least 1000 
bilateral and multilateral agreements between the two World Wars.”2 Nevertheless, 
Iceland had no ministry of foreign affairs nor any diplomatic envoys abroad, except 
in Copenhagen, at the time of the German occupation of Denmark. Upon the 
German occupation of Denmark, the Icelandic Government declared that it would 
take charge of her foreign affairs. This meant that she set up a diplomatic corps and 
established consular offices in Britain and in the United States. Thus, unlike the 
Faroe Islands and Greenland, Iceland ultimately became in charge of her own affairs, 
both internally and externally. Did this shift of power mean that the Danish 
representatives became obsolete in matters related to Iceland, or were they still able 
to exercise some influence? This is one of the questions, which this chapter will 
examine in the attempt to understand why the Danish Minister in Reykjavik, contrary 
to his colleagues, was so inactive.
As mentioned in Chapter I Iceland was already in the process of moving her sphere 
of interests, especially with regard to her trade, towards the West and the United 
States rather than the traditional and historical bonds with Europe, and in particular 
the Scandinavian states. The Great War had taught the Icelanders that the vast 
distance from mainland Europe meant that she was easily cut off from trade with 
European states; hence the turn to the West. The incentive, however, was not merely
1 John Joseph Hunt, The United States Occupation of Iceland, Georgetown University, Washington, 
D.C., January, 1966, p. 203
2 Hunt, The United States Occupation of Iceland, 1966, p. 202
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concerned with trade, but as was also discussed in Chapter I, with defence and 
security issues. “As a protection they realise that the Danish connexion (sic) is 
useless. They would consider asking for the protection of the US, if they thought it 
would be obtained.”3 Efforts to improve their connection with the US were made 
prior to the war. These were predominantly made in the sphere of trade negotiations 
and cultural exchanges, in which the Icelanders, according to the Act of Union, were 
able to conduct on their own behalf. However, when it came to foreign affairs issues, 
as mentioned earlier, these remained under Danish jurisdiction. According to the 
Act of Union:
[Denmark] should conduct Iceland’s foreign policy and foreign 
representation in accordance with Iceland’s wishes. Nevertheless Iceland 
had the right to appoint consuls in places abroad where there was no 
Danish Consul already. Treaties concluded between Denmark and 
foreign powers before the ratification of the Act were to be binding for 
Iceland. Treaties subsequently concluded by Denmark were not to be 
binding for Iceland without Iceland’s express wish. Iceland had no war 
flag and was declared perpetually neutral.4
The German occupation of Denmark thus presented the Icelanders with an 
opportunity to take matters into their own hands. And, as we have seen in Chapter II, 
the Danes supported them in doing so.
1. Iceland in the aftermath of the German occupation of Denmark same as in chapter
n
The German occupation of Denmark caused much worry in Iceland and “it was
feared that the German Government would demand that Iceland place herself
immediately under German protection,”5. Thus, to stress their neutrality, the
Icelandic Government decided to completely detach itself from the Danish
Government. This decision was also based on the fact that with all communications
with Copenhagen cut off, Denmark was not able to fulfil her part of the Act:
since the occupation of Denmark by Germany had prevented the King 
from discharging his duties as King of Iceland. It has, therefore, become
3 PRO, FO 419/33, Report on a visit to Iceland by Mr. Gage, 02.06.39
4 NARA, RG 226, OSS, Entry 16, Box 1568, Foreign Office Research Department, Whitehall, “The 
International Status o f Iceland”, 08.01 45
5 Solrun B. Jensdottir Hardarson, “The ‘Republic o f Iceland’ 1940-44: Anglo-American Attitudes and 
Influences”, Journal o f Contemporary History, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Oct., 1974), p 32
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necessary for Iceland to assume the conduct of all her own affairs, 
including her representation abroad.6
The Icelanders were also adamant to maintain their perpetual neutrality. By severing 
any association with occupied Denmark, they strengthened their position as a neutral 
and also strengthened their sovereign integrity in the conflict. As a consequence, the 
Icelanders believed that they safeguarded their territory and people against the 
belligerents. As Hardarson argues, “only in neutrality did the Icelanders see any hope 
of warding off a German attack.”7 However, the concern was not only with regard to 
the belligerents alone. Icelandic apprehension was also with regard to the British, 
who, as we saw in chapter II, had expressed their wish to protect the island in the 
aftermath of the outbreak of war. In return the British wanted Iceland to break off her 
trade with Germany, which she refused as such a move would be contrary to her 
perpetual neutrality. The Icelanders, however, soon realised that in order to safeguard 
economic survival and territorial defence, especially once a republic, they would 
have to alleviate their neutrality policy.
2. Iceland becomes de facto independent and establishes her own diplomatic corpse 
independent from the Danish diplomatic corpse
To begin with the British were not quite sure what to do with regard to Iceland and 
the representation of Icelandic affairs in London.8 At first “it was pointed out that the 
Danish Minister was also the Icelandic Minister, and that he might be able to claim 
certain privileges in his latter capacity, although [the British] might be compelled to 
deny them to him as the representative of Denmark”.9 However, it seems that the 
fact that Iceland had been independent for the past twenty years, and had conducted 
trade negotiations with the British on her own during that time, had had an effect on 
how the British perceived and respected Iceland as independent from Denmark. They 
were thus soon ready to accept them as diplomatic envoys on par with the Danes.
6 NARA, RG 226, OSS, Entry 16, Box 1568, Foreign Office Research Department, Whitehall, “The 
International Status o f Iceland”, 08.01 45
7 Hardarson, “The ‘Republic o f Iceland’ 1940-44”, 1974, p. 32
8 PRO, FO 371/24784, N4565/4220/15, Comment by Coote 13.04.40
9 PRO, FO 371/24784, N4565/4220/15 (former N4420), minute by Patrick Dean of the Foreign 
Office, reporting from a meeting held in Sir W. Malkin’s room, 10.04.40
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As to the question of a Minister of Iceland, the matter was cleared by Collier. Collier 
had been informed by Reventlow, that he, in the aftermath the Icelandic 
announcement that she took charge over her foreign affairs, did not see himself as the 
Minister of Iceland, and that Icelandic affairs subsequently were to be handled by 
Mr. Benediktsson, the Icelandic member of the Joint Standing Committee in London 
appointed under the Anglo-Icelandic trade agreement. Mr. Benediktsson, however, 
had not at this stage asked to be regarded as Icelandic Charge d’Affairs, and Collier 
thought that the matter was not important/ of immediate concern for the time being.10 
The British thus waited for the Icelanders to make a move.
The request from the Icelanders came a few days later. In the mean time, however, 
the British had learned about the move of the United States to establish a Consular 
post in Iceland. As we saw in the first chapter, the British had acted rather 
indifferently two years previously when the Germans were showing much interest in 
Iceland. The failure of the British to respond by stepping up their attention to Iceland 
had resulted in the Germans getting a strong foothold on the island. Now, however, it 
seemed that the British would not be overtaken by the Americans as they had by the 
Germans.
The Icelandic Government have asked His Majesty's Government to 
receive an Icelandic Charge d’Affaires. It is recommended that we should 
agree. In that case it is desirable that the Icelandic Government should 
address a letter to His Majesty's Government...On the question of 
reciprocal representation in Iceland, it was agreed that there was good 
reason why we should appoint a diplomatic representative in that country 
in view of the naval and aeronautical importance of the Island during the 
war. For this reason there was much to be said for our going out of the 
way to be strongly represented in Iceland. It was also important that we 
should be first in the field. It was noted that the United States 
Government had already announced their intention to appoint a Consul in 
Iceland.11
Acknowledging the importance of Iceland in their war plans, the British thus found it 
important to keep good relations with the Icelanders. As shown in Chapter I there 
were other incidents, for example the British sea-plane breaching Icelandic 
neutrality, which illustrated this willingness to build good relations with Iceland.
10 PRO, FO 371/24784, N4565/4220/15, Comment by Collier 13.04.40
11 PRO, FO 371/24784, N4680/4220/15, report by Dashwood o f meeting in Sir Orme Sargent’s room
18.04.40
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Also, when it came to Icelandic independence the British were expressing their 
interest;
In these circumstances, and as the Consul-General has confirmed that 
there is considerable uneasiness in Iceland public opinion, I submit that 
we should take the opportunity to state publicly that we have a vital 
interest in Icelandic independence, and we clearly have such an interest, 
in view of the danger to which we might be exposed from the use of 
Iceland as a naval or air base by any hostile power, though it might be 
going rather far to say that we viewed Icelandic independence in the 
same light as that of France.12
While the British showed willingness to recognize Icelandic independence, they 
nevertheless realised that the U.S. recognition of the independence of the island 
would make matters more difficult for the British with regard to eventual occupation 
of the island;
If the Adty [Admiralty] and the A.My [Air Ministry] are very anxious to 
have the use of bases in Iceland, we shall have to consider whether it will 
be possible on any pretext to take Iceland under some form of protection.
This would be more difficult now that the U.S. Govt have recognised the 
independence of Iceland to the extent of agreeing to appoint a Consul 
General there.13
The Americans were also anxious in getting a strong foothold in Iceland and were
ready to meet the Icelandic wishes with regard to the status of the diplomatic envoy;
The Icelandic Government, which seems to attach an undue importance 
to matters of protocol, considers the question of diplomatic 
representation as one of national prestige. Icelandic sensibilities will be 
soothed only when our consulate has been elevated to a legation14
The new situation of Iceland taking over her foreign affairs and consequently setting 
up her own diplomatic corps did thus not cause any problems abroad. On the 
contrary, as we have seen, the realisation and acknowledgement of Iceland as an 
important new player on the international stage, was very much recognised. It even 
created a race between the interested parties to set up diplomatic representations in 
Iceland, as it was believed that such a signal would strengthen their relationship with 
the Icelanders, whose island was becoming more and more important in the strategic
12 PRO, FO 371/23654, Comment by Collier to Parliamentary Question by Lieutenant Colonel 
Macnamara, 03.04.39
13 PRO, FO 371/24783, Bowering to FO, Northern Department, 14.04.40
14 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5384, 859A.20/88, from Kuniholm, Reykjavik, to 
Secretary of State, Washington, 18.07.41
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plans of war. Thus, whereas in the case of the Faroe Islands the concern of the 
British was to keep good relations with the Danish representatives, as the Faroes still 
were a county of Denmark, the situation was different in the case of Iceland after the 
German occupation of Denmark. Nevertheless, as we will see later in this chapter, 
although the British and Americans put much emphasis on good relations with the 
Icelanders, rather than the Danes, the British and Americans nonetheless had their 
concerns for their relationship with the Danish representatives when the issue of 
Iceland leaving the Union with Denmark prematurely arose. This concern had very 
much to do with the other Danish territories in the North Atlantic, which were still 
under the Danish Kingdom.
a) Changes at home and reactions in Danish circles following the taking over of 
foreign affairs and setting up a diplomatic corps
In the Icelandic administration the major change following the declaration was the
establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later the appointment of a
regent.15 The important question was how their representatives abroad would be
received. Upon being questioned about his opinion on the establishment of an
Icelandic Charge d’Affairs in London, Reventlow replied to his Norwegian colleague
that he had no problems with Iceland taking over direct diplomatic correspondence
with other countries. On the contrary he hoped, and would appreciate, that the
Icelandic Charge d’Affairs would be welcomed and treated with friendliness.
(translated)16 There is also an example of Reventlow stepping aside for the sake of
his Icelandic counterpart immediately after the German occupation of Denmark, that
is, even before any decision had been taken by the British on the matter. This is
documented in the following extract from a letter to the British Consul-General in
Reykjavik from Collier:
I [Collier] am directed by Viscount Halifax to transmit to you herewith a 
translation of a telegram reporting the measures taken by the Icelandic 
Parliament in consequence of the German occupation of Denmark, which 
was communicated to this department on the 10th April by M. 
Benediktsson, Icelandic member in London of the Joint Standing 
Committee appointed under the Anglo-Icelandic War Trade Agreement.
15 PRO, FO 371/29307, N205/205/15, Howard Smith, Reykjavik, to Eden, 14.01.41, Report on 
Political Conditions in Iceland during 1940, p. 2
16 RA, UD-2 Leg/Ambassaden i London, fra Erik Colban, London, to Foreign Minister Koht, 20.08.40
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The Danish Minister had previously telephoned to ask that M. 
Benediktsson should be received, since the communication, which Count 
Reventlow himself might, strictly speaking, have been entitled to deliver, 
was, as would be seen from its contents, rather a delicate matter for him17as a Dane to deal with.
The Norwegians subsequently decided that it was in accordance with their interests 
that Norway should be represented in Iceland and on August 29 they appointed Mr 
Esmarch as the Norwegian Consul in Iceland.18
B. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF ICELAND: THE ROLE OF FONTENAY 
AND REVENTLOW
Despite the Icelandic declaration to take over the royal powers of her Foreign 
Affairs, Iceland remained in a personal union with Denmark till May 17 1944. The 
declaration meant that Fontenay and Reventlow no longer would be directly involved 
with Icelandic external affairs. As a main rule they left the Icelanders to their own 
affairs. However, as we will see later in the chapter, when it came to issues, which 
would further alter the constitutional status of Iceland, they stepped in. The 
interesting question is why the Danish representatives allowed the Icelanders so 
much space and freedom, when they were not ready to give the Faroese any room to 
manoeuvre?
1. The role of Danish Minister in Reykjavik, Fontenay, Danish Minister in London. 
Reventlow, and Danish Minister in Washington, Kauffmann
Despite having lost their positions as representatives of Icelandic affairs in their 
respective host countries, Kauffmann and Reventlow nevertheless did not cease to 
act in their roles as the envoys of their King. Thus, although the Danish 
representatives became almost invisible with regard to Icelandic external affairs as 
well as internal affairs, when it came to guarding Danish interests in Iceland, they all 
tried to varying degrees to influence all parties concerned when Iceland began the 
process to leave the Union with the Danish Kingdom.
17 PRO, FO 419/34, N 4 197/236/15, Collier, FO, to Consul-General Bowering, Reykjavik, 17.04.40
18 RA, UD-2 Leg(Ambassaden i London, fra Colban, London, til Koht, 03.09.40
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1.1 Sage de Fontenav
Like Hilbert Fontenay found himself in a delicate situation with regard to declaring 
himself independent from the Government in Copenhagen. Unlike the situation of 
Kauffmann and Hilbert, Fontenay found that the Icelandic politicians were reluctant 
to issue a binding assurance that his position would not be compromised in the event 
of him denouncing the Government in Copenhagen. It was feared by the Icelanders 
that such a step by Fontenay would cause trouble for Icelandic subjects abroad, the 
Icelandic Legation in Copenhagen, and Icelandic neutrality. Also, Fontenay feared 
that if he followed Kauffmann’s step it would provide the independence camp with 
arguments against his cause and position.19 These were the same concerns, which 
Hilbert was faced with when he was asked to join the Free Danes and denounce the 
Government in Copenhagen.
The Danish adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941 renewed the 
question of Fontenay declaring his independence from the Government in 
Copenhagen: should he break with Copenhagen and declare himself as member of 
the “Free Denmark” movement or not? Like Hilbert Fontenay once more came to the 
conclusion that he would not bolster Danish interests if he were to take the same 
course as Kauffmann and break off with Copenhagen. He feared that such a move 
could be exploited by the independence course of the Icelandic Government. Thus, 
as Warner reported to Halifax on the matter, Fontenay’s “position remains 
unchanged, though he has made no secret of his sympathy with the Free Danish
Movement and confines his communications with the Danish Government to a
• „ •  „ 2 0  minimum.
Fontenay found that his position in Iceland had not suffered to great extent because 
of the situation in Denmark, and he put it down to the fact that the notion in Iceland 
was that “Denmark still latently [was] a free and independent state.”21 Fontenay had 
no contact with Copenhagen but for a couple of telegrams through the Legation in 
Stockholm. Upon Fontentay’s wish to give the King of Denmark or the Prime
19 SA, 9.B.27/1983/450, Pakke II, Islands politiske forhold til Danmark efter 9.4.40, from Fontenay, 
Reykjavik, to Kauffmann, Washington, 06.05.42
20 PRO, FO 115/3484, N  5402/33/15, Warner, FO, to Halifax, Washington, 31.10.42
21 FL, J. Nr. 4079, Faer0 Amt, Diverse vedr. Island, br.bk .l40A .l, letter from Fontenay to Hilbert,
15.08.40
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Minister in Copenhagen some information about the situation in Iceland, the British 
were supportive,22 as was the case with the Danish representatives in the Faroes.
Fontenay’s role in everyday matters was thus, as compared to that of Hilbert in the 
Faroes, minimal. He kept a low profde, except when the plans for Iceland to break 
away from the Union with Denmark started to materialise. His presence in Iceland 
did not seem to cause the representatives of the United States or Britain any reason 
for concern either. Thus, when Leland Morris, who by 1943 had assumed the post as 
American Consul in Reykjavik, was approached by Minister for Foreign Affairs with 
regard to the status of Fontenay following the German proclamation of a state of 
military emergency in August 1943 following the August revolt in Denmark, he was 
taken by surprise;
[the] Minister for Foreign Affairs...stated that the Danish Minister, Fr.
Le Sage de Fontenay, had originally been accredited by the Danish Prime 
Minister to the Icelandic Prime Minister and he inquired how I and the 
other chiefs of mission felt about his being the Dean of the Diplomatic 
Corps since Mr. Thor considered it doubtful whether Mr. de Fontenay 
has in fact diplomatic status. I expressed astonishment that the question 
should be raised after all the years that Mr. de Fontenay has been treated 
as a diplomatic Minister and stated that any action to curtail his 
prerogatives now or to change his long-accepted status would appear 
most ungracious and discourteous, especially in view of the events taking 
place in Denmark. I told him that I had never heard any of my colleagues 
object to Mr. de Fontenay’s being Dean of the Diplomatic Corps and I 
personally considered him a persona grata for that office...Mr. de 
Fontenay could not account for this action of the Icelandic Government.23
The events in Denmark therefore gave the British and Americans little or no 
apprehension with regard to the Danish representative in Iceland.
The difference between Fontenay’s situation and that of Hilbert was only that with 
Iceland being independent and having taken over her foreign affairs, Fontenay’s role 
in Iceland had diminished, while Hilbert’s remained central. Fontenay also 
acknowledged that by laying low, he would serve Danish interests better than taking 
a similar line as to that of Hilbert.
22 PRO, FO 371/32750, comment by Clarke to draft by Howard Smith, Reykjavik, addressed to 
Warner, FO, 30.06.42
23NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5366, 859.00/1059, from Leland Morris, US Legation in 
Reykjavik, to Secretary of State, 09.09.43
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1.2 Reventlow’s involvement in Icelandic foreign affairs
When Denmark was occupied by the Germans, the consequences this would have on 
the position of the Danish Minister in London with regard to Icelandic matters were 
discussed. Now that Iceland was entrusted with the conduct of the royal power, the 
British were anxious to learn the views of the Icelandic Government on the matter of 
an Icelandic Minister in London. This was especially acute in the case of Reventlow, 
who initially had decided to return to Denmark, in which case he would become 
persona non grata and the His Majesty’s Government would cease to recognise him 
both as the Minister of Denmark and of Iceland.24
As already mentioned in chapter III the initial reaction in Britain towards the Danish
representation in London was that it could no longer continue to enjoy diplomatic
facilities. It was considered by the Foreign Office that
To what extent any or all of them [Danish Consular Officers] can 
henceforward be allowed to function may also depend on the question 
whether the Icelandic Government are willing to make use of them. Even 
if that Government are no so willing, the Consular Officers are in 
consequence deprived of consular status, it will, in the opinion of the
H.O., (semi-officially stressed), be possible to make use of them in a 
number of ways of value to the Allied cause.25
Although Reventlow at first was resolute to return to Denmark, he nevertheless 
changed his mind a few days later after he learned that King Christian X wanted him 
to stay in London. The British, who thus originally thought that they would not have
0 f \to take a stance on the position of Reventlow in London , since he was determined
to return back to Denmark, now had to contemplate what their attitude toward him
should be. Collier stated that Reventlow
wants to stay as Minister and not as a private person; and, provided that 
we control his correspondence, I see no political reason why we should 
not permit this, though it is not in accordance with the French attitude, 
which seems to me unnecessarily severe. The fact that Denmark has 
accepted enemy protection does not, I presume, automatically deprive 
either Count Reventlow or Mr. Howard Smith of their status as
24 PRO, FO 371/24784, N 4565/4220/15, Comment by Coote 13.04.40
25 PRO, FO 371/24784, comment by R. Dunbar to letter sent by Sir R. Campbell, Paris, to FO, 
Northern Department, 15.04.40
26 PRO, FO 371/24784, comment by R. Dunbar to letter sent by Sir R. Campbell, Paris, to FO, 
Northern Department, 15.04.40
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accredited Ministers, though it gives us the right to prevent Count 
Reventlow from exercising any functions to which we choose to object.27
Reventlow was thus allowed to stay in London and act semi-officially in matters 
relating to Danish subjects and interests in Britain,28 and also with regard to 
problems that might arise with regard to the British occupation of the Faroe Islands. 
It was hence conveyed by Lord Halifax that Revenltow’s “diplomatic immunities 
will, in practice, be continued as an act of grace in so far as this may be practicable, 
and that there will be no objection to his corresponding with King Christian through 
the United States representatives here and at Copenhagen on purely domestic matters 
affecting the Royal Family.”29
Although stepping aside to let Icelandic matters be taken over by Iceland’s appointed 
Consul, Reventlow would, as will be evident in a later section, meddle with one 
particular aspect of Anglo-Icelandic affairs: the Icelandic decision to leave the Union 
with the Danish Kingdom.
1.3 Icelandic diplomatic relations with the United States: change of role for 
Kauffmann
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Icelanders put great importance in the status 
of the consular representations in their island; the higher status the more prestigious. 
As for their own diplomatic service, the Icelanders were more anxious to appoint 
their first minister to the United States than to Britain, where they only had a Charge 
d’Affairs.
for Iceland to appoint her first minister [Thor Thors] to the United States 
rather than to England would not be out of keeping with the spirit of the 
relationship recently established between our two countries. I said “first” 
because not only will the minister now appointed to Washington be 
Iceland’s first at that post, but her first anywhere, with the exception of 
Copenhagen.30
27 PRO, FO 371/24784, N4680/4220/15, Collier, FO, to the Under Secretary of State, Home Office,
25.04.40
28 PRO, FO 371/24784, N 4680/4220/15, report o f meeting in Sir Orme Sargent’s room 18.04.40
29 PRO, FO 371/24784, N4680/4220/15, Collier, FO, to the Under Secretary of State, Home Office,
25.04.40
30 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 1857, 701.59A 11/10, Lincoln MacVeagh, Reykjavik, to 
Secretary o f State, 10.10.41
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This was, as mentioned earlier, because the Icelanders were anxious to build a 
stronger relationship with the United States, where they saw greater future economic 
and trade possibilities than in Britain. The sentiment was also recognised by the 
Secretary of State when he met Thor Thors:
I [Cordell Hull] concluded by saying that if and when the crisis is over 
and Hitler is defeated...it will give this Government the greatest 
satisfaction to cooperate to the fullest practical extent with the 
Government and the people of Iceland with a view to aiding them in 
formulating and establishing policies and plans and bringing about 
conditions that will create for the Icelandic people greater progress and 
comfort than they have experienced at any time in the past.31
In addition to the appointment of Thor Thors, Vilhjalmur Thor was appointed 
Icelandic Government Trade Commissioner in New York and temporary Consul 
General for Iceland in New York before being appointed Consul General of Iceland 
in New York and in charge of the Legation in Washington.
Handing over the consular and diplomatic matters to the Icelanders seemed not to be 
a problem to Kauffmann.32 Rather it was, as we will see later in this chapter and 
furthermore in Chapter Y, very much in concert with Kauffmann’s general pragmatic 
attitude towards the situation, which the German occupation, and the subsequent 
collaboration of the Danish Government, had created.
The Department had previously been informed by the Danish Minister in 
Washington of the adoption by the Icelandic Parliament of a resolution 
by which the executive power vested in the King of Iceland will, for the 
time being, be entrusted to the Icelandic Cabinet, and of a second 
resolution by which the Icelandic Government takes over of the time 
being the entire charge of Icelandic foreign relations. The Danish 
Minister now states that in view of the foregoing he has turned over to 
the Icelandic Government Trade Commissioner in New York all 
Icelandic diplomatic and consular business hitherto transacted by the 
Danish Legation and Danish consular officers in the United States.33
31 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 1857, 701.59A 11/12, Memorandum o f conversation 
between Secretary o f State Hull and the New Icelandic Minister, Mr. Thor Thors, 14.11.41
32 FRUS, Foreign Relations, Diplomatic Papers 1940, Volume II, General and Europe, United States 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 1957, p. 678, Kauffmann to the Secretary o f State, 
Washington, 18.04.40
33 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 1857, 701.59A11/1, telegram from Cordell Hull to 
American Legation in Copenhagen, 22.04.40
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This shows the pragmatic stance by Kauffmann to the situation. However, the 
Americans only pointed out that it was “agreeable in the existing circumstances”34
The steps taken by the Icelandic Government taking charge of their foreign affairs 
and establishing representations abroad were also found justifiable by King Christian 
X and the Danish Foreign Minister Munch.35
1.4 American Consul to Iceland, Mr. Bertel E. Kuniholm
Following the Icelandic wish for an American consul in Reykjavik, the State 
Department appointed Mr. Bertel E. Kuniholm to the post. To the Icelanders, as 
mentioned earlier, the appointment of Kuniholm marked an important development 
for Iceland in their relations with the United States. For the United States, however, it 
was not until the talks of an American take-over of the occupation of Iceland that the 
diplomatic relations with Iceland really became important. The importance was 
emphasised by the fact that Roosevelt appointed his trusted friend, MacVeagh, as 
Kuniholm’s successor.
The decision by the Americans to establish a consular representation in Iceland was 
also perceived by the British Press as a positive sign despite their initial concerns of 
the U.S. getting a better foothold in Iceland than the British. The Times noted that 
“the State Department maintains silence as to the implications of this statement 
[establishment of a Consular representative in Reykjavik in the near future], but its 
promptitude in issuing it invites the inference that it may be the forerunner of more 
important developments.”37 Thus, although the British were anxious to avoid being 
overtaken by the U.S. in Iceland they nevertheless appreciated that this was a 
positive sign of further involvement by the Americans towards the East.
34 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 1857, 701.59A 11/1, from Cordell Hull to American 
Legation in Copenhagen, 22.04.40
35 Hardarson, “The ‘Republic o f Iceland’ 1940-44”, 1974, p.33
36 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 1857, 701.59A 11/1, from Cordell Hull, Secretary of 
State, to Herman Jonasson, Prime Minister o f Iceland, 16.04.40
37 The Times, “Iceland’s Request to U.S. Direct Relations Opened. 17.04.40
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2. The British occupation of Iceland
As we learned in Chapter I Britain had offered Iceland protection after the outbreak 
of the war in September 1939. These offers were presented at the war-trade 
negotiations between the two countries, which took place in London from October 
1939 to January 1940. Iceland, however, turned down the offers, because they 
required that she should stop all trade with Germany. The Icelanders, as mentioned 
earlier, were reluctant to leave their policy of perpetual neutrality because they were 
afraid that submitting to such a British offer would cause German repercussions in 
the form of attacks on the island and their vessels. It was also feared by the Danish 
Minister in London that if Iceland accepted the offer the Germans might take action 
against Denmark if the conditions of the offer became known to them.38
On the day of the German invasion of Denmark the British renewed the offer of 
protection to the Icelanders.39 However, the Icelanders were still resolute to stick to 
their neutrality and subsequently turned down the offer. The German occupation of 
Denmark and their progress up the west coast of Norway nevertheless made the 
security situation of unprotected Iceland more acute to the British. Especially the 
prospect of German airbases along the Norwegian coast, which would put the North 
Atlantic in range of immediate danger of German attacks by air, worried the British. 
The British thus stood at a crossroad. They could not afford Iceland to fall into the 
hands of the enemy, but were they ready to violate Icelandic neutrality despite the 
clear signal from the Icelanders that such a move would not be welcomed? 
Nonetheless, as we saw in the previous chapter, the attitude of the British towards 
neutrals had altered over the first months of 1940, not least after the Altmark 
incident. Subsequently, and despite that they on April 9th had explained to M. 
Benediktsson “that His Majesty's Government had no intention to occupy Iceland or 
“protect” her in the German manner, and that it was hoped that it might never be 
necessary for them to come to her assistance”40, they occupied Iceland on May 10th.
38 PRO, FO 371/24778, N902/133/15, memorandum by Collier, 19.01.40
39 PRO, FO 371/24778, N 4099/133/15, telegram from FO to Bowering, Reykjavik, 09.04.40
40 PRO, FO 419/34, N4197/236/15, Collier, FO, to Consul-General Bowering, Reykjavik, 17.04.40
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The British Government had contemplated repeating their request for Iceland’s co­
operation,41 but refrained from doing so to avoid yet another refusal. A German 
landing in Iceland would, however, have directly endangered British security, so on 6 
May the British Government decided to occupy the island forthwith, presenting the 
Icelandic government with a fait accompli. This would secure Iceland as a flying- 
boat base and permit refuelling of the Northern patrol fleet.42
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the War Office was reluctant to send any
resources of significance to the North Atlantic islands, because of the importance
placed upon the European theatres instead. Once the initial stages of the occupation
were over some of the troops were called back to fight in the European theatres. The
state of the replacements indicated the extent to which the British thought that
Iceland was in real danger of a German attack. As U.S. Consul Kuniholm remarked:
The only recent event of significance has been the arrival of a squadron 
of 18 fighter planes, together with ground crews and equipment. The 
planes are old and obsolete. I have been informed that the British War 
Office has refused to send Spitfires or Hurricanes, since none can be 
spared for use outside of Great Britain. This will now constitute the only 
air combat group on the island, since the Walrus seaplanes already here 
are old and slow reconnaissance planes used only for patrolling Icelandic 
coastal waters...Many of the best staff officers who came here with the 
original expeditionary force have now been returned to duty in the British 
Isles. The replacements for these departing officers seem in general to be 
much less experienced, and decidedly of a much inferior type. The new 
officers are mostly from the reserve, whereas those who have gone were 
seasoned veterans, not only from the last war, but from the present one.43
These observations by Kuniholm on the British occupation were mirrored by the 
Norwegians in Iceland. During the war a Norwegian battalion was present in the 
island as part of the allied occupation. It was not formally set up by the Norwegian 
Government in exile, but established as a consequence of the course of the war. They 
had arrived from Petsamo, from where they had fled occupied Norway. Wanting to 
take part on the allied side they remained in Iceland in order to win the war and 
preserve Norwegian interests in Iceland and the surrounding waters. According to the 
Norwegians “the British marine commando on the island was lacking both in
41 PRO, FO 371/24558, N5209/133/15, Admiralty to FO, 29.04.40
42 PRO, War Cabinet Conclusions, 06.05.40, 111 (40)
43 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/4, from Kuniholm, Reykjavik, to 
Secretary o f State, Washington, 11.08.40
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personnel, equipment and transport. As a result it was the Norwegian contingent who 
was the initiative taking and dominating marine factor in the beginning of the 
occupation.” (translated)44
a) Reactions to the British occupation of Iceland
The reaction in the British press to the occupation of Iceland was welcoming, 
especially after the British ‘missed the bus’ in Norway -  the Icelandic case showed 
that the British Government had become more alert the British press noted. And, 
although it was acknowledged that the occupation was a breach of Icelandic 
neutrality, the British should not have any moral qualms, because it was a peaceful 
occupation, it was argued.
The Times wrote
It is admittedly a breach of Icelandic neutrality, but in the circumstances 
no one is likely to boggle at this, least of all the Icelanders themselves. In 
comparison with the great events now shaking the world the landing is a 
comparatively trivial affair. It is none the less welcome as an indicator 
that the Government do not always feel it necessary to wait for Hitler to 
seize a vantage point before taking steps to prevent him.45
In the House of Commons in June 1941 the occupation was questioned by Mr. 
Gallagher. “Is it not the case that the Forces of His Majesty’s Government have taken 
control of Iceland in opposition to the wishes of the Icelandic Parliament?” To which 
Mr Eden answered: “No, Sir; it is not the case. What is the case is that a British 
garrison is temporarily stationed in Iceland, in order to prevent the occupation of that 
country by the common enemy.”46
The conduct of the actual occupation by the British did not only come under 
criticism because of its breach of neutrality or the lack of an Icelandic consent. The 
American consul did not think much of the way the British had conducted their 
arrival, which was everything but a surprise.
44 RA, 312/2B08611-54, Div. papirer angaaende Islandsavdelingen. Sjpforsvarets Mineinspeksjon. 
J.nr. 1025, 1948, from Kom. Kapt. E Ullring. Ref. Jnr. 999/48, to Den Krigshistoriske Avdeling, Ad. 
Islandsavdelingen.
45 The Times, 11.05.40
46 SA, 9.B.27.bilag.pkIII/1983/450, report by Reventlow 26.06.44.
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Although the setting, as concerns surprise, was perfect, the British threw 
this advantage away, and, before landing-parties had gotten under way, 
flew their plane over the city to impress the inhabitants, providing 
thereby a theatrical setting totally irrelevant to the problem at hand. The 
time lapse between the appearance of the planes over the city, and the 
arrival of the landing-parties within the mole of the inner harbor, was 
sufficient for the German Consul General, Dr. Werner Gerlach, to bum 
his confidential documents and codes. When the first British detachment 
rushed up to his office he was standing in front of his fireplace busily 
disposing of incriminating papers...It was early apparent that the British 
authorities had but a rudimentary and half-baked conception of the 
problem facing them here, both with respect to the potentialities of the 
country as a base of operations, as well as the simple matter of 
geography. Brigadier Lamie, who preceded me here by a short period of 
time, told me in the early stages, that an attempt to man Iceland with one 
brigade was absurd. The country was larger than he had been led to 
believe...it was perhaps, therefore, fortunate that the Germans did not 
attack Iceland in May. 7
A month later Kuniholm still sent reports back home to the State Department, which 
criticised the British conduct:
The British are beginning to be less careful in handling the local 
population than heretofore. Now orders are given and action taken before 
notification is sent to the Icelandic Government. Officials of the 
Government are becoming more and more resentful of the British attitude 
toward them, and now express themselves in rather violent language. The 
reaction is inevitable in a country which has been reared in a long 
democratic tradition.48
Thus, although the Americans were pleased that the island had not fallen into the 
hands of the Germans, they did not approve of the way the British had conducted the 
occupation. The fact that the British did not notify the Americans of the occupation 
until on the day of the invasion49, did not improve the sentiments of the Americans. 
As a note from Adolf Berle, assistant Secretary, stated: “The President was not happy 
about the occupation of Iceland without prior consultation with the United States, 
though obviously there is no intent or desire to do anything at this time.”50 However, 
as we will see later in this chapter, there was a plan behind the swift and secret action
47 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.01/57, from Kuniholm, Reykjavik, to the 
Secretary o f State, Washington, 15.07.40
48 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/5, from Kuniholm, American Consulate, 
Reykjavik, to Secretary of State, Washington, 22.08.40
49 FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1940, Volume II, p. 679, from The British Ambassador Lothian to the 
Secretary o f State 10.05.40
50 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 1857, 7 1 1.59A/9, from Berle to Welles, 17.01.41
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taken by the British, and they were later trying to convince the Americans to conduct 
the take-over of the island in the same manner, as they had occupied the island.
2.1 Howard Smith, British Minister in Reykjavik
Upon the occupation of Iceland the British appointed Howard-Smith, who had just 
left his post as British Minister in Copenhagen following the German invasion, as 
British Minister in Reykjavik replacing Consul General Bowering. The British thus 
chose to send a well-established and experienced Minister to be in charge of their 
affairs in Iceland, unlike their choice of representation on the Faroe Islands. As for 
Howard Smith’s character, Whitehead writes: “Howard Smith was approaching his 
goal with his usual tact and insight.”51 The difference between the British 
representative in Iceland and the Faroes was remarkable. Whereas Consul Mason 
was inexperienced and thus easily influenced by the Danish authorities in the Faroes, 
there were hardly any references made by Howard-Smith with regard to the Danish 
Minister in Iceland. However, it can be discussed whether the reason was British 
indifference to the Danish Minister or if it was simply down to Fontenay keeping 
quiet. As we saw earlier in this chapter Fontenay did not feel too secure in his 
position as the Danish representative in Iceland. His stay in the island as Danish 
Minister was very much dependent upon the goodwill of the Icelandic Government. 
Also, the fact that the British in conjuncture with the Danish representatives had 
agreed to and recognised the declaration of Iceland that she took over the charge of 
foreign affairs inevitably resulted in a minimised role for Fontenay. Subsequently it 
might be noted that in the first many reports on the occupation sent back to the 
Foreign Office, Howard Smith made no mention of meeting with or seeing 
Fontenay.52
2.2 Anglo-Icelandic relations during the occupation
Taking into account that the British had arrived uninvited, despite repeatedly being
notified that they were not welcomed, it was no surprise that the Icelanders showed
reservations towards their presence. Kuniholm reported that:
The gradual tightening of the British control of the island has brought 
about a corresponding stiffening of the attitude of the Icelanders. Certain
51 Whitehead, Iceland in the Second World War, 1978, p. 170
52 PRO, FO 419/34, N5693/133/15, Howard Smith, Reykjavik, to Halifax, FO, 12.05.40
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leading officials of the Government have communicated...during the past 
few days their growing antipathy against the British. Others have voiced 
their doubts as to Britain’s might, and some have even gone so far as to 
imply that victory for Germany might not be a bad thing at all, 
particularly for Iceland.53
Relations between the British and the local population were thus not as good as they 
were in the Faroes. It was reported by a Miss Hansen, connected with the Bank of 
Iceland, that
It is a fact, not very widely known, outside of military and naval circles 
that, since the occupation of Iceland by Britain there has existed a great 
deal of tension between the British forces and the Icelandic 
population...54
At the arrival of the American troops in Iceland, however, a change in the attitude of 
the Icelandic politicians towards the British troops was noticed. “Sentiment within 
the Atlhing is now much more kindly disposed toward the British than a year ago. 
The admission of the Prime Minister that the former theory that neutrality and the 
refusal of protection from any country is, in his opinion outmoded, is typical of the 
opinion of the majority of the members,”55 Kuniholm reported to the Secretary of 
State.
Upon the American take-over and the subsequent British departure (which, however, 
did not take place as immediately as planned) Icelandic newspaper Visir wrote: “The 
whole time that the British garrison has been here, it may be said that their whole 
behaviour has been so gentlemanly that there have been very few difficulties in the 
relations with it. It is amazing what a good disciplined behaviour has reigned in its 
ranks, and one may say that the nation owes them thanks for their behaviour in 
everything.”56 Hence, although there were criticisms in Iceland towards the conduct 
of the British occupiers, once they were faced with the arrival of another
53 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/4, from Kuniholm, Reykjavik, to 
Secretary o f State, Washington, 11.08.40
54 NARA, RG 226, OSS, Entry 106, Box 83, folder 508, Memorandum on Iceland (no date and no 
author)
55 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5384, 859A.20/83, from Kuniholm, American 
Consulate, Reykjavik, to Secretary of State, Washington, 17.07.41
56 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5384, 859A.20/83, from Kuniholm, Reykjavik, to 
Secretary o f State, Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 135 dated July 17, 1941, Visir 09.07.42, Leader: 
Increased Danger o f Accidents
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occupational power, the Americans, whom they were not acquainted with, they 
showed appreciation for the British troops.
C. AMERICAN TAKE-OVER OF THE OCCUPATION OF ICELAND 
This third part looks at the American take-over of the occupation of Iceland from the 
British. The actual deal of the take-over was highly orchestrated with all parties 
drawing upon different aspects of the deal, which would work in their favour. What, 
then, were the incentives of the Icelanders, British and the Americans? And to what 
extent did the Danish play a role in the outcome?
While the British occupation and subsequent increased export to the British Isles had 
solved the Icelandic export crisis, the British nevertheless were not able to meet the 
needs of the Icelanders import-wise. The Icelanders, therefore, continued to look 
westward to the United States for improved trade. Also, the fact that the British were 
a belligerent power, as oppose to neutral United States, inevitably put the island in 
danger of repercussion from the Axis powers, to which the British defence, as was in 
the case of the Faroe Islands, was close to inadequate. It was therefore very much in 
the interest of the Icelanders, as well as the British, that the occupation was taken 
over by the United States.
The only problem the Icelanders had with accepting the American terms of the take­
over was the aspect of British troops remaining in the island after the arrival of the 
Americans. By the continued presence of the British in Iceland, one of the main 
arguments and justifications for inviting the Americans to take-over fell wayside, 
namely that Iceland no longer would be under the protection of a belligerent, but a 
non-belligerent.
The arrival of the Americans came to have a great impact on the Icelandic 
independence course. Not only did the Americans promised to recognise Icelandic 
sovereignty and support their independence morally, but also economically through 
trade agreements, once the war was over. Thus, the deal with the Americans, 
although made without the knowledge of the Althing, was acceptable to all parties, 
except the Communists. They opposed it due to the fact that nothing was mentioned 
of providing aid to Russia, who was now at war with Germany. However, their
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criticisms were checked by their acknowledgment that through supporting the Allied, 
they indirectly helped the Russian cause.57
1. Icelandic-American relations prior to American occupation of Iceland 
On the American part, the political environment in the United States had, by the time 
of the talks of a take-over of the protection of Iceland, changed. To Roosevelt and 
others, who wanted the United States to take a more active part on the allied side, the 
relief of British troops in Iceland presented an ideal opportunity for the Americans to 
help the British without actively joining the war on the allied side.
Although Vilhjalmur Thor and Thor Thors, as was seen in Chapter I, had
campaigned Iceland’s cause in the United States it was not until after the German
occupation of Denmark that the focus really was set on Iceland. Looking back in
August 1944 a State Department memorandum read:
Prior to 1939, limited attention was paid to Iceland by the United States 
in view of the negligible commercial exchange between the two 
countries, the European orientation of Icelandic economy and culture 
and, finally, the fact that transatlantic air transportation was not 
sufficiently advanced to warrant negotiation of landing rights in Iceland.
In the spring of that year, however, the ominous European situation made 
it necessary to reappraise our attitude to the defence of the Western
Hemisphere. Consideration was also given to the opening of an American
Consulate at Reykjavik. The neutrality of Denmark permitted the United 
States temporarily to hold these proposals in abeyance. However, the 
German seizure of that country in April 1940 followed by the occupation 
of Iceland by British forces in may of the same year required this 
Government to adopt a more active policy toward Iceland.58
This gives a clear indication that despite Iceland being independent and taking 
charge of her Foreign Affairs, the separation from the Government in Copenhagen 
really had an important impact on the status of Iceland, also even though the U.S. at
the time was not at war with the Germans and still had an open Legation in
Copenhagen.
The importance of Iceland in the course of the war was not lost to the Americans:
57 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5384, 859A.20/83,, from US Consulate in Iceland to 
Secretary o f State
58 FDR, President’s Secretary’s File, Diplomatic Correspondence, Iceland, Box 39, memorandum by 
Hull, Department o f State, for the President, 23.08.44
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The role of Iceland in the North Atlantic...has increased enormously of 
late, and seems destined to develop into an answer to the submarine 
menace, if not the ultimate one. There seems to be no doubt that...it 
constitutes the only route that can afford any security during the 
foreseeable future. The trade route, with proper protection from patrol 
bombers based on Newfoundland, Greenland and Iceland, can be covered 
throughout its entire course during the whole of the year.59
The idea of American presence and defence of Iceland was thus not unfamiliar 
to the Americans.
2. The take-over process
As seen in Chapter I, the Icelandic envoys in the United States had made a thorough 
preparatory work to change the American perception of the Western Hemisphere to 
include Iceland.
As also shown previously the Icelanders realised that the British would not be able to 
provide them with enough resources. Neither were the British able to provide enough 
protection to the Icelandic fishing vessels freighting fish to the British market. In a 
communication with the American Consul in Iceland, Prime Minister Jonasson had 
voiced his concern “that Great Britain was unable to furnish the Icelandic nation with 
food in an quantities.”60
For the Icelanders the prospect of an American take-over of the protection was thus 
also linked to the future prospect of increased trade and economic prosperity as a 
result of strengthened relationship with the United States. Hence, an American take­
over would provide Iceland with a stronger foundation in her process of leaving the 
Union with Denmark and establishing the republic of Iceland.
2.1 Icelandic wish for United States to take over the occupation
On July 12th 1940 the Icelandic Consul General in the United States asked Berle
“whether the United States would not include Iceland in the Western Hemisphere
59 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/15, from Kuniholm, Reykjavik, to 
Secretary o f State, Washington, 21.04.41
60 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5387, 859A.8595/3, Enclosure to No. 1 to despatch No. 
104 dated April 22, 1941 from Bertil Kuniholm to Secretary o f State, Washington, memorandum of 
conversation between Mr. Herman Jonasson, Prime Minister, and Kuniholm, American Consul at 
Reykjavik, 08.04.41
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and put it under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine.”61 Berle’s answer was that
“the political Western Hemisphere did not turn altogether on the theoretical meridian
of division; historically the Monroe Doctrine had been fairly close to the American
continent,” and that Berle therefore “could not give assurance, though [he] should be
glad to study it.”62 The matter was raised again on September 5th 1940 by Vilhjalmur
Thor and Thor Thors in a meeting with Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and Hugh S.
Cumming, from the Division of European Affairs. However, again the issue was
wavered off by the Americans on the account that “with the many complicated
phases of problems arising out of the European situation and the situation in the Far
East” the Administration was not able to come with a definite answer. A month
previously Vilhjalmur Thor along with the newly appointed Consul General, Thor
Thors, visited the Secretary of State and expressed that:
What most Icelanders would like best is to get under the protection of the 
Monroe Doctrine. At least one article has been published to this effect, 
but it is the most significant possible, for it was written by Jonas Jonason, 
the most powerful man in the strongest of the political parties, the 
Cooperative Party, of which the Prime Minister is a member.6
It was thus not surprising that the Americans got the notion that an American take­
over of the occupation of Iceland was a common wish of all Icelanders. This notion 
was given further substance when Thor Thors, at a meeting with the Secretary of 
State Hull and Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Division of European Affairs, said that:
speaking informally and unofficially, but with the knowledge and 
consent of his Government, he wished to repeat the inquiry which he had 
previously made of Assistant Secretary Berle that the United take Iceland 
under its protection through some sort of a declaration which would 
recognize that Iceland was in the Western Hemisphere, and which would 
extend the Monroe Doctrine so as to include that island. Mr. Thor also 
suggested, on his own initiative, that in view of the recent acquisition by 
the United States of a naval base in Newfoundland the United States 
might wish to strengthen its sea defences in northern waters through 
acquiring naval and air bases in Iceland. [He also suggested that] some 
arrangement be worked out by which Iceland might obtain certain
61 FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1940, Volume II, p. 681, Memorandum of Conversation, by the 
Assistand Secretary o f State (Berle), Washington, 12.07.50
62 FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1940, Volume II, p. 681, Memorandum of Conversation, by the 
Assistand Secretary o f State (Berle), Washington, 12.07.50
63 FRUS, Foreign Relations, 1940, Volume II, pp. 682-3, Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh 
S. Cumming, Jr., o f the Division o f European Affairs, Washington, 05.09.40
64 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.01/56, Photostatic copies o f a letter and 
memorandum entitled “British Occupation o f Iceland” from Vilhjalmur Stefanson, 11.06.40
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economic and trade advantages in the United States in exchange for such 
naval and air bases in Iceland.65
Although Thors was rather evasive about the extent to which he had his 
Government’s consent for this approach to the State Department on the issue of an 
American take-over of the protection of Iceland, it cannot be denied that the 
sentiment of the majority of the Icelandic Parliament, Althing, would back such a 
deal. However, the problem became how to go about the issue without causing too 
much uproar, either in Iceland, the United States or elsewhere.
Following these signals from the Icelandic representatives in the U.S. it was 
therefore understandable that the Americans expected a positive receipt of their offer. 
However, from the British Embassy in Washington the Americans were given a 
different impression of the Icelandic mood. “The British Minister in Iceland believed 
that it was doubtful whether Iceland would ask the United States Government to 
assist in its defence,”66 Lord Halifax had explained and as we will see in the next 
section, this was not far from the truth.
2.2 The British role in the take-over
As argued earlier the British were very anxious to have the Americans closer to the 
theater of war. At the Foreign Office “Eden and Hambro had long recognised that 
Britain had every reason to foster U.S. interest in Iceland.” Thus, they were 
dismayed when they learned about the Icelandic reluctance to meet the American 
terms and offer:
The President of Iceland had in the same conversation with the British 
Minister in Iceland also expressed his opposition to such a move, 
although he acknowledged that there were “many individuals in the 
Icelandic Government [who] favoured the step proposed.68
65 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.014/9, memorandum of conversation 
between the Secretary o f State, Mr. Cordell Hull, Mr. Vilhjalmur Thor, Retiring Consul General o f 
Iceland, Mr. Thor Thors, N ew ly Appointed Icelandic Consul General, Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., 
Division of European Affairs, 05.09.40
66 66 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/20 1/12, memorandum of  
conversation between British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, and Under Secretary, Mr. W elles, 22.06.41
67 Whitehead, Iceland in the Second World War. 1978, p. 159
68 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/20 2/12, memorandum o f conversation 
between British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, and Under Secretary, Mr. W elles, 25.06.41
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The reluctance of the Icelandic Government to provide the Americans with an 
invitation to take over the occupation of Iceland took the Americans by surprise. As 
pointed out earlier the Americans subsequently expressed their reluctance to go 
further with the plan. The British, who by now were adamant to have the matter 
settled, instructed their Minister in Reykjavik to do his utmost to influence the 
Icelandic stance. A cable sent by Halifax to the British Minister in Reykjavik the 
following day was “couched in very stiff terms and...amounted literally to an 
instruction to the British Minister to “see to it” that the Icelandic Prime Minister sent 
a request to the President of the United States for assistance in defending the 
independence of Iceland.”69
The reply from Howard Smith, however, was not positive
Despite my every argument and insistence Iceland Government refuse to 
use word “invite”. Their position is that during last session of Parliament 
there was large majority in all parties against asking United States for 
protection. They cannot therefore assume responsibility for “inviting” 
without consulting Parliament, but they are anxious that whole plan 
should not come to nought.70
Another hurdle in the plan was the need for justification to the American public that 
an American take-over of the occupation of Iceland was compatible with their 
interests. President Roosevelt was eager to help the British and Allied cause. 
However, as pointed out in Chapter II, without the backing of public opinion and 
with the danger of dividing the Congress, he was reluctant to take any action that 
could harm his cause, especially with the upcoming elections in mind. Iceland, 
therefore, presented the president with an opportunity to move the sphere of interest 
of the United States closer to Europe. By taking over the protection of Iceland, the 
United States presence in the North Atlantic waters would inevitably increase, both 
in presence and activity. This at a time, when the Battle of the Atlantic was gathering 
pace and the British Navy looked to loose out to Germany’s Wolf Packs, and 
therefore was in desperate need of support for their convoys. Consent from the 
isolationists for such a move, however, was unattainable without the inclusion of 
Iceland in the Monroe Doctrine. By doing so, the protection of Iceland would
69 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/20 3/12, memorandum o f conversation 
between British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, and Under Secretary, Mr. W elles, 26.06.41
70 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/20 5/12, Telegram from British Minister 
at Reykjavik to the FO, 27.06.41
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become part of the defence of the Western Hemisphere, and hence not a move of 
aggression but self-defence.
Roosevelt, however, had the backing of the military. In a memorandum amongst 
Sumner Welles’ papers it is stated that “the President is advised by the Army and by 
the Navy that it is essential to prevent, through prior occupation by the United States, 
the probably German attempt at the occupation of Iceland.”71 However, Roosevelt 
needed the backing of the public opinion and the Congress before any measures 
could be taken. In order to obtain that, Iceland would have to be included in the 
Western Hemisphere so that she was covered by the Monroe Doctrine.
The subsequent ABC-1 plans, which were agreed upon by the Americans and 
British, entailed that the United States eventually would take over the protection of 
Iceland.
2.3 Inclusion of Iceland in the Western Hemisphere
In Chapter II, section 4.1, it was demonstrated how Vilhjalmur Thor and Thor Thors 
back at the New York World Fair had started a campaign to alter the American 
perception of the Western Hemisphere to include Iceland.
At a meeting in the State Department five months after the German occupation of 
Denmark and four months after the British occupation of Iceland, Vilhjalmur Thor 
and Thor Thors approached the matter again. The Secretary of State, Hull, however, 
was reluctant to give a definite answer.72 The matter, however, did not lay dormant. 
The interest in widening the scope of the Western Hemisphere was noticeable, 
especially amongst those, who wished for a more active U.S. role in the war.
A letter from Lt. Col. Chief, Special Assignment Branch, Bureau of Public Relations 
helped to form the argument to include Iceland in the Western Hemisphere:
71 FDR, Sumner W elles Papers, Box 164, Folder 15, Europe Files 1933-1943, Iceland 1940-1941, No 
author, but written by pencil on upper right corner it says “take to Sen. George 7-2-41”.
72 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.014/9, memorandum of conversation 
between the Secretary o f State, Mr. Cordell Hull, Mr. Vilhjalmur Thor, Retiring Consul General o f  
Iceland, Mr. Thor Thors, Newly Appointed Icelandic Consul General, Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., 
Division o f European Affairs, 05.09.40
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Writing on Iceland in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Dr. Pius Wittman of 
Biidingen, Germany, said: “The island called Iceland, which, though 
really a part of America, is considered, because of its population and 
history, as forming a part of Europe...” This article was apparently 
written about 1910 as it bears a copyright of that year.. ,”73
The result was that the Western Atlantic Area was redefined to include Iceland such
that the area lay west of the following line:
Meridian of 10 west longitude south to the 65th north parallel, thence by 
rhumb line to the junction of 53 north latitude and 26 west longitude, 
thence south along the 26th meridian west.74
The Icelanders thus succeeded in influencing the Americans although they were very 
much helped by military interests in the United States.
a) British interest in the inclusion of Iceland in the American conception of the 
Western Hemisphere
On April 12th 1940 Marquess of Lothian in Washington reported to Halifax in 
London that the Secretary of State had stated that “Iceland did not come within scope 
of Monroe Doctrine.”75
Whether or not Iceland was included in the American concept of the Western 
Hemisphere, and thus covered by the Monroe Doctrine, did occupy the British a lot 
in the aftermath of the German occupation of Denmark and the subsequent situation 
Iceland and the rest of the North Atlantic area found itself in. In July 1940 it was 
noted in the Foreign Office that “Mr. Waldock (Admiralty) asked Sir John 
Dashwood whether Reykjavik was in the American Belligerent port Area. Sir John 
asked Mr. Perowne who states that no reference can be found either to Iceland or 
Reykjavik in any of the Presidential pronouncements and it may therefore be
1 f \assumed that it is not.”
73 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.014/16, letter from Lieutenant Colonel F. 
V. Fitzgerald, Chief, Special Assignment Branch, Bureau o f Public Relations, War Department, to 
Mr. W illiam D. Bassett, The White House, Washington, D.C., 15.07.41
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To the British the inclusion of Iceland in the Western Hemisphere was of utmost 
importance, because that would mean that the Americans physically would move 
into closer proximity of Europe and this would in turn increase the chances for an 
early U.S. entry to the war.
On July 12th 1940 the Evening Standard contained a short piece under the headline 
‘Iceland “Monroed”’, where Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Republican, 
Massachusetts), during a debate at the Senate the day before “contended that Iceland 
was part of the Western Hemisphere...[and thus] covered by the Monroe 
Doctrine”.77 Following this query the American Consul General in Reykjavik, 
Kuniholm, received an urgent telegram from Sumner Welles, requesting information 
on the military situation in Iceland, the Faroes and the coast of Greenland.78 This 
unprecedented approach by the Americans quite upset the British, as the normal line 
of inquiry would be for the Americans to approach the British in London in order to 
acquire such information on British military activities in the North Atlantic. 
However, it was chosen to look at the incident as a case of an ‘oversight’ on the part 
of the American Under-Secretary. Also, it raised some interest amongst the 
officials at the Foreign Office, because Dashwood noted that “I am under the 
impression that this is the first indication we have received that the U.S Govt were in 
any way particularly interested in Iceland.”80
2.4 Iceland ‘invites’ the Americans to take-over the protection from the British 
As mentioned earlier the State Department was surprised to find that contrary to the 
indications they had been given by Vilhjalmur Thor and Thor Thors, the Icelanders 
were initially not welcoming the idea that the occupation should be taken over by the 
Americans. Roosevelt was thus reluctant to make such a move without an invitation 
from the Icelandic Government. The British on the other hand suggested that the 
Americans should just copy the steps taken by the British when they occupied the
77 Evening Standard. ‘Iceland “Monroed”’, 12.07.40
78 PRO, FO 371/24783, decipher from Howard-Smith, Reykjavik, to FO, 22.07.40
79 PRO, FO 371/24783, N 6034/4115/15, comment by Dashwood, 23.07.40, to decipher from Howard- 
Smith, Reykjavik, to FO, 22.07.40
80 PRO, FO 371/24783, N 6034/4115/15, comment by Dashwood, 23.07.40, to decipher from Howard- 
Smith, Reykjavik, to FO, 22.07.40
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islands and turn up unannounced. Mr Butler, the then British Minister in
Washington, left a memorandum at the State Department, which read:
The British feel that it would be preferable, for military and tactical 
reasons that no advance information of the proposed despatch of United 
States forces should be given. The British authorities would suggest that 
the best course would be for the Icelandic Government to be presented 
with a fait accompli as was the case when the British troops occupied 
Iceland.81
The British based this recommendation on the fact that their Minister in Iceland 
believed that it was doubtful whether Iceland would ask the United States 
Government to assist in its defence. Both he and the Foreign Office feared that if 
negotiations were to take place there would be danger of leakage since there was no 
censorship of the press in Iceland and likewise no control over wireless installations 
on Icelandic fishing vessels.82
At first the Americans were not inclined to follow the procedures as put forward by 
the British. Instead the Americans wanted the British to inform the Icelanders that 
the British forces were needed elsewhere. This would make the Icelanders see that 
they needed protection from another country. However, the British could not 
withdraw their forces and leave Iceland unprotected. They would furthermore inform 
the Icelanders that to their knowledge the U.S. Government was interested in taking 
over the protection of Iceland as part of their Western Hemispheric defence. In turn 
the Americans would “assist in the defence of the integrity and independence of 
Iceland.”83
This plan, however, required that the Icelandic Prime Minister would send a request
for protection to President Roosevelt. To President Roosevelt, however, it was
unfeasible and undesirable to follow the British recommendation since, as Sumner
Welles pointed out
the whole basis of our [U.S.] relations with the other American Republics 
was based upon our policy of non-aggression and non-intervention, the
81 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/17, memorandum left at the State 
Department by British Minister in Washington, Mr. Butler, dated 16.06.41
82 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/20 1/12, memorandum of conversation 
between British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, and Under Secretary, Mr. W elles, 22.06.41
83 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/17, memorandum of conversation 
between British Minister in Washington, Mr. Butler and Under Secretary, Mr. W elles, 18.06.41
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occupation by the United States of Iceland without having received from 
the Icelandic Government a request to do so, would destroy in great 
measure the confidence which the other American Republics possessed 
in this Government and would be utilised by axis propagandists 
throughout the Western Hemisphere.84
Also, an occupation without invitation, it was reasoned by Welles, would mean that 
“fears of Portugal with regard to our possible action in the Azores would be 
materially stimulated and would be exploited to our disadvantage and that of the 
British by German propaganda in Portugal.”85 Likewise, President Roosevelt did not 
approve of the suggestion by the British that a statement should be made suggesting 
that the Americans were acting “in concert with His Majesty's Government”.
The Americans were thus anxious and adamant that
the British Government should studiously emphasize the fact that the 
action taken by the United States was not the result of any secret 
agreement or any collusion between Great Britain and the United States 
but was the result of a message received by the President from the Prime 
Minister of Iceland and was the result of the practical fact that Great 
Britain intended to withdraw her forces of occupation from Iceland.87
As mentioned earlier, Halifax had given the British Minister in Iceland instructions 
to see to that the Icelanders would request for American help to defend the island. 
The efforts of the British Minister were not in vain. On the matter of the British 
suggestion for a take-over of the occupation by the United States, the Foreign 
Minister, Stefansson, approached the American Consul, Kuniholm. Stefansson 
enquired for Kuniholm’s opinion for a possible approach by the Althing, on behalf of 
the Icelandic people, appealing to be “placed under the protection of the American 
flag.”88 The meeting was a success, because upon leaving Stefansson said: “he hoped 
that some arrangement could be made, when zero hour does come, so that Iceland
84 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/20 1/12, memorandum of conversation 
between British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, and Under Secretary, Mr. W elles, 22.06.41
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between British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, and Under Secretary, Mr. W elles, 22.06.41
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87 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/20 9/12, memorandum of conversation 
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would be able to dispose of its produce under favourable conditions in the United 
States. Perhaps as a condition to granting the United States a base in Iceland, tariff or
Q Q
other concessions could be made.” This was the first real important step in the
process of the United States acquiring the invitation, they needed and wanted, for the
take-over to take place. However, in the end the Icelandic people and Althing were
not notified of the steps taken. Although there was a majority within the Atlhing for
asking the Americans to take over protection of the islands,90 the final decision was
taken by the Icelandic Government alone, without summoning the Althing. Prime
Minister Herman Jonasson explained in his speech to the Atlhing a couple of days
later that he and the other three Ministers had wanted to summon the Atlhing, but
that the British Minister had discouraged this idea.
I hope that the Althing will agree with the Government that the 
responsibility was great which this Government took upon itself in 
replying to the British Minister’s request without consulting the Althing, 
and that the responsibility would have been even greater if the 
Government under these circumstances could have taken upon its 
shoulders to summon the Althing. For this reason and for this reason 
alone did the Government choose the only possible way to reply without 
discussing the matter in the Althing...Though the Government alone 
should take the decision, which was taken, it is desired that the 
Honorable Regent, because of the special importance of the matter under 
discussion and to be decided upon, should preside over the meetings 
which were held to discuss the matter. The Honorable Regent considered 
it natural that the matter should be taken up as it was, and therefore 
willingly agreed.91
Thus, the problem was solved and the British subsequently prepared a suggestion as 
to how the invitation should look like. An aide memoire was delivered to the Prime 
Minister by the British Minister where the latter had “come to ask you [Prime 
Minister] to give this invitation to the United States” and at the same time listed the 
advantages of taking this course of line: “
89 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 1857, 711.59A/9, memorandum o f conversation 
between Mr. Stefan Johan Stefansson, Icelandic Minister for Foreign affairs, and
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222
1) Whatever may be the outcome of war so far as Great Britain is 
concerned you will have the assurance that the United States will 
defend the independence and integrity of Iceland...
2) The position of Iceland and the Icelandic Government will be much 
stronger if the United States troops come on your invitation. 
Admittedly the British violated your neutrality, but the course of war 
has shown that they had no alternative. If the Americans come on 
your invitation, they will not be committing any unneutral act, and 
the undertaking which the President will give you about non­
interference will have the greater force if it is given after your
92invitation...
In his message to President Roosevelt Prime Minister of Iceland, Hr. Hermann 
Jonasson, asserted that in conversation on June 24th a British Minister explained to 
him that the British forces in Iceland were required elsewhere. At the same time it 
was stressed that the adequate defence of Iceland was of immense importance and 
that President Roosevelt was prepared to send United States troops immediately to 
supplement and substitute for the British forces. This action, however, could not be 
taken except at the invitation of the Iceland Government.
It is worth noting, that the Danish representatives were completely absent in this 
process.
2.5 Reactions to the American take-over
In general the take-over did not make the headlines in the world press. However, in 
most countries the event appeared at least in one newspaper.
a) Reactions in Icelandic newspapers
In Iceland Brynjolfur Bjamason of the Communist Party questioned the legality of
the Government’s decision;
although we must be satisfied with the accomplished fact, it is necessary 
to point out that this agreement was unlawfully made because in so 
serious a matter that which calls itself a Government should have 
appealed to parliament and the people. He suggests that the agreement is 
not binding on the Icelandic people, who have never expressed 
themselves ready to entrust the United States...everyone will agree that
92 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5384, 859A.20/83, Aide Memoire handed to Icelandic 
Prime Minister by British Minister at Reykjavik, Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 135 dated July 17, 
1941, from Bertel E. Kuniholm, American Consul at the Reykjavik, Iceland, on subject o f Protection 
of Iceland by United States
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Iceland has now ruined her neutrality...it is good to have written 
promises, but nothing is more dangerous than for a small country to be 
dependent for its sovereignty and freedom on the mercy of one great
93power.
On of the largest Icelandic newspapers, Morgunbladid, however, showed more 
approval towards the decision of the Government. Although the newspaper 
recognised the necessity of the Government’s actions, they nevertheless did not want 
it to become a precedent; “Most of the Atlhing appreciated the Government’s 
necessity of making their decision without consulting the Atlhing, although it is 
obvious that in usual times such an action is not to be imitated, if democracy and the 
Parliamentary system is to reign in our country.”94 Thus, in general (the Communist 
Party aside) there was wide approval of the invitation sent to the Americans to take­
over the occupation from the British.
b) Reactions in U.S.
By the time of the invitation the mood in the United States towards the war had
changed somewhat. Already in June 1940 it was voiced that
Neutrality has proved a death trap Isolationism and defense [sic] strategy 
have run counter to the elementary military lesson that it is best to fight 
on someone else’s soil and to have friends fighting for you.. .America has 
ignored that the Monroe Doctrine has existed by the grace of the British 
and the British navy. With Britain and the navy gone, the Monroe 
Doctrine is only an incantation. Such is the Nemesis of sentimentalism.95
However, according to Morgunbladid reactions in the Senate were not all positive, as 
could be expected. Robert Taft, leader of the Republicans in the Congress was 
reported to have said that “it is the same as an aggressive war.”96 Also, amongst the 
American public there were split opinions. Following the take-over of the occupation 
the President received letters from civilians of all walks of life expressing their
93 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5384, 859A.20/83, from Kuniholm, Reykjavik, to 
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reactions. Those on the pro-side were along the lines of “A little slow on the trigger 
but Iceland shot a bulls eye”97
Others were not so impressed by the decision of the President. It was pointed out that
it was not according to the promises made at the elections
In view of the fact that I supported your Administration at the last three 
Presidential Elections on the strength of your campaign promises...may I 
respectfully ask how this move can be reconciled with campaign 
promises?...are we not occupying an Island directly north of the British 
isles. Are we not in the war zone where shooting cannot be avoided?98
.. .one argued. Another wrote
I have read in the paper that Navy Secretary Frank Knox implied, in 
connection with United States occupation of Iceland, that United States 
naval forces had been ordered by you to shoot, if necessary, to keep sea 
lanes open. Such would be an act of war, and Congress alone has the 
power to declare war. You must not assert this power and become a 
dictator. We are opposed to dictatorship abroad, and we do not want it in 
any form in America.99
Some of the arguments went along with the idea of the Western Hemisphere:
by what stretch of the imagination [sic] can Iceland be called a part of 
Western Hemisphere? If it is not you are clearly violating your oath of 
office inasmuch as present laws expressly forbid sending United States 
armed forces out of this hemisphere if congress were not slavish 
following all the recent years of the peoples money poured out by you 
impeachment would follow.100
c) Reactions elsewhere
The decision for an American take-over of the occupation of Iceland came as a 
surprise to the other Scandinavian countries. The American Legation in Stockholm 
reported that the Swedish newspaper Stockholm-Tidningen termed the decision
97 FDR Official File, OF 660 Iceland, Box 1, folder OF 660 Occupation o f Iceland, Icelandic misc,
Pro A -l 1941, telegram to President Roosevelt, from Frank W. Buxton, Brookline, Mass. 07.07.41
98 FDR Official File, OF 660 Iceland, Box 1, folder Of 660, Occupation o f Iceland, Iceland misc, Con 
A-G 1941, to President Roosevelt, from Ackerson, Wilkinsburg, Pa, 07.07.41
99 FDR Official File, OF 660 Iceland, Box 1, folder O f 660, Occupation o f Iceland, Iceland misc, Con 
A-G 1941, to President Roosevelt, from Walter T. Burke, Boston, 10.07.41
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extraordinary noteworthy and implies significant change in position of 
island in that instead of being militarily occupied by warring power 
Iceland now comes under armed protection of neutral power. Although 
opinion differs as to nature of United States’ neutrality and label 
“nonbelligerent” is accepted even by Americans themselves as more 
adequately descriptive of their position United States is nevertheless 
neither de facto nor de jure at war with any country.101
In Spain the event was on the first page. In an editorial in the ABC it was stated 
that
the case of Iceland is regarded by political observers as the forerunner of 
similar action with respect to Cape Verde, the Azores, and Dakar. ABC 
states that by this action the President has exposed his country to great 
danger and pointing out that Iceland is outside the zone defined by the 
United States as forming part of the Western Hemisphere, but on the 
other hand is within the War Zone laid down by Germany, it forecasts 
some “great incident” in Iceland waters in the near future.10
In some South-American countries, however, the tone was different. The Legation in 
Bogota reported that “President Santos...observed...that our entry into Iceland was 
“extremely grave”, that we were going a long way (four-fifths) across the 
Atlantic.”103 The Legation in San Jose, nevertheless, reported that the Foreign 
Minister there had
“expressed himself as pleased that the United States Government has taken the steps 
indicated and he considers it necessary for the protection of the Western 
Hemisphere.”104 According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, (FBI), the 
Brazilian Ambassador in Washington listed several reasons for which he thought 
were the reasons for the American occupation of Iceland. Amongst those were, apart 
from to prevent German presence on the island and thus in the vicinity of the United 
States,
to protect Greenland...to create a supplementary advance line of national 
and continental defence in front of that created by the bases in British 
possessions...to pursue the interventionist method adopted by the 
exchange of destroyers for bases last year, in which intervention and help 
for Great Britain is co-ordinated and unified with the general system of
101 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.20/25, telegram from Sterling, Stockholm, 
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national and continental defence...to carry American cooperation with 
England to the furthest limit compatible with the constitutional powers of 
the Executive; strategical offensives against Germany and the naval 
safeguarding of merchant shipping supplying England’s war needs, both 
steps directly or indirectly accepted and approved by the greater part of 
the nation’s public opinion.. .that the U.S. are practically in the War.105
Not surprisingly the reports from Legations in the Axis countries stated that the 
coverage of the take-over bore the notion of the decision being an “aggressive and 
imperialistic move,”106 and that the “landing of United States military forces on 
Iceland was a move bringing closer an intercontinental war as it represented a 
deviation from neutrality policy and put the United States a further step towards 
armed conflict” and characterized Roosevelt as “an aggressor who meddled with
1 0 7European affairs and played the game of wolf and sheep with Iceland.”
In Denmark the papers were marked, not surprisingly, by German propaganda. 
Politiken described the decision a “sensational step that a neutral should demonstrate 
its lack of respect for sovereignty of another neutral state by occupation of its 
territory.”108 The Berlin GSKD was reported to predict that “so long as the 
occupation lasts tendency will be to take Iceland away from the Nordic countries and 
from Europe generally. This is the opposite of what Iceland wants and therefore the 
Nordic countries regret that the great North American power should have laid its 
hand on Icelandic territory.”109 The Social Democrat wrote on the same lines that the 
take-over was not in accordance with what the Icelanders wanted, while the National 
Times [National Tidende] referred to “domestic American opposition asserting that 
the President and his adherent have long ago exceeded the bounds of the Monroe 
Doctrine”.110 The Danish Press, nevertheless, was also careful not to harm Danish
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relations with Iceland and risk pushing them further away in the wake of the growth
of wish for independence. Henceforth
they [Danish newspapers] all express great sympathy for Iceland and the 
hope that Iceland’s status in the family of Nordic nations will not be 
changed. The articles are as friendly in tone as is possible for them to be 
under present conditions. There is however strong evidence of the 
German propaganda influence.111
In the Folketing, the Danish Parliament, the Prime Minister stated that “Iceland had 
no choice in the matter and that new state of affairs caused great worry in Iceland 
which may be drawn into war operations zone.”112
The fact that the Danish Government did not issue a formal complaint to the 
Americans regarding the American occupation of Iceland was a surprise to the U.S. 
Government.113 However, as we have seen throughout this chapter, the lack of 
involvement of the Danish representatives in these matters was remarkable. There 
were hardly any, if none, references made to the opinion of the Danes, nor were their 
views on the shift of occupational power ever requested, it seems. Nevertheless, as 
shown above, it looks as if the Danes were overall supportive of the steps taken by 
the British and the Americans with regard to the defence of Iceland.
In the Faroe Islands much attention was paid to the events in Iceland. The fact that 
the Icelanders successfully had made trade-agreements with their occupiers was 
noted in the Faroese papers, and the Faroese asked why nothing of the same sort was 
achieved by the Faroese.114 The Faroese independence movement was right in 
feeling a bit jealous, because not only had the American take-over brought a better 
prospect for prosperity, but, as previously mentioned, the Americans had also 
promised to respect Icelandic independence and not interfere with domestic politics. 
The American take-over had thus created favorable conditions for the Icelanders to 
abrogate from the Union with the Danish Kingdom.
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3. U.S. occupation of Iceland
The American troops and personnel sent to Iceland were not all too content with their 
situation. MacVeagh reported back to President Roosevelt that “it is at least a barren 
existence her for most Americans. Among the troops there is already a high 
incidence of mental disease of one sort or another and several officers have had to be 
sent home owing to excessive strain.”115 A week earlier in a telegram to the Secretary 
of State on U.S. relations with Iceland, MacVeagh had commented, that the U.S. 
relationship with Iceland was an ‘unusual one’: “When consideration is given to the 
circumstances that brought about the establishment of this office and to the unusual 
nature of our relations with Iceland and to the special problems with which the 
Legation has to deal...”116 What MacVeagh referred to here was not only the physical 
circumstances of Icelandic-American relations, that is that the Americans found it 
difficult to adjust to the geographical parameters and climate of the island, which 
called for increased care of illnesses and vacations for the personnel compared with 
other locations of U.S. Legations. What MacVeagh also referred to in his telegram 
were the circumstances surrounding the American take-over and thus the grounds for 
the American presence on the islands.
To begin with the Americans did not have an overriding policy with regard to 
Iceland, except for ensuring that she did not fall into the hands of the enemy. After 
Pearl Harbour Iceland, like other American outposts, in particular served as a buffer 
zone safeguarding the American Continent. However, Whitehead argues that “the 
president [Roosevelt] ascribed such importance to the U.S. presence that he remained 
personally in charge of diplomatic and military relations with Iceland during 1941- 
42. To ensure a direct liaison with the local scene, the president installed his friend 
Lincoln MacVeagh as the first U.S. minister at Reykjavik.”117 This practice by 
Roosevelt, however, was not unusual. As mentioned in Chapter II, Roosevelt 
attached much importance in direct relations with persons, upon whose information 
he relied. The appointment of MacVeagh, nevertheless, can be read as a sign that 
Roosevelt did put importance on U.S. relations with Iceland. What also needs to be
115 President’s Secretary’s File, Diplomatic Correspondence, Iceland, Box 39, from MacVeagh, 
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taken into account is that Iceland became one of the first theatres of war where both 
the British and Americans were based simultaneously. It was thus also an important 
venue for Anglo-American relations in practise.
One rather controversial plan, which emerged within the U.S. military circles, and
was contrary to the promise given to the Icelanders by the Americans and thus not
welcomed by the State Department was General Bonesteel’s announcement that in
the event of an attack on Iceland the General would install a military government
without conferring with the American Consul or the local authorities. Welles made
his opinion on this matter clear to President Roosevelt:
General Bonesteel, who has now assumed the Supreme Military 
Command in Iceland, has requested Minister MacVeagh to inform the 
Icelandic Government secretly that in the event of an attack on the Island 
sufficiently serious to warrant such action, he will instantly proclaim the 
existence of a military government without further recourse to the civil 
authorities...In my [Welles’] opinion, the establishment of an American 
military government in Iceland, even in the event of a German attack, 
would be contrary to the spirit if not the terms, of your explicit promise 
not to interfere with the Government of Iceland and to recognize the 
absolute independence and sovereignty of the country.118
The Minister in Reykjavik was subsequently advised to follow the lines as suggested 
by Welles.119 It turned out, however, that Bonesteel was bound by orders from the 
War Department, which were contrary to that of the Department of State, and which 
“not only approve and direct the use of the proclamation proposed by him but follow 
a secret direction previously issued authorising military government here in the event 
of invasion.”120
The State Department was anxious to keep good relations with the Icelanders and to 
stick to their promised policies towards the island. The main concern of the military, 
on the other hand, was to secure the island. Here is thus an example of two 
departments at odds with each other.
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1,9 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5384, 859A.20/173, Under Secretary o f State to 
American Legation, Reykjavik, 07.05.42
120 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5384, 859A.20/180, telegram from MacVeagh, 
Reykjavik, to Secretary o f State, Washington, 09.05.42
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There were other examples showing the length the Americans were ready to go to 
secure good relations with the Icelanders and meet their wishes. One was the 
Icelandic wish on racial restrictions within the U.S. troops that were sent to their 
island;
During last year’s negotiations leading up to the agreement between the 
President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Iceland for the 
entry of American military forces into the country, the Prime Minister 
specially requested that no Negroes be included in units sent to Iceland.
So far the Army has complied with this request but the Navy has 
included some 50 Negro mess attendants in the personnel of its base 
camps...since their presence in Iceland is contrary to the expressed wish 
of the Icelandic Government, I earnestly hope that the Navy Department 
will promptly accede to the Commandant’s request for their 
replacement.121
The Americans thus were ready to go to great lengths to avoid any trouble arising. 
Also, when the Americans were informed that because problems between the troops 
and the locals there was a desire amongst the Icelanders “that American troops be no
longer quartered in town, where unfortunate collisions may more frequently occur
122than in the country,” the Americans took actions accordingly.
This accommodating attitude by the Americans was also noticed by the British. On
the diplomatic matter Howard Smith noted that
It is interesting to observe how differently MacVeagh seems to take his 
job from how I conceived I ought to take mine. I thought that it was up to 
me to try to assist the soldiers in getting things done, when they came up 
against obstructions from the Icelanders. MacVeagh on the other hand 
seems to take the line that he is here to see that General Bonesteel does 
nothing which might upset the Icelanders... Indeed the Americans seem 
to be very chary of doing anything, which might offend the Icelanders. 
MacVeagh has hinted on several occasions that his position is very 
different from mine, seeing that the Americans came here on invitation 
and we came here against the will of the Icelanders, and there is of course 
something in that.12
Herein lies the main difference between the conducts of the occupational forces and 
their aspirations for a good relationship with the Icelanders. Whereas the Americans
121 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5384, 859A.20/198, from Hull to Frank Knox, 
Secretary o f the Navy, 30.06.42
122 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5384, 859A.20/200, from MacVeagh, Reykjavik, to 
Secretary of State, Washington, 03.06.42
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showed great will to accommodate the wishes of the Icelanders, the British
acknowledged that their approach had been somewhat different, but that was the
result of the different basis of the two occupations, where one was based on an
invitation and the other not. Hence, despite having handed over the protection of
Iceland to the American’s Warner exclaimed that
we do not want the Icelanders to feel that we have forgotten them and I 
think it is important that we should continue to be strongly represented 
there if only for prestige reasons...you will remember, too, that when 
they were persuaded to invite the Americans to take over their protection 
the Icelanders expressly said that they wanted to retain the present 
diplomatic representation between themselves and us, thus showing their 
desire to keep in touch with us and not to be drawn too much into the 
American orbit.124
D. ICELAND’S DECISION TO LEAVE THE UNION WITH DENMARK 
As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, when Germany occupied Denmark 
and Iceland subsequently declared herself in charge of the Foreign Affairs the role of 
the Danish representatives with regard to Iceland diminished and there are, as we 
have seen, hardly any references to any communication of importance between the 
Danish representatives and the occupiers, except for when the independence question 
surfaced. To what extent were the Danish representatives able to influence the British 
and Americans to intervene in the Icelandic plans to leave the Union?
According to the Act of Union either party could, if they wished so, leave the Union 
after 1943; “either Parliament can express a wish for a revision of the treaty. If the 
revision is not agreed on within three years either Parliament can nullify the treaty by 
the votes of two thirds of Parliament and subsequently 75 per cent of 75 per cent of 
the electors in favour of annulment.”125
On April 10th 1940 the Icelandic Government agreed to pass a resolution to revise the
treaty. On May 17th 1941 the Althing further passed two resolutions,
the first stated that, since Denmark is no longer in a position to take care 
of those affairs which she had undertaken by the act of 1918, the Althing 
declared that it considered Iceland to have the right to cancel the Union
124 PRO, FO 371/32750, from Warner, FO, to Howard Smith, Reykjavik, 27.05.42
125 PRO, FO 371/29311, Summary o f article in Timinn 04.03.41
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with Denmark. It also stated that Iceland does not intend to renew the 
Union.126
Thus, according to the Act of Union Iceland could, providing that all provisions were 
in place, leave the Union in 1943. However, considering that one party of the Act, 
Denmark, was occupied and therefore not free, and that it was not sure when she 
would be free, there were some who argued that Iceland should declare herself a 
republic and no longer a part of the Union. Others advocated that “seeing that Iceland 
is now practically independent, nothing is to be gained by precipitate action.”127
In the first instance nothing happened, and the matter was laid to rest. However, with 
the resolutions in place, the Icelanders were free to take the matter up again when 
they wanted to. In the meantime the Danish representatives tried everything in their 
power to forestall the development, as it was not appreciated by them and Denmark 
that the Icelanders exploited the unfortunate situation Denmark found herself in. 
Thus, the question is: were the Danish representatives able to exert any influence to 
forestall any change happening within the Union while Denmark was under 
occupation?
1. Danish pressure on the British and American policies with regard to Iceland’s 
independence course
Although the common concensus amongst the parliamentary parties in Iceland since 
the late 1920s had been to steer towards a departure from the Union with Denmark128 
some Danes were of the belief that the Icelanders were not intending to leave the 
Union once the agreed period was over. This is evident in a letter to Consul C.A. 
Brun in Washington in 1944, thus after Iceland’s decision to leave the Union, where 
Reventlow expressed his concurrence to Brun’s views on chances for Iceland 
renewing the Act of Union. These chances would have been present if Iceland had
126 Thor Thors, A  Small Nation in a Great War. World War, 1939-1954, Iceland, booklet, reprinted 
from The New York Historical Society Quarterly, for April 1944
127 PRO, RO 371/29307, report by Howard Smith to Eden, Report on Political Conditions in Iceland 
during 1940
128 Hardarson, “Republic o f Iceland 1940-44”, 1974, p. 29
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not been occupied by foreign forces, they believed. Likewise both expressed regret 
that Iceland would not remain under the same crown as Greenland and the Faroes.129
1.1. 1940-1941: Iceland commences the process to leave the Union with the Danish 
Kingdom: reactions of the Danish representatives
Feeling that it was his duty to try and stop the plans Fontenay nevertheless was 
unable to turn to his Government or his colleagues in London and Washington D.C. 
for immediate guidance. He therefore voiced his worries to the British Minister in 
Iceland, Howard Smith, who advised him “not to commit himself prior to Icelandic 
action.”130 Howard Smith’s instruction to Fontenay endorses the delicate situation the 
Danish representative found himself in; being a representative of a government 
cooperating with the enemy and being situated in a country, which had taken over all 
its affairs from Copenhagen had thus diminished his role in the country. He would 
also have to tread carefully with regard to the occupying forces, who, as we have 
seen, were keen to support the Icelanders in order to maintain good relations with 
them. There were thus no grounds for trying to have the British or Americans side 
with him, as was the case in the Faroe Islands.
Fontenay’s approach, nevertheless, sparked some worry with Howard Smith, who
passed on Fontenay’s concerns to Reventlow in London. At the Foreign Office
Reventlow warned Collier that an early exit from the Union would harm the British
cause. Reventlow’s warning must have struck a note with the Foreign Office,
because shortly after the Foreign Minister, Eden, expressed that
Since HMG have no technical locus standi in this matter, not being a 
party to the Act of Union, nor having any treaty obligations in connexion 
therewith, they cannot take up the question officially with the Icelandic 
Government. On the other hand, since it is clearly undesirable that this 
further complication should be introduced into their position as the 
Government of the occupying Power, it seems desirable that such action 
as may be possible should be taken unofficially to dissuade the Icelanders 
from taking an illegal step, the blame for which, in Denmark and 
elsewhere, would be likely to fall partly upon HMG themselves, as well
129 SA, 9.B.27/1983/450, Bilag, Island politiske forhold til Danmark efter 9.4.40, Pakke I, from 
Reventlow, London, to C.A.C. Brun, Washington, 06.03.44
130 PRO, FO 371/24790, N  7032/7032/15, Howard Smith to Halifax, 12.10.40
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as upon the Icelanders, unless everything possible had been done to 
dissuade them from it.131
Following this notice a letter was sent from Foreign Office to Halifax notifying him 
that
Mr. Howard Smith was recently instructed to do what he could 
unofficially to discourage movement in Iceland in favour of declaring 
immediate separation from Denmark in violation of Act of Union, in 
view of undesirable repercussions this would have on position of HMG 
as occupying Power. USG’s [United States Government] notification, 
coming at this moment, will not make his task any easier, though in 
general we welcome any signs of US interest in Iceland,132
In 1941 Collier, the head of the Northern Department, also voiced the concerns of the
British with regard to the Icelandic intentions to leave the Union with Denmark while
Denmark was still occupied by the Germans. The British were thus worried that if
the Icelanders made any such move it would have serious consequences to the British
since Iceland was occupied by them. Especially it was anticipated that such a move
would be exploited by German propaganda in as much as the Germans would portrait
that the British had encouraged the Icelanders to take such steps despite the British
promise not to intervene with Iceland’s relations with Denmark or any other 
1country.
Trying his best to influence the British Reventlow indicated to the British that 
willingness to help the Danish cause in the independence matter would meet great 
gratitude with the Danish King. C.A. Brun, who at the time was positioned in Iceland 
(he later transferred to the United States) also made a point to warn the British that if 
Iceland went ahead with its pursuit of independence it would inevitable also affect 
the situation in the Faroes, which already was troublesome. Reventlow thus used all 
measures to influence the British in the matter, however he soon realised that the 
British were not willing to change their initial stand on the matter.134
131 PRO, FO 371/29311, N  398/398/15 (no 11.), from Eden, FO, to Howard Smith, Reykjavik,
03.02.41
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The head of the Nordic Division in Foreign Office nevertheless expressed to 
Reventlow that the British would prefer if the Icelanders waited to take any action till 
after the war, and Reventlow was quick to suggest that Mr Howard Smith should be 
instructed to make it clear to the Icelandic Government that such an action would not 
be looked upon in favour by the British. Reventlow tried to apply pressure on the 
British by saying that it would not serve the British reputation well, neither in 
Denmark nor in other countries, if this happened on their watch. Amongst other this 
was an important imperial affair,135 Reventlow pointed out, playing on the imperial 
factor.
Having in mind that the preparations were still in the early stages and sensing that the 
mood of the British was not in their favour, although officially they would not say so, 
the Icelanders refrained from taking any hasty steps to further the process.
1.2. 1942: The United States in charge of the occupation; effect on the attitude 
towards the Icelandic plans to leave the Union
By 1942, when the plans to leave the Union resurfaced, the occupation of Iceland
had changed hands. The American take-over of the occupation marked a shift in the
official British attitude towards the Icelandic plans to leave the Union. It might be
suspected that this shift was due to the fact that the British no longer were in charge
of the island and therefore would not feel the brunt of blame when Iceland inevitably
left the Union with Denmark. The British, although they were reluctant to make any
official statements, showed understanding for the Danish position and provided
support by other means, such as conveying a message from the Danish
representatives to their King in Denmark;
...although we ourselves are taking up an attitude of indifference in the 
constitutional question, it is only natural that the Danish Minister should 
stand up for the maintenance of the Act of Union and should want to 
report on this question confidentially. If we transmit the message it will 
perhaps help to show that we are not encouraging the Icelanders to break 
with Denmark.136
135 SA, 9.B.27.Bilag.pkIII/1983/450, report by Reventlow, 26.06.44
136 PRO, FO 371/32750, comment by Clarke to draft by Howard Smith, Reykjavik, addressed to 
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This also shows some consideration on the British part for the situation the Danish 
representatives found themselves in after the German occupation of Denmark. This 
also corresponds to the argument put forward by Nils A. S0rensen in the previous 
chapter, that there probably was some element of loyalty in the British attitude 
towards Denmark, her being a fellow imperial power.
The change in the official British attitude to ‘indifference’ disturbed Hull, because
the Americans felt
that a unilateral abrogation of the Act by Iceland in a manner contrary to 
that provided for by the Treaty itself and while our troops are in the 
country would be seized upon by the Germans to spread pernicious 
propaganda, at which they are adept, in Denmark and other Scandinavian 
countries which might react unfavourably on both Icelandic and
137American interests.
This was also an issue which the Danish representatives were aware of and they did 
not hesitate to highlight the disadvantages to the Americans should Iceland leave the 
Union prematurely while under their supervision. In June 1942 Fontenay wrote to 
Kauffmann
I have earnestly emphasized the serious consequences both for the 
mutual relations of the two countries by such a unilateral, untimely, 
premature disregard of a solemn Treaty, and for Iceland entering the 
ranks of democratic states as a treatybreaker following the bad manners 
of nations which cast aside agreements which they do not find convenient 
any more and which are neglecting solemn promises given of their own 
free will.138 [sic]
It was not only the British and the Americans who expressed their hopes that the
Icelanders would wait and not leave the Union prematurely. It was reported that “the
representatives of Norway and Sweden unofficially endeavoured to persuade the
Icelandic Government to abide by the Act of Union, and, while not opposing
1Icelandic desire for independence, exhorted the Icelanders to behave ‘decently’”.
To the dismay of the Danish representatives, the Icelanders were able to support their 
arguments with statements by the occupiers, such as the initial declarations by the
137 FRUS, 1942, Volume III, p. 13, Hull to the Charge in Iceland, Warner, 22.07.42
138 SA, 9.B.27/1983/450, Pakke II, Islands politiske forhold til Danmark efter 9.4.40, from Fontenay, 
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Prime Minister and President Roosevelt, when the American take-over took place, 
where they pledged to “recognise the absolute independence and sovereignty of 
Iceland.”140 The Icelanders also made the most of Churchill’s announcement while 
on his visit to Iceland in August 1941 where he stated “that the British along with the 
Americans would take care for Icelandic independence.”141 Reventlow was surprised 
by this statement because he was of the understanding that “neither the British nor 
the Americans would want any change to occur until after the war” and he thought 
that Churchill could not have had “Danish-Icelandic relations in general nor in 
particular the United Kingdom in his mind.”142
A republican constitution was drafted and it was later reasoned by the British that if 
the Americans had not intervened it would probably have been brought into force in 
the autumn of the same year.143 The Americans were now in charge of Iceland and a 
premature abrogation of the Union whilst under American occupation would harm 
the Americans. Hence, the plans were halted after the United States Government in 
the summer of 1942 “informed the Icelandic Government that they would not 
approve of the formal abrogation by Iceland of the Act of Union before the end of 
1943, when the Act might have expired under normal circumstances.”144
The Icelanders were dismayed by this American stance. In a radio message Olafur 
Thors informed the listeners that the Icelandic Government had asked the Icelandic 
Minister in Washington to examine the reasons behind U.S. Governments 
reservations towards Icelandic separation from Denmark, whether it was their wish 
that Iceland would put the case on hold until after the war, so that the decision taken 
would be completely unaffected by the war, or whether the reservation only meant 
that Iceland should wait to put the decision into force until the end of 1943. In the 
radio speech Olafur Thors was happy to announce that the conclusion was the latter. 
There were, however, some sceptics, who accused the Free Danes in London and
140 PRO, FO 371/32749, Howard Smith to FO, 26.05.42
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Washington to be behind the American intervention in the matter of having the 
abrogation delayed and this was more or less confirmed by Clarke of the Foreign 
Office:
I expect Mr. Pjetur Ottesen was right in seeing the hand of the Free 
Danes in the U.S. intervention; we first heard of it from Count 
Reventlow, who got it from Mr. Brun of the Danish legation in 
Washington, and I expect it was the Danish Minister there who urged 
such action on the State Department, as his colleague here did, 
unsuccessfully, on us.145
Understandably this interference by the Americans was not kindly looked upon by 
most Icelanders, especially when taken into account that the Americans had declared 
upon their arrival that the U.S. would recognise Iceland’s independence.146
The Icelanders nevertheless acknowledged that there was not much to gain by going 
ahead with the plans without the support of the British and the Americans. The plans 
were thus temporarily suspended. However, because there was a wide political wish 
and support for leaving the Union with Denmark, the Icelandic Government 
nevertheless stated that “it has never been and is not a desire of the Icelandic people 
to cause any inconvenience to the United States Government; quite contrary it is their 
desire that the friendly collaboration may continue intact as hitherto.”147 The 
Icelandic Government nevertheless stressed that the Icelandic Parliament already 
twice before the outbreak of the war had declared unanimously that the Union would 
be abrogated the Union with Denmark and also, in accordance with the Act there had 
never “existed any disagreement between Icelanders or Danes or others as in fact the 
wording of the treaty cannot be disputed.”148
This attitude and reasoning of the Icelandic was appreciated by the Americans who 
showed understanding for the situation the Icelandic politicians found themselves in 
with regard to this matter. It was thus noted that “the question of the immediate 
severance of the union before the expiration of the treaty appears in no way to be a
145 PRO, FO 371/32751, from Mr. Ross, Reykjavik, to FO, 15.09.42, comment by Clarke
146 PRO, FO 371/32751, from the Press Attache, Reykjavik, to FO, 15.09.42
147 FRUS, 1942, Volume III, pp. 14-5, The Charge in Iceland to the Secretary o f State, 08.08.42
148 FRUS, 1942, Volume III, pp. 14-5, The Charge in Iceland to the Secretary o f State, 08.08.42
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vital or pressing popular issue but since each party has publicly come out for it no 
one alone can afford politically to change its declared position.”149
1.3. British and American attitude to Icelandic abrogation of the Union after 1943 in 
accordance to the Act
After the decision of the Icelandic Government to suspend the plans to after 1943, 
the State Department committed themselves to support the Icelandic case. “The 
Government of the United States has no desire to interfere in the slightest degree 
with the freedom of action of the Icelandic people in these respects, but it is desirous 
that no action should be taken during these troublous [sic] times that might interfere 
with the general war effort of the United Nations, on the outcome of which so greatly 
depends the future welfare and independence of Iceland and of the United States as 
well as of other nations and peoples.150
The attitude of the British and Americans with regard to the argument that the 
Icelanders were in their full legal right to leave the Union after 1943 was thus set, 
and so was the Icelandic Government decision to wait till 1943 before carrying out 
their plans. Therefore the Danish representatives had to accommodate and prepare 
themselves for what Howard Smith pointed out in his despatch to the Foreign Office 
namely that “there appears to be quite a chance that the declaration of a republic will 
take place before the end of the war.”151
Fontenay nevertheless made a last attempt in 1943 to sway the Americans to 
“intervene further in this matter and persuade the Icelanders to hold in suspense the 
question until Denmark was in a position to negotiate” but the U.S. Consul in 
Reykjavik informed him that the Americans “had expressed [their] views relative to 
this question and were not likely to go further.”152
149 FRUS, 1942, Volume III “Europe”, p. 16, The Charge in Iceland to the Secretary o f State, 15.08.42
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Thus, when it became “inevitable that Iceland by unilateral action would abolish the 
union and monarchy in 1944”, Kauffmann pleaded to Fontenay that they should 
“exchange views in respect to the common line of policy to be followed from now on 
before you take further official steps on behalf of Denmark.”153 It was subsequently 
reasoned by Kauffmann in Washington that they could do no more and he therefore 
realised that in order to serve Danish interests a change of tactics and attitude was 
needed.
2. A Common Danish Stand?
Whereas Fontenay, Reventlow and Kauffmann to begin with were in agreement that 
the Icelandic plans to leave the union had to be halted, at least as long as Denmark 
was occupied and therefore not able to have her say, Kauffmann soon changed 
course. This change occurred after the arrival of C.A. Brun to the Legation in 
Washington.
C.A. Brun arrived in Washington after having been based in Iceland for five and a 
half years. He, therefore, had much more insight to Icelandic affairs, than any other 
in Washington. According to Brun the Icelanders did not bear any grudges towards 
Denmark; they were just indifferent, because they had no natural or long historical 
connection with Denmark nor the Monarchy, and the traditional idealistic notion 
amongst the Icelanders was republican. Brun pointed out that the picture could 
possibly have been different if King Christian, like his father, had been more active 
in visiting the island, or if he even had built a castle there, because then the 
Icelanders would sense a stronger belonging to the Kingdom. However, while the 
Icelanders were polite and welcoming towards the Danish King and his family when 
on visits to the island, the sentiment was no different than that to the Norwegian or 
the Swedish Royal Family. It was also pointed out by Brun, that the Danish cause in 
Iceland suffered a heavy blow on April 9th 1940 and for some time after that. 
However, after the August-revolt in 1943 the sympathy for Denmark and admiration 
for the King had been noticeable. But, Brun emphasised, it was “King Christian as 
the King of Denmark and not as King of Iceland, and therefore the Icelanders did not
153 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.01/99A, telegram from Hull to American 
Legation Reykjavik paraphrasing a message from Kauffmann to the Danish Minister in Reykjavik
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feel that they owe him any obligations with regard to the future of Iceland.”154 
[emphasis in original]
In 1941 Fontenay had suggested that the Danish representatives in the United States 
should raise awareness amongst the American public to the Danish cause in relations 
to the Icelandic decision to declare her independence and leave the Union. However, 
Kauffmann pointed out to Fontenay that the American public was poorly informed 
about Danish-Icelandic relations. Therefore, one should not expect the American 
public to react to any news of Iceland leaving the Union with Denmark. To start 
propaganda in favour of the Danish cause with regard to the Icelandic decision to 
leave the union was not perceived by Kauffmann as being plausible. The attitude 
amongst the American public towards Denmark was rather unfavourable as Danes in 
Denmark were seen as too complacent in relation to their German occupiers. 
Denmark and Danes, therefore, could not count on as much sympathy as their 
Norwegian counterparts, for instance.155 Again an example of how the situation in 
Denmark affected the lives and work of the Danish representatives.
In 1943 Kauffmann informed Reventlow that those officials in charge of Icelandic 
matters at the State Department were of the opinion that after 1943 Iceland was free 
to do what she wanted.156 The Danes, therefore, should not expect any help from the 
State Department.
As was mentioned earlier the arrival of C.A. Brun in Washington changed the mood 
of Kauffmann with regard to the Icelandic wish for independence and after a while 
he had convinced Fontenay to adopt the same attitude. Whereas Reventlow lived in 
the hope that the Icelandic plan would never materialise, Fontenay and Kauffmann 
were more realistic as to where things were heading and were of the opinion that 
Iceland should be allowed to pursue her wishes, and also that she legally and morally
154 FL, J. Nr. 4079/3, Faer0 Amt, Islands forhold til Danmark, br.bk .l40A .l, letter from C. Brun to 
Reventlow 03.02.44
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had the right to do so.157 To take a negative stand would only create alienation in the 
relations between the two countries. Thus, when it was clear that Iceland would leave 
the union Kauffmann approached Fontenay and suggested that they should exchange 
views before Fontenay took any further official steps on behalf of Denmark, so that a 
“common line of policy to be followed [by the two] from now on”158
3. Worries for repercussions in the other North Atlantic Areas 
The worries for repercussions in the other North Atlantic territories, which the 
Danish representatives had stressed to the British and Americans in their attempts to 
make them intervene in the Icelandic plans, were not merely a means of tactics. The 
resistance of Reventlow towards the independence course Iceland had started was 
very much due to the repercussions he feared such a move would have on other 
Danish territories separated from the Government in Copenhagen because of the war.
Reventlow was anxious that his and Danish worries and endeavours to secure 
Faroese interests and the rights of Faroese subjects in Iceland in the case of an 
Icelandic departure from the Union should be known, not least to the Faroese 
themselves. Reventlow also foresaw that a positive Danish attitude towards Icelandic 
independence wish would put a damper on the quest for independence for the 
Faroes,159 which inevitably would follow. By refraining from putting up too much 
resistance towards the independence wishes of the Icelanders the Faroe Islanders 
might not see the need to follow Iceland suit and act swiftly while Denmark was still 
occupied, he reasoned. As we saw in the previous chapter, the attitude of the British 
towards Denmark and the Faroese wish for independence was changing in favour of 
the Faroese independence movement. Reventlow, therefore, was not too far off his in 
his premonition. By showing such care and willingness to guard Faroese interests in 
Iceland, Reventlow hoped to achieve appraisal in the Faroes and that this would 
dampen the independence movement, because the Faroese would acknowledge that
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Denmark was pursuing Faroese interests, and he presented this idea to Fontenay, and 
Hilbert.160
Also, C.A. Brun voiced his worries when he referred to the Danish Union as a ‘string 
of pearls’ and was, although he supported the Icelandic cause, a bit disappointed that 
this would mean a “break in the chain stretching from Cap Farvel to Reykjavik and 
via Torshavn to Copenhagen.”161
Although Kauffmann foresaw that the situation in Iceland would have its effects on
the situation in the Faroe Islands, he nevertheless reassured Hilbert that the outcome
could not be the same. Unlike Iceland, which had been an independent country
within the Danish Kingdom, the Faroe Islands were technically a part of Denmark.
Thus a similar action in the Faroes would not have any legal grounds. Kauffmann
finally concluded that he was of the belief that if Denmark had been more
cooperative with the Icelanders from the beginning it would only have strengthen the
Danish position in the Faores, because it would have shown the Faroese that the
Danes were willing to listen to their wishes, and thus it would effectively dampen the
1
demands of the independence movement.
Hilbert on the other hand was not so pleased about the way things turned out in 
Iceland, probably because he foresaw, that the reaction in the Faroes would not be to 
his advantage. On the contrary it would only bring about more trouble with the 
independence movement. Hilbert also belonged to the group of critiques, who found 
it appalling that Iceland should exploit the situation Denmark found herself in, to
1 f t \make such a move.
160 FL, J. Nr. 4079/3, Faer0 Amt, Islands forhold til Danmark, br.bk .l40A .l, report by Reventlow  
26.06.44,
161 FL, J. Nr. 4079/3, Faer0 Amt, Islands forhold til Danmark, br.bk .l40A .l, letter from C. Brun to 
Reventlow 03.02.44
162 FL, J. Nr. 4079/3, Faer0 Amt, Sendemand til Island, br.bk.l40A .l (Islands forhold til Danmark), 
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163 FL, J. Nr. 4079/3, Faer0 Amt, Sendemand til Island, br.bk.l40A .l (Islands forhold til Danmark), 
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4. Iceland decides to leave the Union in 1944
Once it was clear that an Icelandic exit from the Union was inevitable the Danes did 
what they could to maintain good relations with the Icelanders.164 Kauffmann thus 
was anxious that the Danish representatives should officially present a common line 
on the issue. In London, Fontenay, Kauffmann and Reventlow came to the 
conclusion that
In view of the practical impossibility of preventing or even delaying this 
move, the three Ministers propose to draft a message to Iceland in which, 
after mentioning their regret that the step is being taken at a time when 
the Danish Parliament is unable to deliberate on the matter as provided 
for in the Act, they will express the desire that the change in Iceland’s 
status will in no way affect the close ties which have always existed 
between it and Denmark. Thor Thors, with whom Carl Brun of the 
Danish Legation recently discussed the matter, has agreed to draft a 
resolution for the Icelandic Althing reciprocating the friendly sentiments 
of the three Ministers.165
This common Danish line was, however, somewhat disrupted by the King’s message, 
a) King Christian X’s message
Following the Icelandic decision to break out of the Union with Denmark King 
Christian X sent a condemning message to the Icelanders. When in the company of 
his Icelandic colleague Kauffmann tried to smooth the lines of the reactions from 
Denmark to the Icelandic decision to leave the union.166
According to Hull, Kauffmann did not support King Christian’s protest of Iceland’s
decision to sever the Act of Union. Through the Icelandic Minister in the U.S.,
Kauffmann and Brun declared to the Icelandic Government that they
deeply [regretted] the message from His Majesty the King to Iceland and 
that they [were] convinced that the statement contained in the message 
only [could] be occasioned by the fact that the King owing to the German 
occupation [could not] have formed a clear idea of all the circumstance.
They [entertained] no doubts that the Danish people when they [were]
164 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.01/99A, telegram from Hull to American 
Legation, Reykjavik paraphrasing a message from Kauffmann to the Danish Minister in Reykjavik
165 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5368, 859.00/1150, report by Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., 
Danish Political Summary -  March 1944, Division of Northern European Affairs, Department of 
State, 01.04.44
166 FL, J. Nr. 4079/3, Faerp Amt, Sendemand til Island, br.bk,140A.l (Islands forhold til Danmark), 
letter from Kauffmann to Hilbert 18.06.44,
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free to form an opinion and to speak [would] understand all these 
circumstances which determined the decision made by Iceland.167
The news of the King’s attitude and message, however, did not deter the Icelanders 
from their decision. “The Government and the political parties agree that the news of 
the King’s message can change in no way their position with regard to the founding 
of a republic in Iceland and they urge every individual Icelander to vote on the 
republic constitution so that no doubt can exist regarding what the Icelanders 
wish.”168
The news of the message from the Danish King to the Icelandic Government was
received with surprise by the Foreign Office
as, during the recent talks with Count Reventlow, Mr. De Kauffmann and 
Mr. De Fontenay...it was stated that all three of them believed that the 
thing to do was for the Danish Government to accede willingly in the 
decision of the Icelandic Government to sever its ties with Denmark, and 
that all three of them believed the King would make no objection at this 
time.169
Warner thus expressed the opinion “that the King had made a mistake in 
tactics, but that he felt there was nothing the British Government could doi nr\
regarding the matter inasmuch as it was considered to be a domestic affair.”
It was believed by some Icelanders that Fontenay was behind the King’s message to 
Iceland, but this was denied by Kauffmann, who nevertheless admitted that the 
message possibly was the result of his, Reventlow’s and Fontenay’s decision to
171inform the King of the decision and asking him of his opinion.
There was a worry that the King’s message to Iceland and the reaction in Iceland to 
the message would harm Icelandic relations with the rest of the Nordic countries, and
167 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.01/127, from Hull to US Legation in 
Stockholm 11.05.44
168 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.01/127, from Morris, Reykjavik, to 
Secretary o f State, 06.05.44
169 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.01/127, telegram from Winant, London, to 
Secretary of State, Washington, 06.05.44
170 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.01/127, telegram from Winant, London, to 
Secretary of State, Washington, 06.05.44
171 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.01/130, telegram from Morris, Reykjavik, 
to Secretary o f State, 09.05.44
246
the Danish representatives in charge of the other two North Atlantic regions 
Kauffmann, Hilbert and Reventlow were thus anxious to forestall such a turn in 
Nordic relations.172
5. British and American attitude to Icelandic decision to leave the Union
Although the British and Americans acknowledged the right of the Icelanders to
abrogate the Union with the Danish Kingdom after 1943, thus according with the act,
they nevertheless were cautious not to harm their relations elsewhere by taking a too
supportive stance on the matter. The instructions to the U.S. Legation in Reykjavik
from Hull thus read:
Department approves of your proposal to call on the Foreign Minister 
and convey to him orally felicitations on the results of the plebiscite and 
to assure him that we will welcome the Republic of Iceland into the 
Family of Nations...We do not believe that it would be advisable to 
make an additional call on the Regent unless the Foreign Minister 
himself suggests such action. This step would, in our opinion, not only 
accentuate the divergence in attitude between the representatives in 
Reykjavik of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet 
Union on the one hand and the Scandinavian States on the other, but also 
might supply additional fuel to the German propaganda contention that 
we and the British have been instrumental in bringing about the 
severance of the Act of Union. Further, such action might render 
somewhat anticlimactic the June 17 ceremonies at which the Chiefs of 
the diplomatic missions to Iceland are to deliver formal addresses of 
welcome.173
The same restriction on the British part was also apparent when the Icelanders finally 
declared the establishment of the Icelandic Republic and invited the foreign 
representatives to the official celebrations. Whereas the United States were ready to 
attend the celebrations and Roosevelt even had notified the Icelandic Government 
that they would appoint a “special representative with the rank of Ambassador to 
represent him at the celebrations,”174 the British “felt that the United States 
Government might wish to reconsider its decision to appoint a Special Ambassador
172 FL, J. Nr. 4079/3, Faer0 Amt, Islands forhold til Danmark, br.bk .l40A .l, letter from Kauffmann to 
Hilbert 29.06.44, J. Nr. 4079/3, Faer0 Amt, Islands forhold til Danmark, br.bk.l40A .l
173 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859A.01/124, telegram from Hull to US 
Legation Reykjavik, 28.05.44
174 NARA, Decimal F ilel940-44, RG 59, box 744, 124.59A/5-3044, Department o f State, 
Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. P. Pares, Second Secretary, British Embassy, Mr. 
W illiam C. Trimble, Division o f Northern European Affairs, and Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Chief, 
Division o f Norhtern European Affairs, 30.05.44
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on the occasion of the celebrations incident to the establishment of the Icelandic 
Republic.”175 The British based their argument on the fact that they felt that the 
“Icelanders have behaved with little consideration in dismissing their King when he 
is in captivity, and they might in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government more 
properly have waited until the Danish Government were once more free to discuss
i
with them the term of settlement.”
Thus, although the British and Americans upon their arrivals to Iceland had 
expressed their support and interest in Icelandic independence, they were reluctant to 
make official approvals to the Icelandic decision, due to the repercussions it would 
have, because of the manner, the Icelandic Government had conducted the affair.
The reason for the Icelandic wish to leave the Union with the Danish Kingdom
before the war was over was stated in a report to the Secretary of State in June 1943.
In the report Leland Morris drew particular attention to the statement of Mr.
Benediktsson that the Icelanders’
desire to have a fixed form of Government before the war is over so that 
they will have the final voice in the arrangement of their own affairs at 
the peace table.” I [Leland Morris] do not recall that I have seen quite 
such an open and blunt statement heretofore offered of one of the bases 
for the Icelandic desire to dissolve the union without negotiation with 
Denmark. Only yesterday evening the Danish Minister expressed to me a 
hope that the United States might intervene further in this matter and 
persuade the Icelanders to hold in suspense the question until Denmark 
was in a position to negotiate. I told him that as far as I could see we had 
expressed our views relative to this question and were not likely to go 
further.177
5.1. Other countries’ reactions to Icelandic decision to leave the Union 
The Norwegian Minister in London, Lie, was a bit concerned with what reaction the 
Norwegian should adopt if the Icelanders approached him and asked Norway for 
recognition of Iceland as a sovereign and independent state following their decision
175 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, box 744, 124.59A/5-3044, Department o f State, 
Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. P. Pares, Second Secretary, British Embassy, Mr. 
W illiam C. Trimble, Division o f Northern European Affairs, and Mr. Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Chief, 
Division of Norhtern European Affairs, 30.05.44
176 NARA, Decimal F ilel940-44, RG 59, box 744, 124.59A/5-3044, Memorandum by the British 
Embassy, Washington, D.C., 30.05.44
177 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5383, 859.01/97, from Leland Morris, US Legation, 
Reykjavik, to Secretary of State, Washington, 10.06.43
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to leave the Union. As we saw just earlier the Norwegians, along with Sweden, had 
expressed their concerns with the Icelandic plans in 1942 of a premature departure 
from the Act of Union. He therefore approached Collier with the wish that the British 
kept him and the rest of his office up to date with the attitude of the British 
Government towards this issue and other matters related to Iceland.178
6. Post-occupation Iceland
If Iceland was deemed a too important strategic point prior to and during the war to 
be left alone, the acknowledgement of her strategic importance to the British and 
Americans did not diminish in the aftermath of the war. The interests of both the 
British and Americans in future bases in Iceland were always present in their policies 
surrounding the occupation of the island. This was also a reason why the British were 
reluctant to completely withdraw from Iceland and kept a small number of troops in 
the island after the American take-over, despite the need for all forces in other 
theatres of war. However, British and American aspirations of future bases in the 
island were too delicate an issue to entertain during the occupation, and was 
therefore not spoken of officially. When the matter thus was raised by a member of 
the U.S. Senate it caused much stir.
According to the Icelandic newspaper Visir Tom Connally, the Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee had expressed
his opinion of the policy which he considers the United States should 
follow in future concerning the acquisition of bases abroad. Connally 
said among other things...’in the Atlantic the United States should try to 
reach an agreement regarding a long term lease of all bases on islands 
there if necessary but if possible the United States should try to gain 
possession of these islands. It is vitally essential to have bases in Iceland.
These are Connally’s words and it is right to point out that the committee 
which he is chairman wields the greatest influence in the United States 
regarding the country’s foreign policy. Iceland and its future is beginning 
to be the subject of frequent discussion in the United States.179
This article caused great concern in Iceland and especially within the Atlhing. 
Subsequently the American Minister was called upon. His queries to the State
178 RA, UD-579, 34.1/2a, Notat fra t. Lie, UD, London 22.05.44
179 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5385, 859A.20/8-2244, telegram from Dreyfus, Iceland 
to Secretary o f State, 22.08.44
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Department resulted in Connally being confronted with the matter. Connally, 
however, said that he had been misquoted.180
The importance of these releases [copies of editorials from the Chicago 
Tribune and the Washington Star discussing in the problem of post-war 
security ad the necessity of military bases outside the United States in 
order to maintain the peace] is that they evidence a skilful move on the 
part of the Foreign Ministry to keep alive in the public mind the 
important question of post-war bases in Iceland.181
In London Ernest Bevin, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, feared that the 
intention of the Americans to acquire future bases in Iceland would have 
repercussion with regard to the Soviet Union and her relation with Denmark and 
Norway. The Soviet Union had already established bases on the Danish island of 
Bornholm in the Baltic Sea, and it was contemplated that the American move would 
cause the Soviet Union to acquire more bases in Denmark and Norway. The 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs also noted that ’’The Russians already occupy 
the Danish island of Bornholm and this American proposal may induce them to stay 
in Northern Norway. We might thus get straight back to the worst form of power 
politics and armed neutrality. The chances of organising world security on an 
international basis through the Security Council would be gravely prejudiced and the 
relevant provision of the Charter might remain a dead letter.”182 The British therefore 
would have preferred that the Charter was done and dusted before anything was done 
by the Americans: “I know that you share my anxiety that nothing should be done in 
this difficult period before the United Nations Organisation has got under way to 
prejudice the successful working of the provision in the Charter for preserving world 
security in the future.”183
The course chosen for the future of Iceland did not come as a surprise to the pro- 
German voices in Denmark. Already in 1942 an article in the pro-Nazi paper DNB 
read:
180 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5385, 859A.20/8-2244, telegram from Hull, State 
Department, to AM Legation, Reykjavik, 28.08.44
181 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5385, 859A.20/10-544, from Dreyfus, AM Legation, 
Reykjavik, to Secretary of State, Washington
182 PRO, CAB 120/571, Copy o f a Minute (P.M.45/21) from the Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs 
to the Prime Minister. American Desire for Bases in Iceland. 27.09.45
183 PRO, CAB 120/571, Draft o f letter to Mr. Byrnes from the Secretary o f State, FO, September,
1945
250
British-American negotiations about the future of Iceland are on the point 
of being concluded. It was already agreed between Roosevelt and 
Churchill during their last meeting that in the event of a victory of the 
Western Powers, Iceland will pass after the war under the U.S. control.
The population will be accorded a certain measure of self-government, 
but real power will be in the hands of the eventual commander of the 
American base on the island.184
E. CONCLUSION
The case of Iceland and the respective Danish representatives in charge of securing 
Danish interests in Iceland differs greatly from that of the Faroe Islands in Chapter 
III. Whereas the Danish representatives with regard to the Faroe Islands were highly 
active, on the whole this was not the case with regard to Iceland. This difference was 
due to several factors, both in terms of persons involved and circumstances. As we 
saw in this chapter the British personnel sent to Iceland was of a higher calibre than 
that sent to the Faroe Islands. Also, both the British and the Americans quickly 
acknowledged the importance of Iceland in their war plans, whereas the strategic 
importance of the Faroes, once Iceland had been occupied, never really materialised. 
The constitutional status of Iceland, as compared to that of the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland, also had its effect on the difference of the roles of, and the influence 
exerted by, the Danish representatives with regard to Iceland as compared with the 
other two North Atlantic territories.
The Danish representatives, nevertheless, initially succeeded in influence the British 
and Americans to stop the Icelanders from leaving the Union prematurely.185 
However, as the importance of Iceland (and Greenland) increased the influence 
exerted by the Danish to prevent British and American policies from working in the 
favour of Icelandic departure from the Union diminished. One point which highlights 
the importance Iceland was to have to the Allied is that while no prominent figures 
ever visited the Faroe Islands, Iceland received the visits of Churchill, the Secretary 
of War and the Secretary of Treasury from the U.S. Administration and five 
Americans senators.
184 PRO, FO 371/32751, from Miss Thornton, Ministry o f Information to Clarke, FO, 15.09.42 
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It was not only the fear of repercussions to the British and American causes
elsewhere which sparked Allied concern of an early Icelandic departure from the
Union while under their occupation. The consequences this would possibly have on
the new world order after the war were also in their minds:
.. .the abrogation of the Act of Union before the date of its normal expiry 
might be prejudicial to the interests of the United Nations, and be used as 
propaganda against them by the Axis Powers. Axis propagandists would 
tell the world that the United Nations had induced Iceland to separate 
from Denmark.186
The first part of this chapter focused on the Icelandic decision to take charge of her 
foreign affairs and the readiness of the British and the Americans to accept this 
decision. The findings showed that this decision was not opposed by the Danish 
Ministers in London and Washington, who otherwise had been in charge of Icelandic 
foreign relations with the British and the United States. Also examined was what 
constituted the extent of the success of the Icelanders in acquiring full control over 
their foreign affairs and the extent to which this would form the conduct of British 
and American policies towards Iceland. Moreover, the extent to which this 
determined the role of the Danish representatives concerned with the island was also 
looked into.
In addition to the German occupation of Denmark on April 9th 1940 three events 
during Second World War were to shape the Anglo-Dano-Icelandic relations: the 
British occupation, the American occupation and the decision to leave the Union 
with the Danish Kingdom. Whereas the role of the Danish representatives was close 
to non existence in matters relating to the occupation and the shift in occupational 
forces, they were highly active in trying to influence the British and Americans when 
the Icelanders began to plan an early exit from the Union. Although they succeeded 
in influencing the British and Americans, by pointing out the repercussions of an 
early Icelandic exit while under British or American occupation would have for their 
war case, especially in terms of German propaganda, the future strategic importance 
of Iceland weighed more. The Danes were therefore to a degree successful in
186 NARA, RG 226, OSS, Entry 16, Box 1568, Foreign Office Research Department, Whitehall, “The 
international Status of Iceland”, 08.01.45
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forestalling the untimely Icelandic plans to leave the Union before 1943, but not 
after.
An important issue to stress in relations to the American take-over of the occupation 
of Iceland is that the take-over took place prior the United States had entered the war, 
that is while the U.S. still was neutral. In order to overcome the question of 
legitimacy for taking such an action Iceland had to be included in the Western 
Hemisphere. Although the fact that the United States was neutral at the point of the 
take-over was important, what was even more important to the Icelanders was the 
prospects of an increased access to the U.S. market, which this would entail. With a 
stronger economy, the island would enhance her ability to leave the union with the 
Danish Kingdom. The Icelanders therefore put much effort in, and succeeded, in 
having Iceland included in the Western Hemisphere.
Of the points in the agreement between the Icelandic Prime Minister and President 
Roosevelt on the American take-over the two most important were the American 
promise to recognise Iceland’s sovereignty and independence, both during the war 
and after, and the promise not to interfere with internal affairs. These two statements 
proved to be vital in the Icelandic argumentation against the Danish representatives, 
who nonetheless were able to exert a considerable degree of influence on the British 
and Americans in the matter. This was due to the fact that the Americans were 
anxious not to cause any damage in their relations with Denmark, especially with 
regard to Greenland. The British, too, were wary not to cause any upset with the 
Danish. They had already occupied two of her territories without the consent of 
neither the Government in Copenhagen nor the local population in the islands, and 
the British were well aware of, that their conduct of affairs in the North Atlantic 
could easily be exploited by enemy propaganda. There was also the notion of 
solidarity amongst the British for their fellow colonial power, also because if the 
British allowed the territories of another empire more independence, while under 
their occupation, they would have difficulties not doing the same for their own 
colonies.
Some Icelanders felt that the British had pushed them to invite the Americans to their 
island; those, who were reported to suggest that “the British were pressing it to invite
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[the Americans] here,”187 were therefore not too far off the mark. However, as this 
chapter shows, there were several forces at work, the Icelandic Minister in the United 
States being one. Also, the American take-over was not unwelcomed by the 
Icelanders. As the chapter shows the take-over was a culmination of Icelandic 
interests in securing a stronger basis for independence, British needs to relieve their 
forces for other theatres, and American intent to widen their scope of influence to 
Europe and take a more active role in helping the Allied cause despite the isolationist 
mood on the home front.
It is worth noting that although the American take-over did spark criticism, none 
were officially made by Danish authorities. The Danes realised that with the support 
of the British and the Americans for Icelandic independence a resentful Danish 
stance would only harm Danish interests elsewhere and the future position of 
Denmark in the world. This was also noted by the Americans; thus when discussing 
the situation in Denmark and the role of the Danish representatives in 1942 when 
Danish cooperation with the Germans was at its high, Welles pointed out to FDR that 
“you will remember that in view of our occupation of Iceland and of Greenland, of 
the very cooperative attitude of the Danish Minister in Washington and various of his 
colleagues...”188
The reason behind Icelandic wish to abrogate from the Union with the Danish 
Kingdom before the war ended was that when the war was over they wanted to “have 
the final voice in the arrangement of their own affairs at the peace table.”189
187 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5384, 859A.20/124, telegram from MacVeagh, 
Reykjavik, to Secretary o f State, Washington, 17.10.41
188 FDR Official File, OF486-OF491, OF488 Denmark, Box 1, folder OF488, Denmark 1933-1945, 
from Sumner W elles, Department o f State, to FDR, 13.06.42
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CHAPTER V: U.S. OCCUPATION OF GREENLAND AND THE POWER
STRUGGLE AMONGST THE DANISH REPRESENTATIVES 
The two previous chapters have examined the roles of the Danish representatives 
with respect to the Faroe Islands and Iceland. This chapter will not only examine the 
role of the Danish representatives with respect to Greenland, but also the power 
struggle which emerged amongst the Danish representatives due to the fact that no 
Danish Government in exile existed during the war, hence the division of the chapter 
into two parts. The first part examines the elements of the competition for the 
authority over Greenland and sees a power-shift taking place from the Greenland 
Governors Svane and Brun to Danish Minister in Washington, Kauffmann. The 
second part examines the situation the Danish representatives found themselves in 
arising from the lack of a Danish Government in exile and the fact that the Danish 
Government was collaborating with the Germans. The power-struggle that the 
situation created amongst the Danish representatives in London and Washington did, 
as we saw in the previous two chapters, have some effect on the Danish 
representatives in Iceland and the Faroes. Especially Kauffmann’s calls for Hilbert 
and Fontenay to show their support of the Free Denmark movement and renounce the 
Government in Copenhagen caused Hilbert and Fontenay some distress, as they did 
not feel that such a move would serve their positions.
Apart from being situated within the Western Hemisphere and therefore covered by 
the Monroe Doctrine, there were other matters related to the unprotected post-April 
9th 1940 Greenland which were of importance to the Americans. The cryolite mine in 
Ivigtut provided the U.S. industry with aluminum for the production of airplanes; 
Greenland also became an important stepping stone for the transatlantic route 
between the U.S. and Europe (Britain) and later on of great importance in the 
protection of the Atlantic convoys.
When Denmark was occupied by the Germans on April 9th 1940 Greenland was 
administered from the Greenland Office in Copenhagen and run by two governors in 
Greenland, Svane and Brun. However, with the connection with Copenhagen being 
severed all matters relating to Greenland were initially handled by the two governors 
as agreed by the U.S. Department of State. However, as time went by more and more 
of the administrative power was taken over by the Danish Legation in Washington
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and the Minister there, Mr. Henrik de Kauffmann. This happened partly against the 
will of the governors in Greenland, but with the consent of the Americans, who took 
over the protection of Greenland shortly after the connection with Copenhagen was 
severed. This chapter looks into how this shift of power happened and which factors 
were present in the process.
The Greenland Agreement permitted the Americans to some extent to establish 
bases, radio and metrological stations in the island, and the prospect of this extended 
boundary of activity of the Americans in Greenland did not please the Greenland 
Governors. The Governors condemned the fact that they had not been consulted and 
that they neither had had the chance to scrutinise the Act beforehand. This, because 
the Agreement did not address a solution to some of possible consequences of the 
American presence in the island on the local environment and population, such as 
loss of land and hunting areas to the activities of the Americans. Also the terms 
regarding the conclusion of the American protection of the island were rather diffuse. 
It was clear that Kauffmann had rushed the process of the Defence Agreement, 
because it lacked in the legal part and did not serve the interests of Greenland to the 
full. The Agreement became one of the single most important events in the shaping 
of the Danish position amongst the allies during the war and in the aftermath of the 
war.
Although the American troops in Greenland hardly ever got in contact with the locals 
there were some troubles between the American Consul and the two governors; 
these, however, stemmed rather from a personal difference between the three of them 
than from practical issues regarding the U.S. presence in Greenland. Did this fact 
have any bearing on the attitude towards the shift of power between the Governors in 
Greenland and the Minister in Washington that took place? Or was the shift purely a 
practical solution taken by the Department of State? Where other factors involved in 
this change of attitude of the State Department? And if so, which were they?
Prior to April 9th 1940 Greenland was, as mentioned in Chapter I, a closed area with 
its only communication to the outside world managed through Copenhagen. This 
meant that all traffic, export and import had to go through Denmark where Greenland 
matters were handled by the Greenland Office. The German occupation of Denmark
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thus left Greenland without a protectorate that catered for all the needs of the island. 
This was the immediate problem the Danish Governors were faced with in the 
aftermath of the severing of communications with Copenhagen.
Being within the Western Hemisphere Greenland was covered by the Monroe 
Doctrine. It was therefore in the interests of the U.S. Government to secure the island 
from a foreign power establishing bases there. The decision of the Danish Minister in 
Washington to sign the Greenland Treaty without the consent of his Government 
caused a crisis between the Government in Copenhagen, the Danish Embassy in 
Washington and amongst the Danish representatives. What did Kauffmann achieve 
by doing this? Did he do it for the good of Denmark and the King, to whom he had 
declared his loyalty to at his appointment as Minister? Or were there other motives 
behind the decision?
The fact that there was no Danish Government in exile and the fact that the 
Government in Copenhagen cooperated with the Germans (until after the August- 
revolt in 1943, when the Government was abolished) meant that the post-war 
political situation in Denmark was very open. Did this have any influence on the 
decisions the Danish representatives took with regard to their positions towards the 
Government in Copenhagen and towards the policy they chose with regard to the 
territory they administered and their relations with the locals and occupiers? That is, 
were their actions influenced by their aspirations for a place in the building up of a 
new Denmark after the war?
The move by Kauffmann inevitably sparked a chain of reaction amongst his fellow 
Danish representatives abroad. His subsequent dismissal split the Danish Foreign 
Service between those, who stuck to the loyalty pledges they had given the King 
upon their appointments, and those, who chose to denounce their Government in 
Copenhagen, but remained in their positions, if allowed by their host government, in 
order to safeguard Danish interests in the best way possible. How did this split 
strengthen Kauffmann’s position?
Greenland proved to be an important feature in the shaping of the Danish diplomatic 
corps in the aftermath of the German occupation of Denmark. How did Greenland
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figure in the power struggle that arose amongst Danish representatives abroad due to 
the absence of a Danish Government in exile?
Another question addressed in this chapter is what role the importance of Greenland 
to the Americans played in the status of Danish representatives as compared to other 
countries’ representatives? This is in particular interesting in conjunction with the 
fact that the position of the Danish representatives abroad was very much dependent 
upon the goodwill of their host governments, which again depended upon the 
perception of the situation in Denmark. Why did the Danish representative maintain 
their positions, despite the fact that their Government in Copenhagen was 
collaborating with the enemy? Which obstacles did the Danish representatives 
encounter in their quest to minimize the damage caused by the pre- and post­
occupation policy of the Government in Copenhagen?
A. U.S. POLICIES TOWARDS DENMARK AND GREENLAND 
Politically Greenland is part of Europe, however geographically Greenland is part of 
the North American continent. Therefore, unlike Iceland, Greenland was always 
included in the Western Hemisphere, albeit originally the border did not embrace 
whole of the island. The question of moving the borders in order to justify the 
presence of American troops in Greenland was thus not necessary, as was the case 
with Iceland. However, there were other obstacles; being neutral the United States 
could not send her troops to a territory that belonged to another state. Although the 
U.S. Government fully recognised the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Denmark over 
Greenland, the notion within the State Department was nevertheless that the Danish 
Government was “not in a position to exercise sovereign power over Greenland so 
long as the present military occupation continues.”1
The importance of Greenland to the Americans lay not only in her geographic and 
strategic location; there was also the Cryolite-mine at Ivigtut, which was important to 
the U.S. aluminum industry, which amongst others used it for the production of 
aircraft components.
1 SA, 8.S. 15/1909-45/0002, letter from Cordell Hull to Kauffmann, 07.04.41
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With all Danish monetary resources being held back in the United States following 
the German occupation of Denmark, the Ivigtut mine provided the only income the 
Danish community abroad had at their disposal. The control over the income from 
the Ivigtut mine therefore became a point of struggle between the Governors of 
Greenland and the Danish Minister in Washington; a struggle, which in the end was 
determined by the State Departments acknowledgement of Kauffmann’s status as the 
representative in charge of Danish interests, including Greenlandic, in the United 
States. The process of this power-shift will be examined later.
The severance of connection with Copenhagen following the German occupation of 
Denmark also meant that the Greenlanders needed a new market for the small local 
production of salt fish, blubber and sealskin, which hitherto had been handled via the 
Greenland Administration in Copenhagen. Likewise, although the island had secured 
itself a larger storage of provisions than normal due to the uncertainty of war, 
Greenland needed another source for import of goods, now the connection with 
Copenhagen was severed. The West, that is, the United States and Canada became 
the obvious providers of these needs. To formalize the coverage of these needs both 
countries established consulates in the islands within a few months of the German 
occupation of Denmark and the U.S. Coast Guard began patrolling the waters around 
the island.
These were the parameters of the initial relationship between Greenland and the 
United States. The signing of the Greenland Agreement on April 9th 1941 and the 
entrance of the United States to the war later that year would also had an impact on 
U.S. relations with Greenland and its authorities.
1. U.S. diplomatic relations with Denmark during the war
The United States maintained their representation in Copenhagen after the German 
occupation of Denmark. Although the Government in Copenhagen dismissed 
Kauffmann as their Minister to the United States and despite the fact that the State 
Department decided to recognise Kauffmann as the Danish representative regardless 
of his dismissal, the U.S. Government was not interested in breaking off relations 
with Denmark although Kauffmann had. On May 5th 1941 President Roosevelt thus 
sent a letter to King Christian X in which he wrote:
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I have noted with regret Your Majesty’s statement to the effect that it is 
now inexpedient to deal with the Government of the United States of 
America through Mr. de Kauffmann even though this Government 
recognizes him as Minister of Denmark at Washington. I am confident, 
however, that Your Majesty’s Government will find it possible to 
maintain completely friendly relations with the Government and people 
of the United States of America through the Charge d’Affaires a.i. [ad 
interim] of the United States in Copenhagen.2
As we will see later in this chapter, albeit not applauding Kauffmann’s single-handed 
action without their authorization, the Danish Government was pleased that the 
United States Government took over the protection of Greenland, whilst Denmark 
was occupied. The Germans on the other hand were not so thrilled by the 
arrangement and tried to cast doubt on and cause damage to U.S.-Danish relations. In 
a telegram from Stockholm, Sweden, on December 22nd 1941, the State Department 
was informed that
telephone and telegraphic communications have been cut not by Danish 
Government but by German Wehrmacht...Danish Government continues 
normal relations and has stressed its desire to maintain Legation as long 
as possible. Danes however constantly expect demand from German 
authorities to close Legation.3
This telegram was sent six months after the signing of the Greenland Agreement. It 
must therefore be concluded that the Agreement did not strain the relations between 
the countries to the extent that the Americans felt the need to leave Copenhagen. In 
August the same year the Department of State sent a telegram to the Legation in 
Copenhagen in which it was stated that they “irrespective of changes in the status of 
relations between the United States and Germany which might take place in the 
future, this Government proposes to maintain the Legation at Copenhagen as long as 
possible.”4
The Americans thus maintained their Legation in Copenhagen until December 20th 
1941, when the Legation was informed by the Danish Foreign Office that they had
2 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002 , Kauffmann (Kopi), N ils Svenningsen, Letter from Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to the King Christian X  o f Denmark and Iceland, 05.05.41
3 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, box 744, 124.59/50, telegram from Johnson, Stockholm, to 
Secretary o f State, 22.12.41
4 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, box 744, 124.59/53A, telegram to American Embassy, 
Berlin, from Department o f State 14.08.41
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received a demand from the Germans to close the American Legation.5 Upon asking
whether this implied
a breaking of relations on the part of the Danish Government or whether 
it was simply a request that the Chancellery should not conduct 
business...he [Mr. Hvass of the Foreign Office] stated the latter was the 
case. He was unable to give any indication as to what would happen to 
our group but stated that he felt certain we would be included in the 
regular diplomatic exchange.6
Despite having kept the Legation open for business until late 1941, already in March 
the same year the Americans nevertheless began to contemplate what to do with the 
embassy, and especially the archives, should “a situation arise requiring the departure 
of our Legation and Consular staffs in Copenhagen.”7 The memorandum, written by 
the American Consul Atherton, was clearly written with the forthcoming Greenland 
deal in mind because it further said that “since the closing of our Legation in 
Copenhagen might very possibly be coincident with or preceded by a short time the 
closing of our establishment in Berlin...”8. This indicated that the Americans were 
well aware that an action from their side in the near future would deteriorate relations 
between the Americans and the Governments in Copenhagen and Berlin.
It is worth mentioning that although the U.S. Consular remained in Copenhagen until
January 24th 1942 the Americans did not notified the Danish Government of their
decision to send a consul to Greenland until after the decision was taken.9 This
procedural matter did not seem to cause any distress in Copenhagen. They showed
understanding of the requirements of the situation:
The Ministry take note of the declaration contained in the said 
memorandum to the effect that this action of the U.S.A. Government has 
not in any way impaired the validity of the declaration made by the 
Secretary of State on August 4th 1916 concerning the Danish rights over 
Greenland...The Danish Government note with satisfaction the 
assurances given in the memorandum that the consulate at Godthaab has
5 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, box 744, 124.59/70, Memorandum by State Department, 
Division o f European Affairs, 04.06.42
6 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, box 744, 124.59/70, Memorandum by State Department, 
Division o f European Affairs, 04.06.42
7 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, box 744, 124.59/52 Vi, Memorandum to Atherton by State 
Department, Division of European Affairs, 24.03.41
8 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, box 744, 124.59/52 V2 , Memorandum to Atherton by State 
Department, Division of European Affairs, 24.03.41
9 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002 , Bilag til Redegprelse for Minister Kauffmann’s Holdning (’’Graabog 
I”), bilag 33, Memorandum from the Legation o f the United States o f America 31.07.40
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been established on a provisional basis and will not operate to the injury 
of any legitimate interests.10
The Danish Government, however, expected that “the American Government will in 
future if wishing to undertake further measures in connection with the approvisioning 
of Greenland submit such plans to the Danish Government through the channel of the 
American Legation in Copenhagen, [sic]”11 The U.S. Government, on the other hand, 
found this impossible. Although they recognised the sovereignty and independence 
of Denmark they nevertheless recognised that the Danish Government was not in a 
position to exercise full sovereignty while being under German military occupation. 
The U.S. Government thus decided to acknowledge those Danish elements, which 
were not under German occupation and had chosen not to follow orders from 
German controlled Danish Government. This was the only way the U.S. Government 
could possibly recognise the neutrality of Greenland, for otherwise Greenland would 
be under the control of a belligerent, Germany. Hence, as long as Greenland acted 
neutrally from the Government in Copenhagen the U.S. Government could make a 
distinction between their dealings with Greenland and the authorities there and the 
Danish Government in Copenhagen. If the situation was to change and Greenland 
seized to act autonomously from the Government in Copenhagen the U.S. 
Government would find it difficult to object other belligerents, such as Britain or 
Germany, to occupy the island.12 Thus, as long as the United States remained neutral 
in the war, they could only provide protection to another neutral territory. This was 
also the reason why a Canadian protection of Greenland could not have been 
accepted by the U.S.A., seeing as Canada was a belligerent.
2. American concerns regarding Greenland following the German occupation of 
Denmark
10 SA, 84 .B .2 .a /l909-45/0002 , Bilag til Redeg0relse for Minister Kauffmann’s Holdning (’’Graabog 
I”) bilag 37, Note Verbale delivered to the Legation o f the United States o f America by the Danish 
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs on 16.08.40
11 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 86, 125.422H/11, letter from Copenhagen to Secretary 
of State, Washington, 17.08.1940
12 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01/293, memorandum by Berle of 
conversation with Kauffmann, 03.09.40
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It seems that following Britain’s occupation of the Faroes and the notion that Iceland
inevitably was next, the State Department feared that the British had forgotten the
Agreement of 1920 between the United States and Denmark13, which the U.S. had
informed Britain of. An aide-memoire from the Department of State written on the
day of the landing of British troops in the Faroes read:
Without assuming that the Government of Great Britain has any thought 
of interfering with the present status of Greenland but having in mind the 
existing situation resulting from the war in Europe and particularly as it 
relates to Denmark, it is deemed appropriate to call attention to the 
abovementioned communication of 1920 and to say that the position of 
the Government of the United States remains unchanged.14
The Americans, however, were not too keen on going into Greenland themselves, at 
least not prematurely and not before the American public was ready for such a move. 
Thus, when Kauffmann met Roosevelt on April 10th 1940, the day after the German 
occupation of Denmark, and stressed the importance of an announcement by the 
President on the safety of Greenland, the President only went as far as to promise to 
do what was in his power. Roosevelt thought it better to wait with a too strong 
declaration of commitments to the Greenland cause, because there was a risk that 
such a declaration would prompt criticism from the Isolationists. The President, 
nevertheless, was more optimistic about swaying the American public which, to a 
great extent, was not aware that Greenland fell under the Western Hemisphere. Thus, 
when informed hereof, Roosevelt expected the public to accept U.S. protection of 
Greenland on that basis.15
There were other aspects to take into account as well. The State Department was 
worried that any move with regard to sending troops to Greenland might have 
repercussions in the Far East, where the fear was that Japan would follow such a step 
by occupying the Netherlands East Indies.16
13 “In 1920 the Government o f the US stated that it would not be disposed to recognize the right o f a 
third government to acquire Greenland should the Danish Government desire to dispose o f that 
territory.” Department of State for the Press, 09.01.41
14 PRO, FO 371/24787, Aide-memoir from the Department o f State, 13.04.40
15 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Kauffmann-Sagen, Referat No. 1/Bilag, p. 5
16 PRO, FO 371/24784, from Marquess of Lothian, Washington, to FO, 27.04.40
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The question of protecting Greenland was thus a delicate matter and on the Danish 
part Kauffmann instructed Svane and Brun not to do anything, which might provoke 
a reaction from the public or the politicians either in the U.S. or in Denmark. 
Especially, Kauffmann stressed, the wording “protection” had to be avoided at all 
costs. The Greenlanders should also be cautious not to ask for too much from the
17Americans to begin with, 
a) American relief to Greenland
Although the Greenlanders appreciated the American relief, there were worries 
amongst them with regard to what the American presence in the island would entail. 
In October 1940 American Consul Penfield reported to the Secretary of State on the 
atmosphere in Greenland with regard to the presence of the Americans on the island: 
“The questions most asked in Greenland this summer seem to be, “will the United 
States take over Greenland” and “what will happen if she does?”18 Amongst some of 
the Danish residents in Greenland there was concern regarding the possibility of 
losing their positions in the island, as there seemed to be some fear that the United 
States would take over the entire administration of the colony. Consul Penfield did 
his best to eradicate this fear in conversations with Danes in the various settlements. 
With regard to the native Greenlanders, although there were not a sufficient number 
of educated or wealthy Greenlanders to constitute a group with any real power in the 
colony, it was of passing interest to note that some of the more “radical” 
Greenlanders privately expressed the hope that the United States would take over the 
administration, on the assumption that the Greenlanders would obtain greater 
freedom and privileges under American rule.19
Although the reaction of the Danish Government to the arrangement between the 
Americans and the authorities in charge of Greenland for provision supplies was 
positive, there was some scepticism amongst the Danes in Denmark to the 
arrangement. From the Greenland Society it was reported that the “Administration
17 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Legationsraad Blechingbergs Akter vedr. Minister Kauffmanns Politik: 
Gr0nland: Bilag 20; letter from Kauffmann to Svane and Brun, 08.05.50
18 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5397, 859B .00/11, report from American consulate, 
Godthaab, sent to Secretary o f State, 07.10.40
19 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5397, 859B.00/11, report from American consulate, 
Godthaab, sent to Secretary o f State, 07.10.40
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had supplied colony with requirements for one year in addition to the current year,” 
and the arrangement therefore came as a surprise; nevertheless, it was concluded that 
although “it is not known who took initiative...we trust our Greenland officials and 
have faith in their judgment and loyalty. [The] District chiefs have acted on own 
responsibility and undoubtedly to the best in their belief but certain points are not 
understandable here.”20
3. Enemy activity in Greenland
Even with bases along the Norwegian coast, Greenland was too remote for the 
German Luftwaffe to cause any concern of such to the U.S., as was the case with the 
Faroes and Iceland. Some German activity in the air was registered nevertheless. In 
the autumn of 1940 an air reconnaissance was registered over East Greenland and in 
spring 1941 a German bomber and another German war plane were spotted. On the 
sea, on the other hand, the German threat to Greenland was present, but the level of 
German activity in Greenland never reached the same level as in the other two 
territories. During the summer of 1940 some German activity was registered on the 
eastern coast of Greenland. Three ships sailing from German occupied Norway 
arrived of the coast of Greenland supposedly for commercial or scientific purposes. 
Norway had still retained some rights with regard to the North Eastern coast of 
Greenland and at the outbreak of war some Norwegian hunters were in the area. The 
presence of Norwegian ships in the area, therefore, could be explained. However, 
although it was stated that the landing was for scientific purposes, the actual reason 
turned out to be to set up a meteorological station in order to provide assistance to 
German belligerent operation in the North Atlantic.
The substantiation of German activity in the Western Hemisphere also helped paving 
the way for the U.S. Government to take further steps for a more active role in the 
defence of Greenland.
20 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01/302, telegram from Perkins, 
Copenhagen, to Secretary o f State, 18.10.40
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4. Further U.S. involvement with Greenland
German activity in Greenland not only substantiated the argument against the 
isolationists to protect the island based on the Monroe Doctrine it also caused 
concern in other American states resulting in the consultation of American Foreign 
Ministers at Habana on July 25, 1940, where it was declared that “any attempt on the 
part of a non-American state should be considered an act of aggression, and that they 
would cooperate in defense against any such aggression.”21 A declaration, the Act of 
Habana, further declared that “the status of regions in this continent belonging to
European powers was a subject of deep concern to all of the governments of the
22American republics.” The increased German activity in Greenland thus required 
that “further steps for the defense of Greenland were necessary to bring Greenland 
within the system of hemispheric defense envisaged by the Act of Habana.”23 The 
path to the subsequent agreement on the defense of Greenland, signed on April 9th 
1941 was thus well cleared in advance and Roosevelt had strong arguments on his 
side against the criticisms from the isolationists.
The Greenland Agreement stated that the United States recognized Danish 
sovereignty over Greenland and that the United States would assist Greenland in 
maintaining its status. However, the Agreement lacked a clear statement on when 
and how the American presence in the island would be brought to a close. Also, the 
Agreement granted the United States the right to locate and construct landing sites 
for airplanes and other facilities for the defense of Greenland and for the defense of 
the American Continent.
Not only was the legal basis of Kauffmann signing the Agreement on behalf of the 
Government in Copenhagen questionable, but between 1941 and 1944 the Americans 
built 17 bases of different sizes ranging from airfields to weather stations in 
Greenland. These constructions caused the locals some distress as they interfered 
with their livelihood, that is, their hunting grounds. The Agreement provided that in 
case of such interference caused by the American presence in the island financial
21 U.S. Department o f State, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943, U.S., Department o f State, Publication 1983, p. 640
22 U.S. Department o f States, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, 1983, p. 640
23 U.S. Department o f States, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, 1983, p. 640
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compensation would be given, but this would always just be based on an estimation 
and did not lessen the distress and disrupt experienced by the locals.
Thus, although providing Greenland with the necessary protection and at the 
meantime recognizing Danish sovereignty over Greenland, the Agreement was met 
by criticism amongst some Danes abroad as well as in Denmark, as will be 
demonstrated later in this chapter.
4.1. American Consul in Greenland, James K. Penfield
On May 7th 1940 the State Department announced its establishment of an American 
consulate at Godthaab and Mr. James K. Penfield as the designated Consul. The 
Consulate was
provisionally established at Godthaab to facilitate the handling of 
numerous questions which have arisen with respect to the purchase in the 
United States of food and other supplies for Greenland and of the sale of 
Greenland products in this country.24
The establishment of an American consulate in Greenland left the State Department 
in a dilemma. According to the Monroe Doctrine it was an obligation that an 
American Government representative was to be situated in Greenland in order to 
study conditions, establish liaison with the local authorities, et cetera. The 
Americans, however, were sure that if they contacted the German controlled Danish 
Government beforehand, in order to achieve approval of the establishment of the 
consulate, they would be refused, and this would therefore leave the U.S. 
Government in embarrassment. The Americans thus concluded that “normal 
independent sovereign functions had been suspended through the occupation of 
Denmark by a belligerent power. Accordingly, as a matter of policy, we considered 
the consent of the Danish Minister in Washington and the Greenland Government as 
sufficient authority under the circumstances for us to go ahead with the establishment 
of a consulate.”25
24 PRO, FO 371/23904, Department o f State, for the Press, 09.01.41
25 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 862, 125.422H/10, Department o f State, Division of 
European Affairs, to Mr. Dunn, 22.07.40
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Penfield’s instructions were to secure good relations with the Governors of 
Greenland, Svane and Brun. With the consulate situated in Godthaab, Penfield’s first 
contact was naturally with Svane, who was the Governor of South Greenland and 
positioned in Godthaab. Although, as will be evident later in this chapter, Penfield 
did not think highly of the Greenland Governors, he nevertheless took upon himself 
to follow his instructions to secure good relations with them and planned to travel up
9 f\to Godhavn, the seat of the Governor of North Greenland, to meet Governor Brun.
Penfield quickly got a negative impression of Greenland, its inhabitants and
authorities. Of the natives he wrote to the Secretary of State that “in their childlike
way, they invariably approve of anyone who gives them things.”27 In a telegram
almost a year later likewise to the Secretary of State Penfield wrote
Greenland like other unsophisticated regions appears to be 
extraordinarily productive of rumors and false reports...there are a lot of 
false reports and rumors always current in a country like Greenland 
which is so cut off from world events. These rumors and reports are often 
repeated, even though obviously inspired to a considerable extent by 
active imaginations, by reliable Greenlanders and even the more 
sophisticated Danes.28
Penfield’s impression of the Greenlanders did not improve over time. A few months
later he attended a meeting of the Greenland United Councils, a gathering of all the
local chiefs and administrators. In his report from this meeting Penfield wrote:
The session as a whole gave more the impression of a class in school 
than of a deliberative assembly in operation...It is only natural, however, 
that a people which has lived under the extremely paternal Danish 
colonial system for over two hundred years should be characterized by an 
immature provisionalism, and the tone of the Council meetings is 
certainly no reflection on the native intelligence or character of the 
people. 9
Thus, he did not have a high impression of the standard of the Councils or the role 
they played either. His impression was that the role of the Councils was relatively
26 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.01/189, telegram from Penfield to Secretary 
of State 27.05.40
27 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5397, 859B.00/11, report from American consulate, 
Godthaab, sent to Secretary o f State, 07.10.40
28 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/30, telegram from Penfield, Godthaab, 
to Secretary o f State, 04.05.41
29 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B:00/49, from Penfield, Godthaab, to 
Secretary o f State, 15.07.41
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unimportant and that there was little or no interest amongst the Greenlanders in the 
deliberations of the Councils. This impression was confirmed by the absence of 
spectators to the sessions, which were open to the public.30
Penfield’s negative impression of the locals and, as we will see in the following 
pages, of the Danish Governors in his reports he sent back home did not aid the 
Governors’ cause, when they later struggled with Kauffmann for the power over 
Greenland.
5. Greenland and the Danish representatives
As mentioned in Chapter I, Greenland was a Danish colony at the outbreak of war 
and was run accordingly, with a strict ‘closed’ policy. All ships sailing to Greenland 
came from Copenhagen and all supplies were obtained through the Greenland Trade 
Office in Copenhagen. With little traffic to and from Greenland, the Greenlanders 
were more or less left to their own devices. Thus, when Greenland was opened up to 
the outside world following the German occupation of Denmark, the Governors 
found it difficult to adapt to the new situation. Their lack of experience with other 
areas than local domestic politics became apparent. This was especially the case of 
Brun, who was Svane’s junior and compared to Svane had limited experience 
governing Greenland. He was thus perceived by his countrymen in the United States 
as “not young enough to comfortably seek guidance from others and not old enough 
to acknowledge that the wiser a man is, the more willing he is to seek other’s 
opinions.”(translated)31
Apart from the disruptions caused by the constructions by the American forces to the 
livelihood of the natives and apart from the few cases of contacts between the natives 
and the members of the American forces, which the Danish representatives otherwise 
had put much effort into preventing, it was reported that the population of Greenland 
appeared to be
30 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B:00/49, from Penfield, Godthaab, to 
Secretary o f State, 15.07.41
31 SA, 8.S.15 (B ilag)/1909-45/0002, Gr0nlandsafdelingens Kontor ved generalkonsulatet I New York. 
Rapport om ’’The American-Greenland Commission” og dens Forretningsudvalg i Tiden April 1940 
til August 1941. Udarbejdet af Kommissionens Formand H. Chr. Sonne.
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adapting themselves easily to the changing conditions, and are, on the 
whole, contented. This is no doubt due to the fact that they are materially 
well provided for. Their connections with America and Canadian ships 
have added interest and excitement to their lives.32
5.1.Danish Governors in Greenland, Svane and Brun
Shortly after the German occupation of Denmark the Danish Minister in Washington,
Kauffmann, declared himself independent from the German controlled Government
in Copenhagen. This meant that he would not take orders from Copenhagen if these
were perceived as being made under duress by the occupiers. As will be
demonstrated in the second section of this chapter, which deals with the relationship
between the Danish representatives abroad, and which has also been mentioned in
the earlier chapters, Kauffmann was anxious that all Danish representatives abroad
followed his suit, there amongst also the Greenland Governors, Svane and Brun.
When no immediate reaction came from the Greenland Governors to his request of
allegiance both Kauffmann and the State Department got worried.
...During the past two days these messages have been insistently 
demanding an answer, but no answers have come. Two theories are 
entertained to explain this state of affairs: (1) that German sympathizers 
in Greenland, with or without assistance, have taken some action there; 
though this is regarded as improbable, and (2) that the Greenland 
authorities have been receiving messages and instructions from 
Copenhagen as well as from the Danish Minister in Washington and that 
they are undecided what to do and are sitting tight.33
As it turned out the latter was the case. Both Svane and Brun were uncomfortable 
with the shift of power that took place after the German occupation of Denmark and 
the subsequent interest shown by others, especially the Americans, to the situation of 
Greenland. The Greenland Governors felt strong loyalty towards the King and 
Denmark. Nearly a month after the German occupation of Denmark the United 
Greenland Councils met in Godthaab and adopted a resolution reiterating their oath 
of allegiance to King Christian X and Denmark.34
32 PRO, FO 371/24790, Postal Censorship Reports, New Series no. 98, 19.12.40
33 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.01/233 GRR, secret memorandum written 
on 27.04.40, attached to report by Penfield (written at Washington, DC) sent Secretary o f State
10.07.40
34 Herbert W. Briggs, “The Validity of the Greenland Agreement,” American Journal o f International 
Law. Vol. 35 (3) Jul. 1941, p. 507
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Explaining the situation of the Greenland Governors and their realm of power to the 
Secretary of State, Penfield pointed out that “the legal basis of the present 
administration of Greenland in Article 10 of the Law of 1925 which states that the 
Governors may “in special cases make such arrangements as the welfare of the 
population may render necessary”.35 With the plan that Governor Brun would travel 
to New York to handle matters related to the situation Greenland found herself in, the 
Governors executed a decree stating that in the event of Governor Brun being absent 
from Greenland he would be empowered to act on behalf of Greenland while 
Governor Svane would take over the administration of both North and South 
Greenland.36
This was the initial set up of the administration in Greenland. However, 
disagreements amongst the Danish representatives in Greenland and Washington on 
which policies should be adopted with regard to Greenland brought about changes in 
the administration. This will be looked upon closer later on in this chapter in the 
section examining the shift of power that took place.
a) Governor Svane
Aksel Svane was appointed Governor of South Greenland in 1932. In a telegram to 
Secretary of State six months after his arrival in Godthaab, Penfield had little 
positive to say about Svane and his administration. Penfield found him pompous and 
rather inefficient in his position, where he showed “inability to delegate 
responsibility...and himself incapable of handling efficiently the mass of detailed 
involved in the administration of the colony.”37 Furthermore Penfield found Svane to 
be “unable to grasp the “feel” of the situations in his dealings with people, a fault 
which many times leads to unnecessary and unconscious tactlessness on his part.”38 
Penfield also felt that Svane lacked attachment to the island and its in inhabitants. 
According to Penfield Svane was due to return to Denmark, where he was expected
35NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5387, 859B.00//11, from American Consulate, 
Godthaab, to Secretary o f State, 07.10.40
36 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5387, 859B.00//11, from American Consulate, 
Godthaab, to Secretary of State, 07.10.40
37NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5387, 859B.00//11, report from American Consulate, 
Godthaab, to Secretary o f State, 07.10.40
38NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5387, 859B.OO//11, report from American Consulate, 
Godthaab, to Secretary o f State, 07.10.40
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to be appointed to a judgeship. “All his actions, therefore,” Penfield concluded “are 
influenced by his understandable desire to avoid any act which would prejudice his 
chances of obtaining a desirable appointment in Denmark after the war.” 39
When Svane in 1941 left for the United States Penfield noted the remarkable change 
in the administration in Greenland. Reporting home to the Secretary of State Penfield 
wrote “on May 17th Governor Svane left for the United States...and very soon 
thereafter the effect of Governor Brun’s greater energy and willingness to delegate at 
least some responsibility became evident, and by the end of the period under review 
the general administration of Greenland had appreciably increased in efficiency.”40
While in the United States, the effect of Svane also became apparent at the 
Greenland delegation there. Penfield noted that after Svane’s arrival in New York the 
“inability of the authorities here to obtain prompt replies to telegrams and in other 
delays.”41 It was therefore suggested that the matter was taken up between the State 
Department, Kauffmann and Svane. To dismiss Svane was not an option and 
therefore it was contemplated to position him at the Ivigtut mine as Controller on a 
permanent basis.42 Such a solution, it was perceived, would be the most practical 
solution as the Americans believed that the “widening differences of opinion 
between Svane and Brun regarding policy and the great temperamental differences 
between the two men render it improbable that they would be able to work together 
in Godthaab harmoniously or efficiently.”43
Although Brun agreed with the suggestions made by the Americans with regard to 
Svanes position, he nevertheless refrained from putting forward the idea to Svane as 
this would inevitably cause an open break between the two. The matter, as mentioned 
earlier, was therefore taken up by the State Department in collaboration with
39NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5387, 859B.OO//11, report from American Consulate, 
Godthaab, to Secretary o f State, 07.10.40
40 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B .00/49, Quarterly Political Report from 
Penfield, Godthaab, to Secretary o f State, 10.07.41
41 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/53, telegram from Penfield to Secretary 
of State, 12.09.41
42 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.OO/53, telegram from Penfield to Secretary 
of State, 12.09.41
43 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/53, telegram from Penfield to Secretary 
of State, 12.09.41
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Kauffmann. Svane did not refuse to go along with the suggested plan. The outcome 
was that Svane at first remained in New York indefinitely as “adviser” to the 
Greenland Section,44 after which he should return to Greenland to take up his new 
position at the Ivigtut mine.
Penfield was noticeably pleased with the decision, as Svane in his position as
Governor in Greenland had caused him much concern. Although he also had some
apprehensions with regard to Brun these were of no comparison to those with regard
to Svane. His remark to the solution was
Governor Brun was obviously pleased with the arrangement, and 
although the Minister’s expression of confidence in him seemed to 
inspire an expansion of his already well inflated ego, there seems to be 
no doubt that the administration of Greenland will, from every point of 
view, be carried on more efficiently and satisfactorily by Governor Brun 
alone rather than by Governor Svane or by both Governors together.45
From 1941 and onwards Brun thus became the sole Governor of Greenland,
b) Governor Brun
Bom in 1904, Eske Brun had a law degree and experience working in the Ministry of 
Finance, when he already in 1932 applied for the position as Governor in South 
Greenland. At the time it was nevertheless reckoned that being only 28 years of age, 
he was rather young for such a post, and his application was therefore not met.46 In 
the autumn of the same year, however, the Governor of North Greenland had to go 
home on six-months leave, and Brun was asked whether he was interested in taking 
the post in the meantime, which he was. This was Bmn’s first encounter with 
Greenland. After his return to Denmark he was appointed as official to the Greenland 
Office.
Bmn’s second visit to Greenland was in 1934 when he went to cover for Svane, who 
went on leave, as Governor in South Greenland. When Svane returned to Greenland 
in Spring 1935, Governor Rosendahl of North Greenland went on leave and Bmn
44 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B .00/68 PS/VFZ, Political Report June 1942 
from Penfield, Godthaab, sent to Secretary o f State, 06.07.42
45 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/68 PS/VFZ, Political Report June 1942 
from Penfield, Godthaab, sent to Secretary o f State, 06.07.42
46 Eske Brun, Mit Grpnlandsliv: Erindringer af Eske Brun, Gyldendal, Haslev, 1985, p. 9
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therefore remained in the island to cover for him. From 1936-38 Bnm was back at 
his post at the Greenland Office in Copenhagen, however when Director Daugaard- 
Jensen died and Departmental Chef Oldendow replaced him, Rosendahl was called 
back to Copenhagen to take up the post as Departmental Chef, which left the post as 
Governor of North Greenland vacant. In summer 1939 Brun was appointed as the 
Governor of North Greenland.47
In his memoirs Brun listed three main principles to which he adhered to in his 
position as Governor in Greenland during the war. First, that the responsibility of the 
Greenland administration was to prevent the war and its atrocities from having any 
effect on the situation of the Greenlanders. Second, like all other Danes abroad, it 
had to be the responsibility of the Governors to support the allies in their fight 
against the Nazis. Third, that he would never take advantage of the fact that the 
connection with Copenhagen was severed. It was not in his interest or his job to 
bring about changes, which could be brought about by a free Denmark in the 
future.48
Penfield’s view of Brun was that he was a person who sometimes appeared to base 
his opinions on emotions rather than on fact or reason. However, Penfield noted, “he 
is usually quick to change his attitude if presented with reasonable evidence that it is 
unjustified.”49 As we saw in the previous section Penfield’s opinion of Brun was 
considerably higher than that of Svane and Penfield recognised that “in spite of a 
tendency to carelessness and hasty decisions [Brun] is proving extremely cooperative 
and easy to work with.”50
Brun felt great responsibility towards Greenland and its inhabitants. As we will see 
later in this chapter he and Kauffmann did not always agree upon which policy 
would serve the Greenland cause best. The discussion did not only occur between
47 Brun, Mit Gr0nlandsliv: Erindringer af Eske Brun, 1985, pp 53-4
48 Brun, Mit Grpnlandsliv: Erindringer af Eske Brun, 1985, pp. 66-7
49 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 1857, 701.5911/409, from Penfield, Godthaab, to 
Secretary of State, Washington, 13.10.41
50 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/45, telegram from Penfield, Godthaab, 
to Secretary o f  State, 04.08.41
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Kauffmann, Brun and Svane, but was also central amongst Danish representatives
and the Danish community abroad as the latter part of this chapter will demonstrate.
Despite differences of opinions it was nevertheless recognised by some, amongst
them Holtken-M0ller of the Greenland Section, Royal Danish Consulate General in
New York, that although he did not agree
with Governor Brun’s piecemeal efforts at electrification in Godthaab, 
nor with his conservative views towards a possibility of greatly increased 
economic activity in Greenland, he nevertheless, as a loyal Dane, feels 
that Greenland has “needed a strong man” during the present period and 
that Brun is doing a good job for Danish interests.51
One of the issues which Brun felt strongly about with regard to the American 
occupation of Greenland was that the American presence should have as little effect 
on the lives of the natives as possible. The less contact between the two parties the 
better, he felt, and the Americans showed consideration for his sentiments. However, 
in September 1943, the American Vice Consul, Gray Bream, reported to the 
Secretary of State that Governor Brun criticised the Americans for not keeping to the 
strict line of keeping the American troops and the natives apart.52 The Danish 
representatives in the United States, however, did not perceive the matter as 
troublesome as Brun, and when Mr. Holten-Mpller of the Greenland Section at the 
Royal Danish Consulate General in New York visited Greenland in 1944, he noted 
that the Greenlandic settlements were administered “much as they were on his last 
visit two years ago. In other words, American influence, through the various 
regulations of the armed forces limiting contacts with the native settlements in 
accordance with Article IX of the Defence Agreement, has been small.”53
Brun also took an active role in the aftermath of the war, when the new Greenland 
policy was discussed in Denmark. More on this later in the chapter.
51 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B .00/8-1044, Political Report b American 
Consul John B. Ocheltree, March 1 1944 to July 31 1944, sent to Secretary o f State, 10.08.44
52 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/80, Political Report, July-August 1943, 
sent to Secretary o f State by Gray Bream, American Vice Consul, 03.09.43
53 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B .00/8-1044, Political Report by American 
Consul John B. Ocheltree, March 1 1944 to July 31 19411, sent to Secretary of State 10.08.44
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5.2. Danish Minister in Washington, Henrik Kauffmann
Immediately after the German occupation of Denmark the Danish Minister in 
Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, declared himself independent from the Government 
in Copenhagen. In a letter to Danish Foreign Minister Scavenius Minister Kauffmann 
explained the reason for distancing himself from a Danish Government acting under 
the duress of Nazi-German rule. Kauffmann stressed that it was of importance for 
Danish interests in the United States that Denmark attained sympathy from the 
American public. Showing lack of backbone against the German pressure would 
“hurt Danish “good-will” in the U.S. and would also seriously jeopardise Danish 
odds for maintaining Greenland Danish.”(translated)54
Whereas Brun’s main concern with regard to Greenland was the situation of the
island and its inhabitants as well as securing Danish interests in the island,
Kauffmann put more emphasis on the strategic importance of Greenland in
strengthening the position of the Danish representation in the United States and
hence the position of an liberated Denmark in the aftermath of the war. Kauffmann
also succeeded early on to attract the attention of Assistant Secretary Berle and the
two began to prepare a U.S. policy towards Greenland and the subsequent status of
Denmark and Danish subjects and funds in the United States. Indications of Berle’s
and Kauffmann’s plans with regard to the Danish status in the United States after the
German occupation of Denmark and the consequences of that to the Greenland
situation were also present in a conversation between Berle and Morgenthau.
Berle: “You may not realize it, but you and the Danish Minister and the 
President and I are building a Denmark in our heads for the time being.” 
H.M.Jr: “What’s that?” Berle: “I say, you may not realize it, but about 
three of us are building a Denmark in our heads for the time being.” 
H.M.Jr. ’’You mean -  meaning what?” Berle: “Well, obviously there isn’t 
any Danish government. There’s a German Government there.” H.M.Jr:
”Oh.” Berle: “And we’re just arranging there’s going to be a Denmark 
existing somewhere in the upper ether and just keep on going until the 
Germans get out of there.” H.M.Jr: ’’Well, if they want to send an 
Ambassador this summer to Greenland, please consider my application.”
Berle: “I’ll put your application on file and consider your qualifications.”
H.M.Jr: ’’All right. I don’t know whether I’m qualified, but after all Ruth 
Bryan Owen went there and liked it.” Berle: “Well, my grandfather 
explored that country in the earlier days, crossing Greenland he was
54 SA, 8.U. 13/1/1964/516, letter from Kauffmann, Washington, to Foreign Minister Scavenius, 
Copenhagen, 04.09.40
shipwrecked on the coast up there and had a very good time.” H.M.Jr: 
’’(Laughs) All right.”55
Although the prospect of the Americans sending an envoy to Greenland was treated 
lightly in this conversation, it shows that the idea was not foreign to the State 
Department. On a more important note, Berle made a reference to him and 
Kauffmann being in dialogue with regard to the lack of a Danish Government in 
exile. This point will be elaborated on in the second part of this chapter. In 
connection with the Greenland question, though, this record of Berle’s remark should 
be read as an initial step in a plan to secure Kauffmann’s position such that in case 
the United States were to deploy forces in Greenland, this could be done with the 
authority of Kauffmann.
Berle, along with his friend Sumner Welles, turned out to be the persons in the State 
Department, who were most ready to accept Kauffmann, and because they were not 
directly under the Secretary of State, they were able to bypass those, who were more 
sceptical of Kauffmann’s legitimate position as Danish Minister to the United States. 
With the prospect of not being able to conduct any negotiations with the Government 
in Copenhagen, as long as it was acting under the duress of the Germans, Kauffmann 
became instrumental in the American plans with regard to Greenland, and that was 
partly why the Americans were so ready to recognise his position as Danish Minister 
independent of his Government, also after he was dismissed by the Government in 
Copenhagen following the Greenland Agreement. It will also become evident later in 
this chapter, that the Americans also placed much importance on Kauffmann’s 
position in relation with other Danish representatives abroad, especially as there was 
no Danish Government in exile.56 Thus, on April 18th 1941 Scavenius received a note 
from Cordell Hull, delivered by the American Charge d’Affairs, in which the latter 
stated that “this Government will continue to recognize Mr. de Kauffmann in his 
official capacity until such time as the Royal Danish Government may be able to
55 FDR, Morgenthau Diaries, book 253, p. 301, Telephone conversation between Berle and 
Morgenthau 11.04.40
56 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5366, F.W. 859.00/1068, memorandum by A.A. Berle 
of conversation with Kauffmann, 04.09.43
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reconsider his status as freely as did the Danish Government seek his agreement as 
Minister to this country in 1939.”57
Mutual recognition of the other party’s role in their strategic ambition with regard to 
the future position of Greenland and Denmark created a strong bond between Berle 
and Kauffmann and from an early point they met regularly, sometime several times a 
week, to discuss U.S.-Danish-Greenland matters.
5.3 Relations between Kauffmann, Svane and Brun
As mentioned earlier there were some discrepancies between Kauffmann, Svane and 
Brun with regard to their preferred Greenland policy. Although Brun played down 
the disagreement between him and Kauffmann in his memoirs58 and stressed their 
mutual aim in securing Danish interests and the best conditions for Greenland the 
relationship between them was marked by distrust and discontent with the conducts 
of the others. While Kauffmann was annoyed by the presence and meddling of the 
Greenland Governors in matters, which he felt should be under his control, Svane 
and Brun on their part felt overrun by Kauffmann in matters, which they felt were 
under their control.
Soon after the arrival of the Americans in Greenland the Danish Governors voiced 
their disgruntlement over the occupiers and their lack of understanding of the 
situation Greenland found itself in and the conditions there. Brun argued, that 
someone from Greenland should go to the United States and support the 
administration there with some local knowledge.59 Kauffmann, however, did not 
welcome the idea. In general Kauffmann discouraged the Governors from spending 
too much time in U.S. and argued that they served Greenland better by staying in the 
island. To substantiate his point of view Kauffmann pointed out to Svane and Brun 
that “it would not be looked upon with favour if Danish representatives and their 
families spent too much time in one of the ‘most expensive cities’.’’(translated)60
57 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Bilag til Redeg0relse for Minister Kauffmann’s Holdning („Graabog 
I“), bilag 102. Note from Secretary of State Cordell Hull to Danish Minister o f Foreign Affairs 
Scavenius, 18.04.41
58 Brun, Mit Gr0nlandsliv: Erindringer af Eske Brun, 1985
59 SA, 8.S. 15/1909-45/0002, letter from Eske Bruun, Greenland, to Kauffmann, Washington, 17.05.41
60 SA, 8.S. 15/1909-45/0002, letter from Kauffmann to Svane and Bruun, 04.03.41
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Kauffmann also pointed out that according to State Department’s view, “staying 
outside Greenland for longer periods under the present circumstances was neither 
proper nor consistent.” (translated)61
Following the increased American interest and focus on Greenland Kauffmann began 
to meddle with the internal affairs of Greenland. As mentioned above Kauffmann 
also tried to diminish the Governors’ involvement in Greenland affairs in the United 
States and criticised the conduct of the Governors.
Kauffmann reprimanded the Governors on their economical mnning of the island, 
especially the fact that they were “using the dollars from the Cryolite mine to acquire 
imports of all sorts, while their countrymen in Denmark were suffering under
fflGerman oppression.” However, as is mentioned later in this chapter, Kauffmann 
himself was accused of using the money from the Cryolite account to other purposes 
than the welfare of Greenland.
Kauffmann also used the opportunity in a letter to Svane and Brun to state that he 
acknowledged the two of them as the highest authority in Greenland. However, he 
requested that Svane and Brun would continue, like they had done hitherto, to inform 
him before any correspondence was made with the outside world. This because, 
Kauffmann said, it would put him in a very awkward position if any correspondence 
with Copenhagen or the American Government took place without his knowledge, 
especially in the case of the latter. To stress this point Kauffmann indicated that 
being situated in Greenland, the two Governors would have little opportunity to 
know what happened on the political international arena, as well as internally in the
fiXdifferent countries. Thus, by indicating the necessity of him ‘approving’ all 
correspondence to the outside world beforehand, in order to prevent possible 
misunderstandings, Kauffmann would be able to control all communication from the 
Govemos to the U.S.
61 SA, 8.S. 15/1909-45/0002, letter from Kauffmann to Svane and Bruun, 04.03.41
62 SA, 8.S. 15/1909-45/0002, letter from Kauffmann to Svane and Bruun, 04.03.41
63 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Legationsraad Blechingbergs Akter vedr. Minister Kauffmanns Politik: 
Gr0nland. Bilag 20 (Letter from Kauffmann to Svand and Brun, 08.05.40)
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Another means, which Kauffmann used to keep the Governors in check, was the 
rumours within political circles in the United States that the U.S. wanted to annex or 
buy Greenland. Although these ideas were present, they were never taken up at 
serious discussion at a higher level and Kauffmann did neither believe that this 
would happen. However, he nevertheless used the opportunity to worry the 
Governors about the possibility and stressed the necessity that Danish representatives 
‘played their cards right’ .64 This was no doubt a warning to the Governors not to do 
anything hasty and as we saw above, to confer with Kauffmann before 
communicating with other countries.
The sour grapes between Kauffmann and the Greenland Governors were not missed 
by onlookers. Penfield reported to the Secretary of State that Brun occasionally made 
critical remarks of Kauffmann and his representation of Greenland interests. These 
were partly based on news reports recounting that the State Department had granted a 
general license for the export of American goods to Iceland. Brun’s immediate 
comment to these reports was that “Greenland would certainly have been granted a 
similar license long ago if it had had a representative in Washington with any 
push.”65
Brun had also expressed after meeting Kauffmann on his visit to the United States 
that he felt that Kauffmann, “while a charming and able person, was perhaps too 
concerned with his personal popularity with the State Department to be a completely 
effective representative of Danish interests.”66 Kauffmann’s handling of the 
Greenland Agreement only accentuated this feeling of Brun, as it seemed that 
Kauffmann had signed the Agreement without any questioning its content. There 
were many issues in the Agreement, which Brun felt could have been done 
differently. The comparison with the Agreement, which the Americans presented to 
Iceland, mentioned above, was one example. More examples on the effect of the
64 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Legationsraad blechingbergs Akter vedr. Minister Kauffmanns Politik: 
Gr0nland. Bilag 20. Letter from Kauffmann to Svane and Brun, 08.05.40
65NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG59, Box 1857,701.5911/406, from Penfield, Godthaab, to 
Secretary of State, 13.10.41
66NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG59, Box 1857, 701.5911/406, from Penfield, Godthaab, to 
Secretary of State, 13.10.41
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Greenland Agreement on the relationship between Kauffmann and the Greenland 
Governors will be examined later in the chapter.
a) American Greenland Commission and Greenland Delegation in the United States 
Shortly after the German occupation of Denmark Kauffmann appointed an American 
Greenland Committee. Manned with prominent Danes and American friends of 
Denmark its role was to act as an advisory council on Greenland matters as well as 
perform practical matters in this connection. Kauffmann was eager to have the 
United States Government approval of the establishment of the Committee. Berle’s 
reply was that the U.S. Government had no reason to object, but it was an affair of 
the Danes and Greenlanders, not the United States. But when Kauffmann asked 
whether the Americans could see the Commission have any political function,
/TQ
Berle’s reply was negative.
This was only but one example of Kauffmann’s strategy to have powers taken from 
the Greenland Governors to the Danish administration in the United States. The 
following section will examine this struggle for power over Greenland. However, in 
this particular case Kauffmann failed because Berle’s answer in this instance was 
that the position of the Americans was that “so far as political authority was 
concerned...[the United States Government] was proceeding on the theory that such 
political functions as there were resided in the Greenland councils and their 
governors, who were not cut off from the Copenhagen Government by reason of the 
occupation.”69 The U.S. stance at this point as compared to their stance later reflects 
the fact that the statement was made in the early stages of the war.
The Greenland Governors were not pleased with the work of the Commission. They 
felt that one member of the Commission, Mr. Sonne, tried to control Greenland 
affairs in the U.S. “a little too closely.”70 Thus, when Governor Brun went to the
67 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/60, Quarterly Political Report by 
Penfield, July-September 1941, sent to Secretary o f State, 02.10.41
68 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.01/170, memorandum by Berle of 
conversation with the Canadian Minister, Mr. Christie, 27.04.40
69 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.01/170, memorandum by Berle of 
conversation with the Canadian Minister, Mr. Christie, 27.04.40
70 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5387, 859B.00//11, report from American Consulate, 
Godthaab, to Secretary o f State, 07.10.40
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United States in July 1940 he gathered together General Manager Corp of the Ivigtut 
Cryolite Mine and four other officials and established the Greenland Delegation, 
which was a separate entity from the Commission. The aim was for the Delegation to 
take over the conduct of Greenland affairs in the U.S. and that Brun would set up 
permanent office in New York for that purpose.71 Brun also stayed in New York over 
the winter, but then returned to Greenland, when he was replaced by Svane in spring 
1941.
The dissatisfaction of the conduct of the Commission amongst the Greenland 
Governors came to a conclusion in September 1941, when the Commission was 
dissolved. The dissolution apparently happened after a long period of squabble 
between Kauffmann and Svane, where the latter felt that “some of the members [of 
the Commission] were endeavouring to bring about a permanent separation of 
Greenland from Denmark.”72
The evolution of relations between the Danish Legation and the Greenland 
Delegation over this matter caused the State Department great concern. The State 
Department also received reports from their Consul in Greenland, who criticised the 
Greenland Delegation for not “functioning on an efficient or satisfactory basis. This 
situation is apparently due in part to inefficiency and friction in the organization and 
in part to shipping, warehousing, and other difficulties arising from the present 
emergency conditions in the United States,”73 Penfield pointed out.
The result was that only a month after the dissolution of the Commission, the 
Delegation was, with the State Department’s approval, placed under the Danish 
Consulate General in New York by Kauffmann. Hereafter it became the Greenland 
Section, Danish Consulate General.74 This organisational change did not appear to 
affect the conduct of Greenland business in the U.S., as far as the administration in
71 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5387, 859B.OO//11, report from American Consulate, 
Godthaab, to Secretary o f State, 07.10.40
72 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/60, Quarterly Political Report by 
Penfield, July-September 1941, sent to Secretary o f State, 02.10.41
73 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/49, Quarterly Political Report from 
Penfield, Godthaab, to Secretary o f State, 10.07.41
74 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/63, Quarterly Political Report by 
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Greenland was concerned. Governor Brun stated to Penfield, that it was his 
impression that only two changes had taken place: The name “Greenland 
Delegation” has been dropped, and the fact that Danish Consul General was to see 
copies of all correspondence. In Greenland the change in status did thus not in itself 
appear to cause a great deal of surprise or concern, but there was widespread 
resentment over the fact that no full announcement or explanation of the change was 
given until after a month and a half had passed.75
Kauffmann thus succeeded, albeit great efforts from the Greenland Governors, to 
minimize the role of the Governors in the United States. Whereas the United States 
Government initially was ready to acknowledge the authority of the Greenland 
Governors in all affairs concerning Greenland, this incident helped Kauffmann in his 
process of taking over the power of Greenland matters in the United States.
b) The Danish representatives and the Greenland Agreement
Less than a month before the signing of the Greenland Agreement Kauffmann 
received a telegram from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the telegram 
Kauffmann was informed that in a conversation between Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Scavenius and Mr. Perkins the latter had pointed out the possibility of an American 
‘protection’ of Greenland according to the Monroe Doctrine. Scavenius had replied 
that in that case a rumour of a threat to Greenland was not good enough basis for an 
American protection, there had to be actual danger. The response from Washington 
was that continuous flights in low altitude over East Greenland by German 
recognisance planes breaching the neutrality of Greenland, was enough indication of 
a threat to Greenland.77
When discussing the Agreement at the early stages, Kauffmann asked Berle whether 
he could inform the Greenland Governors of the plans. Berle thought that they 
should rather wait until the time was ripe and there was consensus within the United
75 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/63, Quarterly Political Report by 
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1”), bilag 54. Telegram from the Foreign Ministry, Copenhagen, to Danish legation in Washington,
18.03.41
77SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Bilag til Redegprelse for Minister Kauffmann’s Holdning (“Graabog 
1”), bilag 57. Telegram from Kauffmann, Washington, to Foreign Ministry, Copenhagen, 10.04.41
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States Government to make such an agreement. It was thus not a case of Kauffmann 
not willing to let the Greenland Governors in on what was going on. Kauffmann, 
however, did indicate to Berle at this early stage, that he hoped that the negotiations 
would be taken up with him. Berle was not willing to commit to anything at that 
point,78 but this was to be the line that was followed as the process went on.
The fact that Kauffmann signed the Greenland Agreement without the consent of the 
Government in Copenhagen caused concern amongst the community of Danish 
representatives abroad, and especially to those, who felt a strong loyalty towards the 
King and country. The fact that negotiations had solely been conducted with 
Kauffmann and not with the participation of the Greenland Governors as well did not 
help the matter much. The Governors were not notified of the plans to sign the 
Agreement until a few days before.79 When they did so, they were obviously 
disturbed, not only because they had been kept in the dark, but also because they 
were given little time to scrutinize the Agreement and hence little but no choice to 
give their consent to it. Penfield reported that On April 5th 1941 Governor Svane 
came to see him and informed him that he had received a telegram from Kauffmann 
where the latter strongly advised him to authorize signature of an agreement, which 
Svane was yet to see. The terms of the Agreement were to be sent to Penfield, who 
upon Svane’s visit had not received them yet.80
According to Penfield’s report the telegram arrived later that day and when Penfield 
went over to Svane to go over the substance of the telegram in detail, Svane 
“appeared to appreciate the position of the United States but was much more agitated 
and concerned than I have ever seen him.”81 After a long discussion with Penfield 
Svane, nevertheless, decided to concur “under extreme force of circumstances.” Only 
after Penfield had secured Svane’s assent, was Brun notified of the Agreement,82
78 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01/346, memorandum by Berle of 
conversation with Kauffmann 18.02.41
79 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01/348A, telegram from Department of 
State to American Consul, Godthaab, 04.04.41
80 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B01/351, report from Penfield to Secretary o f  
State 09.04.41
81 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B01/351, report from Penfield to Secretary o f  
State 09.04.41
82 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B01/351, report from Penfield to Secretary o f  
State 09.04.41
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who also had his hesitations with regard to concurring in the Agreement. However, 
whereas Governor Svane’s hesitation was due to his “very personal loyalty to the 
King”, Governor Brun’s was “because of the sudden manner in which the matter was 
presented to him. 83
Governor Svane subsequently, without referring with the Consulate, sent a telegram 
to King Christian X in which he stated that in his opinion the Agreement was illegal 
and that he had only concurred because of the extreme pressure of circumstances. 
Governor Brun also telegraphed the King to explain that his decision to concur was 
motivated purely on the grounds that he believed this to be in the best interests of 
Denmark and Greenland. The King’s reply to both telegrams merely said, 
“Understand difficulties, hope for brighter times.”84
It was not only Svane and Brun within the community of Danish representatives who 
were notified of the Agreement at this very late stage. Blechingberg, who worked 
with Kauffmann at the Legation in Washington, reported that he got quite surprised 
when he returned from a couple of days leave on April 6th 1941 to find the Greenland 
Agreement almost ready to sign, because the matter had not been given much 
attention as far as he knew. Kauffmann explained the situation by informing him that 
German airplanes had been spotted over Greenland and thus both the U.S. and the 
Canadian Governments were convinced that bases would have to be established on 
the island, in order to secure the supply route to Britain.85
The treaty was signed on April 9th 1941, thus on the anniversary of the German 
invasion of Denmark. There was much controversy attached to the signing of the 
deal between the United States Government and the Danish Minister in Washington. 
The legal aspect of the deal was especially dubious, as Kauffmann was operating 
outside his parameter of his contract as Minister representing the Danish 
Government. In the aftermath of the signing of the deal an article by Herbert W. 
Briggs substantiated this notion, because it questioned the legality of the Agreement:
83 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/49, Quarterly Political Report from 
Penfield, Godthaab, to Secretary o f State, 10.07.41
84 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/49, Quarterly Political Report from 
Penfield, Godthaab, to Secretary o f State, 10.07.41
85 SA, 84 .B .2 .a /l909.45/0002, Kauffmann-Sagen, ReferatNo. 1, p. 15-6
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“Mr. de Kauffmann was apparently without competence to conclude the Agreement,
o/:
and there is some doubt as to the legal capacity of Denmark.” The U.S. 
Government downplayed all criticism and on announcing the deal to the public. 
President Roosevelt stated that the ’’present step is a new proof of our continuing 
friendliness to Denmark.”87
As for the reaction overall in Greenland Eske Brun was of the opinion that the 
response towards the deal and the sympathy towards the Americans would have been 
of a more positive note if the State Department and Kauffmann at least had given the 
impression of that the Greenlanders had been involved in the negotiations.88
Although Kauffmann acknowledged that the Agreement could have been negotiated 
and signed by the Governors and U.S., he nevertheless thought it best if he took it 
upon himself to be in charge; this partly because he doubted the Governors’ 
capabilities and level of experience in matters like these, but also because he thought 
it most correct that he was in charge, since he was responsible for the direction the 
Greenland-negotiations with the U.S. and Canada had taken since the occupation of 
Denmark, and finally Kauffmann thought that his position as opposed to that of the 
Governors weighed heavier in the dealings, and hence the respect the Agreement 
would be shown in the years to come and especially when the time came for
89occupation to seize.
5.4 Shift of power
Like we saw the Danish Governor in the Faroes, Hilbert, continuously seeking 
British confirmation and approval of his authority in the Faroe Islands, so did 
Kauffmann also seek to secure recognition of his authority over Greenland from the 
State Department. The previous sections have already demonstrated how Kauffmann 
managed to gain more and more authority over Greenland matters, by acquiring the 
consent and approval for small actions from both the Greenland Governors and the
86 Briggs, “The Validity o f the Greenland Agreement”, 1941, p. 507
87 SA, 8.S. 15/1909-45/0002,Statement by the President announcing the take-over o f protection of 
Greenland, 10.04.41
88 SA. 8.S. 15/1909-45/0002, Eske Bruun, Greenland, to Kauffmann, Washington, 17.05.41
89 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909.45/0002, Kauffmann-Sagen, Referat No. 1, p. 15-6
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United States Government. The shift of power that took place over time is best 
shown in the change of attitude of the United States.
In April 1940, shortly after the German occupation of Denmark, Berle told 
Kauffmann that the State Department was inclined to “accept the action of Greenland 
officials as the action of the Danish Government, so far as Greenland concerned, on 
the theory that it was the surviving remnant of the Danish Government. Were the 
Minister to present authorization from the Greenland authorities to act, we should 
consider that authority, and not impossibly would recognize authority derived from 
that source.”90 Kauffmann indicated to Berle that the Governors “apparently were 
prepared to give him direct authority to act for them in commercial matters, and that 
they might go so far as to authorize him to take over and administer under his own 
name, of course pursuant to their instructions, any funds which might be derived 
from the trade of the Danish monopoly.”91
Later the same day Kauffmann sent a letter to the Greenland Governors in which he 
recognised the Governors’ “supreme authority for dealing with all questions arising 
in Greenland.”92 Kauffmann, however, requested that “all questions pertaining not 
only to Greenland’s position vis-a-vis the U.S.A., but all questions and 
communications concerning Greenland’s position to other powers,”93 should be dealt 
with by the Minister. Kauffmann promised that he would work in accordance with 
the Governors’ wishes in all questions concerning Greenland. Kauffmann closed the 
letter by requesting the “concurrence of District Administrators and possibly district 
councils.. .at the earliest possible.”94
90 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.01/152, memorandum by Berle of  
conversation with Kauffmann, 20.04.40
91 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.01/152, memorandum by Berle of 
conversation with Kauffmann, 20.04.40
92 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.01/233 GRR, telegram from Kauffmann to 
Svane and Brun sent 20.04.40, attached to report by Penfield (written at Washington DC) sent 
Secretary of State 10.07.40
93 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.01/233 GRR, telegram from Kauffmann to 
Svane and Brun sent 20.04.40, attached to report by Penfield (written at Washington DC) sent 
Secretary o f State 10.07.40
94 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.01/233 GRR, telegram from Kauffmann to 
Svane and Brun sent 20.04.40, attached to report by Penfield (written at Washington DC) sent 
Secretary o f State 10.07.40
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As demonstrated earlier Kauffmann tried to have political powers of some sort 
conferred to the Greenland Committee, which he set up in April 1940 to address 
Greenland affairs in the United States. In that instance, however, we saw that the 
State Department did not follow his request.95
With all Danish funds in the United States being held back due to the German 
occupation of Denmark, Kauffmann was anxious to get authority over the money 
which the Greenland authorities had disposal of from the sale of cryolite from the 
Ivigtut mine. The State Department supported Kauffmann’s request for the necessary 
funds.
In our opinion the Greenland authorities would be fully warranted in 
expending $10,000 on defense measures, especially since the entire 
proceeds of the cryolite sold this year will be at the disposal of the 
Greenland authorities instead of being divided with the Copenhagen 
company, as was formerly the case.96
In September 1940 Kauffmann turned to Berle and asked for the reassurance that the 
United States Government still kept the same line in respect to Greenland, that is, 
that the U.S. Government dealt directly with the Greenland Administration through 
him, without going through Copenhagen. The reason for Kauffmann’s concern was 
that following the American notification to the Government in Copenhagen of the 
establishment of an American Consulate in Godthaab, the Government in 
Copenhagen had indicated that it expected the U.S. to take up Greenland matters 
with them.97 However, as we saw earlier in this chapter, the Americans made a clear 
distinction between their dealings with the Government in Copenhagen and those 
elements of the Danish Government, which acted autonomously from the German 
controlled Government in Copenhagen. Berle could therefore reassure Kauffmann, 
that the Government still kept the same line.98
95 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.01/170, memorandum by Berle of 
conversation with the Canadian Minister, Mr. Christie, 27.04.40
96 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.01/184 FP, telegram sent by Hull, 
Department o f State to American consul, Godthaab, 26.05.40
97 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01/293, memorandum by Berle of 
conversation with Kauffmann 03.09.40
98 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01/293, memorandum by Berle of 
conversation with Kauffmann 03.09.40
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As previously mentioned the arrival of Brun to the United States and his subsequent
establishment of the Greenland Delegation, which was set up in opposition to the
Committee, which Kauffmann had established in April, did not please Kauffmann. In
September Kauffmann raised the subject of the presence of the Greenland Governor
in the United States with Berle. Berle informed Kauffmann that based on a report
from Penfield, which stressed the incapability of Svane who remained in Greenland,
he also believed that Brun would be more useful in Greenland rather than in the
United States. Kauffmann replied that he had tried to talk Brun into returning back to
Greenland. Brun, as we have seen previously, however, always felt that those
persons, which represented Greenland affairs in the United States, lacked a true wish
for the good of the island and its inhabitants. He thus felt it essential that he,
representing the “real Greenland ought to be on the Danish Purchasing
Commission.”99 Kauffmann, however, managed to have the State Department
communicating to Svane and Brun, that while the State Department did not wish
to interfere in the execution of their duties, it was our judgment that their 
presence at their posts of duty in Greenland to handle any emergency 
situation that might arise transcended in importance such Greenland 
commercial business as they might wish to undertake in the United 
States...we hope that upon reflection both officials will themselves 
conclude that present circumstances require that they remain in 
Greenland until the situation in the north has further crystallized.100
The Greenland Agreement was another, maybe the most important, step which
helped Kauffmann secure his power over Greenland. The Americans were conscious
of the reactions of the Governors to Kauffmann negotiating and signing the
Agreement single-handedly, as the Governors had repeatedly “[thrashed] out the
delicate question of the boundary between their authority and that of Kauffmann in
so far as United States-Greenland relations are concerned.”101 In the aftermath of the
signing of the Agreement it was therefore proposed to develop the view that
under present circumstances the governors are the local representatives of 
the Danish crown and sovereignty in Greenland, and as such the United 
States of course consults and deals with them through its consular 
officers at Godthaab, particularly as regards local and purely Greenland
99 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01/301, memorandum by Berle of 
conversation with Kauffmann, 30.09.40
100 NARA, Decimal File, 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01/347A, telegram from Department of 
State Hull to American Consul, Godthaab, 01.04.41
101 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859.01/373, report from Treasury Department, 
United States Coast Guard, to Berle, 10.04.41
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matters; that on the other hand Kauffmann is minister of Denmark and 
the representative in the United States of the Danish crown and 
sovereignty and as such the United States must at this time look primarily 
to him in matters in the general international field which ordinarily would 
be taken up with the foreign office in Copenhagen, although we could 
make attempt to keep the governors as fully informed as possible and
1 ryy
seek their views in Greenland matters to the extent practicable.
This suggestion came from the Treasury Department at the United States Coast 
Guard and the report gives the impression that the author had been in contact with 
the Governors on a fairly regular basis. He seemed to have a greater insight and 
understanding than the State Department of the position the Greenland Governors 
found themselves in with regard to Kauffmann and the Greenland Committee taking 
over some of their authority with regard to Greenland.
By May 1941 the confusion about Greenland authority and who was in charge of
what seemed to peak. While Cumming was away, his replacement, Higgs, had a look
through the Greenland files and was “impressed with the lack of clarity in the
division of functions between the Governors themselves on the one hand and the
Greenland Delegation, Sonne, and Kauffmann on the other, and the lack of
coordination of the functions of all of them.”103 Higgs subsequently suggested that
With regard to the desirability of clarifying the respective spheres for the 
functions of the Governors, the Delegation, and Kauffmann, it would 
appear to be advisable to attempt to bring about a canalisation of political 
and administrative matters, as far as the Department and the Governors 
are concerned, through Kauffmann and Penfield, and delegate to the 
Greenland Delegation only those matters strictly pertaining to Greenland- 
American trade. It would probably be simpler if the Department could 
handle all matters relating to the Delegation only through Kauffmann and 
never directly with the Delegation; in other words, reduce to a 
considerable extent the present quasi-official character of the Delegation.
A prerequisite to such a set-up would doubtless be a closer understanding 
and cooperation between the Governors and Kauffmann which may be 
somewhat difficult of achievement104
Whether or not Higgs’ suggestions struck a chord is difficult to say. Although steps 
were taken that clarified the division of functions between the parties, first the
102 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859.01/373, report from Treasury Department, 
United States Coast Guard, to Berle, 10.04.41
103 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01/357, Memorandum by Cumming’s 
replacement Higgs??, Division o f European Affairs, directed at Berle, 21.05.41
104 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01/357, Memorandum by Cumming’s 
replacement Higgs??, Division o f European Affairs, directed at Berle, 21.05.41
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dissolution of the commission set up by Kauffmann and second the placing of the 
Delegation under the Consulate-General in New York, it seems rather that it was the 
personal problems between Kauffmann and the Governors, which brought these 
changes about. In August, Kauffman had once again visited Berle at his office and 
stated that “there were certain difficulties between him and Greenland. Svane was 
anxious to establish his new-found authority, and sometimes he was not very brilliant 
about it.”105 Kauffmann thus hoped that the State Department “could emphasize a 
little the fact the he [Kauffmann] was in the picture and should stay there. He pointed 
out that in any event he would have to carry the political responsibility for the 
Greenland arrangements before Denmark, and before Europe.”106
Kauffmann repeated his qualms to Berle in October, this time in relation to the
financial situation of Greenland and the Governors’ authority over the income from
the Ivigtut. Knowing that the State Department was planning to approach Svane on
this matter, Kauffmann hoped that before they did so, they could prepare a proposal
by which “the authority over these purchases could be transferred to the Danish
Legation.”107 Although Berle could see the point in doing as “the situation had got to
the point where something had to be done” he had to inform Kauffmann that
the Department had been very unwilling to interfere in the colonial
administration of Greenland, since we were endeavouring scrupulously to
respect the integrity of that administration. We could therefore only
follow the lead of the Danish authorities. But we recognized Mr. De
Kauffmann as the representative of the interest of the Kingdom of
Denmark here; and would of course give careful consideration to any
108representations he made on that subject.
|Two weeks later Hull wrote to Penfield that
the evolution of relations between the Greenland Delegation, the Danish 
Legation and the United States authorities has given us increasing 
concern, particularly in view of the reaction in Greenland and among the 
Danish community here to Svane’s interview; of his inefficiency in
105 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/53, memorandum by Berle o f  
Conversation with Kauffmann 08.08.41
106 NARA, Decim al File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/53, memorandum by Berle o f  
Conversation with Kauffmann 08.08.41
107 NAlJtA, Decim al File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01/376, memorandum by Berle of 
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business relationships and of his failure to consult the Legation, the 
Treasury or the Department with respect to matters of mutual concern.109
Hull thus concluded that because this situation made it impossible for Kauffmann to 
properly supervise Greenland affairs in the United States and satisfactorily discharge 
his responsibilities as recognized Danish Minister, some radical change had to take 
place. Hull therefore told Penfield that he could inform Brun of the decision of the 
State Department. Penfield should also mention that Kauffmann had informed the 
State Department that “as a matter of course he would propose to leave internal 
Greenland affairs to the Danish authorities in Greenland exercising a general 
supervision from here.”110
Later in October Kauffmann thus achieved in acquiring a statement, on par with that
which Hilbert acquired from the British authorities, acknowledging his power and
authority. The statement marked a shift in the position of the United States
Government towards the relationship between the Danish Legation in Washington
and the Greenland Governors with respect to power and authority. It stated that
...Note has been made of the fact that the Colony of Greenland did not 
have autonomous powers within the framework of the Danish 
constitutional system, but that its internal administration and external 
relationships were in all respects determined and directed by the 
Government of Denmark. It follows that were the United States to enter 
into relations with the Colony or the Colonial officials other than through 
the duly accredited and recognized representative of the Danish 
Government, it would, in effect, be contributing to a separation of 
Greenland from its historic and constitutional relationship with Denmark; 
and such action would therefore tend to be in violation of the obligations 
assumed by the United States to respect Danish sovereignty over 
Greenland and to assist Greenland in the maintenance of its status.
...The Secretary of State has accordingly determined that all matters 
regarding finance, supplies, and the sale of Greenland products in the 
United States will, as a matter of policy be taken up with the Danish 
Legation in Washington...American consular officers in Greenland will, 
of course, continue to transact with the Danish authorities in Greenland 
such official business as is customarily transacted between a consular 
officer and the local officials within his consular district.”111
109 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01B11/5A PS/WHA, telegram from Hull, 
Department o f  State, to Penfield, 22.10.41
110 NARA, Decim al File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01B11/5A  PS/WHA, telegram from Hull, 
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111 NARA, Decim al File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5389, 859B.01B11/6 PS/PLS, from Secretary o f State 
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The United States Government thus changed their position with regard to the level of 
power of the Governors in order to grant Kauffmann with authority over the most 
important aspects of Greenland affairs, that is financial aspects, supplies and the sale 
of Greenland products in the United States. This new interpretation of the level of 
authority of the Governors may be seen as a golden opportunity for the United States 
Government to reach a solution to a delicate problem without causing too much 
damage to the parties involved.
The statement did not go down well with the Governors. In the aftermath Brun
notified Kauffmann in a telegram that he did not recognise the final decision that
Greenland matters rested with Kauffmann and still less that Kauffmann was entitled
to exercise any control normally exercised by the Greenland Administration in
Copenhagen. Kauffmann therefore should not expect Brun to submit to Kauffmann
other appropriation matters than those, which Brun found it expedient to seek
Kauffmann’s advice.112 Following Brun’s telegram the State Department conveyed a
message to him through Penfield where Brun was given a reprimand for his lack of
will to cooperate.113 Brun later stated that
he did not intend to dispute the Minister’s control over Greenland funds 
in the United States, that he felt that he and the Minister were in essential 
agreement regarding Greenland policies, and that he therefore intended to 
continue to cooperate fully with Mr. de Kauffmann.114
In the following months Penfield reported that Brun had “reached the point where he 
will consult and cooperate with the Danish minister at Washington only under 
pressure.” 115 Brun’s main point of issue was Kauffmann’s claim to be “acting in the 
place of the Greenland Office at Copenhagen in so far as appropriations [were] 
concerned, a claim which the United States Government [had] in effect recognized 
but which the Governor [maintained] he [was] legally unable to admit.”116
112 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5370, 859.01 B 11/16 Vi PS/ET (drafts o f 3 telegrams)
113 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5370, 859.01 B 11/16 Vi PS/ET (drafts o f 3 telegrams)
114 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/67 PS/VFZ, Political Report April-May 
1942 from Penfield, Godthaab, sent to Secretary o f State 04.06.42
115 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/70, General Political Report, August 
1942, sent to Secretary of State from Penfield 12.10.42
116 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5388, 859B.00/70, General Political Report, August 
1942, sent to Secretary of State from Penfield 12.10.42
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The difficulties between Kauffmann and Brun did not stop and in June 1944 
Kauffmann still conveyed his concerns to Berle. Kauffmann told Berle that “matters 
were getting increasingly difficult with Brun, as they once had with Governor 
Svane,”117 and once more requested the State Department to make a statement with 
regard to whom the United States Government were dealing with, that is, the 
Legation in the U.S. rather than the Governors.118 Reassuring Kauffmann Berle said 
that he would “inquire whether something could not be done”119 and that the State 
Department “had never wavered from our policy of dealing with the Legation as the 
representative of the Danish Government, with which, when liberated, we should 
have to regulate any questions arising out of the arrangement.”120
The outline of the struggle for power between Kauffmann and the Greenland 
Governors bears some similarities to that between Hilbert and Thorstein Petersen in 
the Faroe Islands. In both cases the most important aspect in gaining or maintaining 
power was to have the means and opportunity to influence the key persons in the 
administration of the occupying power. Thus, like Hilbert and Reventlow, 
Kauffmann was, through his position in Washington, able to regularly be in contact 
with key persons at the State Department, whereas those opportunities were scarce to 
the other parties. However, whereas Hilbert never held the same central strategic 
position in British war plans, Kauffmann’s role with regard to U.S. strategy in the 
North Atlantic was paramount.
B. DANISH REPRESENTATIVES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A 
POWER-STRUGGLE
The lack of a Danish Government in exile had a big effect on the Danish 
representatives abroad. The sudden break in communications with Copenhagen 
meant that most of the Danish representatives in the Allied world were left without 
anyone to turn to if a situation arose that needed consultation. The situation saw the
117 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5369, 859.001/6-2844, memorandum by Berle of 
conversation with Kauffmann 28.06.44
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emergence of two power centres of Danish authority in exile, in London and in 
Washington. In London the most prominent persons were Christmas M0ller and 
Reventlow, while in Washington it was Kauffmann.
Although their Government in Copenhagen was still operating it was clear to 
everyone that it was not operating completely independent from it’s occupiers, 
despite such claims of both the Government itself and the Germans.121 Thus, unlike 
the Norwegians, who had a King and Government in exile in London to refer to, the 
situation of the Danish representatives became unclear and ambiguous. Their 
continued presence and operations in the respective host countries in the allied world 
became dependent upon that they acted independently from the Government in 
Copenhagen.
Why, then, did the Danish King and Government remain in Denmark rather than 
follow the Norwegian example? To answer that Reventlow pointed out that the 
situation of Denmark was remarkably different from that of Norway. It would not 
have been perceived as a laudable deed if Prime Minister Stauning and Foreign 
Minister Munch had fled the country, when it was their respective parties and 
Government, who were to blame for the defenceless state Denmark found herself in 
at the outbreak of war. Thus, there was no other option open for them but to stay in 
Denmark and try to make the most of the situation, which they had created. And, 
without a government there was no point for the King to go into exile, since such a 
move on his own would have little actual effect,122 Reventlow argued.
With no government in exile the Danes tried to set up other means of a centralised 
organization, which could gather all Danes abroad in their common cause to work for 
in the interest of the liberation of Denmark. One of the most acute aims was to 
restore the international reputation of Denmark and the Danes remaining there during 
the war. The lack of resistance put up against the German invasion and the 
subsequent open collaboration by the Government with its occupiers had shattered 
the Danish image.
121 SA, 84 .B .2 .a /l909-45/0002 , Bilag til Redeg0relse for Minister Kauffmann’s Holdning (’’Graabog 
I”), bilag 8, Telegram til Gesandtskaber og udsendte Konsulater i neutrale Lande, 06.05.40
122 SA, 3.F.Londonl3.pk. 12/1982/0002, Letter from Reventlow to Mrs. B. Grinling, 10.10.41
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As demonstrated in Chapter III, IV and V the level of influence exercised by the 
Danish representatives with regard to the Faroes, Iceland and the United States was 
to a varying degree dependent upon the attitude of the Foreign Office in London and 
the State Department in Washington towards the situation in Denmark. In case of 
Hilbert in Chapter HI, the situation in Denmark played quite a central factor to the 
attitude of the British towards him throughout the occupation. With regard to 
Fontenay in Iceland, he chose to keep a minimal profile during the occupation and 
thus did not end up in a situation where the occupiers questioned about their attitude 
towards him as a representative of a German controlled Government. The situation of 
Svane, Brun and Kauffmann, again differed slightly from the other in this respect. In 
the case of Svane and Brun their positions were never questioned by the Americans 
although their continued allegiances to the King and country were to some degree 
frowned upon. As for the Danish Legation in Washington and Danish representatives 
elsewhere the situation in Denmark was very much vital to their scope of operation 
and especially the prospect of securing Danish interests and the future of Denmark as 
a part of the allied world after the war. Kauffmann’s central role with respect to 
Greenland, however, put him in a particular position. After his denunciation of the 
Government in Copenhagen the situation in Denmark did not affect his position as 
such, but it did to all the Danish subjects, he represented in the United States and he 
therefore was also anxious to uphold a good picture of Denmark to the U.S. 
Government and American people.
1. Reputation of Denmark and Danes after the German occupation 
Taken into account that common knowledge abroad of a small country like Denmark 
was limited, critical writings about the situation in Denmark, such as Joachim 
Joesten’s book with the title “Rats in the Larder,”123 were easily taken at face value 
by the local population. The Danes therefore realised that they needed to put an effort 
into constantly distancing themselves from the Germans, who controlled their 
Government. They also needed to escape from the stigma of being a people, who did 
not put up a fight in order to defend their neutrality but chose to cooperate with the 
enemy. If they did not do this they would loose any goodwill from the Allies.
123 SA, 8.U. 13/1/1964/516, referred to by Kauffmann in a letter to Scavenius, 04.09.40
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Kauffmann thus sent out a despatch to the other Danish representatives providing 
guidelines to be followed when official and unofficial statements were being made 
about the Danes situation and Denmark and Danish in general. This in order to 
minimize the chances of any damage being made to the Danish reputation and profile 
amongst the Allies. The Danish were very worried that they would be classified with 
the Balkan states “which more or less of their own volition have joined the Axis”124
There were incidents, where Danish subjects did feel the brunt of their Government’s 
decision to collaborate with the Germans. Danish Consul at the Royal Vice- 
Consulate of Denmark in Philadelphia, P. A. wrote to his colleague, Consul General 
George Bech, New York, upon discovering that he had been by-passed by the British 
Consul in Philadelphia. Someone had made a remark that this was perhaps because 
he was a “persona non grata on account of conditions in Denmark.”125
Propaganda could, to some extent help change the view of the Danes and the 
situation Denmark found herself in. However, as long as Danish representatives 
abroad did not speak with one voice, this was difficult to achieve. The establishment 
of an institution to operate as the highest Danish authority abroad, therefore, seemed 
utmost important.
2. The Danish Council and the “Free Denmark” movement
The two competing institutions for becoming the overriding Danish authority in the 
absence of a government in exile became the Danish Council in London and the 
“Free Denmark” movement with Danish Minister in Washington, Kauffmann, at the 
forefront.
a) Danish Council
The Danish Council in London was established in September 1940 by prominent 
Danes, who, with the absence of a government in exile, wanted to set up an 
institution for coordination of all Danish interests. The Council conducted a
124 SA, 5.D .8/7/1983/516, Memorandum by Kauffmann, 14.10.41
125 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Legationsraad Blechingbergs Akter vedr. Minister Kauffmanns 
Politik: Danske Udenrigstjenestemaend udenfor Tysk magtomrade, letter from L.T. Brehm, Royal 
Vice-Consulate o f Denmark, Philadelphia, P.A., to Consul General George Bech, Esq., New York,
15.01.41
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widespread number of activities that would enhance the Danish independence cause 
during the war. Although it was contemplated by the British that the Council could 
receive recognition as a Danish Government in exile, these plans were never 
materialised. This was partly because the Council, with the lack of support from 
Reventlow, did not have any leadership material during the first two year of its
1 9Aexistence. Another reason was that the British feared that such a recognition would 
cause a crisis in the relations between London and Washington; a British recognition 
of the Danish Council as the national authority of all Danes in exile would 
undermine the authority of the Danish Minister in Washington.127
Upon the news of Kauffmann’s disassociation with the Government in Copenhagen 
it was anticipated by the Foreign Office that Kauffmann’s next step would be to 
establish a “Free Denmark” movement in the United States. Such an establishment, 
the Foreign Office recognised, would become a contender to the Danish Council in 
London.
On the other hand, the Committee felt that, if it should transpire that M.
de Kauffmann’s intentions were now to set up a “Free Danish
Movement” in the US and that, in this, he had the full backing and
support of the U.S. Government, careful consideration would have to be
given to the question whether the time had not come for H.M.G. to give a
more extended recognition and official support to the Danish Council
than it had hitherto received. This would ipso facto involve the “Free
Danish Movement” being treated more or less on a par with the “Free
French” organisation, in which case all official dealing would thereafter
be conducted with the Danish council and it would be necessary to put
the question to the Danish Minister whether he supported the “Free
Danish Movement” or not. In the event of an unfavourable reply he
would logically have to be informed that H.M.G. could no longer have
any dealings with him and would cease to afford him any diplomatic 
• • • 128 immunities or courtesies.
The British worries were, however, calmed by a telegram from their Embassy 
in Washington stating that “the Minister has not discussed with the State 
Department anything on the lines of the Danish Council. The State Department
126 Christmas M0ller, who later became the chairman of the Danish Council, did not arrive in Britain 
until late 1942
127 Hans Kirchhoff, J.T. Lauridsen & A. Trommer ed. Gads leksikon om dansk besaettelsestid 1940- 
45 , Gads Forlag, Kdbenhavn, 2002, p. 114
128 PRO, FO 371/23904, FO Minute by Sir J. Dashwood, “Agreement between United States 
Government and Danish Minister in Washington regarding Greenland,” 15.04.41
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feel, as you do, that there is no scope for a Danish equivalent to the Free
129French movement.”
b) “The Free Denmark” movement
The “Free Denmark” movement had national branches in most countries with a 
substantial population of Danish nationals or people with Danish ancestries. In some 
countries the Free Denmark movement was viewed with suspect by onlookers. This 
was, as we saw in Chapter III, especially the case in the Faroes where Hilbert was 
reluctant to openly join the movement in fear of the repercussions such a move 
would have on his position in the Faroes. His reluctance, however, was read by some 
as a reluctance to take sides, as long as there was no clear indication, who would
1 Q A
come out of the war as the victorious.
It was also pointed out by some, that the ambiguous position of the Danish 
representative abroad resulted in that many Danes were very cautious as to not to 
make any commitment to the Free Denmark movement, because they were afraid 
that such a move would not be welcomed by the Government in Copenhagen and 
therefore would have a negative effect on their future and the prospect of being 
included in the build up of the country after the war. (translated)131
In his request to President Roosevelt for a statement on the American support for the 
freedom fighters in Denmark, Kauffmann also requested that the President should 
mention “the Danish official representatives in Washington and London as trustees 
for Danish interests outside Denmark, “working for the liberation of Denmark 
together with the Free Danish organizations all over the world”.”132 Kauffmann 
pointed out that ”he put this in partly to remind the existence of the Danish Council 
in London and partly to indicate that the Danish Council was not the only such
129 PRO, FO 371/23904, FO Minute by Sir J. Dashwood, “Agreement between United States 
Government and Danish Minister in Washington regarding Greenland,” 15.04.41
130 RA, UD/9974/2.23, De ul0nte stasjoner: Torshavn. Bind II, Fra Wendelbo, Torshavn, til UD, 
London, 02.09.42
131 RA, UD/9974/2.23, De ul0nte stasjoner: Torshavn. Bind II, Fra Wendelbo, Torshavn, til UD, 
London, 02.09.42
132 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5366, F.W. 859.00/1068, memorandum of 
Conversation by A.A. Berle between him and Kauffmann, 04.09.43
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Council in existence.”133 Kauffmann thought that there were larger Danish societies 
in the United States which were far more entitled to be recognised than the handful 
of Danish business and shipping men who lived in London134 Kauffmann also 
admitted that “the effect of such a statement would be in part to build up his own 
position a little, but under the circumstances he thought this was allowable.”135 By 
this remark, Kauffmann meant that his position was being compromised by the 
Danish Council in London. Although Kauffmann made no mention of it, Berle 
nevertheless sensed that ” he had in mind the fact that the juniors in the British 
Foreign Office have indicated a slight tendency to try to take over control of the 
whole Danish matter by emphasizing the position of Christmas M0ller in 
London.”136
Berle noted that the idea of such a statement was not a bad one. He recognised that 
the American interest in the Danish situation was on par with that of the British, if 
not larger. This primarily because of Greenland but also their responsibility in 
connection with their occupation of Iceland. Berle concluded by stating that 
Kauffmann probably was the strongest Danish figure outside Denmark, and that 
Berle believed that Kauffmann “would probably be accepted in Denmark as the Dane
1S7outside the country best qualified to handle the Danish interests.”
These passages clearly accentuate the argument that the importance of Greenland and 
Iceland to the Americans made Kauffmann’s position very strong and fortified his 
ability to influence not only the Americans, but also the British and his fellow Danish 
representatives elsewhere.
133 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5366, F.W. 859.00/1068, memorandum of 
Conversation by A.A. Berle between him and Kauffmann, 04.09.43
134 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5366, F.W. 859.00/1068, memorandum of  
Conversation by A.A. Berle between him and Kauffmann, 04.09.43
135 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5366, F.W. 859.00/1068, memorandum of 
Conversation by A.A. Berle between him and Kauffmann, 04.09.43
136 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5366, F.W. 859.00/1068, memorandum of 
Conversation by A.A. Berle between him and Kauffmann, 04.09.43
137 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 5366, F.W. 859.00/1068, memorandum of 
Conversation by A.A. Berle between him and Kauffmann, 04.09.43
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2.1 Kauffmann’s relations with the other Danish representatives
Because of his early announcement that he disassociated himself from the
Government in Copenhagen, thus turning his back on the authority, who had
appointed him to his post, Kauffmann was put under much scrutiny by some of his
colleagues, who would not compromise their pledges of loyalty to the King and
Government.
It can only be contemplated whether Kauffmann had any aspirations to enhance his
position, that is, to expand it further than the frames of his diplomatic position
allowed him, prior to the war or whether the situation brought that about.
Nevertheless, it was noted by Tscheming138, amongst others, that once Denmark was
occupied, Kauffmann certainly viewed the situation as an opportunity to exceed the
parameters of his position as merely a Minister. Blechingberg’s allegations that such
a change occurred in Kauffmann’s objectives after the German occupation of
Denmark can to a degree be supported with how Kauffmann himself described the
situation in a letter to Svane and Brun a year after Denmark was occupied. In the
letter Kaufmann noted that the “occupation certainly put the three of them in a
problematic situation, which nevertheless presented them with some extraordinary
1opportunities, which do not fall into every man’s hands.”
As we saw in the first part of this chapter, acquiring the authority over the funds 
derived from the cryolite mine in Ivigtut became an important issue to Kauffmann. 
With the money from sales of cryolite Kauffmann became the only Danish 
representative abroad with a considerable economical means. Bo Lidegaard indicates 
that Kauffmann at one point stepped outside his parameters and began to utilise this 
profit from the cryolite mine at Ivigtut for other purposes than what they had been 
designated to, namely Greenland matters.140 Instead, Kauffmann used the money to 
the built up a network of Free Denmark movements.141
138 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Report 2: Referater om Kauffmannsagen, Referat Nr. 2.d, p. 2
139 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Legationsraad Blechingbergs Akter vedr. Minister Kauffmanns 
Politik: Grpnland, Bilag 21 (Letter from Kauffmann to Svane and Brun, 04.03.41)
140 Lidegaard, I Kongens Navn, 1999, p. 229
141 Lidegaard, I Kongens Navn, 1999, p. 230
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The first part of this chapter also demonstrated the importance Kauffmann placed 
upon the acknowledgment of the State Department of his power and authority. This 
was not only important in relation to his position vis a vis the Greenland Governors 
and his authority over Greenland affairs, but also towards the community of Danish 
representatives abroad. The recognition of him by the State Department as a central 
role with regard to Greenland meant that when Kauffmann’s personae and position 
was contested, for example by the Germans who wanted to replace him with his 
colleague Blechingberg, the Americans would not succumb to the request. Rather 
they reinforced the statement that they would continue to recognise Kauffmann as 
the “authorized Minister of Denmark at Washington.”142
After the German occupation of Denmark Kauffmann listed the three options open to 
all Danish representatives abroad: 1) to resign, 2) to continue to take orders from 
Copenhagen at any rate, or 3) to act to a certain degree on their own, i.e. not 
necessarily act on order from Copenhagen, but only when they found the orders to 
work to serve Danish interests at best. Kauffmann then added, that in his case all 
three options were open to him, and the reason why he chose the option he did, was 
with regard to the opinion of the American public, which grew more and more 
unfriendly towards the German cause, and he therefore wanted to avoid being put in 
the same basket.143
Kauffmann wanted to ensure that he had the support of all the other Danish 
representatives abroad. By achieving this, he would strengthen his position not only 
during the war but also after. After his dismissal by the Danish Government the issue 
of whose backing Kauffmann could count on and who disassociated themselves from 
him reached a conclusion. A final stand was necessary. In order to sway those, who 
still had not made up their mind, Kauffmann proclaimed that he had the full backing 
of all Danish representatives in America. Despite knowing that this was not quite 
true, Kauffmann also knew that as long as he was not dismissed by the State
142 NARA, Decim al File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 1856, 701.5911/356, memorandum o f conversation 
between Blechingberg and Berle, 28.04.41
143 SA, 84.B .2.a/1909.45/0002, Kauffmann-Sagen, Referat No. 1, p, 4
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Department, everyone probably went along.144 To the State Department Kauffmann 
also stated that he had the full backing of all other Danish representatives in the 
United States145 although this was not quite the case.
2.3 Kauffmann’s opposition amongst the Danish representatives 
For the Danish representatives in the Americas the question whether to answer to 
Kauffmann or Copenhagen became acute after the signing of the Greenland 
Agreement. Kauffmann stressed to his colleagues that for the future of Danish 
relations with the United States it was of utmost importance that he could present a 
note to Hull with the full back-up of his fellow envoys that he should refuse to follow 
his dismissal order from Copenhagen. He reminded everyone that they had already 
given him their loyalty a year earlier. Therefore, if there were some who were not 
ready to follow him in the present standpoint, he would have to inform the State 
Department of those.146 There were in particular three Danish representatives in the 
United States, who openly disagreed with Kauffmann: Blechingberg, Helmut M0ller, 
and Tscheming.
Blechingberg was the Danish Minister in Mexico at the time of the German
occupation of Denmark. Upon the request from Kauffmann, he joined the Legation
in Washington. Blechingberg, however did not agree to Kauffmann’s overall
policy.147 Blechingberg also questioned the ‘full back-up’ that Kauffmann declared
that he had amongst his fellow Danish representatives in the United States. It seemed
to him that the question was not
whether the other representatives were willing to continue to take orders 
from Copenhagen or not, but rather whether they dared to go against 
Kauffmann, who, according to Blechingberg, to some extent pressurised 
some of his colleagues to follow him and confirm their loyalty to him as
148opposed to the Government in Copenhagen.
Tscheming was also one of those representatives, who stuck to his loyalty pledge to 
his King and Government. He was thus surprised to find that Kauffmann was “ready
144 SA, 84 .B .2 .a /l909-45/0002, Legationsraad Blechingbergs Akter vedr. Minister Kauffmanns 
Politik: Legationsraadens tjenstlige korrespoindance fra 16.4 til 12.7.1941, Telegram from Kauffmann 
to Copenhagen 25.04.41.
145 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Report 2: Referater om Kauffmannsagen, p. 31
146 SA, 84.B.2 .a/1909-45/0002, Report 2: Referater om Kauffmannsagen, p. 32
147 SA, 84 .B .2 .a /l909-45/0002, Report 2: Referater om Kauffmannsagen, pp. 28-30
148 SA, 84 .B .2 .a /l909-45/0002, Report 2: Referater om Kauffmannsagen, p. 28-30
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to go outside the normal parameters of a diplomat and take up the position of a 
politician.”149
After Blechingberg, Tscheming and Helmuth M0ller had openly taken distance from
Kauffmann they were dismissed or had to retreat from their posts. Subsequently, they
found that they were being monitored, but they did not know for certain by whom.
The purpose, they believed, was not only to try to catch them in doing something
wrong, but also to intimidate them and others from taking contact. Their guess,
however, that Kauffmann along with the State Department was behind this150 was not
far from the truth. Berle had namely requested that the FBI (Federal Bureau of
Investigation) should keep “a careful watch on Mr. Einar Blechingberg.. .and Messrs.
Helmuth Ingemann Mpller and Adam Tobias Tscheming.”151 This request came
following a conversation with Bang-Jensen, who was Kauffmann’s prodigy, where
Bang-Jensen said that Tscheming “may be definitely pro-Nazi”152 Reflecting upon
this unpleasant experience Tscheming wrote:
The ever-ready Mr. Berle handled the case personally, and did it in a 
manner which can only be described as a flagrant violation of 
international courtesy as well as of plain human decency. It was an 
insidious campaign to embarrass the three men out of the country without 
giving them or their Government a chance to discuss things in a sensible
manner although it was clear beyond doubt that none of them had
any German affiliations whatsoever, and that they would, in fact, have 
acted against the interests of their country if they had established any 
such contacts, Berle, nevertheless, with the aid of de Kauffmann 
convinced the State Department that they were Nazis and that, 
consequently, it was necessary to take all measures to prevent them from
fulfilling their sinister plans of sabotage, spying, and other deviltry He
[Berle] is a master in the art of underhand tricks and coercion.153
2.4 Kauffmann versus the Danish contingency in London
While Kauffmann was busy gathering supporters for the Free Denmark movement 
and the stance against the Government in Copenhagen, Reventlow, to Kauffmann’s
149 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Report 2: Referater om Kauffmannsagen, Referat Nr. 2.d, p. 2
150 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Legationsraad Blechingbergs Akter vedr. Minister Kauffmanns 
Politik: Legationsraadens tjenstlige korrespoindance fra 16.4 til 12.7.1941, Letter from Mpller, 
Montclair, N.J. to Blechingberg, 10.06.41
151 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 1856, 701.5911/360A, Berle to Hoover, FBI, 08.05.41
152 NARA, Decimal File 1940-44, RG 59, Box 1856, 701.5911/361, Department o f State, Division of 
European Affairs Memorandum 01.05.41
153 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002, Vicekonsil Tschernings materiale til ev. Brug for artiklen in den 
amerikanske presse om Kauffmann., Letter from Tscheming to Mr. Dudley Swim, 09.07.41.
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dismay, kept more quiet, and was reluctant to react to any of Kauffmann’s queries 
and encouragements for an official announcement of his allegiance to the Free 
Denmark movement.
a) Reventlow
Reventlow was, as pointed out in Chapter HI, reluctant to follow Kauffmann in 
announcing himself independent from his Government in Copenhagen. Although it 
was in the interest both of the Foreign Office and members of the Danish Council in 
London that Reventlow should do so, his decision was respected. It was accepted that 
forcing Revntlow would not likely produce the desired result. Also it was 
acknowledged that ”if Count Reventlow were forced into a position where he would 
have to resign, this would inevitably lead to a most serious split in, and consequent 
weakening of, the Council itself.”154
In a conversation with Collier shortly after the German occupation Reventlow had 
expressed that due to his loyalty to his King he could not adopt the same position as 
Kaufmann, “who had apparently proclaimed himself the representative of “Free 
Denmark” regardless of the wishes of the King and Government...His Majesty's 
Government could [however] rest assure that his sympathies were with their cause 
and that he would never commit, or allow his staff to commit, any act contrary to 
their interests.”155 Reventlow did not break with Copenhagen till late 1941 following 
the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact by the Danish Government in November 
1941.
It was only after reading a report on Greenland in November 1940, that Reventlow 
wrote to Kauffmann on the matter. He did not condemn Kauffmann’s standpoint, but 
remarked that
to each separate post to a certain extent special conditions apply. I did not 
deem it expedient or necessary here to issue any declaration of a political 
nature. My work has been continued as heretofore -  with such alterations 
in its character and the conditions for its execution as the unhappy events 
in Denmark have necessitated. According to what Else, who spent the fist
154 PRO, FO 371/23904, FO Minute by Sir J. Dashwood, “Agreement between United States 
Government and Danish Minister in Washington regarding Greenland,” 15.04.41
155 PRO, FO 371/24784, N  4567/4220/15, memorandum of conversation between Collier and 
Reventlow by Collier, 16.04.40
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fortnight after the occupation in Denmark, has told me this was in 
accordance with the King’s and the Government’s wishes.156
b) Christmas M0ller
John Christmas M0ller did not arrive in London till 1942. He had thus remained in 
Denmark after the German invasion and had even held the post as Minister of Trade 
and Commerce after the arrival of the German occupiers. M0ller’s aspiration to give 
the Danish population some insight to aspects of the collaboration so that the Danes 
would understand the rationale behind the Government’s decision to collaborate, was 
not welcomed by the Germans. Consequently M0ller had to leave his post as 
minister. Over the course of the year he became more and more critical of the 
Germans and was subsequently pushed out of all other political posts he held. 
Despite being met by criticism by Danes upon his arrival in London, he nevertheless 
soon became attached to the Danish Council in London. Since Reventlow refrained 
from making any public denouncement of the Government in Copenhagen and 
subsequently declined requests by his fellow Danes in London to take up the post as 
the Chairman of the Danish Council, the Council was in desperate need of a strong 
leader to act as a counterpart to the strong position Kauffmann was gaining in the 
United States. Christmas M0ller’s arrival in London was thus welcomed and he 
became the chairman of the Danish Council shortly after.
3. Level of success of the Danish representatives’ quest to restore Danish reputation: 
Danes comparatively higher in estimate than the Norwegians
During the war members of the Norwegian Royal family frequently visited 
Roosevelt’s summer residence at Hyde Park. While King Haakon and Prince Olav 
spent most of their time in London with the Norwegian Government in exile, 
Princess Martha and her children were sent to the United States to escape the 
atrocities of war, and most of that time, they were Roosevelt’s guests. However, 
although the Norwegian Royals experienced much hospitality and contributed a great 
deal to Norway’s good image in the United States157, this goodwill was not reflected 
in the State Department. Time after time the Norwegians complained that they and
156 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909-45/0002 , Minister Kauffmanns Politik, Legationsraad E. Blechingberg og 
Fuldmaegtig A. Tscheming (1. eks.), p. 79 (letter from Reventlow to Kauffmann, 14.11.40)
157 SA, 8.U. 13/1/1964/516, letter from Kauffmann to Foreign Minister Scavenius, 04.09.40
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Norway were overlooked by the United States,158 especially as compared to the 
attention and treatment the Danish representatives were given.
There is no doubt that the fact that Greenland was under the authority of the Danish 
and not the Norwegians played a major role in the level of importance attached to the 
representatives of the two countries by the Americans. One example of this was 
when the Kauffmann was allowed to travel from Britain to the United States, while 
his Norwegian colleague, Morgenstieme, was denied permission.159 The permission 
for Kauffmann to travel was given on the grounds that because of Greenland it was 
important to the Americans to have the Danish Minister, whom they regarded as the 
rightful representative of the Danish Government, in the United States.160 
Morgenstieme, however, was admitted to travel back to the United States some 
weeks later, after he had placed a complaint on the matter.161
The Norwegians also felt that it was not correct that the Danish Minister was given 
the same status as the Norwegians at the Inter-allied meeting in Washington on 
December 27th 1941 despite the fact that the Danish Government was collaborating
1 fif)with the Germans and thus did not hold the status as an ally, like all other 
participants of the meeting. The Norwegian representatives in the United States 
especially found it degrading towards the Norwegians that the Americans did not 
make any distinctions between the Scandinavian countries, despite their different 
conducts and experiences during the war.
Another event which augmented the Norwegian sense of partiality shown by the 
Americans towards the Danes was with regard to the status given to the Danes as 
compared to that of the Norwegians. When a conference on supplies to the war 
stricken Europe (which was the forerunner to the UNRRA, United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration) was about to take place in Washington, Welles
158 RA, UD/579, 34.1/2a, Memo from T. Lie, UD, London, 05.01.45
159 RA, U D /10181/15, Diplomaters og konsulers status i ffemmede land, Oversettelse La Razon, 
31.05.44
160 RA, U D /10384/25.1, Minute o f conversation with Collier, FO, by Lie, 05.05.44
161 RA, U D /10181/15, Minute from meeting with Under Secretary Stettinius by Moregenstierne, 
Washington, 17.07.44
162 RA, UD /579, 34.1/2a, Minute from meeting with Mr. Biddle, by Lie, UD, London 31.12.41
163 RA, UD /579, 34.1/2a, letter from CJ. Hambro, Princeton; N ew  Jersey to Ambassador 
Morgenstieme, Washington D.C., 17.08.42
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turned to the Norwegians to notify them that it was in the interest of the Americans 
that Kauffmann was invited along as an observer. Such a move would be of great 
importance to improve the morale of the freedom fighters in Denmark, Welles 
believed.164 The Norwegians, on the other hand, were afraid that showing such little 
difference in the attitude towards the two people, the Norwegians and the Danes, 
would have a negative impact on the morale of the freedom fighters in occupied 
Norway, who had suffered much greater hardship under the Nazis than their 
neighbours had.165
C. CONCLUSION
The main question set in this chapter was: How was Kauffmann able to exert the 
level of influence he did to the extent that he nearly got unconditional support from 
the State Department as compared to the Greenland Governors?
Apart from examining the relationship between the Americans and the Danish 
representatives with regard to Greenland, this chapter also examined the power 
struggle that arose amongst the Danish representatives abroad due to the lack of a 
Danish Government in exile. One can argue that this power struggle was two- 
levelled and on both levels Kauffmann was the central person. Whereas the Danish 
representatives in Iceland and the Faroes had to compete with the natives for power 
and influence on the occupiers, this chapter shows that in the case of Greenland the 
contest was amongst the Danes themselves.
While the first part examined the struggle at a lower level, that is, between 
Kauffmann on the one hand and Governors Svane and Brun on the other, the second 
part of the chapter examined the struggle at an international level, that is amongst the 
community of Danish representatives world wide. Both levels had one common 
power factor that proved to be decisive in both struggles: the authority over 
Greenland affairs.
164 RA, U D /10386/25.1, Utenriksministerens samtaler i USA, Minute from conversation with Sumner 
W elles, State Department, by Lie, 20.04.43
165 RA, UD/10386-25.1, Utenriksministerens samtaler i USA, Minutes from conversation with 
Sumner W elles, by Lie, 23.3.43
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Before the occupation of Denmark on April 9th 1940, the administration of 
Greenland was run from the central administration, the Greenland Office, in 
Copenhagen, and carried out by two Governors in Greenland, one in the South and 
one in the North. Even the smallest actions of the officials in Greenland were 
circumscribed by regulations, from which departure was not permitted without 
special authority from Denmark. Greenland was thus a territory guarded and run by a 
small group of people and it was difficult for others outside the group to have any 
influence on Greenland matters. This was also demonstrated in Chapter I where 
criticisms of the lack of will of the Greenland Office to open up the Greenland border 
to the outside world were introduced to the debate. The following passage from a 
report by the Canadian consulate in Greenland during the war depicts the 
circumstances in which Greenland and the two Governors in Greenland found 
themselves with regard to the governance of Greenland after communications with 
Copenhagen were severed: “Most of those now in the service grew up during the 
regime of a Director of the central office in Copenhagen -  Daugaard-Jensen -  who 
was something of an autocrat (a Danish “Little Emperor”) who did not look kindly 
on ideas not originating in his own person.”166 The report thus indicated that the 
Governors were very much bound by what the Greenland Office stipulated. This 
was, as was evident in this chapter, especially applicable to Governor Svane, who 
had long served as Governor in South Greenland. Governor Brun on the other hand 
had just recently arrived in Greenland and turned out to be more independent from 
the Greenland Office and thus more adjustable once the connection with Copenhagen 
was severed.
Although the Americans continued to correspond with the Danish Government and 
kept their Legation in Denmark open until they entered the war, they nevertheless 
distinguished between the dealings with Copenhagen and those representatives that 
acted independently from their German controlled home Government.
The chapter showed that the United States Government initially had the policy that 
all matters relating to Greenland should be dealt with by the Governors in Greenland. 
Kauffmann, however, had a close relationship with Berle, who saw the interest of
166 PRO, FO 371/47273, Report from the Canadian Consulate Greenland, Godthaab, 12.04.45
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U.S. further involvement in the war being served by granting Kauffmann more 
authority over Greenland.
The difference between Kauffmann and the Greenland Governors was that whereas 
the latter two never wavered from their loyalty to the King and country, Kauffmann 
saw it serving his and Danish interest best that he broke off with the German 
controlled Government in Copenhagen and declared himself independent. As regards 
Greenland the three of them also had different ideas as to what would be the best 
policy. Whereas the Governors put much importance into securing the best 
conditions for the island and its inhabitants, Kauffmann merely saw Greenland as a 
means to acquire influence and power. This was particularly evident in the case of 
the signing of the Greenland Agreement. As the discussion in the chapter shows, the 
Agreement lacked a great deal, both legally and with regard to aspects relating to the 
future of Greenland.
The chapter showed that he American willingness to continue to recognise 
Kauffmann as a representative of Denmark was very much connected with the 
American strategic interest in Greenland. From early on Kauffmann and Berle 
recognised the mutual need for each other in their pursuit for separate goals. Berle’s 
goal was American involvement in Greenland, which would inevitably mean further 
involvement in the war. Kauffmann’s goal was to gain influence over the Americans 
and secure their support in his quest to safeguard Danish interests in the United 
States and the future role of Denmark in the post-war world.
Since American Consul Penfield quickly had formed a disapproving opinion of the 
two Greenland Governors, and the State Department was repeatedly given the similar 
impression from Kauffmann, the Greenland Governors soon found it difficult to 
acquire any influence of such on the Americans. Kauffmann’s and Berle’s similar 
views with regard to the role of Greenland during the war, as opposed to that of the 
Greenland Governors, did not improve the chances of the Governors in gaining any 
influence to their advantage. Realising the importance of Greenland in acquiring 
influence, Kauffmann convinced the Americans that the Governors should only have 
the powers over internal matters in Greenland bestowed upon them, whereas the rest
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should fall within his authority, despite the Americans initially recognising the full 
power and authority of the Governors in matters relating to Greenland.
Kauffmann’s move to declare himself as independent from the German controlled 
Danish Government and the subsequent taking in charge the affairs of Greenland has
1 r n
been described as a personal move from being an official to becoming a politician.
As was demonstrated in this chapter, there were some who questioned the motives 
behind Kauffmann’s deeds and it was speculated whether he was using his position 
during the war to secure himself a role in the building up of a liberated Denmark. 
Kauffmann was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first Government 
after the liberation of Denmark. The appointment was not received with universal 
approval in Denmark. This reservation towards Kauffmann was not so much due to 
his activities during the war, but rather due to the fact that he had been away for the 
past 20 years and the fact that he was a diplomat by trade and not a politician.
Kauffmann’s denunciation of the Government in Copenhagen and the subsequent 
central role he gained in relations to the U.S. Government following the signing of 
the Greenland Agreement also helped his quest to become the highest Danish 
authority outside Denmark. Helped by the mutual interest the State Department 
supported him to get established in that role in opposition to the Danish Council in 
London, which was backed by the British Government.
The authority over Greenland and its affairs thus proved to be central to the level of 
influence Kauffmann was able to exert on the Americans. It not only helped him to 
become the highest Danish authority abroad, but it also helped him in securing 
Danish interests, which was the main task of the Danish representatives while their 
Government and country was occupied by the Germans. Thus, by the end of the war, 
it was noted by the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Lie, that during the war Kauffmann
167 SA, 84.B.2.a/1909.45/0002, Kauffmann-Sagen, ReferatNo. 1, p. 1
168 RA, UD/10465 Danmark Bind II-III, Memorandum by Per Johansen, Norwegian Legation in 
Stockholm, 04.01.44
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had “succeeded in securing himself a strong position by the help of the Americans, 
who perceived him as sort of a ‘Danish de facto government”.169
169 RA, UD/10384/25.1, Minute o f conversation with Collier, FO, by Lie, 05.05.44
312
CONCLUSION
The thesis set out to examine U.S. and British policies towards the Danish North 
Atlantic territories during Second World War and the extent to which the Danish 
representatives were able to influence these policies.
The thesis shows that although representing a government collaborating with the 
enemy the Danish representatives were to a large extent able to exert influence on the 
respective occupying power or host government to the extent that they to a varying 
degree were successful in securing Danish interests in the North Atlantic territories 
and the position of Denmark as part of the allied world in the post-war period.
The thesis demonstrates, that although the Danish representatives in charge of the 
North Atlantic Territories found themselves in a similar problematic situation, as 
their communications with the Government in Copenhagen were cut off, their roles 
in the respective territories were quite dissimilar due to the different prerequisites 
attached to the situation of the territories during the duration of the Second World 
War: Firstly, the different constitutional status of each territory; secondly the level of 
strategic importance attached to each territory by the occupiers, and thirdly the 
difference in personality of the Danish representatives.
The common objective of all Danish representatives was to secure Danish interests 
and maintain status quo in the North Atlantic territories and elsewhere while their 
Government was occupied. With regard to the different level of status within the 
Danish Kingdom, that is, the different level of independence, ranging from home- 
rule governed semi-autonomous Iceland to the colony of Greenland, the thesis 
showed that this aspect reflected the various levels of competition for influence in 
each territory. In the Faroes, then a Danish county with a parliament acting as an 
advisory body to the Governor, the Danish Governor faced fierce competition from 
members of the Faroese independence movement. In the case of colonised Greenland 
the Danish representatives did not experience competence from the natives, but were 
rather competing amongst themselves for the authority over Greenland. In Iceland, 
on the other hand, where the Icelandic Government had taken over the authority over 
all her affairs, the Danish representative sensed that nothing was to gain from
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challenging the Icelandic rule and therefore remained passive, as this would serve the 
Danish cause the best.
The thesis also demonstrated that the different level of strategic importance paid by 
the Allies to the Faroes, Iceland and Greenland affected the level of interest and 
involvement of the Allies in internal affairs of the respective territories. As we saw in 
Chapter HI the lack of strategic importance paid by the British to the Faroes was not 
only reflected by the choice of diplomatic envoy to the islands but also by the 
decision to decline the request of the Admiralty to have an aerodrome built in the 
islands in the early stages of war. An additional factor, which most probably played a 
role in the limited strategic importance of the Faroes, was the lack of interest shown 
by the Americans to the islands. Subsequently, the occupation of the Faroes only 
became a matter of guarding the islands from a German occupation, which would 
have placed the British islands in immediate danger. What happened internally in the 
Faroes would, therefore, not jeopardise the overall strategy of the British in the North 
Atlantic. There was therefore never any serious need of the British to take a stance or 
get involved in the internal struggle between the Governor and the Home Rulers and 
the support shown to either side very much depended upon the change of attitude of 
the British themselves.
With an aerodrome built in the island and the U.S. interest in a guarded Iceland 
coinciding with the debate in the U.S. on whether or not Iceland was to be included 
in the Western Hemisphere, the strategic importance of Iceland was remarkably 
higher than that of the Faroes. The strong indications of a post-war independent 
Iceland also increased the interest of the future strategic importance of Iceland 
amongst the Allies. There was therefore an interest amongst the Allies to be as 
forthcoming and accommodating to the Icelanders as possible.
The strategic importance of Greenland to the U.S. and consequently to the Danes and 
their situation in the Allied World during and after the war was not lost neither to the 
Americans nor the Danish representative in Washington. The strategic importance of 
Greenland therefore placed the representative with the most authority over the island 
in a very favourable situation vis-a-vis the United States.
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The level of strategic importance attached to Greenland also helped strengthening the 
position of the Danish Minister in Washington vis-a-vis his colleagues in the power 
struggle to become the most acknowledged Danish authority abroad in the absence of 
a government in exile.
As we saw in the chapters on each of the three territories, the Faroes, Iceland and 
Greenland, the level of activity of the representative varied. In addition to the already 
mentioned factors such as the level of independence of each territory, the level of 
strategic importance and external interest in the territory, the level of influence 
exercised by each respective representative was also down to how he personally 
perceived his role and aim and the policy he applied in achieving that aim.
In order to address the hypothesis two questions had to be asked. The first one was: 
How were the Danish representatives in the North Atlantic territories, London and 
Washington DC able to exert influence on the British and Americans in their policies 
towards the North Atlantic territories when they were representing a Government, 
which was under the influence of the enemy? The second question was: What were 
their actions and policies in achieving this?
In order to address these questions the scene had to be set first. Thus, in chapter I and 
II the reader was introduced to the historical background of the relationship between 
Denmark and the North Atlantic Territories, and British and American relations to 
the Danish Kingdom, including her territories, in the period up to the German 
occupation of Denmark on April 9th 1940. This gave the reader an understanding of 
the prerequisites for the representative’s role in each respective territory. Chapter I 
also introduced the reader to the historical background of the Danish decision to stay 
neutral in the first place and why the Danish Government then decided to collaborate 
with the German occupiers. Decisions, which would have a bearing to the attitude of 
the host territory’s occupying forces towards the Danish representatives.
In chapter III we were introduced to the main actors with regard to the British 
occupation of the Faroes, Governor Hilbert, Danish Minister in London Reventlow, 
Consul Mason, and Thorstein Petersen of the People’s Party. The chapter saw an
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intense struggle for influence between Hilbert on the one side and Petersen and his 
colleagues of the People’s Party and at the Norwegian Consulate on the other side.
Upon arrival in the Faroes the British occupying forces and newly appointed Consul 
Mason issued a loosly worded declaration, stating that the British would not interfere 
with internal matters. The reason why the declaration was so vaguely worded was 
because of the situation in Denmark immediately after the German occupation and 
the ambiguous attitude the Danish Government was applying to the Germans. The 
vague declaration and the fact that Consul Mason was young and inexperienced 
allowed room for influence on the British policies towards the Faroes. Governor 
Hilbert quickly acknowledged this and struck up a close relationship with the young 
British Consul. Hilbert and Reventlow also recognised the opportunity to influence 
the British through their communications with one another which they knew would 
be checked by the British due to the censorship that accompanied war-time. Hilbert 
was therefore able to exert a great level of influence in concert with Reventlow. 
Hilbert also exerted some degree of influence on the Commander-in-Chief of the 
occupying forces on the island. The British headquarter was in the capital, which was 
very small area and population wise, and therefore fraternisation between those in 
power was frequent. Hilbert was renowned for keeping a tight circle of people of 
importance around him, and that included both Mason and the Commander-in-Chief.
The fact that Hilbert’s success in influencing British policies towards the Faroes was 
due to his impact upon Consul Mason became evident in two cases. Firstly, when 
Mason left the islands, and secondly when new forces arrived in the Faroes in 
connection with the building of the aerodrome. This meant that London began 
receiving information and reports from staff elsewhere in the Faroes, upon whom 
Hilbert did not exercise any influence. Consequently the picture and attitude in 
London towards Hilbert changed.
The role of the Danish Minister in Iceland, Fontenay, was quite dissimilar to that of 
Hilbert. Because Iceland had declared herself in charge of her foreign affairs 
following the German occupation of Denmark, Fontenay’s role in Iceland was very 
limited compared to that of Hilbert in the Faroe Islands. Fontenay’s limited role was 
also due to his personal stance on the situation he found himself in. Unlike Hilbert,
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who very actively tried to influence the British in order to secure Danish interests in 
the Faroes, Fontenay reasoned that based on the constitutional situation of Iceland 
within the Danish Kingdom at the outbreak of war, it was inevitable that she would 
leave the Union before the war was over. Rather than fight against the inevitable, 
Fontenay reasoned that he would serve Danish future interests in Iceland best by 
keeping a low profile and not create a scene, which could generate ill feeling 
amongst the Icelanders towards Denmark. The exception was when the Icelanders 
planned to leave the Union with Denmark prematurely. In this matter Fontenay 
believed that such a step by the Icelandic Government would harm Danish-Icelandic 
relations and he therefore took action. Together with Reventlow in London, Fontenay 
succeeded in influencing the British and Americans by pointing out the unfortunate 
repercussions an early Icelandic departure would have on the British and U.S. 
reputation and on the conduct of occupation in the other Danish territories. 
Fontenay’s warnings struck a chord to such an extent that the Icelanders, on request 
from the British and Americans, postponed their plans to leave the Union 
prematurely.
Although Hilbert and Reventlow enjoyed great success in influencing the British 
with regard to their policies towards the Faroes, it was the Danish Minister in 
Washington, Kauffmann, who became the strongest player of all the Danish 
representatives. His level of influence, both on the Americans and his colleagues, 
was very much strengthened by the fact that the Americans placed so much 
importance on Greenland. He was subsequently shown much goodwill by the State 
Department and that had a great bearing on the force of his actions. His counterparts 
were the Greenland Governors, Svane and Brun, who with their reluctance to depart 
from their loyalty to the King, restricted themselves and their opportunities to use 
their authority over Greenland to influence the Americans. Thus, when Kauffmann 
declared himself independent of the German controlled Government in Copenhagen 
he created a possibility for the Americans to recognise him as the acting Danish 
authority in the absence of a free operating Danish Government. The subsequent 
signing by Kauffmann of the Greenland Agreement provided him with a great level 
of American support and influence on the State Department to the extent that he was 
able to secure Danish interests in the United States and the future position of 
Denmark in the post-war era; a position, which otherwise because of the German
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collaboration of the Danish Government, was bleak at one point during the war. 
Exercising this level of influence on the Americans made it easy for Kauffmann to 
have the power and authority over the more important Greenland matters conferred 
to him rather than the Greenland Governors, where these powers originally lay. With 
the support of the State Department Kauffmann was also able to establish himself as 
the counterpart to the Danish Council in London, which aspired to take up the role as 
Danish Government in exile.
Thus, despite representing a Government, which collaborated with the enemy, 
Danish representatives were to a great extent, due to their resources and innovations, 
able to influence the allied policies towards the North Atlantic and other Danish 
interests during the war. This became especially evident when comparing to the level 
of influence their Norwegian neighbours, who had fought against the Germans and 
therefore had achieved more sympathy for their causes from the Allies than the 
Danes had.
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